Word in the Cultures of the East

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SPIS TREŚCI

1.

JAKUB PETRI

The Making of Relational Space in Japanese Music Project's Audio-Visual Performances

> „The music of Shamisen has something of the nebulous, of the indefinite, of the unequal […] „no lights, only flashes!"
>
> Kuki Shūzō , *Considerations on Time*

1. The matter of time

It is a fact of belief that generally speaking, music in Japan has rather been not a subject of a metaphysical reflection. It is worth to mention a statement of a famous Japanese philosopher Kuki Shūzō in that matter: "*There is not much to write about Japanese music [...] It is difficult to speak about music in an abstract manner*".

It is striking however, that Kuki, instead of keeping the silence, gives us some interesting philosophical reflections about music. In an essay entitled "Considerations on Time", the Japanese philosopher describes music as a medium connected with a notion of time. Kuki's notion of time is although far from the one which seems to be familiar to us. It's not that acquaintanced, linear time that tacts our daily routine and can be measured by mechanical devices like clock. Kuki characterizes time as fluid and countinous. In philosophical terms we can speak

about an opposition between quantitative time (our daily mode) and qualitative time (Kuki's mode). How does it relate to music?

Michael Marra, an author of an essay on Kuki Shūzō's poetry and poetics, gives us a simple answer: for Kuki, *"Like poetry, Japanese music mean a liberation from a measurable time*"[1]. Kuki himself, wrote an essay entitled "The expression of Infinite in Japanese Art", where he states, that Japanese arts in general art devoting their technique to destroy the perspective of time and space.[2] It is expected from an artist that he should switch his perspective from geometrical mode to a metaphisical one.

2. Music as a pure performance

The attitude presented by Kuki, may be a little awkward for most of us, Western listeners, for whom the context of sound is so important. Following the already mentioned by Marra, "liberation from a measureable time" postulate, leads us close to the category of a pure sound performance, far away from melodic structures and idea of compostion. Kuki idea of sound seems to correspond with his general philosophical standpoint, founded on the specific notion of a category of "emptiness". In spite of a strong interest in european phenomenology, Kuki defined his philosophy in accordance with Japanese philosophical tradition, which he perceived as deriving from hindusitic thought and Chinese pantheism. For Kuki, one of the most important of Japanese aesthetic ideals was to express the infinite in the finite form. This, however did not implicate the transcendent understanding of art.

It is important to mention, that a practice of art as a mode of transcendence which was so popular in a western paradigm, involved the special category of artifact. For a long time, the most important question for Western aestheticians was "what is the definition of work of art?". They simply needed to now how to define and produce forms. The idea of a form reffering to a transcendent "outer world" was cor-

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1 Michael Marra, *Worlds in Tension: An Essay on Kuki* Shūzō*'s Poetry and Poetics*, a foreward to Kuki Shūzō, *A Philosopher's Poetry and Poetics*, 2004, University of Hawaii Press, p.40

2 Kuki Shūzō, *The Expression of Infinite in a Japanese Art*, w: idem, *The Journal of the History of Philosophy, Monography Series*, Illinois, 1987, p.57.

responding well with dualistic, western tradition of philosophy. Contrary, as Kuki states, the Japanese notion of the infinite was founded far from the paradigm of transcendence and provided a conviction that the infinte is, in a paradoxical way, immanent to the finite world.[3] "*The infinite*" stated Kuki "*is everywhere: there where it is not, there is nothing*"[4]. That was the reason, for which for Kuki the performing of sound itsel was so important. There is a huge difference between performing a melody in aim to evoke the impression of transcendence and performing sound in understanding that there is no difference between categories of "inner" and "outer", no goal to be accomplished. Only the latter mode can be understood as following the buddhist postulate of "form without a form" during practicing the art.

What seems to be significant for such understood performing of sound is it's decontextualization. It seems to be a good frame linking ,the mentioned before *shamisen* play and some modern performative disciplines. It is noticeable, that many of disciplines and activities of a performative character, tries to define themself in isolation from their historical, traditional context. It is not a question of a pure negation of a context, rather of a limitation of it's impact on a performed discipline. It's more about just performing, less about the notion and understanding. Let us explain:

- The movement can be performed (*as a body improvisation* for example) in a separation from a dance tradition
- The city space can be performed (as an *urban explorations*) in a separation from an architecture's tradition[5]
- And also the sound can be performed (as *noise music* or *electronic music*) in a separation from a music's tradition.

It is significant, that all mentioned examples, are incorporating a momentum of a turn back to a pure medium constitutive for each discipline.

- For *body improvisation* it is a movement
- For *urban explorations* it is a space
- For *noise and electronic music* it is a sound.

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3 Kuki Shūzō, *The Expression of Infinite in a Japanese Art*, w: idem, *The Journal of the History of Philosophy, Monography Series*, Illinois, 1987, p.57

4 ibidem, p.52

5 *Urban explorations, Urbex* is a discipline of a performative character, which involves exploration of man-made structures, such as abandoned ruins or not usually seen components of the man-made environment.

3. *Noise*

A Polish *noise* music performer, Zbigniew Karkowski, who is a long time Japanese resident, states that noise literally is a music in the same sense as vodoo would be called a christianity. Karkowski describes *noise* as an activity growing beyond Western division on a music and ..noise (in a literal sense), the art and non-art. Karkowski mentions that Europeans are obsesed with theory and they usually tend to search for analogies. Europen needs to posses a knowledge about an artifact, to set it in the context of a tradition. He likes to work on art in a mode of continuance or opposition. Karkowski remarks that in Japanese paradigma this mode of work does not seem to be as popular as in Europe. The Polish composer describes this difference during his emotional interview for a *Neurobot Zine:*

> *"I like Japan for it is open for creativity. In Europe everyone talks about history and tradition. If I cut a piece of a country & western and paste it in a different context, people will start talking about the genealogy of what i did, < this was 100 years ago, and that 50 years ago, you know >. In Japan you will find more freedom, because Japanese tend to think about music in a different manner. For them it is a fetish. Once upon a time Europeans came to Africa on a christian mission and they have carried with them Jesus on a cross. They put it in a small village. Local community covered it with mud, animals blood and plants. Was it still a symbol of Christianity? No, it was a fetish. That describes the way how Japanese receive music. Noise for many of it's creators is not even a music, nor an art,"*[6]

The already mentioned, Karkowski's controversial thesis, finds it's confirmation in words of Akita Masami aka Merzbow, one of well known pioneers of noise and electronic music who claims that: *„Japanese artists use noise simply as cathartic release without the philosophical underpinnings".*[7]

It is a paradox, because such a concentration put on a sound in itself, seams to be an expression of very refined philosophy rather

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6 Karkowski Zbigniew, in: Neurobot Zine, http://neurobot.art.pl/03/wywiady/karkowski/karkowski.html ,last acces date: 21.02.2014

7 Woodward Bred, *Merzbook*, Extreme, 1999, p. 14

than lack of reflection. Akita Masami however also seems to be aware of that fact as he adds: *„Japanese noise relishes the ecstasy of sound itself and the concepts come from the sound. It is a tradition of an eastern philosophy to base theory on a real experience*"[8]

It is important to mention that "fetish" which has already been defined in a positive sense, for many XXth century researches was a plague of contemporary music. One of the prominent philosophers of that time, Theodore Adorno published an essay entitled "*On the Fetish – character in Music and the Regression of Listening*", where he followed a relationship between the regression of listening and the process of fetishization of music. One of Adorno's claims was similar to our earlier observations: contemporary music seems to loose it's original context. The "cut&paste" culture of remix and sampling which sets standards for contemporary music productions seems to have it's origins in the process described by Adorno. Today's contemporary mass music is produced and listened in isolation from the context, it's intended to be light and meaningless.

However, the lack of context is not a negative phenomenon itself, neiteher was for Adorno. What's striking, Adorno was worried mainly about quality of music and quality of musical experience. What he calls as a "rejective listening" seems to mean an isolation from the consequences of sound, not the sound itself. Thus we still listen to music, but we reject the experince attached to it. What Adorno critisizes in fact is the whole "easy listening music" industry and culture.

There is a great remark, Adorno makes on Shoeneborg at the last page of his essay: " *The terror which Shoenberg and Webern spread, today as in the past, comes not from their incomprehensibility but from the fact that they are all to correctly understood. Their music gives form to that anxiety, that terror, that catastrophic situation that others merely evade by regressing*"[9]. In fact, both, following the "easy listening" culture or sticking to traditionaly understood music,

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8 Woodward Bred, *Merzbook*, op. cit., p. 23.

9 Adorno Theodore, *On the Fetish – character in Music and the Regression of Listening*, in: R. Leppert, ed., Adorno. Essays on Music, California 2002, p. 325

founded on an idea of composition seem to be an act of regression in listening in the light if modern experimental music performances.

If so, why Schoenberg's sound is so terryfing for Adorno? It seems the reason is, Schoenberg as an example of extreme, late modern movement in music, destroys the frame of experience, performs sound breaking the philosophical illusion of dualism, objectivity and subjectivity. This is the manfestation of one of those moments in modern culture when extreme forms of Modernism cut off their roots. What remains there, is a pure experiment, that means a rejection of tradition. Jean Francois Lyotard has described this process as one of the most important antinomys of the Modernism, thus it should be perceived as one of the most important of our contemporary culture antynomies.

The "terror", the term Adorno used to name the Schoenberg's music, seems to be a very appropriate word to name an activity of breaking customs, defining an aesthetic experience. In the same sense, we can understand Akita Masami as a "music terrorist" as he postulates a sound catylizing cathartis release with no philosophy attached.[10] What's more, Kuki Shūzō also spreads the "terror" as he is demanding to destroy a frame of perception. This is the way, that should be understood his motto of "liberation from time and space" in arts. And finally, the *shamisen* is a tool of the "terror" as it does not pleasure our ear but makes us anxious rather by its unequal, mysterious sound.

4. A Relational Space

If music can mean a liberation from linear, fluid time, can the sound correlated with visual effects mean a liberation from both, time and space? Little bit on the side of the Kuki Shūzō high standard's set for an aesthetic experience, we can safely say that a proper use of sound and light in audio-visual performances can generate an experience of a relative space. Which maybe does not establishes a "*nirvana*" of musical experience, but makes the step in the right direction.

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[10] The connection between Schoenberg's experiments and modern noise and electroic music is a a whole different story to be described in a separate paper. We will not discuss this matter here for this reason.

The concept of a relative space is enrooted in Japanese culture and finds it's manifestation in a Japanese stone gardens perception for example, where not the garden frame itself is important but relations it generates are important. A world class Japanese architect Kurokawa Kishō, in his book entitled *Intercultural Architecture,* describes the relational space (*ma),* as a category essential for each Japanese. According to the author, *ma* can be described as a transitional space, which is based on dynamic oppositions. This understanding of space seems to derive from Lao Tsu concept of space that includes both "the inner" and "the outer". Lao Tsu, has defined this kind of space in an architectural context in the eleventh chapte of *Tao Te Ching*, where he wrote:

> "*Thirty spokes share the wheel's hub;*
> *It is the center hole that makes it useful.*
> *Shape clay into a vessel;*
> *It is the space within that makes it useful.*
> *Cut doors and windows for a room;*
> *It is the holes which make it useful.*
> *Therefore profit comes from what is there;*
> *Usefulness from what is not there.*"[11]

Kurokawa Kishō, gives as an example of such understood space, an *engawa*. The *engawa* is a kind of Japanese, wooden veranda, that was used to be placed in a traditionally built house. It served to organize the space between house and a garden, thanks to application of a mobile screens, called *shōji.*[12] Kurokawa Kishō sums up the spatial concequences of *engawa* in the matter of *ma* as follows: "*In a Chinese caligraphy, the space between signs is more important, than signs themself* [...] *Ma does not force opposing elements into compromise or harmony, but provides the key to their living symbiosis*".[13] This corresponds great with a way, the mentioned already before, Ching-yu Chang defines the space of a traditional, Japanese, stone

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11 Lao Tsu, Tao Te Ching, http://www.wussu.com/laotzu/index.htm last acces date: 26.02.2014

12 *Shōji* was directly a screen between the garden and the house.

13 Kurokawa Kishō, *The Philosophy of Symbiosis,* Washington, 1999, p.109

garden: "*He who sees, see the stones, he who perceives, sees a space between stones*". [14] The mode of perception seems to follow the same logic as the one proposed by Kuki Shūzō in the context of *shamisen* music. *"No lights, just flashes!"* stressed Kuki. It is however striking, that speaking of music, the Japanese philosopher uses the metaphor of a "flash" in it's spatial context.[15]

The difference between a "flash" and "light", is that a flash is sudden, short, dynamic and rapid, whereas light can be defined as a something constant and static rather. Thus, the "flash" generates the switch; it is the factor that allows things covered in darkness to be seen for a while but in another moment those things are hidden back again. And finally, we usually tend to belive that casual "light" let us see things "as they really are", whereas we can not be sure of the nature of the things revealed by a sudden flash in a darkness. What we experience then, can be described as a play of relations rather than an object of perception. However it is important to remember that in a philosophical paradigm founded on concepts coming from hindhuism and buddhism, with very specific sub cathegories, as *maya*, such categories as an "object of perception" are not objective itself. If the whole paradigm is founded on the premonition that sensual world is a delussion, it appears that an aesthetic aspect of a flash, a phenomenon, which undermines the nature of common experience, can be more appealing than aesthetic aspects of the pehnomenon of "light". Summing up, what does "flash" do, is it questions the nature of an experience itself. It interjets our senses into a state of a radical discomfort.

4. A Switch of Perception

It can be obviously expected that a combination of sound and flash can be more effective than the tactic of using them separately. One of artists who achieved some great effects in that matter is Ikeda Ryōji.

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[14] Ching – Yu – Chang, *Japońskie pojęcie przestrzeni, in: Estetyka Japońska,* ed. Krystyna Wilkoszewska, Kraków, 2001, p.206

[15] Or the „flashes" rather, because it is clear in th context of Kuki's words, that the author is trying to characterize music as a dynamic activity. The *shamisen* music effect seems also to be build on the sequence of sounds not the only one sound itself.

Ikeda is known from his audio-visual instalations from many years. One, extremely worth to mention in an already decribed context is called: "*The transfinite*". It has got it's exhibition in Armory Park – New York in 2011. It is also striking, how the Japanese performer and composer work has been described in the exhibition catalogue: "*Ikeda creates a visual and sonic environment where visitors are submerged in an extreme illustration of projected and synchronized data. His work uses scale, light, shade, volume, shadow, electronic sounds, and rhythm to flood the senses. In choreographing vast amounts of digital information, Ikeda conjures up a transformative environment in which visitors confront data on a scale that defies comprehension, experiencing the infinite.*"[16] However, "experiencing the infinity" during Ikeda's projections is rather an individual matter, we should not reject the force of the experience generated by his instalation itself.

Let me speak a little bit more about perception and space in the already mentioned matter. The process that has been described by Ching –yu Chang was defined by him as a "*transcending beyond a physical dimension*" of a garden.[17] This statement corelates with a description given by an american pragmatist philosopher Richard Shusterman, who uses a Richard Danto's term of transfiguration to define a process of switch of perception of a landscape, he witnessed by himself during meditation. The meditation described by an american philosopher took place during his stay in Japan and it was a part of his personal *Zen* practice. Shusterman used to meditate in a *zazen* postion in his master's, *roshi* Ioue Kido, *dojo* with a wonderfull view on a sea bay. It is important to mention that this was a similar practice to stone gardens meditation as both gardens and "Shusterman's bay" arrangement was designed to stimulate percaption in a certain manner. What's significant in this case, *roshi* did not allow Shusterman to feast his eyes on the magnificant sea view as he deliberately put on the beach some old, awfull, rusty oil cans. The effect was also similar to the one that could be acheived in stone garden construction as the oil cans served the function of garden stones. For some time, the American could not understand

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16 Ikeda Ryōji, *The Transfinite*, http://www.armoryonpark.org/programs_events/detail/ryoji_ikeda last acces date: 25.02.2014

17 Ching – Yu – Chang, ibidem s.206

what is the purpose of spoiling such a brilliant landscape by the oil cans as they presented rather low aestetic value in relation to the perfectly picturesque sea shore. The understanding, as stresses Shsuterman, was a kind of a sudden enlightement. After hours of meditation it just came out "naturally". In a one moment, ugly, steel oil cans appeared to Shusterman exceedingly beautiful, far even than the sea itself. As he states, he felt as he perceived them for the first time in his life.According to what an american aesthetician wrote, the perceived landscape suddenly transfigurated. The experience was followed by a strong awarness that what he perceived as objects before the moment of transfiguration, in fact were rather his own ideas of certain objects than objects. As Shuterman reports in his essay entitled "Art as Religion", the process was radical and of a metaphisical character: a sudden switch from time – spatial status to spiritual- transcendental one.

There is also another interesting moment in a mentioned essay when Shusterman tries to analyze practicies which lead him to a described experience. He makes division between active and passive modes of perception. When perceiving, especially seing, hearing (distance senses) we generally tend to be active, whereas what Shusterman was doing during his meditation was practicing a passive perception rather. There is in fact an interesting paradox in the naming here. Shusterman defines his practice of meditiation as following the "hard-looking mode": *"..i think there does exist beauty that is difficult to perceive but that is revealed through a kind of disciplined hard-looking*"[18] This apparently seems to be similar to an aesthetic attitude, defined by phenomenological aesthetics for example. Roman Ingarden also stressed the necessity of disciplined perceptive attitude, which involves the intensification of an active perception as it is focused on analyzing the object of perception and aware substantiation of the work of art. In fact, Shusterman rejects such understanding as he states "*my hard-looking could also be understood as hard nonlooking since it was not motivated by a hermeneutic for the true meaning of the object, just as Zen thinking is often described as nonthinking and the fullness of its enlighten-*

[18] Shusterman Richard, *Art and Religion*, http://www.academia.edu/3125517/_Art_and_Religion_ , p.12, last acces date: 26.02.2014

ment as an emptiness."[19] The described mode of perception could be described as a passive perception mode in this sense, that what we are talking here about is seeing without "looking" and hearing sounds without "listening" to them.

Such attitue seems to be a back side of what Zbigniew Karkowski said. If we create a sound and vision as a pure sound and pure vision, they should be perceived in an appropriate manner. Thus, noise and extreme electronic music do not make sense, however they help set free our senses.

SUMMARY:

Masami Akita, the godfather of Japanese noise music scene once stated that "*Japanese artists use Noise simply as cathartic release without the philosophical underpinnings*". Paradoxically, one of the Japan's greatest philosophers Shuzo Kuki, also used to emphasize a cathartic role of music, treating it as a way of liberating from measurable time and space. In an essay entitled *The Expression of Infinite in Japanese Art*, Kuki highlights his conviction that Japanese arts in general, are guided by the desire of breaking the perspective of time ad space.

The paper follows those suggestions in quest to characterize a phenomena of making a specific type of space experience during some modern, Japanese electronic music project's, audio visual performances.

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[19] Shusterman Richard, *Art and Religion*, http://www.academia.edu/3125517/_Art_and_Religion_ , p.14, last acces date: 26.02.2014

2.

HERMINA CIELAS

Sound, image and meaning. Many aspects of Sanskrit figurative poetry

Although concrete poetry – being very strict in its structure and bringing to mind such artistic movements like the Futurism or Dadaism and theoretical paradigms in linguistics like the Structuralism – seems to be the invention of modernity, it has a long-lasting tradition in the literatures of the world. The figurative poetry can be found in Europe (*inter alia* in ancient Greek, Latin, also in Polish baroque poetry) or for example in the Hebrew literary tradition where it is called microcalligraphy or micrography. The figurative system occurring in Sanskrit poetry – *citrakāvya* (sansk. *citra* – image, *kāvya* – poem, poetry) is very interesting and complex. 'Figurative poetry' is only one of the many meanings of the name of this literary tradition. It can be translated also as 'pictorial poetry', 'visual poetry' or 'entertaining poetry' since *citra* means not only an image but also something conspicuous, manifold, causing surprise or simply a riddle.[1] The term describes literary forms put together because of their basis in 'word play', which, as Edwin Gerow points

[1] See Monier Monier – Williams (ed.), *Sanskrit- English Dictionary*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2005, p. 396., Edwin Gerow, *A Glossary of Indian Figures of Speech*, Paris: Morton, 1971, p.175.

out, *refers to the composition of various puzzles and games, riddles and conundrums and the like* (Gerow 1971, p. 175.). Thus, in this tradition one can find very simple figurative formations (such as for example various kinds of alliteration), more complex figures (like palindromes or poetical equivalents of magic square in which the same text can be read in four directions: from left to right, from right to left, from top to bottom and in diverse order) and very complex forms called *bandha* (sansk. bond, shape, delimitation), which are the most similar to figurative poems known from European literatures. Edwin Gerow defines them as *verses which can be arranged, in terms of certain significant repeated syllables, in the visual form of natural objects, as swords, wheels, axes, etc.* (Gerow 1971, p. 186.). Generally, it is the term describing various compositional patterns and pictorial designs in poetry.

The main difference between *citrakāvya* and the other traditions of this kind is the fact that in the first one the pictorial side of the poem is not indicated directly as for example in the case of the European concepts of *carmen figuratum* and *technopaegnia*. To notice it a reader needs particular knowledge and has to rewrite the poem or the stanza according to the rules known to him and given by normative texts. Moreover, in European traditions the form of a poem was not always linked to its sense. There were of course shapes and patterns which conveyed particular meaning (like for example the cross pattern very popular in Latin Christian literature) but in many cases form was placed in the poem at random. Here, Darmstadt school of concrete poetry which occurred in literature in the late 50's and derived the sense of pictorial form from the meaning of the verbal form of the poem, is one of exceptions (Higgins 1989, p. 419.).

In the field of Sanskrit literature, theoreticians (such as Daṇḍin <ca. 6th-7th century>, Ānandavardhana <ca. 9th century> or Mammaṭa <11th century>) stated that *citrakāvya*'s form is much more important than the meaning carried by the work and hence, it does not deserve to be called poetry at all. What is interesting here is the fact that European traditions of figurative poetry had to face the same view. As Dick Higgins notices *the feeling was that the pattern poem was intermedial, that it lay conceptually between the literary and visual art media, and that it was therefore unable to stand on its own and*

was thus inherently mediocore (Higgins 1989, p. 401.). Despite of this concrete poetry became an important element of popular culture, it was a kind of literary rebellion. The same happened with Sanskrit figurative tradition, although only few of literary theorists, especially in the later period, tried to defend this kind of poetry. One of supporters of figurativeness was 16th century theoretician, Appaya Dīkṣita, mostly known as an expositor and practitioner of *advaita vedānta* school of philosophy. One of his works, *Citramīmāṁsā* (*The investigation into* citra), is entirely devoted to *citrakāvya*. However, Appaya Dīkṣita's view was not very popular. According to the *dhvani* school, figurative poetry has the lowest, so-called *adhama* status, because it is not the real poetry – it is just an image – *citra*. This view has influenced depreciating perception of *citrakāvya*. Some of the poets were even avoiding elements of figurativeness in their works. One of them was Sūryadāsa who lived in the 16th century. He is credited with the invention of bidirectional poetry (*vilomakāvya*).[2] Although this literary tradition is also a kind of poetical riddle based on playing with form, he for example avoided in his works monosyllabic words, which often occur in Sanskrit figurative poetry (Minkowski 2004, p. 328.). Nevertheless, theoreticians could not ignore the popularity of *citrakāvya* – it is flamboyant and extravagant, but on the other hand, creating figurative work is also a great opportunity for poets to show one's virtuosity and erudition. This kind of poetry was not then really appreciated, but had to be accepted by theoreticians.

The most important elements constituting Sanskrit figurative poetry (word, meaning and image) occur in the title of this paper. This triad is very similar to the triad of universals known from the European philosophy where a word conveys a meaning which in turn depicts an object. Two of those elements – a word and a meaning – can be found among components of *citrakāvya*. Instead of an object there is an image. This is due to the fact that in Sanskrit figurative poetry we do not refer directly to the object itself, but to

[2] The term *viloma-kāvya* refers to the poem in which all of the verses can be read both in the ordinary direction (from left to right), and also in the reversed order – from right to left (*vilomena* means literary *against the hair or grain*).

its picture – to an image. But not only the form creates a complete figurative poem. *Citrakāvya* is a fusion between a word (śabda), a meaning (*artha*), an image (*citra*) and other elements constituting a poem such as the rhythm or the meter. To read it fully one has to be aware of all of the elements included. Otherwise, the final aesthetic experience will not be complete.

Then we have śabda – a word, sound. Obviously, words used by a poet in the process of creation of the poem are not random, but in the case of *citrakāvya* there are more reasons for their careful selection than in the case of any other kind of poetry. First of all, the sonic layer of the text is influenced by the rules concerning creation of valuable poetry from the perspective of favorable and unfavorable sounds depicted in normative texts.[3] Another thing is the fact that the metrical design of the stanza, also recommended by normative texts, requires arrangement of particular syllables, i.e. the usage of particular words. In the case of *citrakāvya*, rules concerning the meter which should be applied in the stanza containing particular figurative formations are defined by *Agnipurāṇa*.[4] This encyclopedic work, one of the main 18 *purāṇic* texts, defines specific meter (śārdūlavikrīḍita) for the second type of *cakrabandha* (wheel pattern) and *anuṣṭubh* meter for all the other formations different than *gomūtrikā* (cow's urine track pattern) which is allowed to be composed in any kind of meter.[5]

The structure of words is very important element of all of figurative poetries, but in Sanskrit tradition matters not only the length or the sound of words but also their individual syllables what is crucial from the point of view of prosody. In the process of creation

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3 One of the theoreticians who mentioned favorable and unfavorable sounds in poetry was Bhāmaha (ca. 7th century). In the first chapter of his work *Kāvyālaṅkāra* he refers to so-called *śrutiduṣṭa* (offensive to the ear) and śruti*kaṣṭa* (painful to the ear). By the first one he means particular words, which mostly have vulgar and sexual connotations. In the case of śrutikaṣṭa Bhāmaha refers to harsh and unpleasant sounds which constitute words and also to objectionable compounds which should not be used in the perfect poetical work. (*Kāvyālaṅkāra* 1.47–59.)

4 Because *Agnipurāṇa* is a compilation, it is hard to say to which age it belongs. Probably it was compiled ca. 8th–9th century AD (Cielas 2013, p. 77).

5 AP VII.57: *dvitīyam cakraśārdūlavikrīḍitakasampadam| gomūtrikā sarvavṛttair anye bandhāstvanuṣṭubhā||*

a poet cannot place particular syllables in a random place according to one's own poetical imagination. Normative rules concerning *citrakāvya* define their order in detail. Each formation is characterized by the frequency of alliteration (*anuprāsa*) in the certain places of the stanza and further, systematized rules for individual forms.

Another aspect connected to the śabda is the usage of words which can be read according to different senses and linguistic registers in case of stanzas containing śleṣa – poetic figure consisting either of a combination of contrasted ideas or of words having two or more meanings (it is a kind of paronomasia).[6] By its nature, figurative poetry is itself a kind of śleṣa – by reading a poem on different levels (sonic, visual, verbal etc.) a recipient of a text can receive different meanings. By creating figurative stanza containing additional poetic figures of sense, the author may multiply the overall meaning of a stanza. Special kind of śleṣa, known as *bhāṣā*śleṣa (*bhāṣā* – speech, language) leads us to the second important element of poetry, to the meaning – *artha*. The meaning resulting from the lexical layer of the stanza taking into account manifold linguistic registers (Sanskrit, Prakrit etc.) can be dual or even plural. On the other hand, even using the only one, Sanskrit register, because of occurrence of words having double sense the overall meaning of a stanza can be plural.

However, the sense arising from the lexical layer of the text is not the only one in the case of *citrakāvya*. One has to take into account also the meaning of the visual layer.

Citra, the visual layer of the figurative poetry, complements the overall meaning of the poem because symbols and graphic signs used to create *bandha* forms – already mentioned pictorial stanzas – denote their own, in many cases manifold sense. Lexical layer of the text helps to choose right denotation of the symbol (for

6 As Edwin Gerow points out 'Śleṣa cannot be ultimately defined in relation to the content of the figure (that is, the idea it expresses), since, as has been noted, śleṣa can be associated with almost any other figure – not merely in the sense of adjunction of two figures, but as an essential element in the expression of the other figure's idea.' (Gerow 1971, p. 292). Madan Mohan Agrawal adds that 'Śleṣa can never have independent existence. Because the Śleṣa is never alone; its province is always invanded by other Alaṅkāras. If we give prominence to other Alaṅkāras and throw Śleṣa into background, Śleṣa will be entirely lost. So prominence is always to be given to Śleṣa which alone produces an image of other Alaṅkāras.' (Agrawal 1975, p. 98.).

example from secular or religious point of view). Moreover, pictorial stanzas occur in the text in particular points. As Siegfried Lienhard has already noticed, poets were using elements of figurative poetry to emphasize certain content. According to the scholar, the great number of figurative stanzas, especially *bandha* forms, is to be seen in works depicting warfare. As Lienhard points out:

> (…) the repetitive use of certain vowels and consonant-classes as well as of words or whole passages proved an excellent means of imitating the loud tumult of battle, the shout of the warriors, the clash of weapons and, last but not least, the sound of drums and other musical instruments, while on the other hand, all the *bandha* forms we have mentioned represent poetical correspondence to certain army arrays worked out and made use in ancient Indian warcraft (Lienhard 2007, p. 180).

The readers of the poem, have to demonstrate their cleverness and erudition in order to read figurative work. They have to 'struggle' for the disclosure of all of the elements hidden in a stanza by a poet, just like the characters of the work have to compete in a battle, and the author had to put an effort to create the poem. Not without the reason, already mentioned *Agnipurāṇa* places *bandha* forms among so-called *duṣkara – those which are hard to create, pointing to the poet's virtuosity and despite of being devoid of taste – are the feast for the wise*.[7]

The relation between the form and the meaning of stanzas containing elements of figurativeness shows that the graphic side is not chosen at random, but is a part of the complex system of well-designed poem. The more skillful is the poet, the correlation between śabda, *artha* and *citra* is stronger. The elements of Sanskrit figurative poetry are designed to complement each other. The relation between those components can be roughly presented as follows:

– Creating a pictorial stanza requires the usage of particular syllables matching the pattern.

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7 AP VII.27: *duḥkhena kṛtamaty arthaṁ kavisāmarthyasūcakam | duṣkaraṃ nīrasatvāpi vidagdhānāṃ mahotsavaḥ* || All translations from Sanskrit are my own unless otherwise stated.

– Particular syllables create sonic layer of a text.
– A word and an image convey a meaning.
– The meanings of a lexical and visual layers help to understand each other.

Understanding the relation between all of the components constituting Sanskrit figurative poetry and linking the meanings arising from many levels of the poem result in obtaining a comprehensive picture of the figurative work which is necessary to read it fully. Most of the examples of *citrakāvya* are single stanzas occurring in non-figurative poems or the groups of figurative forms creating the whole passage or a chapter of the work. A lot of elements of visual poetry can be found for example in particular *sarga*s of three out of six *mahākāvya*s[8], considered to be the best representatives of the genre: 19th canto of Māgha's *Śiśupālavadha*[9], 15th canto of Bhāravi's *Kirātārjunīya* (ca. 6th century) and 10th canto of Bhaṭṭi's *Rāvaṇavadha* (in this case those are mostly various kinds of *yamaka* figure) (ca. 7th century). In chapters of Śiśupālavadha and *Kirātārjunīya* poets piled up figure upon figure with small, one or two stanzas intervals between figurative stanzas, which let the reader to focus on cognitive processing of the text without being challenged to recreate visual form hidden in stanzas by the poet and forge new connections. Non-figurative parts of the text which describe battle scene are for their recipients the equivalent of the break, rest during the wartime depicted in the poem. Only one of above mentioned *mahākāvya*s (*Rāvaṇavadha*) doesn't match the pattern – here the 10th canto doesn't depict warfare and we find no break between occurring *yamaka*s.

Citrakāvya is without any doubts very rich tradition containing manifold forms, from palindromes and magic squares to elaborated, implying pictorial signs and symbols *bandha*s, like the lotus flower,

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8 *Mahākāvya* (sansk. a great or classical poem) also known as *sargabandha* (literary *a composition divided into sections or chapters* is a genre of classical Sanskrit poetry characterized *inter alia* by ornate and elaborate descriptions of scenery, love, battles and so on. In *mahākāvya*s more emphasis was laid on description than on narration.

9 According to Jacobi Māgha lived ca. 6th century (Pathak 1902, p. 303.), Kielhorn mentions second half of 7th century (Kielhorn 1908, p. 499.). Anna Trynkowska follows Warder's view that Māgha lived in 7th century (Trynkowska 2004, p. 13.).

drum or sword patterns. It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe or even to name all of them, but to present in short the theory of Sanskrit figurative poetry it is necessary to provide at least one example which will complement given information and show in practice all the bounds between components of *citrakāvya.*

Presented example is not in any way more extraordinary than any other *citra* form. On the other hand, it was not also chosen at random. The stanza is a passage from already mentioned Māgha's Śiśupālavadha, of which 19th canto describes warfare. The figurative form which can be found in the following example is *murajabandha* – drum pattern. Because of involving the images of well-known objects along with their symbolism, *bandha* forms are the most suitable for designating all the interferences between elements constituting *citrakāvya.*

The stanza composed by Māgha and quoted by Bhoja in his treatise *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa* (SKBh 2.320) as an example of *murajabandha* is as follows:

> *sā senā gamanārambhe rasenāsīd anāratā* |
> *tāranādajanā mattadhīranāgam anāmayā* || (ŚV 19.29.)
>
> This army was vigorous and unstopped. As it moved earnestly, Warriors made shrill sounds, [just in the manner of] brave elephants in rut.

Without the knowledge of the rules governing the formation of such forms it is hard to imagine that in those two verses the drum pattern is hidden. Required rules of creation of this form are described *inter alia* by *Agnipurāṇa* (AP 7.54–56). This description which is probably later than Māgha's poem but earlier than instructions given by Bhoja, Hemacandra (11th-12th century) and Mallinātha (ca. 14th-15th century), is very dense and enigmatic. Information of this kind can be found also in Bhoja's *Sarasvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa*, and Mallinātha's *Sarvaṅkasā* – the most well-known commentary on Śiśupālavadha.

Hemacandra's *Alaṅkāracūḍāmaṇi* (AC 5.4.469) description of *murajabandha,* being in prose, is much clearer than instructions given by *Agnipurāṇa*, Bhoja or Mallinātha. As Hemacandra says:

> Write the four quarters of the stanza on four lines. From the first, second, third, and fourth quarters take respectively the first, second, third, and fourth syllables. From the fourth, third, second, and first quarters take respectively the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight syllables. This reconstructs the first quarter. From the fourth, third, second, and first quarters take the first, second, third and fourth syllables. From the first, second, third, and fourth quarters take the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eight syllables. From the second quarter take the first syllable; form the first quarter take the second and third; from the second and third quarters take the two fourth syllables; from the fourth quarter the second and third; from the third quarter take the first. This reconstructs the second quarter. From the second quarter take the eighth syllable; from the first quarter take the seventh and sixth; from the second and third quarters take the fifth syllable; from the fourth quarter take the sixth and seventh; from the third quarter take the eighth. (Trans. Daniel H.H. Ingalls)[10]

Māgha's *murajabandha* is in line with those rules. The stanza can be read according to two patterns – one is regular reading from left to right, *pāda*[11] after *pāda*, and the second one by joining with a line subsequent syllables according to the rules given by normative texts (like in the popular riddle for children where joining subsequent numbers creates an image) results in the pictorial representation of a drum, where the lines reflect *muraja*'s strings which keep its surfaces taut. The last syllable of the first half and the first of the second are the same (underlined *tā* on the schemes below), the syllables which create the first and the fourth line 'fall' in one half of the quarter in regular (down) and in the other in reversed order (up) (letters in bold).

The figurative formation of the first *pāda* is as follows:

sā	se	nā	ga	ma	nā	ra	**mbhe**
ra	**se**	nā	sī	da	nā	**ra**	<u>tā</u>
<u>tā</u>	ra	**nā**	da	ja	**nā**	ma	tta
dhī	ra	nā	**ga**	**ma**	nā	ma	yā

[10] This highly technical description of the way of creating drum-patterned stanza as proposed by Hemacandra has been recalled by Daniel H.H. Ingalls in his article Ānandavardhana›s *Devīśataka* (Ingalls 1989, p. 569.).

[11] Term *pāda* , just like *pada*, means literally foot, but also a portion of a verse – in this context it is a quarter of a stanza.

The figurative formation of the fourth *pāda* takes place according to the following scheme:

sā	se	nā	**ga**	**ma**	nā	ra	mbhe
ra	se	**nā**	sī	da	**nā**	ra	tā
tā	**ra**	nā	da	ja	nā	**ma**	tta
dhī	ra	nā	ga	ma	nā	ma	**yā**

The figurative formations of the second and third quarters proceed on square plans. The formation of the second *pāda* starts from the ninth syllable (letters in bold) and the formation of the third *pāda* continues from the sixteenth (underlined letters):

sā	**se**	**nā**	ga	ma	nā	ra	mbhe
ra	se	nā	**sī**	da	nā	ra	tā
tā	ra	nā	**da**	ja	nā	ma	tta
dhī	**ra**	**nā**	ga	ma	nā	ma	yā

In every *murajabandha* also an occurrence of alliteration is very visible. Syllable *nā* occurs in this stanza eight times, always as a third and sixth syllable of a *pāda*. This is due to the model of this specific *bandha* formation which requires repetition of one syllable in those positions.

Finally, by overlapping figurative schemes of formation of all of the quarters, one gets a complete picture of *muraja*'s strings:



The stanza has been composed in *anuṣṭubh* meter. In this field, Māgha's work is in line with the instructions given by *Agnipurāṇa*.

The above example is a model of *murajabandha* not only because of its form. The correlation between śabda, *artha* and *citra* in Māgha's stanza is very clever and elaborated. As has been said before, it occurs in a particular narration point and describes the army ready to fight. The warriors are compared to proud and brave elephants in rut and they *make shrill sounds*. Was it the poetical equivalent of the sound of *muraja*? Drums and other musical instruments were used in the Indian warfare for example to initiate the battle or to declare the victory. *Muraja* itself is not clearly described in normative literature. According to Monier-Williams' dictionary term 'muraja' indicates either a drum, or a tambourine (Monier-Williams 2007, p. 823.) but since the form of *bandha* resembles the lacing of a drum it is clear that this type of figure is not a tambourine. The sound of the instrument whose image is used here is refined, deep and low thanks to horizontal and vertical straps which keep its surfaces taut. By using *murajabandha* in this particular narration point, the author of the work enriches the meaning of a stanza. The form supplements the sense carried by the words, helps to imagine battlefield, where the army eager to fight strikes the drums, *moves earnestly, is unstopped*. The rhythm of the stanza brings to the mind the movement of warriors, their measured steps.

Since the Sanskrit figurative poetry consists of a great multitude of forms, the above example is only one possible implementation of this literary art in practice.[12] Even here, the complexity of *citrakāvya* is obvious. Despite of the reluctance of theoreticians to this kind of poetry, the tradition developed and evolved having survived to our times in various forms, for example South Indian art of *avadhāna* – 'attention' – where during special meetings the performers compete to solve literary puzzles and rebuses, including *bandha*s.[13] Poets who decided to create figurative poems or use elements of *citrakāvya* in their works sought to achieve something new, they tried to show their skillfulness and creativity in order to amaze, to enrich

[12] For more examples of figurative stanzas in Sanskrit literature see Lienhard 1996, 2007, Jha 1975, Cielas 2013.

[13] More about the many kinds of literary games and tradition of *avadhāna*: Sternbach 1975 and Sudyka, Galewicz 2012.

age-old literary tradition. The best among them were able to link masterfully three most important elements constituting Sanskrit figurative poetry – śabda, *artha* and *citra*. They were playing with the form, the meaning and symbols perpetuated in culture in order to engage a reader of the work. They were able to make him the part of an action by forcing him to face the form, reveal it and discover multiple senses. Reading figurative poems is not an easy task, since the act of reading itself is by necessity selective. Human's mind is not able to decode simultaneously sonic, verbal and pictorial layer of a text.[14] In the case of Sanskrit figurative poetry this visual side is additionally hidden in a stanza. *Citrakāvya* requires, both from the author and from the reader or listener of a text, particular erudition. It poses a challenge. Only few poets were able to create a figurative text in such a way that it becomes *the feast for the wise* involving all of domains of language and implementing all the relations between components of *citrakāvya*. All this and the unique nature of Sanskrit figurative poetry against the background of similar phenomena in the literatures of the world determines the exceptional character of it.

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14 More information about the physiology of reading can be found in Sabine Gross' article on reading pattern poems: Gross 1997.

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3.

WOJCIECH KOSIOR

The Apotropaic Potential of the Name "Shadday" in the Hebrew Bible and the early Rabbinic Literature

The Rabbinic Judaism recognizes the special value of the divine names: since the early midrashes, through the medieval exegesis up till the modern era, these appellations have been believed to possess extraordinary performative potential. For instance in BT Berakhot 55a it is said of Betzalel,[1] the divinely inspired architect of the Tent of Meeting (Exodus 31:1–6) that he was in possession of the knowledge how to permute the letters "by means of which the heavens and the earth have been created".[2] Rashi, the medieval French

[1] Worth noting is the very meaning of the name of the artisan itself. It could be translated as "in the shade of El" what reverberates with the phrase *betzelem elohim* in Genesis 1:27. In other words, Betzalel both due to his name and the nature of his profession could be considered to mimic the divine creation. For a throughout study of the idea of *tzelem* in the HB as well as in the surrounding ancient Near Eastern cultures see: S.L. Herring, *Divine Substitution. Humanity as the Manifestation of Deity in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East*, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2013.

[2] All the sources cited in the present study come in author's own translation. The square brackets indicate the words introduced in translation, the curly brackets – the words translated freely, whereas the soft brackets – additional remarks. The priority of the translations was to maintain the inherent ambiguity of the source text.

commentator adds that Betzalel knew the techniques described in the mysterious *Sefer Yetzirah*, "The Book of Formation" believed to convey the instructions on how to make things with words thus mimicking the creative powers of the deity and his name. Similar instances appear in two other often cited stories. The first one in BT Hagigah 14b tells of the four rabbis, who have entered Pardes, the heavenly orchard[3] while the second in BT Sanhedrin 65b recounts how Rabba created an artificial human and sent him to his colleague, rabbi Zera.[4] The supernatural abilities of the *hazalim* witnessed by these two instances find their explanation in the commentary of Rashi, who claims that the four rabbis "have ascended the firmament by means of the Name" whereas Rabba created the artificial human "by means of *Sefer Yetzirah* which {explained} how to permute the letters of the Name".

Among such literary instances there is a group witnessing to the apotropaic purpose of the divine appellations. One such example comes in Bamidbar Rabbah 12:3 which recounts the story of Moses' ascent to the Mount Sinai during which he was assaulted by a band of hostile angels wishing to prevent him from acquiring the Torah. According to the midrash, the patriarch defended himself by singing the words of Psalm 91, the so called "psalm of plagues". The first two verses are abundant in the divine names: "The one sitting in the cover of Elyon, in the shadow of Shadday will dwell, says to Yahveh: my refuge and my fortress, my Elohim, I will trust in him." Moses acknowledged the protective strength of the biblical poem concluding that "by means of his name I shall repel the {demons} and the angels of destruction". The further interpretation of Psalm 91 develops the idea of the power of the divine name:

Under his wing you shall take refuge – [for] the one who comes to take refuge under the wing[5] of the Holy, blessed be he, he shall be *a shield and a buckler* of truth. What is the meaning of *a shield*

3 Cf. the variant in JT Hagigah 2:1.

4 Aram. *Rabba' bara' gavra'* consists of paronomasia and permutations. Moreover, the very name of the other rabbi evokes the associations with the word *zera'* meaning "seed" or metonymically – "offspring".

5 The image of a deity covering his followers with the wings appears in other biblical passages as well, e.g. in Exodus 19:4; Deuteronomy 32:11; Psalms 17:8; 36:7; 57:1; 61:4; Malachi 4:2. The sources suggested by: R. Good, *El Shadday: Its*

and a buckler? Rabbi Shime'on ben Laqish said: the Holy, blessed be he, said: a weapon I {forge} for everyone who deals with the truth of the Torah [and] the truth of the Torah is the weapon for {those who possess it}.[6] {He also said}: a weapon has given the Holy, blessed be he, to Israel on Sinai, and on it the {explained name} was written.

Protective seal

One could then ask, precisely which of the appellatives is endowed with such an enormous power. After all, the Jewish tradition knows of many names initially belonging to various deities of the ancient Near East and with time attributed to one god of Israel, who is sometimes addressed as, *nomen-omen*, *ha-Shem* ("the name").[7] It seems that at least in case of the protective function it is "Shadday" which is believed to be of particular significance. The name often appears on the devices such as amulets or dedicatory plaques[8] but more importantly it is associated with the traditional Jewish apotropaic customs: male circumcision, mezuzah and tefillin.[9] The

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Meaning and Implications, "Affirmation and Critique. A Journal of Christian Thought", vol. XII 2/2007, p. 69.

6 The Hebrew words *Torah* and *be-'evrato* ("under his wing") are gematrically identical and equal 611. This may be the reason behind the Rabbinic interpretation of the verse.

7 K. Reichert, M. Cohen, *What is Translating? The Endless Task as Reflected in Examples from the Bible*, "Jewish Studies Quarterly", Vol. 14, No. 2, Translating Texts, Translating Cultures, 2007, p. 124. The list of the biblical divine names is even longer when augmented with the appellatives like *ha-qadosh barukh hu'*, *rabeynu shel ha-'olam* or *'eyn sof*, which come from the later periods.

8 S. Sabar, *Torah and Magic: The Torah Scroll and Its Appurtenances as Magical Objects in Traditional Jewish Culture*, "European Journal of Jewish Studies" Vol. 3, Number 1 (2009), pp. 154–156. M. Schniedewind, *Calling God Names: An Inner-Biblical Approach to the Tetragrammaton*, in: *Scriptural Exegesis. The Shapes of Culture and the Religious Imagination. Essays in Honour of Michael Fishbane*, D.A. Green, L.S. Lieber (eds.), Oxford University Press 2009, p. 76. J. Trachtenberg, *Jewish Magic and Superstition. A Study in Folk Religion*, New York 1939, p. 148. E.R. Wolfson, *Circumcision and the Divine Name: A Study in the Transmission of Esoteric Doctrine*, "The Jewish Quarterly Review", New Series, Vol. 78, No. 1/2, 1987, p. 81.

9 Additional arguments for the protective purpose of the said customs are furnished by: W. Kosior, *Brit milah. Some Remarks on the Apotropaic Meaning*

connections of the first one with the name Shadday are twofold. According to the biblical chronology it is El Shadday who ordains the custom of circumcision in Genesis 17:1 and, as is apparent in midrash Tanhuma Tzav 14[10] the *brit milah* itself is the inscription of the part of the name on the body:

> The Holy, blessed be he, has put his name on Israel so they would enter the garden of Eden. And what is the name and the seal that he had put on them? It is "Shadday". [The letter] *shin* he put in the nose, *dalet* – on the hand, whereas *yod* on the {circumcised} [membrum].[11]

The presence of all the three letters of the divine name is crucial, also in the eschatological plane. Soon after, in the same passage we find an additional explanation:

> Accordingly, {when} Israel goes to *{his eternal home}* (Ecclesiastes 12:5), there is an angel {appointed} in the garden of Eden who picks up every son of Israel which is circumcised and brings him {there}. And those who are not circumcised? Although there are two letters of the name "Shadday" present on them, {namely} *shin* from the nose and *dalet* from the hand, the *yod* (…) is {missing}. Therefore it hints at a demon (Heb. *shed*),[12] which brings him down to Gehenna.

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of Circumcision in Agadic Midrashes (*Brit mila. Uwagi o apotropaicznym znaczeniu obrzezaniu w midraszach agadycznych*), "Polish Journal of the Arts and Culture" 4 (1/2013), pp. 103–118; Idem, *"It Will Not Let the Destroying [One] Enter". The Mezuzah as an Apotropaic Device according to Biblical and Rabbinic Sources*, "Polish Journal of Arts and Culture", 9 (1) 2014, pp. 127–144; Idem, *"The Name of Yahveh is Called Upon You". Deuteronomy 28:10 and the Apotropaic Qualities of Tefillin in the Early Rabbinic Literature*, "Studia Religiologica" 48 (2/2015), pp. 143–154.

10 Cf. a parallel passages in Tazri'a 5 and Shemini 5. See also: E.R. Wolffson, op. cit., p. 77.

11 *Yod* is the last letter of *Shadday* and the first letter of *Yahveh*. E.R. Wolffson, op. cit., p. 86.

12 See the biblical instances of *shedim* in Deuteronomy 32:17 and Psalm 106:37 usually interpreted as referring to the Babylonian *shedu*. G.J. Riley, *Demon*, in: *Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible*, K. van der Toorn, B. Becking, P.W. van der Hoorst (eds.), Leiden-Boston-Koeln, Brill, 1999, [DDD], pp. 237–238.

Analogous is the case with mezuzah – a piece of parchment with two passages from the Book of Deuteronomy, curled up in a small encasement and affixed to a doorframe. At least since the Geonic times, the name "Shadday" is often written on the back of the parchment containing the *shema'* and sometimes also on the casing itself. The name is traditionally interpreted as being an acronym of *shomer daltot Yisra'el* ("the guardian of the doors of Israel") or *shomer dirot Yisra'el* ("the guardian of the dwellings of Israel").[13] The name "Shadday" can also be found on tefillin – a set of two black leather boxes strapped to head and arm during the prayers. The binding of particular knots of tefillin is supposed to resemble the shape of the letters: the leather strap of the *tefillah shel rosh* is knotted at the back of the head thus forming the letter *dalet* whereas the one that is passed through the *tefillah shel yad* forms a *yod*-shaped knot. In addition to this, the box itself is inscribed with the letter *shin* on two of its sides. All of the above presented devices appear in several places in the Rabbinic literature being listed and interpreted explicitly as bearing the protective function. One such example comes in BT Menahot 43b:

> Our Rabbis taught: beloved are Israelites, for the Holy, blessed be he, surrounded them with *mitzvot*: tefillin on their heads, tefillin on their arms, tzitzit on their cloth, and mezuzah {on} their doors. And about these David said: *seven [times] a day I praise you, over the decrees of your righteousness* (Psalm 119:164). When David {used to enter} the bath house and see himself standing naked, {he would say}: woe is me that I stand naked without [the sign of any] *mitzvah*. And when he would remember the circumcision in his flesh, he would {calm down}. (…) Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya'aqov said: everyone who has tefillin on his head, tefillin on his arm, tzitzit on his cloth and mezuzah on his doors – is in strength so as he will not sin, as has been said: *a triple yarn will not be broken quickly* (Ecclesiastes 4:12b). [It also] says: *the angel of Yahveh encamps around those who fear him and delivers them* (Psalms 34:8).

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[13] The notarikon itself has its source most probably in Zohar Va'ethanan where it explains the meaning of the word Shadday and connects it to mezuzah. It appears later in Tur Yoreh De'ah 288. H. Aviezer, *Ha-Mezuzah – beyn Mitzvah le-Qamiya'*, "Ma'aliyot" 19/1997, p. 229. Worth mentioning is also Mekhilta de-rabbi Ishmael 12 which attributes the power of mezuzah to the divine names contained therein.

The association between these customs and the name "Shadday" is relatively late and no actual explanation is given for the choice of this particular appellation. The question then is whether "Shadday" possesses any distinctive linguistic or semantic qualities which would make it attractive for the apotropaic purposes. In this regard several aspects need to be considered: the position of "Shadday" in relation to the tetragram, its etymology and the strong ambivalence witnessed by the linguistic puns in both the Hebrew Bible [HB] and the Rabbinic Literature.

Nickname

The name occurs almost 50 times in the HB, both in its short and elaborate form, "El Shadday". The latter, although it appears 7 times only,[14] poses more hermeneutical challenges, because it can convey various types of semantic relations between the two: El of a place known as Shadday,[15] El possessing the quality of *shadday* or El who is known as Shadday – exactly as is the case with the names like "'El 'Olam", "'El 'Elyon" or "'El Bet'el".[16] However, since the second element of the phrase appears also individually, "'El Shadday" may be considered an example of the juxtaposition of two distinct divine names and, by extension, merging the traditions of two separate deities, analogously to the appellation "Yahveh 'Elohim".[17] Frequency-wise

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14 Genesis 17:1; 28:3; 35:11; 43:14; 48:3; Exodus 6:3, Ezekiel 10:5.

15 Some try to draw the connection with the Bronze Age Amorite city Tel eth-Tadyen in northern Syria. L.R. Bailey, *Israelite 'Ēl Šadday and Amorite Bêl Šadê*, "Journal of Biblical Literature", Vol. 87, No. 4, 1968, pp. 434–438.

16 W.F. Albright, op. cit., p. 180. D. Biale, op. cit., p. 244. M. Haran, *Qavim le-Te'ur 'Emunatam shel ha-'Avot: 'Emunat Shivtey ha-'Ivrim*, in: *'Oz le-David: Qovetz Mehqarim be-Tanakh, Mugash le-David Ben-Gurion bi-Mel'ot lo Shiv'im ve-Sheva' Shanim*, Y. Kaufmann (ed.), Qriy'at Sefer Yerushalaym 1975, [online], http://lib.cet.ac.il/Pages/item.asp?item=10629, [29.I 2014]. R. Laird Harris, G.L. Archer, B.K. Waltke (eds.), *Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament*, vols. 1 & 2, Chicago Moody Press 1980 [TWOT], 2333.

17 G. Levy, op. cit., pp. 111–112. W.M. Schniedewind, op. cit., p. 78. An interesting approach to the problem of the divine names has emerged at the meeting point of Biblical Studies and cognitive sciences. According to some scholars, the exceptional power of names lies in the fact that they activate the bio-semantic network of associations in a way which is incomparable to the effects

"Shadday" occupies the third place, right after "Yahveh" (over 6800 instances) and "Elohim" (over 2600 instances), what makes it the most popular from among the less rife divine appellations. In addition to this, the power of "Shadday" seems to be at least partially derived from the "default" name of the god of Israel, "Yahveh", all the more so as these appellations are tightly connected by the HB. Although there is only one instance which explicitly juxtaposes these two deities, it is also the sole verse which directly qualifies "Shadday" as the nickname of Yahveh. The passage from Exodus 6:3 reads:

> I have appeared to Abraham, Isaac and Jacob {as} El Shadday, yet my name – Yahveh – I have not revealed to them.[18]

When approached from the later Rabbinic perspective this affinity bears additional significance. The rabbis have obviously noted the broad variety of the divine names[19] and put special restrictions

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of regular nouns. This is so due to the fact that the signals used for identifying particular individuals have a longer phylogenetic history than language in general. In result, names are the way to organize attention and as such they are "semantic anchors" for complex of emotions, thoughts and memories. G. Levy, *"I Was El Shaddai, But Now I'm Yahweh": God Names and the Informational Dynamics of the Biblical Texts*, in: *Mind, Morality and Magic. Cognitive Science Approaches in Biblical Studies*, I. Czachesz, R. Uro (eds.), Durham, Acumen 2013, pp. 98, 105, 100, 119. See also: H.M. Müller, M. Kutas, *What's in a Name? Electrophysiological Differences between Spoken Nouns, Proper Names and One's Own Name*, "NeuroReport", Vol. 8, No. 1, 1996, pp. 221–225.

18 The assumption that the name "Yahveh" had not been known before is of course wrong. See the utterance of Eve in Genesis 4:1 or the calling of the name of Yahveh in Genesis 4:26. L.F. Hartman, S.D. Sperling, op. cit., pp. 673, 675. For the review of the traditional Jewish interpretations aimed at dealing with the discrepancy see: S. Regev, *'Al Shemot ha-'El ve-Kinuyav*," Daf Shavu'i", No. 166, 1966, [online], http://www.biu.ac.il/jh/parasha/vaera/regev.html, [29.I 2014].

19 See for instance Shemot Rabbah 3:6: "Rabbi Abba ben Mammel said: the Holy, blessed be he said to Moses: You inquire to know my name – I am called according to my deeds. Sometimes I am called as 'El Shadday, as Tzeva'ot, as 'Elohim, as {Yahveh}. When I am judging the creatures, I am called Elohim. When I am waging war against the wicked, I am called Tzeva'ot. When I suspend over the transgressions of man, I am called El Shadday, and when I show mercy to my world, I am called {Yahveh}."

on the tetragram. It is said for example that the one pronouncing it "in its letters" has no share in the world to come (M Sanhedrin 10:1) as the name was allowed to be uttered by the High Priest during the Yom Kippur fest only (M Yoma 6:2). Apart from this occasion it was supposed to be substituted with other appellations like *'Adonay* as suggested by BT Qiddushin 71a.[20] Obviously then, the initial restrictions concerning "Yahveh" must have engendered the utilization of the variety of other biblical names interpreted simply as alternative addresses. The latter have of course differed in terms of their frequency and specific associations: "Shadday", being the codename of "Yahveh" reveals as much as possible without defecting the divine identity. In other words, the close proximity of "Shadday" to "Yahveh", together with its relatively high frequency, may be one of the reasons for the former's popularity.

Fertility and destruction

The etymology of the word is dim and there are several hypotheses concerning its origins.[21] The most widespread is that which derives it from the Akkadian root *šd* along with *shadu* – "mountain" and *shadda'u/shaddu'a* – "mountaineer". This root is cognate with the Hebrew word *sadeh* meaning elevated plateau or wild, uncultivated field and accordingly, the appellation "El Shadday" would mean "El of the wilderness/mountains".[22] The next hypothesis points at the

[20] The source reads "do not pronounce *yod-hey* but *'alef-dalet*". It is usually interpreted as referring to the word *'adonay* but on the other hand one could ask whether it is not a hint concerning the vocalization of "Yahveh" since both *'alef* and *dalet* are pronounced along the a-e vowel pattern. More on the status of particular divine names can be found in BT Shavuot 35a-b. See also: J.Z. Lauterbach, *Substitutes for the Tetragrammaton*, "Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research", Vol. 2, 1930 – 1931, pp. 39–67.

[21] For the concise review see: D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 240–241. F. Brown, S.R. Driver, C.A. Briggs, *A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Oxford Clarendon Press 1907 [BDB], 9714. TWOT 2333.

[22] D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 241–242. A. Even-Shoshan, שדה, שדד, in: *Ha-Milon he-Hadash*, Qriyat Sefer Yerushalaym 1979, [ES], vol. 7, p. 2618. E.A. Knauf, op. cit. p. 750. J. Oullette, *More on 'Êl Šadday and Bêl Šadê*, Journal of Biblical Literature, Vol. 88, No. 4 (Dec., 1969), pp. 470–471. W.H. Propp, *On Hebrew śāde(h), "Highland"*, "Vetus Testamentum", Vol. 37, 1987, pp. 230–236. For

word *shad*, "breast", a derivate of the root שדה meaning "to pour forth". This in turn would suggest that Shadday is the one responsible for bringing rains and securing fertility.[23] The other options are the root שדד meaning "to overrun" or "to destroy" as witnessed by the phrase *shodedey laylah* in Obadiah 1:5 and Jeremiah 51:53[24] or the word *shed*, most probably originating from the Akkadian *shedu*,[25] meaning initially a protective spirit, which eventually came to denote a demon in the later biblical and rabbinic sources.[26]

As it turns out, the etymology of the name is by all means obscure and the further analyses should include the actual usage of the word. Thus almost 50 biblical appearances can be organized into several larger clusters:[27] "Shadday" appears 6 times in Genesis,

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the associations between transgressions and the open field see: A. Shinan, Y. Zakovitch, *From Gods to God. How the Bible Debunked, Suppressed, or Changed Ancient Myths and Legends*, Nebraska University Press 2012, pp. 191, 234–235.

23 BDB 9703, 9714. A. Even-Shoshan, שד, in: ES, vol. 7, p. 2617. L. Koehler, W. Baumgartner (eds.), *A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament*, Brill 2000 [HALOT], 8409, 8414. Worth noting here is the hypothesis advanced by K. and K. Massey. The said authors agree for the validity of the etymology which connects *Shadday* to *shad*, yet propose a slight nuance to its meaning. Accordingly, *shad* refers primarily to animal udder and only by means of semantic extension – to human breast. In consequence, Shadday should rather be initially connected with the pastoral life and prosperity rather than with fertility. K. Massey, K. Massey, *God of the Udder: Another Look at El Shaddai*, [online], http://www.keithmassey.com/files/elshaddaymassey.pdf, [29.I 2014], especially pp. 3–7.

24 A. Even-Shoshan, שדד, in: ES, vol. 7, p. 2618. BDB 9718. TWOT 2331. HALOT 8413. The root is akin also to Arabic *shadiid* (strong). *Names of God* in: JE. See also the root שדפ conveying the idea of scorch, blight, blast and also a hot, dry wind. BDB 9718. HALOT 8420. TWOT 2335.

25 W.F. Albright, op. cit., pp. 181–182. BDB 9714

26 See for example BT Hagigah 15a and BT Sanhedrin 67b which discuss the position of *shedim* between angels and humans. The word in modern Hebrew can convey the idea of proficiency and skillfulness. W.F. Albright, op. cit., p. 180. A. Even-Shoshan, שד, in: ES, vol. 7, p. 2617.

27 All the linguistic statistics have been calculated by means of BibleWorks 8.0. The search included the hypothetical theophoric names and the results may therefore deviate from the data furnished by other treatises. The word *'el* is considered to be the oldest known Semitic term for "deity". The root might serve for a category of celestial beings, both "own" (Psalms 18:31, 33, 48; 57:3) and "foreign" to the Hebrews (Psalms 44:12, 81:10), as well as a personal name "El". L.F. Hartman, S.D. Sperling, *God, Names of*, in: *Encyclopedia Judaica*,

almost exclusively in the context of the fertility blessings; once in Exodus in the revelation of the "real" name of Yahveh; 15 times throughout Numbers as a part of three theophoric names[28] and twice in Numbers 24 as one of the deities of the prophet Balaam. Interestingly, a lion's share of the instances presents Shadday in rather negative terms. The name appears twice in Ruth 1:20–21 as the deity responsible for Ruth's distress; approximately 60% of occurrences are concentrated in Job, where Shadday is presented as the one who afflicts his servant;[29] 6 times appears in the Prophets and Psalms, which speak about Shadday as a mighty and ruthless destroyer (Psalm 68:15; Isaiah 13:6 paralleled by Joel 1:15; Ezekiel 1:24; 10:5)[30] with but one exception when he is portrayed as the protector in Psalm 91:1. This general ambivalence is also reflected in the linguistic puns appearing in particular passages. In this regard there are two main directions; the first one which elaborates on the root שדה, conveying the idea of fertility and the other which plays with שדד, denoting destruction.[31]

F. Skolnik, M. Berenbaum (eds.), vol. 7, Thomson Gale 2007, p. 672. Contra: *Names of God*, in: *Jewish Encyclopedia*, C. Adler, I. Singer et. al. (eds.), Funk and Wagnalls, New York 1901–1906, [online], http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/, [29.I 2014], [JE].

28 These are: *Tzurishadday* ("my rock is Shadday", Numbers 1:6; 2:12; 7:36, 41; 10:19), *'Ammishadday* ("the people of Shadday", or "Shadday is my kinsman", Numbers 1:12; 2:25; 7:66, 71; 10:25) and *Shdey'ur* ("Shadday shines", or "the light of Shadday", Numbers 1:5; 2:10; 7:30, 35; 10:18). R. Good, op. cit., p. 70. There is an ongoing discussion whether these names are "authentic" or just a later addition, influenced by Exodus 6:3, intended to give the narration the flavor of antiquity. D. Biale (*The God with Breasts: El Shaddai in the Bible*, "History of Religions", Vol. 21, No. 3, 1982, p. 244) argues for the ancient origins whereas E.A. Knauf (*Shadday*, in: DDD, p. 751) opts for the late invention. For the discussion see: W.F. Albright, *The Names Shaddai and Abram*, "Journal of Biblical Literature", Vol. 54, No. 4, 1935, p. 188, footnote number 55.

29 See: E.A. Knauf, op. cit., p. 749.

30 Some assume that these instances were intended at relegating the aspect of fertility and substituting it with the destructive nature. D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 254–255. G. Mushayabasa, *The Effect of Etymology on the Rendering of the Divine Epithet (El) Shaddai in the Peshitta Version*, "Journal for Semitics", Vol. 19, No. 1, 2010, pp. 27–29.

31 G. Mushayabasa, op. cit., p. 24. See also: E.A. Knauf, op. cit., p. 751. D. Biale, op. cit., p. 245. R. Good, op. cit., p. 67. For the details concerning the distinction between semantic and historical etymologization see: J. Bronkhorst,

This first aspect is reflected in the fertility blessings which utilize the variants of the formula "be fruitful and multiply" as is the case in 17:1; 28:3; 35:11 and 48:3.[32] Here the blessing of Jacob in Genesis 49:25 deserves special attention:

> {El} Shadday – he has blessed you with the blessings of heavens from above, blessings of the {watery chasm}[33] breeding below, blessings of the breasts (Heb. *shadaym*) and the womb.

Of the foremost interest here is of course the wordplay between *shadaym* ("breasts") and *Shadday* which has led some scholars to hypothesize about the initially feminine nature of the god.[34] According to D. Biale this deity with breasts is Asherah or Anat, who has been subject to a semantic "sex change" and afterwards incorporated into the cult of Yahveh.[35] The other option has been proposed by H. Lutzky who argues that the ending *-ay* is a typical marker of a feminine form found also in the names of Ugaritic goddesses like Tallay, Artzay, Pidray or Rahmay. In fact, *rahmay* and *shadday* may be two epithets of Asherah paralleled by the phrase *shadaym va-raham* in Genesis 49:25d.[36] These considerations should not be that surprising given the relatively developed tendency to present Yahveh as a woman (Isaiah 42:14; 46:3; 49:15; 66:7–9,12–13), a rock

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Etymology and Magic: Yāska's Nirukta, Plato's Cratylus, and the Riddle of Semantic Etymologies, "Numen", Vol. 48, Fasc. 2 (2001), pp. 147–203.

32 D. Biale, op. cit., p. 247, 251–252.

33 Heb. *tehom*. For the connections between *tehom* and Babylonian Tiamat, the mother of all life, see: H.G. May, *Some Cosmic Connotations of Mayim Rabbîm, "Many Waters"*, "Journal of Biblical Literature", Vol. 74, No. 1, 1955, p. 21.

34 E.A. Knauf, op. cit., p. 750. See also: D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 240–256. Heb. *shaday* (without the doubling of *dalet*) means literally "my breasts" and appears in Canticles 1:13.

35 D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 254–256.

36 H. Lutzky, *Shadday as a Goddess Epithet*, "Vetus Testamentum", Vol. 48, 1998, pp. 17, 23–24. For the discussion concerning the hypothetical goddess Shadday along with her entourage (*shedin*) see: B.A. Levine, *The Deir 'Alla Plaster Inscriptions. The Book of Balaam, Son of Beor*, in: *The Context of Scripture. Canonical Compositions from the Biblical World*, W.W. Hallo, K.L. Younger Jr. (eds.), vol. II, Leiden-Boston, Brill 2003, pp. 140–145.

which begot Israel (Deuteronomy 32:18) or specifically a mother (Psalm 131:2).[37]

The second aspect is apparent in these places where the wordplay with the root שדד is involved. One of the most vivid examples comes from the proclamation against Babylon in Isaiah 13:5–6[38] where it is said:

> They come from the distant land, from the border of heavens, Yahveh and the tools of his wrath, to destroy the whole land. Wail, as the day of Yahveh is near, as the destruction will come from Shadday (Heb. *ke-shod mi-Shadday yavo'*).

In its form the passage presents a great example of the Hebrew poetic parallelisms: the border of heavens is juxtaposed with the whole land, the chastisement coming from far away corresponds to the closing of the day of Yahveh whereas the destruction from Shadday parallels both the day of Yahveh and laying waste to the country.[39] The factual re-etymologization takes place in v. 6b which utilizes the wordplay between *Shadday* and *shod*.[40]

Enough said

Surprisingly, when it comes to the more direct expressions of the meaning of "Shadday" in the early Rabbinic literature, the sources are extremely scarce and to the best of the author's knowledge there are just two passages which tackle the problem explicitly. These few instances in turn follow the directions marked by the biblical re-etymologizations: closeness to Yahveh, fertility and destruction.

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37 D. Biale, op. cit., pp. 253–254. R. Good, op. cit., p. 69. The idea of a breasted god goes very well in line with the notion of the androgynous nature of the first man who had been created *be-tzelem 'elohim*. This is the case e.g. in Bereshit Rabbah 8:1 or Rashi to Genesis 1:27.

38 This pun is also present in Joel 1:15.

39 BDB 9707. HALOT 8412.

40 According to some scholars, it is also possible that this particular name has been "excavated" from the more ancient textual strata and applied to Yahveh to denote his militant qualities. E.A. Knauf, op. cit., p. 751.

Thus, there is an acknowledgement of Shadday's providence in a short passage from Shemot Rabbah 42:4[41] which elaborates on the giving of the Torah:

> Just as Moses was about to descend [from mount Sinai], so the angels were about to kill him. What did he do? He grasped the throne of the Holy, blessed be he, [who] spread (Heb. *parash*) his tallit over him so as [the angels] would not assault him, as it has been said *he grasps the face of the moon and covers* (Heb. *parshez*) *it with the clouds* (Job 26:9). What does *parshez* mean? It is a notarikon of the words *parash*, *rahum*, *shadday*, *ziv* [meaning: the merciful Shadday spread the {glamour}] over him.

In addition to this, there is an account in the Babylonian Talmud which explains the name "Shadday". The passage of BT Hagigah 12a is an excellent example of the rabbinic ingenious mixing of various motifs and conveying plenty of meaning in but a few words:

> R[esh] L[aqish] said: what is it that is written: *I am El Shadday* (Genesis 35:11)? I am he who said to the world "enough!" (Heb. *'ani hu' she-'amarti le-'olam: day*.). R[esh] L[aqish] [also] said: in the hour that the Holy, blessed be he, created the sea, it started to expand – until the Holy, blessed be he, reproached it.[42] [Then] it dried out as it was said: *He reproaches the sea and makes it dry; and all the rivers makes desolate* (Nahum 1:4).

This account has two parallel variants with some minute changes. One appears in Bereshit Rabbah 5:8, where Shadday stops the world from expanding and in 46:3 where he limits the earth and heavens. What is common to all these instances is the cosmogonic context and the exposition provided by Resh Laqish, who explains the ap-

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41 Cf. BT Shabbat 88b.

42 It worth noting that the text utilizes the verb *lig'or*, (Eng. "to reproach", "to rebuke"), which has often been used in the apotropaic context of the post-biblical literature. See for instance BT Berakhot 51a. J. Joosten, *The Verb* גער *"to Exorcize" in Qumran Aramaic and Beyond*, "Dead Sea Discoveries", 21 (2014), p. 347–355.

pellation as a compound form consisting of *she* and *day*.[43] These passages in turn have often been exposed in a sophisticated way as indicating the divine plan of drawing the borders between mind and matter, keeping the balance between his right and left hand or as an early manifestation of the kabbalistic idea of *tzimtzum*.[44] It seems however, that they should rather be approached in their immediate context and in relation to another parallel narrative, although it does not contain any direct reference to Shadday. The text comes in BT Sukkah 53 a-b and reads:

> When David dug the Pits, the {watery chasm}[45] arose and threatened to submerge the world. David asked: «is there anyone who knows whether it is allowed to inscribe the [divine] name upon a {piece of clay}, and cast it into the {watery chasm} that its waves would subside?» (…) He thereupon inscribed the name upon a {piece of clay}, cast (Aram. שדי) it into the {watery chasm} and it subsided sixteen thousand cubits.[46]

If to approach these passages from the structural perspective, it is possible to discern two basic essences engaged in the opposition:

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43 This way of explanation is commonly believed to be already witnessed by the Greek translation of the HB which in several instances utilizes the word *hikanos* meaning "self-sufficient". Worth emphasizing here is that such interpretation, although theologically grounded is "historically impossible". G. Mushayabasa, op. cit., p. 26. With all probability however this option became the default one in the Jewish tradition as is witnessed by Rashi's commentary to Genesis 17:1 and Exodus 6:3 or Rambam'a interpretation in *Moreh Nevukhim* 1:63. See also the further part of this paper.

44 E.g. in Pirkei de-rabbi Eliezer 3 it is said that the creation had been preceded by the existence of god and his name who has since then been restricting himself. For the review of the traditional exegeses adhering to this line of interpretation see: M. Altshuler, *Nishmat Shadday Tvinem*, [online], http://www.jewish-studies.info/7.htm, [29.I 2014].

45 Cf. Genesis 49:25.

46 Cf. BT Makkot 11a where David sees the *tehom* rising and stops it by means of the name inscribed upon a stone and Bereshit Rabbah 23:7 conveying the tradition that this was the abuse of the tetragram which brought about the flood. The sources suggested by M. Isaacson, *The Name of God and the Arava*, [online], http://www.academia.edu/4496787/The_Name_of_God_and_the_Arava, [29.I 2014], pp. 1–2. See also: M.I. Gruber, *God, Image of*, in: *Encyclopaedia of Judaism*, J. Neusner, A.J. Avery-Peck, W.S. Green (eds.), vol. II, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2005, p. 870.

the active, dividing agent and passive amorphous matter. Moreover, each of the recalled accounts has strong cosmological undertones, what suggests assuming the comparative perspective. Accordingly, Shadday limiting the expansionist outburst of the world fits well the pattern of the so called *chaoskampf* – an initial divine battle followed by the triumph of the young and vivacious deity, subjugating the hostile, usually aquatic monster and building the palace or creating the cosmos. The mythological traditions of the ancient Near East are full of parallels: Babylonian Marduk and Tiamat, Ugaritic Ba'al and Yam, Egyptian Ra and Apop, Hittite Tarhun and Illuyanka, etc. In fact, this rabbinic reiteration should not be surprising at all, given the semantic capacity of this myth. Not only does the HB recall the cosmic battle numerous times, especially in Psalms (e.g. 77:16–17; 89:10) and Prophets (e.g. Isaiah 51:9–10; Ezekiel 32:13)[47] but also plays with this ancient motif reiterating it to convey a specific meaning. Yahveh blowing the waters of the flood in Genesis 8:1 to make place for the new creation or dividing the *Yam Suf* in Exodus 14–15 to let the Hebrews walk to the other side and start a new national existence – all of these may be read as the retellings of the initial cosmogonic conflict. The deity "that says «enough»" could be than interpreted as the one controlling the broadly understood chaos, especially in its negative and threatening aspect and as such – protecting his people against the enemies.

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In sum, there are several factors which might have contributed to the popularity of the name "Shadday" in the context of the apotropaic customs. First, there are instances which suggest Shadday is the deity responsible for securing fertility and health. Second, Shadday appears in the accounts which emphasize his aggressiveness and strength and this image finds also its elaboration in later rabbinic literature which channels his vigor against chaotic matter. Finally, due to the later restrictions concerning the utilization of the names like "Yahveh" or "Elohim" on the one

47 For a broad selection of sources see: H.G. May, op. cit.

hand and the scarcity of the most of the "lesser" biblical names on the other, "Shadday" might have been the most adequate substitute. Still however, at least two issues remain unresolved. First and foremost, the uniqueness of Shadday is challenged by the fact that the ambiguous meaning could be very well attributed to nearly any other of the biblical deities. Secondly, the later rabbinic sources speaking about Shadday are brief and general and any conclusions drawn therefrom need to be treated as prudent hypotheses. In sum then, the above presented considerations by no means deplete the hermeneutic possibilities and the issue of the protective meaning of the appellation "Shadday" remains opened for further investigations.

ABSTRACT

The power of the divine appellations is widely recognized in the Rabbinic Judaism. Since the early midrashes, through the medieval exegesis up till the modern era these names have been believed to possess the extraordinary performative and protective potential. In this regard the position of "Shadday" is of particular significance. Not only it appears on various amulets and dedicatory plaques but more importantly it is strongly connected to the traditional customs which could be considered apotropaic in nature: male circumcision, mezuzah and tefillin. While this connection is explicitly drawn, no actual justification is given and the question arises, what factors might had contributed to this choice. The present paper argues that the apotropaic significance of "Shadday" probably derives from three factors. (1) It is the only divine appellation so closely and explicitly connected to the tetragram and as such might have been believed to participate in its power. (2) Numerous biblical instances utilize the ambivalent paronomasia with the roots שדה and שדד thus presenting Shadday as the one responsible for securing the flow of life and protecting against the enemies. (3) A few early rabbinic sources portray this deity as the one responsible for limiting the expansion of the chaotic matter during the creation process.

KEY WORDS: Shadday, apotropaism, Hebrew Bible, midrash, Talmud

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4.

MAREK I. BARANIAK

Ways of interpreting Tetragrammaton – word or sign

I. The history of the name of the God of Israel – from word to sign (traditional view)

The personal and cultic name of the God of Israel has always been connected with four consonants Y-H-W-H, which scholars refer to as the Tetragrammaton (usually vocalized as Yahweh) – although throughout the millennia there have been many other ways of referring to God: titles, circumlocutions, and general names.

In Levantine religions as a whole the word El (*'il*) describes a god also known as the Father of humankind and all creatures. El is listed at the head of many pantheons, i.e. he is the Father God among the Canaanites. In Northwest Semitic use El was both a generic word for any "god" and the special name or title of a particular God who was distinguished from other gods as being "the god", or in the monotheistic sense, God[1]. Going further in ancient Israel, the general words for "god" was *'el*, which was usually combined with a location, such as *'el* Bethel, or an epithet. The most frequently used epithets

[1] M. S. Smith, *The origins of biblical monotheism: Israel's polytheistic background and the Ugaritic texts* (New York 2001) p. 135.

are *'el 'elyon* (God Most High), *'el shaddai* (God Almighty), and *'el 'olam* (Everlasting God).

The word *'el* provides the linguistic basis for Elohim (*'elohim),* one of the most common general names for YHWH –, which seems to constitute a plural form of *'el ('eloah?).*[2] This form is cognate to the *'-l-h-m* found in Ugaritic[3], where it is used for the pantheon of Canaanite gods, the children of El. In the later Hebrew text the use of the term Elohim implies in most cases a view that is at least monolatrist. Such use in the singular, as a proper title for the supreme deity, is generally not considered to be synonymous with the term *'elohim*, "gods" in the plural. The most frequently mentioned suggestions for an original meaning of its etymological root are "power" or "fear" but these are widely challenged and much disputed.[4] The plural form ending in *–im* can also be understood as denoting abstraction, as in the Hebrew words *chayyim* ("life") or *betulim* ("virginity"). If understood that way, Elohim means "divinity" or "deity".[5] Next to YHWH, *Elohim* forms the

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2 The Dictionary of Deities and Demons in the Bible defines "elohim" as a plural of "eloah", Cf. K. van der Toorn, Bob Becking, Pieter Willem van der Horst (eds), *Dictionary of deities and demons in the Bible* (revised 2nd edition Brill, 1999) pp. 274, 352–3.

3 The Ugaritic term for "god" or the "chief god" is *il*, plural *ilm*, occasionally plural *ilhm* (cf. UT 19: no. 163).

4 It may be noted that even if the origin of the word in Canaanite or proto-Semitic is from a root meaning power, this by no means indicates the connotation in Hebrew religious usage. Gesenius, Ewald and others find its origin in Heb: *'ul*, "to be strong," from which also are derived Heb: *'ayil*, "ram," and Heb: *'elah*, "terebinth"; it is then an expanded plural form of Heb: *'el*; others trace it to Heb: *'alah*, "to terrify," and the singular form is found in

5 the infrequent Heb: *'eloah*, which occurs chiefly in poetical books; cf. BDB [479] p. 41. *Elohim* is not the only Hebrew noun that can be plural in form but singular in meaning. Such Hebrew noun forms are sometimes used for abstract nouns and as intensifiers. *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar* devotes several pages to this subject. Specifically discussing *elohim,* he observes: "The language has entirely rejected the idea of numerical plurality in *'elohim* (whenever it denotes *one* God).... [This] is proved especially by its being almost invariably joined with a singular attribute" (such as a singular adjective or verb). Cf. F. H. W.; Gesenius, *Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar as Edited and Enlarged by the late E. Kautzsch* [*Second English Edition, Revised in Accordance with the twenty-eighth German Edition (1909)*] (Clarendon Press, 1980). p. 396–401. According to Mark S. Smith the notion of divinity underwent radical changes throughout the period of early Israelite identity. So the term *Elohim* is the result of such changes in terms of "vertical translatability" i.e.

most frequently used name of God in the Hebrew Bible, even though it has no personal or cultic associations. The rabbis developed several new titles for YHWH, which they often used in place of the name: *ha-Kadosh Baruch Hu* (the Holy One, Blessed be He), *Ribbono Shel Olam* (Lord of the World), and *ha-Rahaman* (the Merciful One). They also developed several circumlocutions to avoid God's name: *ha-Makom* (the Place), *Shechinah* (the Presence), and *Memra* (the Word). In a similar vein, orthodox Jewry later developed the terms *'elokim* (for *'elohim*), *ha-Shem* (the Name), and *'adoshem* (for *'adonai*).[6]

The original pronunciation of tetragrammaton is uncertain. Many scholars as Raymond Abba[7] suggest that by inference from its contracted forms in compound names – Yô- or Y^{e}Hô- at the beginning, or -YāH or -YāHû at the end, it appears to have been pronounced "Yahweh". This opinion seems to be confirmed by independent testimony to its transliteration into Greek as 'Iabé or 'Iaoué.[8] The tetragrammaton occurs more then five thousand times in the OT and a separate short form of the divine name YāH only 25 times. Similar short forms YHW and YHH are found in Elephantine Papyri.

The origin of the name in form of Tetragrammaton has been the subject of much controversy, but it has been sufficiently shown by scholars that outside Israel a god with the exact name in the form of four consonants YHWH was not worshipped, and except for the Mesha Stela the name YHWH is absent in West Semitic epigraphical texts.[9] But it can't be denied that there is a topographical link between YHWH and the mountain area south of Edom. According to some theophany

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the re-interpretation of the gods of the earliest recalled period as the national god of the monolatrism as it emerged in the 7th to 6th century BCE in the Kingdom of Judah and during the Babylonian captivity, and further in terms of monotheism by the emergence of Rabbinical Judaism in the 2nd century CE. cf. M. H. Segal, "El, Elohim, and Yhwh in the Bible," *The Jewish Quarterly Review,* New Series, 46/2 (1955) pp. 89–115;

6 Cf. "God, name of" in: J. Neusner (ed.), *Dictionary of Judaism in the Biblical Period 450 B.C.E. to 600 C.E.* (New York ^{2}2002) p.259.

7 Raymond Abba, „The Divine Name Yahweh", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 80/4 (1961) pp. 320–328. Cf. S. R. Driver, "Recent Theories on the Origin and Nature of the Tetragrammaton (1883)," *Studia Biblica I* (reprint 2009) pp. 4–6.

8 So Clement of Alexandria, *The Stromata V*, 6, 34: Theodoret, *Quaestiones in Exodum* 15.

9 Karel van der Toorn, *Family religion in Babylonia, Syria and Israel : continuity and change in the forms of religious life* (Leiden 1996) p. 282.

texts, as in Deut 33:2 (KJV ... The LORD came from Sinai, and rose up from Seir unto them; he shined forth from mount Paran), Judges 5:4 (KJV LORD, when thou wentest out of Seir, when thou marchedst out of the field of Edom, YHWH, ...), Ps 68:8 (NIB ... before God, the One of Sinai, before God, the God of Israel.), Hab 3:3 (KJV God came from Teman, and the Holy One from mount Paran. ...)[10], all these mentioned places are in or close to Edom, including Mount Sinai – traditionally located in the Sinai peninsula, or according to some scholars in southern Edom or northern Midian.[11] Even Frank Moore Cross has argued that these facts would turn YHWH into an Edomite-Midianite deity whose cult was established in Israel and who evolved into an official god of the nation and a patron god of the Israelite monarchy.[12]

In later biblical times there is absolutely no question about YHWH as the existing single God with the names of El, Eloah or Elohim as personal identifications of the same unique divine being. Biblical narratives show that when the high priest addressed God in the Temple's Holy of Holies on the Day of Atonement, he uttered this name (Lv 16). Similarly when the priests blessed the people in the Temple, they used this name (Nb 6:24–27). It seems that the grooving exclusive connection of this divine name with the cultic activity reduced to one temple in Jerusalem and unique priestly class changed the way of the God's name use. By the third century B.C.E. it had become so hallowed that it could not be pronounced outside of worship, and the term *'adonai* ("my lord") was regularly substituted. The Babylonian Talmud[13] also confirms that it was

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[10] There is a remarkable confirmation of this topographical connection in one of the Kuntillet Ajrud inscriptions: [y]hwh [.]tmn wl'shrt[h] = YHWH of Teman and -to- his Asherah.

[11] Cf. J. Blenkinsopp, "The Midianite-kenite Hypothesis revisited and the origins of Judah.", *Journal for the Study of the Old Testament* 33(2008) pp. 131–153. J. Kelley, "Toward a new synthesis of the god of Edom and Yahweh," *Antiguo Oriente: Cuadernos del Centro de Estudios de Historia del Antiguo Oriente* 7 (2009). http://bibliotecadigital.uca.edu.ar/repositorio/revistas/toward-new-synthesis-god-edom.pdf [2014]

[12] Frank Moore Cross, jr. "Yahweh and the God of the Patriarchs," *Harvard Theological Review* 55 (1962) 225–59. 257. "The popularity of the cult of ʾE1 in the Semitic community in Sinai, Egypt, and Seir, gives some plausibility to the notion that Yahweh was anʾE1 figure.".

[13] Tractate *Yoma*, p. 39b: "...When Simeon the Righteous died, with many indications that such glory was no more enjoyed, his brethren no more dared

upon the death of Simeon the Righteous[14], that all Israel began to no longer pronounce the Name YHWH. Later in the rabbinic period the rule was developed, that if a document containing one of God's holy names was discarded, the name would be profaned. So the rabbis prohibited the writing of God's name exactly and ruled that any document that might contain God's name should be thrown into a *geniza* (a special storehouse) rather than be thrown away.

In the Middle Ages the scribes developed a reminder for substituting *'adonai*: when copying biblical manuscripts, they placed the vowels for *'adonai* under the consonants for YHWH, resulting in YeHoWaH. Christian scholars misunderstood this practice and considered it God's name: Jehovah. The conception of the holy name in the form of tetragrammaton found its most significant development in mystical and cabbalistic literature. The Book of the Name (*Sefer ha-Shem*) by Rabbi Eleazar ben Yehudah of Worms contains an extensive theology of the tetragrammaton. The cosmological-magical power of God's name culminates in the creation of a *golem*, a human being created by the use of the Tetragrammaton in combination with the letters of the Hebrew alphabet.[15] In classical Kabbalah God is conventionally without name: *'en sof*, the Infinite, and he is understood

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utter the Ineffable Name..."

14 Simeon the Righteous is either Simon I (310–291 or 300–273 BCE), son of Onias I, and grandson of Jaddua, or Simon II (219–199 BCE), son of Onias II. The scholarly consensus of the late 20th century has fallen on Simon II.

15 Cf. Joseph Dan, *The Heart and the Fountain: An Anthology of Jewish Mystical Experiences* (Oxford 2002) pp. 101–105 at 103. Eleazar of Worms, in his Commentary on *Sefer Yetzirah*, wrote that after kneading virgin soil from the mountains with pure water, the first stage of creation is to form the "limbs" of the golem. Each limb has a "corresponding letter mentioned in Sefer Yetzirah", and this letter is to be combined with every other letter of the Hebrew alphabet to form pairs. Then a more general permutation is done of each letter of the Hebrew alphabet with every other letter into letter pairs, „each limb separately". This second, basic method of combination is called the „221 gates". Then you combine each letter of the alphabet with each vowel sound (apparently for each limb). That concludes the first stage, the formation of the golem's body. In the second stage you must combine each letter of the alphabet with each letter from the Tetragrammaton (YHWH), and pronounce each of the resulting letter pairs with every possible vowel sound. In this case the use of the Tetragrammaton, even though it is permutated, is the "activation word". – see M. Idel, *Golem: Jewish Magic and Mystical Traditions on the Artificial Anthropoid* (New York 1990).

as 'He in Himself', whereas his biblical epithet are applied to the ten spheres as ten manifestations of his being. The thirteenth-century Spanish scholar, exegete, and mystic Nahmanides (1194–1270) argues that the entire Pentateuch is one inventory of divine names or can be understood as one and unique long name.[16] In similar way Abraham Abulafia states that the actual name of God does not occur in the Pentateuch; tetragrammaton and the expression *Ehyeh* ('I am', 'I will be') are only allusions to or reflections of the real or true name of God.[17]

Later Jewish prayer and praise are entirely directed to the worship and sanctification of the divine name as the representation of a true and powerful God. One of the vivid examples is the Jewish concept of *devekut* („clinging on"), a type of *communio mystica*, realized in two kabbalistic methods: the meditation and contemplation (visualization, recitation and vocalization) of the Tetragrammaton, and the explication of it by the combination and permutations of letters (*kavannah* and *hochmah ha-tzeruf*). For instance, the letters of the Tetragrammaton would be combined with each of the letters of the alphabet, or individual letters would be joined to all of the other letters of the Hebrew alphabet. These permutations of the divine name in Kabbalah (Kavanah) aim at overcoming the separation of the forces in the Upper World.'[18]

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16 In similar way his younger contemporary Spanish kabbalist Joseph b. Abraham Gikatillah (1248–1305) wrote that, the entire Torah is a fabric of appellatives, *kinnuyim*–the generic term for the epithets of God, such as compassionate, great, merciful, venerable– and these epithets in turn are woven from the various names of God [such as El, Elohim ('creative power'), Shaddai, Zevaoth ('host of letters')]. But all these holy names are connected with the tetragrammaton YHWH ('as He is') and dependent upon it. Thus the entire Torah is ultimately woven from the tetragrammaton. Cf. Gershom G. Scholem, *On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism* (New York 1969) pp. 37–44.

17 Joseph Dan, "The Book of the Divine Name by Rabbi Eleazar of Worms", *Frankfurter Judaistische Beiträge* 22 (1995) pp. 27–60; cf. Wout Jac. van Bekkum, "What's in the Divine Name? Exodus 3 in Biblical and Rabbinic tradition." in George H. van Kooten (ed.), *The Revelation of the Name YHWH to Moses. Perspectives from Judaism, the Pagan Graeco-Roman World, and Early Christianity* (Leiden 2006) pp. 3–17.

18 See, Martin Buber, *Tales of the Hasidim – The Later Masters* (7th ed., New York 1974) p. 332; Idel, ., "Ashkenazi Esotericism and Kabbalah in Barcelona," *Hispania Judaica* 5 (2007), pp. 94–99; A. Afterman, *The Intentions of Prayers in Early Ecstatic Kabbalah A Study and Critical Edition of an Anonymous Commentary to the Prayers* (Los Angeles 2011) pp. 115–117; an analysis of

II. The Meaning of the Tetragrammaton – name and character

1) The character?

Charles R. Gianotti in his article "The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH"[19] has noticed that in the view of the biblicist, the divine name YHWH was known as early as the time of Enosh (Gen 4:26 KJV *And to Seth, to him also there was born a son; and he called his name Enos: then began men to call upon the name of the LORD*.) and it was used seldom during the patriarchal period (cf. Gen 12:1, 4; 13:4; etc.). But Exodus 6:2–3 seems to indicate that the name was not known until the time of Moses: „ NKJ And God spoke to Moses, and said to him, I am the LORD [YHWH]. I appeared to Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, as God Almighty [El Shaddai], but by My name, LORD [YHWH], I was not known to them.". This tension was resolved by a specific understanding of the passage. An example of compromise exegesis offers J. Alec Motyer translating Exodus 6:2–3 as follows: „And God spoke to Moses, and said to him: I am Yahweh. And I showed myself to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob *in the character of* El Shaddai, but *in the character expressed by* my name Yahweh I did not make myself known to them ... ."[20] He concludes "it was the character expressed by the name that was withheld from the patriarchs and not the name itself. To know by name means to have come into intimate and personal acquaintance with a person."[21] In similar way Sigmunt Mowinckel concurs in reference to the theophany in the burning bush that: "Exodus 3 does not support the theory that the name of Yahweh was not known to the Israelites before Moses .... A name may have deeper meaning

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a mystical practice of letter permutation conceived as part of the practice of "kavannah" in prayer has described Adam Afterman, "Letter Permutation Techniques, Kavannah and Prayer", *Jewish Mysticism Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, 6 , 18 (2007) 52–78.

19 Charles R. Gianotti, "The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH." *Bibliotheca Sacra* (January-March 1985) 38–51.

20 J. A. Motyer, *The Revelation of the Divine Name* (Leicester 1959), pp. 12–13. Cited by Charles R. Gianotti, "The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH." *Bibliotheca Sacra* (January-March 1985) 38–51.

21 Ibid., pp. 15–16. Other fragments fro the Bible – Exodus 33:12–17; 1 Samuel 2:12; Jeremiah 16:21; and Ezekiel 6:7 – seem to support this view.

than the one discernible at first glance and recognizable to everybody... a man who knows the "real" deeper meaning of the name of a god, really "knows the god" in question".[22] Thus though the name YHWH existed well before the time of Moses, the *meaning* of that name was not revealed until the time of Moses. To understand the meaning of the divine name is to understand the character of God revealed by that name. Clearly Exodus 3:14 (KJV And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you.) provides the beginning point for this discussion.

2) The question of the quality

Therefore Abba quoting opinions of Mowinckel and Martin Buber has concluded that at the burning bush was not the revelation of a new and unknown name, but it was the disclosure of the real significance of a name long known.[23] He has noted the Hebrew idiom in Exod 3:14 (TNK Moses said to God, "When I come to the Israelites and say to them 'The God of your fathers has sent me to you,' and they ask me, 'What is His name [Hebr. *ma šemô*]?' what shall I say to them?"). In classical Hebrew text, when the interrogative pronoun *ma*, which occurs in the question, refers to substantives, it frequently expresses an inquiry concerning quality and may be rendered, "What kind of?"[24], In biblical Hebrew it is never used

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22 Sigmund Mowinckel, "The Name of the God of Moses," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 32 (1961) p. 126.

23 Raymond Abba, „The Divine Name Yahweh", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 80/4 (1961) pp. 320–328.323. Cf. S. Mowinckel, *The Two Sources of the Predeuteronomic Primeval History (J. E.) in Gen. i-xi*, (Oslo 1937) p. 55: "Yahwe is not telling his name to one who does not know it... The whole conversation presupposes that the Israelites know this name already."; M. Buber, *Mose: the revelation and the covenant* (Phaidon Press 1946) pp. 43–44: "All we have to do is to compare the peculiarities of the God of Moses with those of the God of the Fathers... If the material of the Bible is subjected to such an examination, the two likenesses will be found to differ in a special manner; namely, just as a clan god in non-historical situations might be expected to differ from a national god in an historical situation. Yet at the same time it can be observed that both depict the identical god."

24 See F. H. W. Gesenius, *A Hebrew and English lexicon of the Old Testament, including the Biblical Chaldee* (7th edition, Baker Book House; 1979), p. 546.

in asking a person's name; for this interrogative pronoun *mî* is employed.[25] In this way Moses seems to indicate that the question pertained to God's character not the recitation of His name.

3) Explanation

Numerous commentators, exegetes and theologians have observed that in God's answer from the burning bush in Exodus 3,14–15:

> NJB God said to Moses, 'I am he who is.' And he said, 'This is what you are to say to the Israelites, "I am has sent me to you." God further said to Moses, 'You are to tell the Israelites, "Yahweh, the God of your ancestors, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you." This is my name for all time, and thus I am to be invoked for all generations to come.
>
> TNK And God said to Moses, "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh." He continued, "Thus shall you say to the Israelites, 'Ehyeh sent me to you.'" And God said further to Moses, "Thus shall you speak to the Israelites: The LORD [YHWH], the God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to you: This shall be My name forever, This My appellation for all eternity.

is given an explanation of the tetragrammaton that connects it with the verbal stem H-W-H- or H-Y-H, 'to be', also 'to become, to befall'. G. Parke-Taylor has called these attempts to interpret the letters of tetragrammaton YHWH in terms of 'being', 'happening', or 'bringing to pass' as 'hayyaology'.[26]

God's answer involves a play on words on the first person imperfect of the verb *hāya(h)*.[27] For the Hebrew speaking audience

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[25] See Judg 13 17. Cf. M. Buber, Moses, pp. 48–49. He also concurs that the question seeks to find the expression in or behind that name, cf. Pamela Vermes, "Buber's Understanding of the Divine Name," *Journal of Jewish Studies* 24 [Autumn 1973] p. 147.

[26] G. Parke-Taylor, *Yahweh: The Divine Name in the Bible*, (Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1975) pp. 48–62, 98.

[27] Puns and wordplay in the Bible is quite common. Cf. Scott B. Noegel (ed.), Puns and Pundits: Wordplay in the Hebrew Bible and Ancient Near Eastern Literature (Bethesda, MD 2000).

the repeated assonance of Exod. 3:14–15: " … Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh. , Ehyeh … YHWH …", is obvious.[28] It does suggest that the connection with the root H-W-H- or H-Y-H gives meaning to the divine name YHWH. But this does not necessarily mean that the name YHWH is sourced etymologically in the verb *hāyā(h),* which could only suggest the meaning of the name YHWH.[29]

Many scholars as Mowinckel observe in reference to God's answer, that "instead of the name we get an explanation of the name."[30] For this reason it seems better to see God's answer as both a name and an explanation of it. In verse 14a, "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh." (NJB I am he who is) could be the name in the form of an epithet with verse 14b containing a shortened form "Ehyeh" (NJB I am). Two other passages which clearly use "Ehyeh" as a proper name are Psalm 40:21 and Hosea 1:9.[31] This would result in three forms of the name given to Moses: (1) "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh"; (2) "Ehyeh"; and (3) YHWH (Exod. 3:15).

It can't be overlooked that the theme of the divine encounter with Moses in Exodus 3 is the establishment of a new covenant relationship between God and the people of Israel. God has visited his suffering people and is now about to deliver them through Moses (Exod 3 7–10, 16–17). In this context Abba points, that with the call of Moses there is given the repeated assurance of the divine presence, "I will be with you," (see Exod 3 12; 4 12, 15; 33 14; Josh 1 5). Hence "Ehyeh" in Exod 3 14 is to be understood in the light of the promise, which precedes it (*'ehye(h) immāk* "NKJ I will certainly be

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28 Cf. Dennis J. McCarthy, "Exod. 3:14," *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 40 (July 1978) p. 316: "the repeated sound has by mere suggestion tied Yahweh to hyh [i.e. *hāyā(h)*] irrevocably."

29 Cf. E. Schild, "On Exodus iii 14-'I Am That I Am,'" *Vetus Testamentum* 4 (July 1954) p. 301: "it must be granted that the passage seeks to explain the meaning of the Divine name, no matter what its real originad derivation, as a derivative of hayah . . . ." .

30 S. Mowinckel, "The Name of the God of Moses," *Hebrew Union College Annual* 32 (1961) p. 124.

31 CF. Charles D. Isbell, "The Divine Name "Ehyeh" as a Symbol of Presence in Israelite Tradition," *Hebrew Annual Review* 2 (1978) pp. 102–5. Isbell points out that in each case (Ps. 50:21 and Hos. 1:9) the context makes the tense clear and that therefore the term "Ehyeh" is probably not needed unless understood as a name.

with you. ", Exod 3 12) and follows it ("NKJ I will be with your mouth", Exod 4 12, 15). It is the same word with the same meaning: "I will be present." The reply to Moses, "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" (Exod 3 14), could be only a more emphatic affirmation of this assurance- i. e., "I will indeed be present."[32]

This short analysis provides a background for evaluating the various interpretations of the divine name. In distilling the vast amount of literature on the subject, Charles R. Gianotti following works of D.J. McCarthy, S. Mowinckel and J.A. Motyer, has described five popular views.[33]

(1) The "Unknowable" View

The name YHWH could reflect the incomprehensibility of God. Proponents of this view see in God's answer a rejection of Moses' question on the grounds that His name constitutes a mystery, since it is impossible to define God.[34]

(2) The "Ontological" View

This view seems to rest on the Septuagint translation of Exodus 3:14: "And God spoke to Moses, saying, I am THE BEING [Gr.: *'egô´ 'eimi 'o ''ôn*]; and he said, Thus shall ye say to the children of Israel, THE BEING [Gr. *'o ''ôn*] has sent me to you.". The use of the participle present active from the verb *'eimi* "be, exist" in the Greek translation supports the view, that the name YHWH in Exodus 3 "reveals God as the Being who is absolutely self-existent, and who, in Himself, possesses essential life and permanent existence."[35] But this view

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32 Cf. A. B. Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 56.

33 Charles R. Gianotti, "The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH," *Bibliotheca Sacra* (January-March 1985) pp. 38–51.

34 Cf. Zimmerli, *Old Testament Theology in Outline* (trans. D.E. Green; Edinburgh 1978) p. 20: "In this figure of speech resounds the sovereign freedom of Yahweh, who, even at the moment he reveals himself in his name, refuses simply to put himself at the disposal of humanity to comprehend him. We must also take into account God's refusal to impart his name to Jacob in Genesis 32:30, "Why do you ask about My name?".

35 Merrill Unger, *Unger's Bible Dictionary* (Chicago: Moody Press, 1957) p. 56. Among Jewish scholars, Maimonides and Jacobs represent this view.

imports a foreign concept to the Old Testament, because in Hebrew 'being' is 'a dynamic, powerful, effective being,' in contrast to Greek thought, which understands being as something immutable.[36] It must be remembered that the Septuagint was compiled in Alexandria for Greek-speaking and Hellenized Jews, so it was probably influenced by a Greek "ontology" .

(3) The "Causative" View

Some scholars have viewed the divine name as YHWH a hiphil form with a causative meaning -i.e., Yahweh is "He who causes to be," "the Creator."[37] So Albright states that the Tetragrammaton can only be derived from the verbal stem HWY, but cannot be the ordinary imperfect (qal) of the verb, but must be causative (hiphil imperfect, third masculine). Freedman accepts this analysis and based on the connection between YHWH and the verb hayah in Exodus 3:14 he concludes that "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" means essentially, "I cause to be what comes into existence."[38] This view is very attractive, but against it must be urged the fact that there is no known example of the verb HYH in the *hiphil*: the causative is expressed by the *pi'el*.

(4) The "Covenantal" View

The theme of the divine encounter with Moses in the book pf Exodus is the establishment of a new covenant relationship between God and the people of Israel, so the God of the Mosaic Covenant is YHWH. The repeated introductions to the commandments at Sinai "I am YHWH ..." give credence to this view (e.g., Exod. 20:1; Lev. 18:2,

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36 Cf. K. H Bernhardt (ed.), "hyh" in: *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament,* 3 381; B Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament* (New York, 1906) ρ. 155, cf. W. Zimmerli, *Old Testament Theology in Outline* (trans. D.E. Green; Edinburgh 1978) ρ 20; U. Simon, *A Theology of Salvation* (London 1961) ρ 89,

37 See P. Haupt, "Der Name Jahwe," *OLZ* 2 (1909) pp. 211–214; W F Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Garden City, NY 1957) ρ 259; D. N. Freedman, "The Name of the God of Moses," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 79 (1960) 152–53. Also see Samuel S Cohon, *Jewish Theology* (Assen 1971), ρ 197; J. Bright, *A History of Israel* (Luisville 1960). pp. 137 f.

38 D. N. Freedman, "The Name of the God of Moses," *Journal of Biblical Literature* 79 (1960) pp. 152–53.

4, 21, 30). The verb *hāyā(h)* to which YHWH is connected occurs often in covenantal formulas (e.g., Deut. 26:17–18; Jer. 7:23; 11:4, 24; 24:7; 31:33; 32:38; Ezek. 36:28; 37:27). Motyer connects YHWH with explicit references to the covenant with the fathers and with the verb "to redeem," concluding that "the heart of the Mosaic revelation of Yahweh was that He was going to redeem His people."[39] Finally as Gianotti conclude, this view does not take into consideration the full ramifications of the meaning of the verb *hāyā(h),* and the name YHWH takes on much wider implications.[40]

(5) The "Phenomenological" View

According to this view the divine name YHWH means that God will reveal Himself in His actions through history. The use of the verb *hāyā(h)* in the creation accounts leads one to perceive God's active manifestation in the beginning of "history" (Gen. 1:3, 5–6). Implicit in this view is of course the "covenantal" view. Israel freed from their bondage in Egypt will worship their covenant God (Exod 3:12; cf. 4:12.15). The presence of the Savior God with his covenant people is symbolized by the pillar of cloud and fire, the tabernacle and the ark, does accompany them in the wilderness (Exod 13:21–22; 14:19; 16:10; 25:8.22; 29:42–43.45; etc.). This effective presence is the central point (Exod 17 15) of their religious and national unity as the "people of Yahweh." This lead A. B. Davidson to see in formula "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" (Exod 3,14) the idea of the Greek *'o èrxomaı* in the sense of YHWH coming in action – His active coming. Motyer sees *hāyā(h)* with a similar connotation of Greek *gínesthaı* instead of *eìnaı*.[41] God is present in history manifesting Himself to others and especially to Israel. Bible scholars point out that "Ehyeh-Asher-Ehyeh" expresses not just abstract existence, but rather points to the God's active manifestation of existence.

It has been already pointed by scholars that there are many indications that the name Yahweh is very ancient, and probably

39 J. A. Motyer, *The Revelation of the Divine Name* (London 1956) ρ. 24

40 The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH, p. 45.

41 A B Davidson, *The Theology of the Old Testament (*Edinburgh 1904) pp. 54–57,70–71; J.A. Motyer, *The Revelation of the Divine Name* (London 1956) ρ .21.

it received a new significance in the exodus period. Its form is archaic, retaining the *waw* that was later replaced by a *yod* in the verb *hāyā(h)* with which the name might be connected. This change took place long before the time of Moses.[42] But in general, the use of the name YHWH in the Bible points to God's relationship to Israel in both His saving acts and His retributive acts, manifesting His phenomenological effectiveness in Israel's history.[43]

III. Translating Tetragrammaton – transliteration or title

It is customary to regard the Tetragrammaton as a sacred name which pious Hebrews and Jews did not pronounce, substituting for it the common Semitic word *'adonay* meaning "my Lord". Such a view, although very popular, has its weaknesses. According to Jewish tradition, until the time of the prophet Ezra, the Israelites pronounced the Tetragrammaton freely, but later they read it aloud as *'adonay* and as time passed it gradually dropped out of general use. Hypothetically could it be, that the priests to prevent its possible profanation encouraged the people to abandon the true pronunciation of the Name. So the people, in order to avoid this mysterious name read Adonai when they encountered it in the biblical text, and even in writing the Tetragrammaton began to fall into disuse. Nevertheless YHWH still retained its sacred character probably because its origin had accompanied the great event of the giving of the law.

When the Septuagint was translated no attempt was made to translate YHWH, but later, according to E. C. B. MacLaurin, the Christians who felt no longer bound by the tradition of the fathers did not hesitate to replace it by *kyrios* "Lord", the equivalent of *'adon-* "a thing they would not have dared to do had the name

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42 Cf. Raymond Abba, „The Divine Name Yahweh", *Journal of Biblical Literature*, 80/4 (1961) p. 322: „Since cognate languages keep the *waw*, the tetragrammaton would seem to go back to a time when Hebrew approximated far more closely to its kindred tongues."

43 Charles R. Gianotti, "The Meaning of the Divine Name YHWH," *Bibliotheca Sacra* (January-March 1985) p. 48.

appeared as sacred to them as it did to the Massoretes some seven centuries later."[44] The Christian rejection of the transliteration YHWH – and also of the untransliterated Hebrew letters – in the Septuagint could be one of the chief factors that sanctified it among the Jews.

Now in many English translations of the Bible the title "LORD," sometimes written in small capitals, is used to represent the four Hebrew letters YHWH. Other six options for the translation of YHWH are listed by Kees F. de Blois[45]:

(1) Transliterate YHWH using a variant of either *Yahweh* or *Jehovah.*

(2) Translate the title *Lord.*

(3) Translate the meaning of YHWH.

(4) Translate YHWH and *'elohim* ('God') the same way.

(5) Use a name from the target culture.

(6) Use a combination of the above options.

Fore sure the names have meaning, just as words do. But as Nico Daams[46] has argued a name is primarily used to refer to a person, and so it is the identity of a particular person that a name is heard or seen. When the Hebrew people saw the name, in the form of the Tetragrammaton YHWH, they saw it as a reference to their God. In some contexts certain connotations of YHWH are essential to the meaning of the text, while in other contexts only the central meaning, 'God', is in focus. Following this way of thinking, in the former contexts YHWH should be transliterated, but elsewhere the word for 'God' could be substituted without any loss of meaning. Daams has rightly identified three instances where the Hebrew Tetragrammaton should be transliterated as *YHWH*:

(1) Where the name is in focus

(2) Where *YHWH* is joined to *'elohim* or *'adonay*

(3) Where *YHWH* is in a descriptive phrase (e.g., *YHWH* the God of Israel)

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44 E. C. B. MacLaurin, "YHWH, the Origin of the Tetragrammaton," *Vetus Testamentum* 12/4 (1962) pp. 461–2.

45 Kees F. de Blois, "How to translate the Name." *The Bible Translator* 43/4 (1992) pp. 403–405.

46 Nico Daams, "Translating YHWH", *Journal of Translation* 1/1 (2005) pp. 47–55.

IV. Function of the Tetragrammaton – word or sign?

The statement of J.M. Hoffman that "it is hardly credible that a society focused on worshiping one God would absolutely forget that one God's name" can't be easily ignored[47]. Even with the traditional religious opinion that only the High Priest knew the pronunciation, this hypothesis remains untenable. Surely the secret of the Tetragrammaton could not have been so well guarded as tradition teaches. So another explanation must be found why no traditional pronunciation is associated with those letters.

Already in Deuteronomy the practices are described, by which the Hebrews were exercised to not forget the covenant with their God.

> **Dt 6:6–9:** NKJ *And these words which I command you today shall be in your heart. You shall teach them diligently to your children, and shall talk of them when you sit in your house, when you walk by the way, when you lie down, and when you rise up. You shall bind them as a sign on your hand, and they shall be as frontlets between your eyes. You shall write them on the doorposts of your house and on your gates."*

Mainly they depended on repeating "these words" (presumably to memorize them) but also, significantly, by writing them down. In this way the Hebrews were among the first nations that could instruct their masses the art of writing. As J.M. Hoffman observed, this picture rising from the Bible ties monotheism to writing. "The vowel letters may have been invented by scribes for the purpose of making it easier for the masses to write. Perhaps what the scribes wanted the masses to write was nothing less than the central creeds of the emerging Judaism. A religious leaders may have realized that writing was central to spreading the word of God. And vowels were central to letting people read and write."[48]

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47 J.M. Hoffman, *In the Beginning: A Short History of the Hebrew Language*, (New York University Press, 2006) pp. 39–47: Chapter 4: *Magic Letters and the Name of God*..

48 J.M. Hoffman, *In the Beginning: A Short History of the Hebrew Language*, (New York University Press, 2006) pp. 39–47: Chapter 4: *Magic Letters and the Name of God*.

In Jewish tradition, YHWH is pronounced 'adonay ("our Lord") from which, by way of the Greek kyrios in the Septuagint and the Latin Dominus in Vulgate translations, the English appellation "the Lord" comes. But this traditional pronunciation associated with that word does not come from the letters in the word – clearly, YHWH is not spelt 'adonay.

Whether the Tetragrammaton YHWH spelt 'adonay is the only word in the Scripture that was not pronounced roughly phonetically or it had no proper pronunciation, so why 'adonay was chosen? The question remains why the four-letter word YHWH was chosen to represent the Hebrew God. The answer given by Hoffman is that "the letters in YHWH were chosen not because of the sounds they represent, but because of their symbolic power in that they were the Hebrews' magic vowel letters that no other culture had". He assumed that YHWH had no traditional pronunciation not because the pronunciation was lost but because it never had a pronunciation. Having in mind the "Hebrews' great invention" of matres lectionis – the use of the consonant letters yod (Y), waw (W), he (H), and even aleph (') of the Hebrew alphabet also to write long vowels in some cases – it is surprising that those exact letters were used for the Tetragrammaton. According to Hoffman it was in the names of the first patriarch (Abram-AbraHam) and matriarch (Saray – SaraH), and in the name God (EloHim), that the letter he has been used "magically" – even twice in YHWH.

The hypothesis that the letters of the Tetragrammaton were chosen only for their symbolic value, rather than their pronunciation, could be further supported by a curious detail about the Dead Sea Scrolls and other earliest biblical manuscripts:

> – Almost all of the manuscripts (i.e. 11QPs[11Q5] "Psalms Scroll") are written in the newer square (Aramaic) script but in some cases revert to the older Hebrew (Phoenician) script for the Tetragrammaton. Why in the Hebrew texts only the Tetragrammaton would be written in the older letters forms?
> – If YHWH as God's name is written in the older script out of reverence, then why 'elohim, the other word for "God" was written in the newer script like the rest of the text?[49]

[49] However in some scrolls, the words 'el [God] and 'ely [my God] were also written in the older script.

> – The Tetragrammaton is the only word that was written solely in the older Hebrew script in some Greek translations in the oldest manuscripts of the Septuagint.[50]

These evidences were used by Hoffman to explain the assumption that the point of the Tetragrammaton was not its pronunciation – for which modern letters would have been required – but rather the letters themselves. This could explain the reason that the authors of the scrolls tried to preserve the old letters in their original form.

The next evidence, that suggests that the Tetragrammaton was not simply a name for God is the fact that YHWH occurs frequently in the syntagma "the name of YHWH(Lord)". The psalmist commonly exclaims, "may YHWH name be blessed" rather than the seemingly more straightforward "may YHWH be blessed," (Ps 113:1: TNK Hallelujah. O servants of the LORD, give praise; praise the name of the LORD; or Pro 18:10: The name of the LORD is a tower of strength To which the righteous man runs and is safe.). These curious expressions are used primarily with YHWH, seldom with Elohim, and never with the name *'adonay*.

Finally J.M. Hoffman proposed theory that "the letters in the Tetragramaton YHWH were chosen not for their phonetic value but because they were the Hebrew's magic letters."[51] This theory attempts to explain why in addition to a lack of clear pronunciation, YHWH seems to defy any clear etymology.

Conclusion – The Tetragrammaton YHWH was pronounced but not as a proper name

The Tetragrammaton YHWH, regardless of its pronunciation or lack thereof, even in form seems anomalous in Hebrew. There is an evident asymmetry between the Tetragrammaton and other appellatives for God; this fact supports the view that YHWH was not

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[50] Cf. Patric W. Skehan, "The divine name at Qumran, in the Masada Scroll, and in the Septuagint." *Bulletin of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies* 13 (1980) pp. 32–34.

[51] J.M. Hoffman, *In the Beginning: A Short History of the Hebrew Language*, (New York 2006) p. 47:

simply another name for God. The position of the word YHWH is different from the typical Sacred Name in the Bible: it is derived from no certain root; usually there is another divine designation beside it which is pronounced when it occurs in the Bible; it is not so ancient as for example Elohim; it largely ceased in later literature. In spite of Hoffman's radical statement there are some facts, which suggest, that the Tetragrammaton YHWH was having its own pronunciation associated with the letters in this word.

Of course the opinion of many scholars as E. C. B. MacLaurin[52] should be repeated that there is no conclusive early evidence that the name was ever pronounced "Yahweh" but there is plenty of early evidence for the theophoric elements as: *Hū'*, *Yah*, *Yo-*, *Yau-*, *-yah* and perhaps *-yo*. The form *Yahu* is only found combined with other elements in proper names in the Hebrew Bible but does occur separately in early Hebrew epigraphic thus indicating that "YHWH is the form of the name which religious tradition has specially preserved."

In this discussion we can't forget some ancient extra biblical occurrences of the Tetragramaton. The word YHWH is found already on the Moabite Stone (IX c. B.C.E.) in a religious context. MacLaurin suggests that, the Moabite scribe probably chose this "official" form of the name in "a deliberate attempt to humiliate its Bearer".

> *…And Chemosh said to me, Go take Nebo against Israel, and I went in the night and I fought against it from the break of day till noon, and I took it: and I killed in all seven thousand men, but I did not kill the women and maidens, for I devoted them to Ashtar-Chemosh; and I took from it the vessels of Jehovah* [YHWH]*, and offered them before Chemosh. …* [53]

It seems impossible that the Moabite scribe could use the form YHWH without knowledge of its pronunciation. This same could be say about the Hebrew scribes of the inscriptions on the Pithoi

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52 E. C. B. MacLaurin, "YHWH, the Origin of the Tetragrammaton," *Vetus Testamentum* 12/4 (1962) pp. 461–462.

53 Simon B. Parker, *Stories in Scripture and Inscriptions: Comparative Studies on Narratives in Northwest Semitic Inscriptions and the Hebrew Bible* (Oxford University Press. 1997) p. 44.

A and B from Kuntillet 'Ajrud IX-VIII c. B.C.E.)[54], Pithos A, in the commonly accepted interpretation, speaks of "Yahweh of Shomron (Samaria) and his asherah (or Asherah)." The inscription on Pithos B states, "I bless you by Yahweh of Teman and by his asherah (or Asherah)."[55] For some scholars, these inscriptions refer not to a consort of Yahweh but to a tree-like cult symbol called "the asherah." In this way even references in the Bible to a goddess called (the) Asherah could be commonly misinterpreted and there too it should be seen only a tree-like cult symbol. Recent reevaluation argues that Asherah, like Baal, often treated and translated as a proper name, is probably a common noun or title. That is why Asherah and Baal are often preceded by the definite article. Baal is thus more properly rendered "the lord" and "Asherah" is better read as referring to a class of goddess or a cult symbol specified as "the asherah."[56]

Another inscription from the same period and similar to those from Kuntillet 'Ajrud was found in a tomb at Khirbet el-Kom.[57] In this inscription, carved into a wall of the tomb, someone is blessed "by Yahweh" and "by his asherah." Only one image of a hand accompanies this inscription.

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54 Kuntillet`Ajrud (Horvat Teiman) is the archaeological site in the northeastern portion of the Sinai Peninsula, nearly 50 km south of Kadesh Barnea, in Judean territory for that time. The datings of this site are from the end of the 9th century BCE and the beginning of the 8th. The site was excavated by Ze'ev Meshel and a team from the Institute of Archaeology of Tel Aviv University in 1975–76. Cf. FW. Dobbs-Allsopp, Roberts, JJM, Seow, CL and Whitaker, R, *Hebrew Inscriptions: Texts from theBiblical Period of the Monarchy with Concordance (Y*ale University Press London 2005) pp. 283–298

55 An alternative to "his Asherah," which curiously refers to a proper name with the possessive "his," is "Asherata," a variation on the Biblical name Asherah that is attested at Ekron during the Iron Age. For evidence in favor of this option, see R. Hess, "Yahweh and His Asherah? Epigraphic Evidence for Religious Pluralism in Old Testament Times," in B. Winter, D. Wright (ed.), *One God, One Lord in a World of Religious Pluralism* (Cambridge 1991) pp. 5–33.

56 Cf. B. Halpern, "The Baal (and the Asherah) in Seventh-Century Judah: YHWH's Retainers Retired." *Konsequente Traditionsgeschichte*, OBO 126 (Fribourg 1993) pp. 15–54.

57 Khirbet el-Qom is located about 13 kilometers west of Hebron, and lies in the foothills between the Judaean mountains and the coastal plain. Cf. W.G. Dever, "Inscriptions from Khirbet el-Kom", Qadmoniot 4 (1971) pp. 90–92.

> *Uriyahu the honourable has written this Blessed is/be Uriyahu by Yahweh And [because?] from his oppressors by his asherah he has saved him* [written] *by Oniyahu .. .by his asherah ...and his asherah.*[58]

The knowledge of pronunciation of Tetragrammaton YHWH also seems to be expressed by the authors of the letters on ostraca from Lachish (Letters 1–9; VI c. B.C.); i.e. Letter Number 2:

> *... To my lord, Yaush, may YHWH cause my lord to hear tiding(s) of peace today, this very day! Who is your servant, a dog, that my lord remembered his [se]rvant? May YHWH make known(?) to my [lor] d a matter of which you do not know ....*[59]

Finally it should be recorded that the Jewish translators of the Greek Septuagint were not consistent in the replacement of YHWH by *'Adonay* in the Greek word *kyrios* as the Christian scribes were doing.[60] When Jewish scribes did transliterate YHWH they rendered it by this same Hebrew form, or sometimes as *'Ieuô* (i.e. 4QLXXLev\b [4Q120] the Septuagint fragment found at Qumran from Leviticus 3:12) or similar forms which suggests its own pronunciation. Similarly Theodoret[61] said that the Samaritans pronounced the Tetragrammaton as *'Iabe* – name or as a reverential periphrasis.[62] Even the other Christian writer Clement of Alexandria, around 180

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58 O. Keel, Ch. Uehlinger, *Gods, goddesses, and images of God in ancient Israel* (Fortress Press, 1998) 239.

59 Cf. Ze'ev Meshel, *Kuntillet 'Ajrud: An Iron Age II Religious Site on the Judah-Sinai Border* (Jerusalem 2012); Shmuel Ahituv, *Echoes from the Past (*Jerusalem 2008) pp. 60–85.

60 „the Greek Bible text, so far as it was written by Jews for Jews did not translate the Divine name by Kyrios but the Tetragrammaton written with Hebrew or Greek letters was retained in such MSS. It was the Christians who replaced the Tetragrammaton by kyrios, when the Divine name written in Hebrew letters was not understood any more", Kahle, The Cairo Genizah (2nd edition, Blackwell; 1947) p. 222.

61 Theodoret of Cyrus or Cyrrhus (c. 393 – c. 457 AD) was an influential Christian author, theologian, and bishop of Cyrrhus (423–457). Cf. Fr. Young, A. Teal, *From Nicaea to Chalcedon: A Guide to the Literature and its Background, (2nd edn, 2004)* 323–238.

62 J. E. H. Thomson, *The Samaritans, Their Testimony to the Religion of Israel* (reprinted, New York 1976) p. 178. Similar pronunciation presents Epiphanius.

C.E., spelt the shortened name as *Iau(e),* using the vowel sounds corresponding to Hebrew *mater lectionis* letters YHW.

> Stromata, V.6*: Further, the mystic name of the four letters which was affixed to those alone to whom the adytum was accessible, is called "Iaoue," which is interpreted, "Who is and shall be." The name of God, too, among the Greeks contains four letters* [Greek: *th-e-o-s*].[63]

These phonetic transcriptions of the Tetragrammaton presented in some Greek text, from the premassoretic period, witness not only to the equivalents of the sacred Name but also to pronunciation strictly associated with the letter of the Tetragramaton.

In conclusion it is possible to propose the understanding of the Tetragrammaton as the word for the sign describing God's character but not necessarily his proper name.

SUMMARY

The Greek term *tetragrámmaton* "four letters" refers to the Hebrew theonym written as the four consonants transliterated to the Latin letters as YHWH (JHWH), which are considered to be a proper name of the God used in the Hebrew Bible. Although it is not certain when the Tetragrammaton ceased to be pronounced, ultimately lack of its use resulted in uncertainty over the tradition of vowel sounds in the name and hence in its meaning. Even Van der Toorn in analyzing potential sources for the name YHWH, has pointed out that the significance of the name Yahweh used to be "a subject of a staggering amount of publications" – including the story from Exodus. The magic-letter theory developed by J.M. Hoffman accounts for lack of etymological derivation for YHWH by specifically claiming that the Hebrews appreciated the value of their newly-found vowel letters [*waw, he, yod*] so much that they used them to define membership in their group, as it was with the names Abraham (from Abram), Sarah (from Saray), and one name for God. The Hebrews took the letters *yod*, *he*, and *waw*, which had already been used to represent consonantal sounds, and used them to represent vowel sounds as well. In doing so, they paved the way not only for the preservation of their own writings, but also the widespread use of

[63] *Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata*, V.6transl.: William Wilson, *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, Vol. 2). The 11th century Greek Codex Laurentianus V 3 quotes Clement as writing "Iaou" and not "Iaoue".

alphabets throughout the world. These vowel letters were destined to play a pivotal role in all of Hebrew's various stages. The Hebrew writers by the connection between the name of God and the vowel letters seem to tie the idea of (heno)monotheism to their works. It must have been overlooked that the names had meaning, just as words do. But a name is primarily used to refer to a person, and therefore it contains the identity of a particular person whose name is heard or seen. When the Israelites saw the Tetragrammaton YHWH they saw it as a reference to their God. In some contexts certain connotations of YHWH are essential to the meaning of the text, while in other contexts YHWH should be transliterated as a sign, but elsewhere only the word for 'God' could be substituted without any loss of meaning. The Tetragrammaton YHWH, regardless of its pronunciation or lack thereof, even in form seems anomalous in Hebrew. There is an evident asymmetry between the Tetragrammaton and other appellatives for God; this fact supports the view that YHWH was not simply another name for God. There is no conclusive early evidence that this form was ever pronounced "Yahweh" but there are plenty of evidences for similar theophoric elements in proper names in the Hebrew Bible and in early Hebrew epigraphic, thus indicating that the Tetragrammaton YHWH had its own vocalized form which religious tradition has preserved. Additionally some ancient extra biblical occurrences of the Tetragrammaton testify that it is impossible that the Moabite or Hebrew scribe could use the form YHWH without any knowledge of its pronunciation (e.g. the Moabite Stone, Pithoi A and B from Kuntillet 'Ajrud, ostraca from Lachish, etc.). Similarly the phonetic transcriptions of the Tetragrammaton presented in some Greek text from the premassoretic period witness not only to the equivalents of the sacred Name (i.e. *Kyrios*, *'o ''ôn*) but also to pronunciation strictly associated with the letter of the Tetragramaton (i.e. *'Ieuô, 'Iabe*). Already Clement of Alexandria, at the end of II c., spelt the shortened name as *Iau(e),* using the vowel sounds corresponding to Hebrew *mater lectionis* letters Y-H-W. In conclusion it is posible to propose the understanding of the Tetragrammaton as the word for the sign describing God's character but not necessarily his proper name.

KEY words: Tetragrammaton, YHWH, Exodus 3:14–15, the Hebrew theonym; God's Name.

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5.

PAWEŁ SAJDEK

Śabda in Ancient Grammarians' Doctrines[1]

1. From mysticism of language to its descriptive grammar

> *OM*
> *catvāri śṛṅgā trayo asya pādā dve śīrṣe sapta hastāso asya |*
> *tridhā baddho vṛṣabho roraviti maho devo martyāṁ ā viveśa ||*
> [It has four horns, three feet, two heads and seven hands |
> Triply bound the bull is roaring! The great god entered the mortal.][2]

The above description of a rather fancy, not to say weird, creature comes from a Vedic hymn and is largely believed to be a description of a language. According to Patañjali[3] the four horns are the four parts of speech (noun, verb, preposition and particle), three

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[1] Artykuł został opublikowany w czasopiśmie "Argument" nr 1 ISSN 20-83-6635, Jun 2016 pod tytułem: *Śabda in the Ancient Indian Grammarians, Doctrines*.

[2] RV IV.58.3.

[3] MBh 1 p. 64: *catvāri śṛṅgāni catvāri pada-jātāni nāmākhyātopasarga-nipātāḥ ca. trayaḥ asya pādāḥ trayaḥ kālāḥ bhūta-bhaviṣyad-vartamānāḥ. dve śīrṣe dvau śabdātmānau nityaḥ kāryaḥ ca. sapta hastāsaḥ asya sapta vibhaktayaḥ. tridhā baddhaḥ triṣu sthāneṣu baddhaḥ urasi kaṇṭhe śirasi iti. vṛṣabhaḥ varṣaṇāt. roraviti śabdaṁ karoti. kutaḥ etat. rauti śabda-karmā.*

feet are the three tenses (past, future and present), two heads are two essences of the word – one eternal and the other as a result of human activity, seven hands are the seven cases of the declension (*vibhakti*), the triple bonds are the three places (*sthāna*) of origin of a word, i.e. the chest, the throat and the head, the roaring of the bull is the word or linguistic sound (śabda). The word is further referred to as „the great god" who enters the human beings and enables them to speak. It is by no means the only possible and existing interpretation of the mysterious four-horned and two-headed beast but all of them share the same certainty – the words of the hymn tell about language.

It hardly ever occurs to a western man that linguistics or grammar could be associated with any kind of mysticism or that they should be treated as the fundamental disciplines of all human knowledge. In India a proposition that the language is the most pivotal subject to study and that the study may bring one liberation, may pass for a platitude. In fact, the reasons for holding language and linguistics in such extraordinary reverence date back to early Vedic times. An offering ceremony was to reproduce on a microcosmic scale the macrocosmic principle of *ṛta*. Had the priest failed to perform everything to a nicety, the sacrifice would inevitably turn against him or against the one in whose favour the offering had been performed. Each sacrifice consists of some permanent elements: the fire, the offering material and the words of a Vedic hymn properly intoned. Actually, the word 'properly' should be emphasized all through the offer. If anything were not performed 'properly', the sacrifice would fail to be auspicious. On the contrary, its consequences would prove menacing for the sacrificer. Thus the priest who intoned the words of a hymn (*udgātṛ*) had to do his best to intone them precisely, which involved the necessity of correct pronunciation of vowels and consonants, the right pitch etc. The priest (*udgātṛ*) had to master the language, its grammar, its syntax, its phonetics included. It was the language that properly used had the power to yield success or wrongly used could cause misfortune. The language compelled respect and in the Vedic times identified with the goddess Vāc, who has been held in high esteem up to our days.

2. Early upanishadic understanding of śabda

There is no explicit term denoting what we call 'the word'. On the one hand the Sanskrit noun 'śabda' may mean 'a word', but also 'a phoneme', 'a sentence' or just 'a sound', depending on the author and on the context, on the other hand English 'word' can be understood as 'śabda' or '*pada*',[4] depending on the context. Initially 'śabda' signified any sound, not necessarily even a linguistic one or one produced by means of vocal organ. The sacred syllable AUM, which covers all possible meanings of the past, the presence and the future, was called śabda. MāṇḍU identifies the syllable (*akṣara*) with *brahman* and with the highest self (ātman). Remote as the doctrine still was from the subsequent theory of Bhartṛhari, both theories share one crucial feature: both in MāṇḍU and in Bhartṛhari the issue of the śabda-brahman seems to be inseparably associated with the idea of time. The doctrines are obviously different,[5] so that the Upanishadic concept of time can be at most considered as the germ of the Bhartṛharian theory of *kāla-śakti*, if not a parallel scheme. Nevertheless, taking into account the gap of about a millennium between MāṇḍU and Bhartṛhari, it can be assumed that the germ of the idea in the Upanishad, had a sufficiently long period of time to develop into an elaborate doctrine of the grammarian school.

3. Collecting words – first lexicons

Words, the basic meaningful components of the language, the integral part of each sacrifice, were considered sacred, therefore they became the object of collecting. Every reader of a Sanskrit text must first distinguish and isolate words which are not written separately but grouped together as far as the *devanāgarī* script allows to do so. Moreover, according to Sanksrit spelling rules, the *devanāgarī* script is expected to

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4 There are no lexical equivalents of Sanskrit 'śabda' and '*pada*', both being denoted by 'word'. Polish equivalents of 'śabda' and '*pada*' are '*słowo*' and '*wyraz*' respectively.

5 Cf. Gaurinath Sastri, p. XXIV: 'But we must be careful not to identify the Śabdabrahman of the grammarian with the Śabdabrahman of the Upaniṣads, for according to Bhartṛhari Śabdabrahman is identical with the Transcendental Reality'.

render all phonetic changes, including *sandhi* rules, like losing sonority of the final voiced consonant etc. Therefore, before reading, words had to be sundered. The first text to undergo such a process was *Ṛgveda* and one of the first authors of such a textual analysis was Śākalya. His work *Padapāṭha* is an analysis of the *Saṁhit*ā text in which he not only separated words, but also isolated components of compounds. so characteristic for Sanskrit. Śaunaka, the reputed author of a *prātiś*ā*khya* known as *Bṛhaddevat*ā, distinguishes a sentence (*vā*k*ya*) consisting of words (*pada*), which consist of phonemes (*varṇa*). Real collections of words, however, were texts called *nighaṇṭu*, regarded as the first lexicons in the world. Vedic texts were becoming increasingly archaic. In order to preserve the correct pronunciation of vedic words it was no longer sufficient to make a *pada-pāṭha*. The words were listed, collected and grouped according to their form and meaning. The most famous author of a commentary to a *nighaṇṭu*, Yāska, defined it as follows:

> The list [of words] to memorize. This needs elucidation. Such a list is called *nighaṇṭavaḥ*. Where does it come from? From *nigam*ā*ḥ*, [the Vedic words].[6]

4. Yāska – classification of words

It was Yāska, the author of the famous *Nirukta*, who first divided words into classes called *pada-j*ā*ta*, counterparts of our 'parts of speech'. The classes are: name (*n*ā*man*), verb (ā*khy*ā*ta*), preposition (*upasarga*) and particle (*nip*ā*ta*). The class of names includes nouns, pronouns (*sarvan*ā*man*) and adjectives, so everything inflected for case. One of the most inspiring ideas of Yāska was associating the definitions of noun (*n*ā*man*) and verb (ā*khy*ā*ta*) with verbal roots (*dh*ā*tu*) '*as*' and '*bh*ū' respectively. Here are the definitions:

> The basis of a verb is 'becoming' (*bh*ā*va*), the basis of a noun is 'being' (*sattva*).[7]

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6 Nir 1.1.1: *samāmnāyaḥ samāmnātaḥ. sa vyākhyātavyaḥ. tam imaṁ samāmnāyaṁ nighaṇṭava ity ācakṣate. nighaṇṭavaḥ kasmāt? nigamā ime bhavanti.*

7 Nir1.1: *bhāva-pradhānam ākhyātaṁ sattva-pradhānāni namāni.*

The terms are derivatives of *bh*ū and *as*, both meaning 'be, exist', the former denoting 'being' more in the sense of 'becoming', 'changing', whereas the latter 'being' in a more static sense. Consequently, the essence of a verb is determined by change, movement, action, whereas a noun is considered to be the motionless, changeless and static element. Yāska was arguably one of the first thinkers who associated linguistics with ontology.

Nearly a millenium later Bhartṛhari, the greatest philosopher of the grammarian and śabdā*dvaita* school, considered *bhāva* and *sattva* to be two aspects of *satt*ā, the Ultimate Reality, the śabda-brahman. If the Reality is manifested as a sequence of time (*kāla*), it is referred to as *bhāva* or *kriy*ā, without the sequence of time as *sattva*. The term *satt*ā was by no means a new coinage of Bhartṛhari, his original contribution, however, was distinguishing between *sattva* and *satt*ā.

Subsequent thinkers of *advaita* school took advantage of the differentiation in their attempt to elucidate the ontological status of empirical reality (*vyavahāra*). The eternal, changeless, unmoving Ultimate Being 'is' (*asti*), whereas the ever-changing phenomenal world 'is being', as it were, 'is becoming'. The world cannot be predicated in terms of 'being' (*sattva*), neither can Brahman be predicated in terms of 'becoming' (*bhāva*). The principle of inexpressibility of ontological status of the phenomenal world in terms of being and non-being (*sad-asad-anirvacanīyatva*) became part of the doctrine of the *bhāmatī*-school of *advaitavedānta*.

5. Patañjali's instruction in śabda – definition

The initial words of the eminent and vast commentary on Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* written by Patañjali are:

> Here is the instruction in śabda.[8]

The first definition proposed by Patañjali refers to the colloquial meaning of the word:

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8 *atha śabdānuśāsanam.*

> So śabda is said to be a sound (*dhvani*) which people associate with a meaningful word (*pada*). (...) Thus śabda is a sound (*dhvani*).[9]

The 'association with a meaningful word' consists in the signifying power of the word (*artha-śakti*) which lies therein. That being so, whenever the sound '*gauḥ*' is perceived, a cow is visualized. We can easily indicate the referent when we hear '*gauḥ*' ('cow') or '*aśva*' ('horse'). Some elements of language, however, fail to 'signify' in a similar way: *atha, iti, pra, pari, upa,uta* etc. Should they be considered to be 'words' (śabda)?

The sound 'associated with a meaningful word' (*pratīta-padārthakaḥ*) requires the context of worldly practice (*loka-vyavahāra*) beyond which its meaning cannot be understood. Therefore words like prepositions (*upasarga*) and particles (*nipāta*) are also treated as śabda, though in isolation they fail to have a meaning of their own. Thus the formula: 'a word (śabda) is a sound (*dhvani*) and meaning (*artha*)' – covers all elements of a language.

It is not sufficient for a word to be a sound. The sound must be articulated (*uccarita*), pronounced by means of our vocal organ, it must be a language sound, associated with meaning. Consequently, word (śabda) must have two natures: phonetic, as physically pronounced (*uccārita*) by means of speech organs and semantic, as a *signifié*, being a notion (*pratyaya*) in the recipient's mind. Hence another attempt to define 'śabda':

> What is perceived by hearing, grasped by intelect, elucidated by utterance and positioned in space (ākāśa) – is word (śabda).[10]

Patañjali follows the *nyāya* doctrine in which sound is the only attribute of space (*ambara-guṇa*), a vibration of ether (ākāśa), perceivable for the sense organ of hearing (śruta) consisting of the identical element, according to the Empedocles' principle 'similar

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9 MBh 1 p. 19: *athavo pratīta-padārthako loke dhvaniḥ śabda ity ucyate. (...) tasmād dhvaniḥ śabdaḥ.*

10 MBh 1 p. 98: śrotropalabdhir buddhi-nirgrāhyaḥ *prayogeṇābhijvalita* ākāśa-deśaḥ *śabdaḥ.*

by similar'.[11] One point, however, remains vague: how is it possible that the vibration of ether is capable to transfer a notion to the intellect. The nature of sound is identical with ether, entirely different from the mental nature of intellect. Why is an utterance accessible to the ear (śrutopalabdhi) capable of conveying mental contents, accessible to the intellect (*buddhi-nigrāhya*)?

Patañjali advocates the view that the meaningful element which he called '*sphoṭa*' is possible to be revealed by phonemes (*varṇābhivyaṅgya*). Their connection with the meaning is permanent and eternal. To support this thesis Patañjali quotes the legendary sage Vyāḍi:

> Then is word eternal or is it a result? (...) Words are eternal and in the eternal words there must be changeless, unmoved, not subject to destructibility and birth phonemes.[12]

Words being eternal, they precede their users in time. A man seeks for the right word in himself rather than creates a word he intends to use anew, since he was born with all necessary vocabulary already present in him. If words were just human products, argues Patañjali, we would buy them from a grammarian like jars from a potter.

5. Are phonemes meaningul? Patañjali's pros and cons

Patañjali seemed to anticipate a subsequent famous polemics between grammarians and *mīm*āṁsā-school. In the opinion of the latter, the meaning lies in phonemes and nowhere else, whereas grammarians claimed the existence of a meaningful element called *sphoṭa* which is above or beyond the physical sounds. According to them the linguistic unit like 'word' (*pada*) (the view of Maṇḍana Miśra) or 'sentence' (*vākya*) (the view of Bhartṛhari) is indivisible and

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[11] ὅμοιος ὁμοίῳ.

[12] MBh 1, p. 57.96: *kiṁ punaḥ nityaḥ śabdaḥ āhosvit kāryaḥ? (...) nityāś* ca śabdāḥ. *nityeṣu ca śabdeṣu kūṭasthair avicālabhir varṇair anapāyopajana-vikāribhiḥ.*

understandable only as a whole. Phonemes are artificial products of linguistic analysis of a word (*pada*), as well as word division is nothing more than a result of analysis of a sentence. Unlike a foreigner who must divide an utterance into smaller items in order to grasp the meaning, a native speaker of a language never analyses an utterance. Each utterance forms an indivisible, self-contained whole, so that any analysis of it is only a secondary and auxiliary act.

Patañjali seems to be the first to pose the question:

> So do the phonemes have any meaning or are they void of any meaning?[13]

Patañjali's answer was not straightforward. Initially he argues for the meaningfulness of phonemes, providing as many as four arguments for it. Firstly, there exists one-syllable (one-phoneme) words in the language:

> We believe that phonemes are meaningful seeing that there are one-syllable verb roots, nominal bases, affixes and particles.[14]

The existence of one-phoneme words proves that one phoneme suffices to convey the meaning. It might be argued, however, that conveying the meaning is not identical with being meaningful. The second argument seems more convincing and, what makes it still more interesting is its striking similarity to modern phonology:

> [Phonemes are meaningful] because a phoneme replaced by another phoneme changes the meaning [of the word].[15]

A substitution of one phoneme for another results in a change of meaning, like in *k*ū*pa* (well), *s*ū*pa* (soup), *y*ū*pa* (column). This leads

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13 MBh 1 p.131: *kiṁ punaḥ ime varṇāḥ arthavantaḥ* ā*hosvit anarthak*āḥ*?*

14 Ibid.: *dhātu-pratipādika-pratyaya-nipātānām eka-varṇānām artha-darṣanāt manyāmahe arthavantaḥ varṇāḥ iti.*

15 Ibid.: *varṇa-vyatyaye ca arth*ā*ntara-gaman*āt*.*

us to the conclusion that *ka*, *sa* and *ya* are semantically dfferent. A contemporary phonologist would indicate a distinctive feature in each of the phonemes. Patañjali was not far from the idea of binary phonological description. The third argument:

> When a phoneme is not perceived, the meaning is not understood.[16]

In the above example the meaning changed when one phoneme was substituted for another (*y* for *k*, *s* for *k* etc.). If the first phoneme were entirely removed, the remaining '*ūpa*' would make no sense at all. Thus omitting one phoneme can deprive a word of its meaning. The noun '*k*āṇḍī*raḥ*' means 'an archer', but 'āṇḍī*raḥ*' does not provide us with any knowledge (*an-artha-gatiḥ*). Should we draw the cocnlusion then that all the meaning of *'k*āṇḍī*raḥ*'is contained in the first phoneme? The conclusion would be valid if the omitted phoneme, pronounced in isolation, conveyed the knowledge of an archer, but it is not so. Besides, the word '*ṛkṣa*' (niedźwiedź) is complete, though one phoneme '*va*' added at the beginning of the word would radically change its meaning (*vṛkṣa* ='tree'). Actually, the problem lies in an aggregate (*saṁghāta*). Each time a different aggregate of phonemes is pronounced. It is aggregate that have their own meanings. Hence the fourth argument:

> We believe that phonemes are meaningful, because the aggregates they belong to are meaningful.[17]

A meaningful aggregate must consist of meaningful components. Were it not so, the aggregate itself would not be meaningful. Just like one man can see with his eyes, so can a group of a hundred men. On the contrary, just like a blind cannot see anything, so cannot even a hundred blind men. The conclusion is that phonemes must be meaningful, because the aggregate formed by them is meaningful.

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16 Ibid.: *varṇānupalabdhau ca anartha-gateḥ.*

17 Ibid.: *saṅghātārthattvāc ca manyāmahe arthavanto varṇā iti.*

After the above four arguments for meaningfulness of phonemes, Patañjali begins, like in a European scholastic *quaestio*, his '*sed contra*'–argumentation. Firstly, a nominal base, like *rājan*, taking declension endings, undergoes some phonetic rules, like eliding the final *–n* before consonantal endings (*rājabhiḥ*, *rājabhyaḥ*, *rājasu*). The elision (*varṇopāya*) does not change anything in meaning, which would be the case if the phoneme '*n*' were meaningful. Secondly, an exchange of phonemes (*varṇa-vyatyaya*) is not tantamount to an exchange of meanings (*artha-vyatyaya*), like in '*siṁhaḥ*' vs. '*hiṁsaḥ*'. Thirdly, if phonemes were meaningful, we would not be able to grasp the meaning by hearing each of them apart.

It is true that phonemes are the smallest units differentiating the meaning but they lack a meaning of their own. According to Ptañjali, the smallest meaningful unit is an aggregate (*saṅghāta*), which should be regarded as an indivisible entity. Such an aggregate, consisting of phonemes arranged in the definite order, is called a word (śabda). To be more exact, a word (śabda) does not 'consist' of anything, even of phonemes which are only a secondary effect of analysis. A word (śabda) can be considered as sound (*dhvani*) and the meaningful element (*sphoṭa*). Their relation to the word is not equal. Sound (*dhvani*) is only an attribute of the word, whereas *sphoṭa* is its essence, *sphoṭa* is the word (śabda) itself.[18] It can signify both individual substances (*dravya*) and universal ideas (ā*kṛti*).[19]

Between Patañjali and Bhartṛhari there was a gap of about a millenium. The passage of time is slow in India and ideas have long lives. Bhartṛhari was a natural successor and inheritor of Patañjali and Kātyāyana.

6. From descriptive grammar to mysticism of language

Bhartṛhari drew all possible consequences from Patañjali's discovery of an indivisible aggregate (*saṅghāta*) as the smallest meaningful

[18] Ibid.: *sphoṭaḥ śabdaḥ, dhvaniḥ śabda-guṇaḥ.*

[19] MBh I p. 56: *kiṁ punar* ākṛtiḥ *padārthaḥ* āhosvid *dravyam? ubhayam ity* āha. The former view was associated with the name of Vyāḍi, the latter with Vājapyāyana. According to Patañjali, Pāṇini accepted both opinions and so did he.

entity. An aggregate is the word (śabda) because the correct understanding of its meaning involves the necessity of hearing the whole of it. For Patañjali such an aggregate was first of all a word understood as '*pada*' which can be the name of an individual substance or of a universal idea. For Bhartṛhari such an indivisible entity (*akhaṇḍa-pakṣa*) was the whole sentence (*vākya*) – 'one individed word'.[20] Just like a word (*pada*) is not a group of phonemes, so a sentence (*vākya*) is not a group of words. Words (*pada*) are some kind of fiction created as a result of analysing a sentence. It may happen that the whole utterance contains only one word. Seeing an animal with horns etc. one says: 'Cow!' – but the meaning is that of a sentence: 'What I see in front of me is a cow." Similarily in Patañjali one phoneme could be the whole word, but the meaning was associated with the word, not with the phoneme. Were the division real, there would be no reason for desisting from further divisions, up to some physically indivisible theoretical entity like atom. Therefore Bhartṛhari says:

> There are no phonemes in a word (*pada*) and there are no components in a phoneme. It is not possible to isolate ultimately words (*pada*) from a sentence.[21]

The entire sentence is one undivided word (śabda), one *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari referred do a sentence (*vākya*) as to a self-contained whole. While listening to the sentence the hearer experiences a sudden enlightment called *pratibh*ā as for the meaning of the whole. Only a user of the language who is not its native speaker would analyse the sentence, separating words, sundering meanings from the general meaning etc. Actually, the relation of a word and its meaning (*vācya-vācaka-bhāva*) is that of identity. Tha word (śabda) and the meaning (*artha*) share the essence. Only the word is ultimately real, the meaning being its manifestation (*vivarta*) engendered by the power of time (*kāla-śakti*). In the first verse of his *Vākyapadīya* Bhartṛhari declares:

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[20] VP II.1: *eko 'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*

[21] VP I.73: *pade na varṇā vidyante varṇeṣv avayavā na ca | vākyāt padānām* atyantaṁ pravibhāgo na kaścana ||

> The Brahman who is without beginning or end, whose very essence is the Word, who is the cause of the manifested phonemes, who appears as the objects, from whom the creation of the world proceeds...[22]

The Highest Being is essentially the Word (śabda-tattva). To say that one Brahman is cognized as the plurality and manifoldness of the empirical world, is almost identical with stating that one Word is cognized as multitude of words in a language. In both cases the reason is superimposition (*adhyāsa*). The word 'almost' indicates the subtle difference between classical *advaita* of Śaṅkara or Maṇḍana and śabdā*dvaita* of Bhartṛhari. In *advaita* the phenomenal world (*vyavahāra*) is ilusory and caused by a cognitive error. In Bhartṛhari the Word has some powers (śakti), especially *kāla-śakti* – time-power, responsible for the manifestation of the world of plurality. The manifestation is, it might be said, due to the will of the Eternal Word, so it cannot be treated as thoroughly unreal. The world of plurality is, as it were, the simple, undifferentiated, simultaneous śabda manifested through the power of time (*kāla-śakti*) as a sequence of things and events. This is the 'proceeding of the creation of the world' (*prakriyā jagataḥ*) mentioned in VP I.1. The crucial function of time is that of allowing and prohibitting things to come into being and to last shorter or longer. This function secures order in the world and protects it from chaos. Bhartṛhari says:

> If it does not prevent and if it does not lift the prohibition, there would be confusion in the state of things, being devoid of sequence.[23]

Bhartṛhari assumed three levels of speech. The audible sound produced with the organs of speech (*vāg-indriya*) is only an external manifestation (*bāhya-rūpa*) called '*vaikharī*'. This lowest level of speech is the subject of descriptive grammar. Before materialization in physical sounds, the speech is born in heart (*hṛdaya*) as inner

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[22] VP I.1: *an*ādi-nidhanaṁ brahma śabda-tattvaṁ yad akṣaram | vivartate 'rtha-bhāvena prakriyā jagato yataḥ || (trans. K.A. Subramania Iyer)

[23] VP III.9.5: *yadi na pratibadhnīyāt pratibandhaṁ ca notsṛjet* | *avasthā vyatikīryeran paurvāparya-vinā*kṛtāḥ || (trans. K.A. Subramania Iyer)

speech (*abhyantara*), having a mental nature. This level is called '*madhyam*ā'. The highest level is the hidden speech called '*paśyantī*', the supreme manifestation of one indivisible Eternal Word, free from any sequence or division. It is said to be the source of light in which everything is seen, like eternal, unfading moon – hence the name. Thus grammar returns to its source – mysticism of language, contemplation of the Highest Word (*par*ā *vāk*), the Ultimate Being, the source of all creation, the Logos.

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6.

MAŁGORZATA RUCHEL

What is the meaning of a word? – concepts of *ākṛti* in two mīmāṃsā texts.

The meaning of a word according to Śabara

Śabara introduces the question of the meaning of words in his comment to the sutra 1.3.30. of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*. In his version the question sounds – 'there a doubt arises – is *ākṛti* the object of a word, or is it *vyakti*?'[1] The way he asks the question is significant, for the possible answers he gives here seem to be not quite the same as other Indian philosophers used to consider.

The answers given to the problem of the meaning of a word can be placed on a scale between the universalist option of *jāti* (a class, universale) and the individualistic option of *vyakti* (an individual),

[1] The question is in fact uttered twice. First at the beginning of the 1.3.30. comment, in words *atha gaur ityevamādayaḥ śabdāḥ kim ākṛteḥ pramāṇam uta vyakter iti saṃdehaḥ* -'there is a doubt concerning words like 'cow' and similar – are they means of acquiring the knowledge of *ākṛti*, or of *vyakti*?' Mentioning the word *gau* (cow), Śabara here enters the global Indian discussion about the meaning of words, started by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. For the second time, after considering other issues in the 1.3.30. comment, Śabara goes back to the topic with *tadā saṃdehaḥ – kim ākṛtiḥ śabdārtho 'tha vyaktir iti* – 'then [we can go back] to the doubt – is *ākṛti* the object of a word, or is it *vyakti*?'

diverse ways of mutual interdependence of the two including. Yet Śabara does not want to choose between universal and individual. He does not use the word *jāti*, which is a commonly accepted term in the topic. Instead he takes (following the sūtra he is commenting) the word *ākṛti,* 'a form', of much less discriminated use and, in fact, a bit vague one. The term *ākṛti* is widely used in the mīmāṁsā texts – and it is indeed universally recognized by researchers as a mīmāṁsān word for 'a class'. We will see it in Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's subcommentary – he states *expressis verbis*, that *ākṛti* should be taken as *jāti*. Yet there is also a tradition of distinguishing *ākṛti* from *jāti*, in other Indian schools. For example – the basic text of the nyāya school, the *Nyāya-sūtras* (c. 3rd century AD) introduces a conception of a 'triple meaning-power' of words, according to which each word has three possible meanings, always present in every use in primary or secondary way. And the third meaning-power listed in the text, besides universal *jāti* and individual *vyakti*, is *ākṛti.*

First I would like to examine closer these parts of Śabara's bhāṣya in which he takes up the topic of *ākṛti*, that is comments to sūtras 1.3.30–35., in order to find out if he is using the word as synonymous with *jāti*, as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa suggests, or is it rather something more resembling the *ākṛti* of NS and *Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya*, the commentary of Vatsyāyana.

Śabara describes *ākṛti* as 'that only, what is common for substances, attributes and movements' (*dravya-guṇa-karmaṇāṃ sāmānyamātram*), while an individual as 'peculiar, not-common properties' (*asādhāraṇa-viśeṣā*). His definition seems to be in agreement with that how other texts and traditions define a class (universale). And indeed, in the main argument of *pūrvapakṣin*, an opponent,[2] who presents an individual meaning theory, we can see that *ākṛti* is

[2] Indian philosophical treatises are composed in a quasi-dialogical way – the author approaches his own view through long lines of pros and contras, employing an imaginary opponent to argue with his statements. In this way the author not only presents and establishes his own view, but at the same time shows unacceptability of his rivals' views. This characteristic of text composition is a trace of the Indian tradition of living philosophical discourse and an example of the so-called 'Indian syllogism', that is a commonly accepted methodology of reasoning, established in texts of nyāya school, which included confutations.

understood as a class. The opponent's standpoint is described by Śabara as follows:

> Why is there a doubt? Because an uttered word brings about a notion of what is common, yet it is an individual that is engaged in acts. That is why they say – an individual is the meaning of a word. On what ground? Because there are calls for acting (*prayoga-codanā*). And calls for ritual acts, such as sacrificing, drizzling, dismembering and others, would be impossible if the class were a word meaning.[3]

The calls for acting (*codanā* or *vidhi*), mentioned in the above argument, are a very important element of the mīmāṃsān worldview. The school's philosophy is based primarily on earlier brahminical speculations about the nature of ritual, the main point of the Vedic religion and culture. The ritual acts, as prescribed in the texts of *śruti* (the Vedic Revelation), are understood as patterns or source-acts for the whole universe. Thus the śruti, being the only way of knowing the ritual acts, became a distinct method of cognition: *śābda-pramāṇa*, verbal cognition. Since the word of śruti is the only means of knowing the ritual procedures, its validity and character must be considered with respect to the calls for ritual acts. This ritualistic source of mīmāṃsān thought is the main reason of the peculiarity of its philosophy of language. They see language as primarily prescriptive – calling for actions, evoking activities, only secondary as descriptive and communicative. That is why the reference to the *codanās*, calls for acting, will be always present in the mīmāṃsān linguistic reflection.

After providing a few examples of the opponent's arguments for an individual word meaning, Śabara points out that a word cannot denote an individual, for that would make practical use of language impossible. He says:

> If an individual were the meaning of a word, then that word could not be applied to another individual. And if it could be applied to another individual, then it couldn't be said that the individual is the

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3 kutaḥ saṃśayaḥ. gaur ity ukte sāmānyapratyayād vyaktau ca kriyāsaṃbandhāt. tad ucyate vyaktiḥ śabdārtha iti. kutaḥ. prayogacodanābhāvāt. ālambhanaprokṣaṇaviśasanādīnāṃ prayogacodanā ākṛtyarthe na saṃbhaveyuḥ. (ŚBh 1.3.30)

> meaning of the word, for an individual is that only, which is devoid of all common qualities.[4]

And then he adduces the opponent's proposition, that we can use the word for another individual in the same way as for the allegedly denoted one – as to something devoid of all common qualities.[5] Śabara states that this understanding of meanings would be self-contradict:

> If you want to apply the same word to another individual as to something devoid of all common qualities, you will in fact establish something common for the two individuals.[6]

From that, I think, we can easily recognize what Śabara means by 'the individual meaning of a word'. It is for him naming only, as in the use of proper names – indicating an individual entity without any references to its qualities or characteristics, even to the fact that this individual is individual. For this purpose he highlights his definition of an individual entity as 'something devoid of all common qualities' (*sarva-sāmānya-viśeṣa-vinirmuktā*), the definition that produces a contradiction at any try to establish a group of thus understood individuals (using the same word for two individuals on the base of their non-commonality is in fact admitting that they have something in common, namely their lack of common qualities – this looks like a model vicious cycle reasoning). He goes even further, trying to show the absurdity of this concept of meaning, saying:

> If using a word for many different individuals is to be possible in this way, why not take the word 'cow' and apply it to an individual horse, as (to an individual) devoid of all common qualities?[7]

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4 yadi vyaktiḥ śabdārtho bhaved vyaktyantare na prayujyeta. atha vyaktyantare prayujyate na tarhi vyaktiḥ śabdārthaḥ sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmuktā hi vyaktir ity. (ŚBh 1.3.33)

5 vyaktyantare sarvasāmānyaviśeṣavinirmukta eva pravartiṣyate (ŚBh 1.3.33)

6 yadi vyaktyantare sarvasāmānyaviśeṣaviyukte pravartiṣyate sāmānyam eva tarhi tat (ŚBh 1.3.33)

7 yadi vyaktyantareṣv api bhavati sarvasāmānyaviśeṣaviyuktāyām aśvavyaktau gośabdaḥ kim iti na vartate (ŚBh 1.3.33)

Next Śabara denies another argument of the opponent, stating that it is the common practice that teaches us which words can be used to which individuals[8]. The argument from *prayogā* (practical use) or *vyavāhāra* (common habit) is very common in classical Indian philosophy of language, reflecting on the common and universal character of language as a human phenomenon. Śabara uses it to rebuff the main opponent's line of argumentation for an individual meaning:

> If we used words (as denoting individuals) according to the practice known before, then we could not use the word 'cow' to the cow just born, for this word has never been seen before applied to this particular cow.[9]

And concluding this part, Śabara sums up:

> If we used words to denote individuals only, we could not get a universal notion of cow, that is, to discern 'this is a cow and that is a cow'. We could only say 'this is a cow or that is a cow'. But there is a common notion of cow, and we can recognize even an individual unseen before as being a cow. Therefore it cannot be accepted that a word 'cow' denotes an individual and is dependent on its previous use.[10]

Next, coming closer to his original view, Śabara puts into opponent's mouth another option, which seems to be a try to establish a compromise. The opponent says:

> 'The cowness' can be this distinguishing factor, indicating to which individual a word 'cow' can be applied: it can be applied to that individual only, in which there is cowness.[11]

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8 āha. yeṣv eva prayogo dṛṣṭas teṣu vartiṣyate na sarvatra. na cāśvavyaktau gośabdasya prayogo dṛṣṭaḥ. tasmāt tatra na vartiṣyate (ŚBh 1.3.33)

9 yadi yatra prayogo dṛṣṭas tatra vṛttir adyajātāyāṃ gavi prathamaprayogo na prāpnoti tatrādṛṣṭatvāt (ŚBh 1.3.33)

10 sāmānyapratyayaś ca na prāpnoti iyam api gaur iti iyam api gaur iti. iyaṃ vā gaur iti, iyaṃ vā gaur iti syāt. bhavati tu sāmānyapratyayo ‚dṛṣṭapūrvāyām api govyaktau. tasmān na prayogāpekṣo gośabdo vyaktivacana iti śakyata āśrayitum (ŚBh 1.3.33)

11 gotvaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ bhaviṣyatīti. yatra gotvaṃ tasyāṃ vyaktāv iti (ŚBh 1.3.33)

And here begins the part where Śabara develops his own theory of meaning. He answers the opponent:

> In this case the individual would be cognized as distinguished / characterized (*viśiṣṭa*) by this distinguishing factor (*viśeṣaṇa*). But if we assume that individual is recognized as characterized, we must assume that the characterizing factor had been known before. For it would be impossible to recognize something as characterized by a distinguishing factor without a previous knowledge of the very factor.[12]

Then he refutes another opponent's idea, that a word could have two meanings – individual and universal – at the same time. This part is interesting in the light of the later Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's text, because his theory will be a kind of transformation of this two-meanings proposition. I shall then return to this later.

Śabara refutes this idea on the ground of one of the main axioms of mīmāṃsā's metaphysics – that a word can have one meaning only, for the language is an independent, beginningless reality, that serves as a pattern for the world of objects. And the unequivocality of language's structure enshrines the stability of the perceptible world, and, what is more important, the invisible world the Vedas speak of – the world of *dharma*. Śabara's conclusion goes as follows:

> The form (*ākṛti*) is invariably related to the individual, in that way that wherever there is a cognition of one element of this relation, the cognition of the second one necessarily coexists. It is known from a personal experience, that an uttered word brings about a notion of an individual entity. But is this individual cognized from the word itself, or from the form? This distinction is not directly perceived. It can be inferred through positive and negative instances.[13]

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[12] evaṃ tarhi viśiṣṭā vyaktiḥ pratīyeta. yadi ca viśiṣṭā pūrvataraṃ viśeṣaṇam avagamyeta. na hy apratīte viśeṣaṇe viśiṣṭaṃ kecana pratyetum arhantīti (ŚBh 1.3.33)

[13] ākṛtir hi vyaktyā nityasaṃbaddhā saṃbandhinyāṃ ca tasyām avagatāyāṃ saṃbandhyantaram avagamyate. tad etad ātmapratyakṣam yac chabda uccarite vyaktiḥ pratīyata iti. kiṃ śabdād utākṛter iti vibhāgo na pratyakṣaḥ. so ,nvayavyatirekābhyām avagamyate (ŚBh 1.3.33)

That is, by using the *anvaya-vyatireka* method of checking the relation between two properties. This widely accepted procedure is here employed by Śabara to prove that there is the necessary concomitance relation between the *ākṛti* and the individual, but not between the word and the individual. So he provides these instances:

> Even without the word, if one knows the form, he can know the individual, too. But if the word is uttered, and one cannot cognize the form from it – because of some dysfunction of the mind – he is not able to cognize an individual.[14]

And then he sums up:

> Therefore, the word is a means to cognize the form. And cognition of the form is a means to cognize an individual.[15]

How should we understand this statement? The *ākṛti* – be it a form, as I translated here, or be it a class, as others want – is the direct meaning of a word. From the previous parts of MS we know that mīmāṃsā opts for a fixed, natural relation between words and meanings. This issue is the topic of sūtra 1.1.5. Śabara states in the comment to this sūtra that the nature of this relation is that when a word is cognized, its meaning is also cognized.[16] What is more, for mīmāṃsā the *śābda-pramāṇa*, or verbal cognition, is a valid and direct instrument of knowing, just as *pratyakṣa*, sensual perception. In fact, Śabara seems to put the two methods of cognition in the same line, as it were, equaling them in their basic characteristics. Both *pramāṇas* are direct, independent and infallible, that is we should accept their objects as true as long as there appears another cognition, falsifying them. On *pratyakṣa* he says:

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14 antareṇāpi śabdam ya ākṛtim avabudhyeta avabudhyetevāsau vyaktim. yas tūccarite ,pi śabde mānasād apacārāt kadācid ākṛtiṃ nopalabheta na jātucid asāv imāṃ vyaktim avagaccheta (ŚBh 1.3.33)

15 tasmāc chabda ākṛtipratyayasya nimittam. ākṛtipratyayo vyaktipratyayasyeti(ŚBh 1.3.33)

16 atha saṃbandhaḥ ka iti. yat śabde vijñāte ,rtho vijñāyate (ŚBh 1.1.5)

> There is no deviation in the perception. Where deviation occurs, that is no perception. What is then perception? The valid perception is when the contact of senses with the object brings about a notion in the knower's mind. If there occurs a cognition of this very object, with which the senses are in contact, then it is a valid perception. If the object of cognition is different from the object being in contact with senses, then it is no perception.[17]

Very similar are descriptions of the verbal cognition:

> The natural relation between a word and its meaning is a means to know this [that is, to know *dharma*, for the sūtra commented here speaks of *codanās* as instruments of knowing dharma]. The relation, not coming from humans (*apauruṣeya*), is a means to know the objects like the agnihotra ritual and similar ones, which are not cognizable by perception or other pramāṇas. Thus the description given by *codanā*, the Vedic ritual instruction, is a proper cognition. If the relation between words and meanings were produced by people, the objects cognized by words would be doubtful. For they would depend on something external; on other peoples' notions. But here, where the word speaks itself, how can a false appear? The cognition here does not depend on any human being. The word "speaks" (*bravīti*), that means it lets us know, it is a means of knowing a thing. And thus, if the word is a means of knowing, if it informs itself, from its very nature, how could anyone deny it, saying 'it is not that'?[18]

This statement, of course, concerns the Vedic words, that is the *codanās*, ritual instructions, revealing the invisible (*adṛṣṭa*) reality

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17 yat pratyakṣam na tad vyabhicarati. yad vyabhicarati na tat pratyakṣam. kiṃ tarhi pratyakṣam. tatsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma sat pratyakṣam. yadviṣayaṃ jñānam tenaiva saṃprayoga indriyāṇāṃ puruṣasya buddhijanma sat pratyakṣam. yad anyaviṣayaṃ jñānam anyasaṃprayoge bhavati na tat pratyakṣam (ŚBh 1.1.5)

18 autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya jñānam (...) apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasyāgnihotrādilakṣaṇasyārthasya jñānaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamānasya. tathā ca codanālakṣaṇaḥ saṃyakpratyaya iti. pauruṣeye hi sati saṃbandhe yaḥ pratyayas tasya mithyābhāva āśaṅkyeta. parapratyayo hi tadā syāt. atha śabde bruvati kathaṃ mithyeti. na hi tadānīm anyataḥ puruṣād avagamaḥ. bravītīty ucyata avabodhayati budhyamānasya nimittam bhavatīti. śabde cen nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate kathaṃ vipralabdhaṃ brūyān naitad evam iti (ŚBh 1.1.5)

of dharma. And that is the clue of Śabara's theory. Just as perception is a direct and independent means of cognition in case of sensual objects, in analogical way *śabda*, a word, is a direct and independent means of cognition in case of imperceptible objects the Veda speaks of. And this is a cognition of *ākṛti*, a form.

Sensual objects are individual, complex and diverse. They can be direct objects of perception, which is also an individual act of contacting individual senses with an individual entity. But words are not individual. They exist primary as beginingless and endless, independent beings, of which the particular sounds are only manifestations. As such they can stand in relation with also beginingless and endless meanings, that is – the *ākṛties*. In case of the ritual sphere of reality we have the *ākṛties* only; the objects of ritual instructions (except the material instrumentarium) are not perceptible, so they are not individual, complex and diverse. These objects, like *devatā*, the godness, *apūrva*, the 'non-existent-before' power of ritual, and dharma (the obligation), are direct meanings and referents of the Vedic words. In case of 'wordly' words, the general terms like 'cow' and 'horse', the direct meaning is also *ākṛti*, which distinguishes or characterizes the individuals and makes it possible for us to recognize them.

So what is this *ākṛti*? In the beginning I quoted Śabara's definition from comment to sūtra 1.3.30. – 'that, which is common for substances, qualities and movements'. But in comment to sūtra 1.1.5. Śabara says a bit differently:

> So, what is the meaning of the word 'cow'? We claim that it is the form (*ākṛti*), characterized by a dewlap etc.[19]

The *ākṛti* of a cow is characterized by a dewlap and others. This is a typical textual reference to the description of a cow. A cow is an animal 'characterized by having dewlap, tail, hump and horns' – as Patañjali said[20] in his *Mahābhāṣya* on Paṇini's *Aṣṭādhyayī*, the treatise on Sanskrit grammar. Indeed, the dewlap is a very distinctive feature of Indian cows. We could say that it is a part of 'cowness',

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19 atha gaur ity asya śabdasya ko ,rthaḥ. sāsnādiviśiṣṭākṛtir iti brūmaḥ (ŚBh 1.1.5)

20 sāsnā-lāṅgūla-kakuda-khura-viṣāṇin (MBh 1.1.3)

the class of cows. But, since this characteristics of a cow always contain a list of physical properties, we can also assume that this *ākṛ̥ti* is indeed 'a form', in literal meaning. Just like in the *NS-bhāṣya*.

Ākṛ̥ti in NSBh

The *Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya* of Vatsyayāna (c. 5 century AD, so about the same time as Śabara's *MS-bhāṣya*) defines the form *ākṛ̥ti* as that which is a means to acknowledge the class and its characteristics. In the comment to NS 2.2.63. the commentator Vastyayāna says about the form:

> The form is the fixed order of a thing's parts and parts of these parts. If the form is cognized, the knowledge of the object's existence is established, in the form 'this is a cow, that is a horse'; that knowledge doesn't occur without cognizing the form.[21]

And a bit later, in the sūtra 2.2.68., we find a definition of *ākṛ̥ti*:

> The form is that what allows to recognize the class and its signs. By 'form' we should understand that by which the class and the signs of the class are known. It is nothing more than the fixed order of parts of an individual being and the parts of its parts. As they say, the fixed order of an individual being's parts is a sign of a class; thus from a head or leg a cow is inferred. Thanks to the fixed order of parts the class 'cowness' is being recognized. Only in case of the classes that do not manifest themselves in forms, like clay, gold or silver, the form is excluded from being the meaning of word.[22]

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[21] sattvāvayavānāṃ tadavayavānāṃ ca niyato vyūha ākṛtis tasyāṃ gṛhyamāṇāyāṃ sattvavyavasthānaṃ sidhyaty ayam gaur ayaṃ aśva iti nāgṛhyamāṇāyām (NSBh 2.2.63.)

[22] ākṛtir jātiliṅgākhyā (NS 2.2.68) yayā jātir jātiliṅgāni ca prakhyāyante tām ākṛtiṃ vidyāt. sā ca nānyā sattvāvayavānāṃ tadavayavānāṃ ca niyatād vyūhād iti. niyatāvayavavyūhāḥ khalu sattvāvayavā jātiliṅgam śirasā pādena gām anuminvanti. niyate ca sattvāvayavānāṃ vyūhe sati gotvaṃ prakhyāyata iti. anākṛtivyaṅgyāyāṃ jātau mṛtsuvarṇaṃ rajatam ity evamādiṣv ākṛtir nivartate jahāti padārthatvam iti (NSBh 2.2.68)

This description is, I think, very clear. Individual objects, like cows, are complex; they have parts and an order of parts. So they have a particular form. But objects not individual, like clay or gold, do not have form; their peculiarity consists of their formlessness and ability to be formed freely. So we can recognize an individual being from its form; like a cow from its dewlap or head with horns. Couldn't it be the same what Śabara says, when he claims that a form, characterized by a dewlap and so, is the meaning of a word? I would say yes.

But there is one more reason I tend to think so. The NS provides an example of a cow made of clay. It is mentioned as an argument for a class being the meaning of a word. The argument is then refuted, but the example is nevertheless very informative as to how we should understand the form. It goes as follows:

> Let's assume that the class is the meaning of a word. Why? As the sūtra says: 'because a cow made of clay, though it is related to an individual and to a form, cannot be used in ritual acts such as drizzling and others'. The Vedic instructions such as 'drizzle the cow', 'bring the cow', 'give the cow' are not applied to a cow made of clay. Why? Because it lacks the class 'cowness'. There is an individual, there is a form, but the meaning of a word can be this only, without what there is no proper use of the word.[23]

The NS thus clearly distinguishes between a form and a class. A clay cow may have the form of a cow, but it doesn't belong to the class of cows. This fragment is especially interesting in the light of a very similar example provided by Śabara. He supports his concept of a form as the word's meaning with a following instance:

> The form is the meaning of a word, for it can lead to actions. This Vedic instruction: 'he should construct an altar like a hawk' is possible if regarding the form, that is if the form is the meaning of the

[23] jātiḥ padārtha. kasmāt. vyaktyākṛtiyukte ,pi mṛdgavake prokṣaṇādīnām aprasaṅgād iti. gāṃ prokṣaya gām ānaya gāṃ dehīti naitāni mṛdgavake prayujyante. kasmāt. jāter abhāvāt. asti hi tatra vyaktiḥ asty ākṛtiḥ yadabhāvāt tatrāsampratyayaḥ sa padārtha iti (NSBh 2.2.64)

> word 'hawk' (*śyena*). If this instruction regarded an individual, then, as producing an actual individual hawk by means of constructing is impossible, the instruction would have an impossible meaning and thus were nonsensical. That is why this sentence is about a form.[24]

This example is a bit vague, for the Vedic phrase *śyenacit* (taken from Taiṭṭiriya Saṁhitā 5.4.11) is equivocal. It can mean 'like a hawk', or '(made) of hawks'. The latter option is uttered by an opponent, who says that it would be possible to construct an altar out of many individual hawks. To this Śabara answers:

> This cannot be, for the word *śyena* in the instruction does not indicate something instrumental, but that what is desired. Thus the instruction says that a hawk is what should be constructed in the act of building an altar. And this can be done only if this word regards the form.[25]

In my opinion the resemblance of this instance to the previously cited one from the NS is very persuasive. Like in the case of a cow made of clay, that lacks a class of cowness, yet has a shape of a cow, similarly here we have a hawk-altar, an individual object in the shape of a hawk, which is not an actual hawk – for it is an altar, a construction made by man, not a living bird – and that apparently also lacks a class of hawkness – for only an actual living hawk can be classified in the class of hawkness, just like an actual living cow only has the class of cowness. And on this ground I would say that what Śabara means by *ākṛ̥ti,* can be easily understood as a form, in quite a literal way.

It can be said, of course, that Śabara simply doesn't discern class and form, or blends them together. But surely he tries to do everything to sustain the main mīmāṃsān assumptions about the beginningless and independent nature of the language. This is why he dedicated so long comments to refuting the idea of the indi-

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[24] ākṛti śabdārthaḥ. kutaḥ. kriyārthatvāt. śyenacitaṃ cinvīta iti vacanam ākṛtau saṃbhavati yady ākṛtyarthaḥ śyenaśabdaḥ. vyaktivacane tu na cayanena śyenavyaktir utpādayituṃ śakyata ity aśakyārthavacanād anarthakaḥ. tasmād ākṛtivacanaḥ (ŚBh 1.3.33)

[25] na sādhakatamaḥ śyenaśabdārtha īpsitatamo hy asau śyenaśabdena nirdiśyate. ataś cayanena śyeno nivartayitavyaḥ sa ākṛtivacanatve ,vakalpyate (ŚBh 1.3.33)

vidual meaning of a word – which would be inconsistent with the eternality of words and relation of words and their meanings. And to sustain the absolute authority of the Veda he developed the idea of two spheres of reality – the visible one, consisting of individual objects, cognized primary by a direct perception, and the invisible one, described in the Veda and cognized only be a means of words. The invisible reality, consisting of *dharma* and *adharma*, has only forms – *ākṛties* – there are no sensible individuals, but also no classes, for classes or universalia are important only where there are multiply and diverse individuals to be classified. And that could be the ground for choosing the word *ākṛti* instead of *jāti*.

One more point of inspiration as to the Śabara's understanding of *ākṛti* can be found in the *Mahā-bhāṣya* of Patañjali. The great grammarian, though equating the words *ākṛti* and *jāti* as (more or less) synonymous, is nevertheless defining the former in a way resembling what we can read in Śabara. First, when trying to find out what is the meaning of a word, he lists some aspects or characteristics of an individual referred to. And the *ākṛti* is there defined as follows:

> That which is not variegated in many variegated (individuals), which is indestructible in many destructible (individuals), and which exists as common.[26]

In a later fragment Patañjali provides some examples showing the way of understanding the notion of *ākṛti*:

> We can see in the world that a lump of clay, when formed (*ākṛtyā*), becomes a ball. When the form of a ball is destructed, the clay may be used to make a pot. When the form of a pot is destructed, the clay may be used to make a jug. The same is possible with gold etc. (…) Thus the form keeps changing, yet the substance (*dravya*) remains the same. Even when the form is destructed, the substance remains.[27]

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[26] tat bhinneṣv abhinnam chinneṣv acchinnaṁ sāmānyabhūtaṁ (MBh 1.1.3)

[27] evam hi dṛśyate loke mṛt kayācit ākṛtyā yuktā piṇḍaḥ bhavati. piṇḍākṛtim upamṛdya ghaṭikāḥ kriyante ghaṭikākṛtim upamṛdya kuṇḍikāḥ kriyante (…) ākṛtiḥ anyā ca anyā va bhavati dravyam punaḥ tat eva. ākṛti upamardena dravyam eva aviśiṣyate (MBh 1.1.7). The use of the word *dravya* (substance)

This, surprisingly, seems to be the same notion of *ākṛti* as that found in the *NS-Bhāṣya*, where formless substances like clay or gold are explicitly refused of possessing a form of their own. They do not have their form, so they can be formed freely. If we add one more sentence from the *Mahā-bhāṣya*, which assures that the form, in spite of being constantly destructed or vanishing in particulars, still exists ('the form is permanent, for even if it can vanish in one individual, it does not mean that it is completely destructed; it can be found in another individual'[28]), this *ākṛti* becomes similar to the form of Aristotle. The form that is always contained in an individual, and that identifies it; makes it what it is. And, as Śabara insists, the form that is also contained in a word, or – besides individuals exists only as a word (notion).

Ākṛti according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa

A couple of centuries later Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, a great mīmāṃsaka and a founder of the bhāṭṭa branch of the school, still understands the dependence between the eternality of language and the concept of non-individual meaning. In the first verse of the *Ākṛti-vāda*, the 13th part of his *Śloka-vārttika*, he states:

> If the meaning were something else than *ākṛti,* the relation between the word and meaning and its permanence would be unattainable. Knowing this, we want here to establish that (the *ākṛti* is the meaning of a word).[29]

In the 3rd śloka he goes directly to define *ākṛti* as a class, *jāti*. Starting from this point I am, too, going to translate *ākṛti* in Kumārila

here is an excellent example of one of constant ambiguities employed in the Indian philosophical discourse. The term stands for a 'substance' understood metaphysically as an independent being that is a substrate for attributes, and at the same time is used to denote an individual being (*vyakti*), comprising of a substance and its attributes.

28 nityā ākṛtiḥ. katham. na kvacit uparatā iti kṛtvā sarvatra uparatā bhavati dravyāntarasthā tu upalabhyate (MBh 1.1.7)

29 ākṛtivyatirikte'rthe sambandho nityatāsya ca na sidhyetāmiti jñātvā tadvācyatvamihocyate (ŚV 5.13.1)

Bhaṭṭa's text as 'class'. Though the fact is that the most often used term in *Ākṛti-vāda* is *sāmānya* – 'commonality; that what is common'. That is how he understands the class:

> He [=Śabara] named the class '*ākṛti*', for the individual is formed, or: characterized (*ākriyate*) by it. It is what is common for many individual objects and what brings about one notion for them all.
>
> The means of creating this one notion is some kind of commonality, which is the range of the word. This is accepted by everyone, there is no contradictions between schools.[30]

As we can see here, Kumārila interprets Śabara as a proponent of the class theory. He meant 'class' – says Bhaṭṭa – when he said 'form'. And he could do this, because this what characterizes an individual, classifies it also – encloses it into a group of similar individuals, which share a common characteristics and which are referred to by the same word. And, according to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, this common characteristic is the meaning of the word *ākṛti*. He clearly takes this dual function of denoting as the main point in establishing his concept of the meaning of a word. Differentiating an individual and classifying it – this is what a word does. In the next ślokas he develops this idea:

> The notion of all objects that arouses (from a word) has a double character – distinguishing and bringing together. That would be impossible if the objects themselves not had an analogical double character.
>
> If the object were an individual only, there would be no idea of a class. And if the object where cognized only as a class, there would be no means of the idea of individuality.
>
> And none of the two can be taken as mistaken or figurative, for this (double) notion is always so solid, that any mistake must be of those who speak that this notion is mistaken.[31]

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[30] jātimevākṛtiṃ prāha vyaktirākriyate'nayā sāmānyaṃ tacca piṇḍānāmekabuddhinibandhanam tannimittaṃ ca yatkiñcit sāmānyaṃ śabdagocaram sarva evecchatītyevamavirodho'tra vādinām (ŚV 5.13.3–4)

[31] sarvavastuṣu buddhiśca vyāvṛttyanugamātmikaḥ jāyate dvyātmakatvena vināsau ca na sidhyati viśeṣamātra iṣṭe ca na sāmānyamatirbhavet

A we can see, Kumārila is highlighting the fact of a double function of a word, instead of trying to escape it, as Śabara was in a way doing. But, to remain in agreement with the basic claims of mīmāṃsā, he had to construct the double nature of individual objects to agree them with the double word-meaning. In this way, we can say, he avoids the unnecessary hypostatizing or objectifying the class. For if there is a double nature in an individual object, none of its constituents can be viewed as an independent being, different from the individual itself. And if so, a double meaning in a word doesn't mean that the word has two different meanings. The class is not something really existing, apart and outside of individual beings; it is only an aspect of them, just as their individuality is their aspect, too. Thus the unequivocality and uniformity of language is sustained. One word still has one meaning only. It is just seen as more complex, for the individual sensible objects are also complex. The relation between commonality and individuality in an individual is described by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa as follows:

> There is a firm mutual expectation between an individual and a class. The class belongs to the individuals, and they belong to a class.
>
> There is no class without individuals, like the hare's horns. And in the same way there is no individuals without a class.
>
> Or, these two reasons can be expressed as 'not having the nature of the other one'. Then there will be no difference at all between a class and an individual.[32]

This 'mutual expectation' (*anyonya-apekṣitā*), or 'dependence', as Jha renders it in his translation of *Śloka-vārttika*, is elucidated by Jayamiśra the commentator:

> That what is called a class (*sāmānya*), is one form of many individuals. That what is called an individual (*viśeṣa*) it a multi-form of one

sāmānyamātrabodhe tu nirnimittā viśeṣadhīḥ na cāpyanyatarā bhrhāntirupacāreṇa veṣyate dṛḍhatvāt sarvadā buddherbhrāntistadbhrānt ivādinām (ŚV 5.13.5–7)

32 anyonyāpekṣitā nityaṃ syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ viśeṣāṇāṃ ca sāmānyaṃ te ca tasya bhavanti hi nirviśeṣaṃ na sāmānyaṃ bhavecchaśaviṣāṇavat sāmānyarahitatatvācca viśeṣastadvadeva hi tadanātmakarūpeṇa hetū vācyāvimau punaḥ tena nātyantabhedo'pi syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ (ŚV 5.13.9–11)

> class. In this way there is the mutual expectation between them, as he [=Kumārila] said in the śloka.[33]

This mutual expectation then should be understood as a necessity of a complement; if we think about an individual, we must place it in some class, from which we discern it. In that way an individual necessarily demands a class. And if we think of a class, we have to, as it were, fill its range with individuals[34]. In that way a class demands individuals. One cannot be thought of without a reference to the other.

The inference mentioned in the 11th śloka is clarified by the commentator as follows:

> The class devoid of individuals, as is admitted by some, is here the substratum. The attribute to be proved is: it does not exist. The premise is: because of being devoid of individuals. The instance is: like the hare's horn. And in the same way – the individuals devoid of class, as admitted by some, are the substratum. The attribute to be proved is: they do not exist. The premise: because of being devoid of class. The instance is the same, that is: like a hare's horn.[35]

Which can be rendered, as I think, that just as a hare's horn doesn't exist because it is without the hare (that is, the horns as such exist, but never in connection with a hare – the expectation, *apekṣitā*, is not fulfilled), in the same way a class devoid of individuals and individuals devoid of class do not exist because they are

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33 sāmānyam nāma bhinnānām eka-rūpatvam. viśeṣaḥ nāma ekasya nānā-rupatvam. ataḥ asti paraspara-apekṣitā iti āha (Ś 1.9)

34 Thinking an 'empty' class, that is a class of unexisting objects, is impossible in the light of the realistic view of mīmāṃsā – similarily as nyāya and vaiśeṣika schools, mīmāṃsā claims that there is a necessary and unavoidable connection between the existent (*astitva*), the knowable (*jñeyatva*) and the describable (*abhidheyatva*). That is – we can think (know) and speak of the existent only. The base here is the fixed and complete corespondence between language and reality.

35 viśeṣarahitaṃ paraparikalpitaṃ sāmānyam dharmi. nāstīti sādhyo dharmaḥ. viśeṣarahitatvāditi hetuḥ. śaśaviṣāṇavaditi dṛṣṭāntaḥ. tathā sāmānyarahitā paraparikalpitā viśeṣā dharmiṇāḥ. na saṃbhavantīti sādhyo dharmaḥ. sāmānyarahitatvāditi hetuḥ. dṛṣṭāntastu sa eva (Ś 1.11)

without the other. Commenting the next śloka Jayamiśra explains that the premises from the above inference can be reformulated. Thus: the class devoid of individuals does not exist because it does not have the nature of an individual. And the individuals devoid of a class do not exist because they do not have the nature of a class. By this reformulating, which serves only as a different expression of the same topic, not as introducing another topic – as Jayamiśra assures – theories of vaiśeṣika and others schools, who accept the existence of a class as something different from individuals, are refuted. For the class, not having the nature of individuals, cannot exist without them, and an individual, not having the nature of the class, cannot exist without it. Just like the hare's horn is impossible to think of without a thought of a hare, so there is no 'clear' notion of a class without individuals that comprise it or of an individual without noticing that it has some common attributes, that is – that it belongs to a class. So, if the two cannot exist independently, and both are connected with an individual object, the necessary conclusion is that the individual object itself has a double nature.

And in this way, as stated before, the unity of language is sustained, for a double-natured object is a denotation of a double-natured word. There is no unnecessary increasing of the number of beings – no 'class' or 'universale' as an independent being, which would require some metaphysical foundation. If the commonality exists in the individuals themselves, as their constituent, it is also a constituent of words. In that way the eternality of language and the fixed relation between words and meanings is also sustained. The eternal 'common' aspect of sensible objects is in fact the same as the universal aspect of eternal words. Thus the eternality of the relation is possible. And yet there is no need to invent such a vague and complicated theory as Śabara had to, if he wanted to keep the unity of language and meaning together with admitting the difference between individuals and classes. Duplicating the nature of things and words as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa did appeared to be an easier way.

Abbreviations:

NS – Nyāya-sūtra
NSBh, NS-Bhāṣya – Nyāya-sūtra-bhāṣya
MBh – Mahābhāṣya (on Paṇini's Aṣṭādhyayī)

MS – Mīmāṃsā-sūtra
ŚBh, MS-Bhāṣya – Śābara-bhāṣya (= Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-bhāṣya)
ŚV – Śloka-vārttika
Ś – Śarkarikā (= Śloka-vārttika-ṭīkā)

ABSTRACT:

Śabara (5th or 6th century CE), in the oldest known commentary to the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras*, states that the primary meaning of a word is *ākṛti* or 'form' – different from both default answers to the question of meaning; individual and class. Śabara's concept of *ākṛti* is strictly connected with his word-oriented metaphysics – just as the phenomenal world is derived from the Vedic Word, so is every cognition based on a verbal (lingual) component. And *ākṛti* is this very verbal component, present in every act of cognition and in every object. It is a base and a source of individual world-objects (seen in *Śabara-bhāṣya* as mere manifestations of eternal word-objects). It is also a medium that makes a recognition of an individual possible. Thus every *pramāṇa*, method of cognition, is based on a verbal component; even perception.

In *Śloka-vārttika*, a later commentary written by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *ākṛti* is admittedly identified with *jāti*, or 'class', yet it is seen as more complex. Kumārila introduces an idea of a double character of objects and meanings. Every word's meaning has two intermingled components; individual and common, just as objects are in fact dual – different from others (an individual) and bearing some similarity to others (a member of a class). None of the two meanings can be treated as secondary. Thus *ākṛti* becomes a single, yet not unitary, answer to the question of meaning. It keeps its verbal character, for a class, too, has for Kumārila a double character – linguistic and real. What is more, the existence of a class makes reasoning and verbal cognition possible, and the class itself is cognised in a basic, direct act of perception.

KEYWORDS: mīmāṃsā, Indian philosophy of language

The texts I will refer to are: *Śābara-bhāṣya*, the commentary to the MS, composed by Śabara in more or less 5th century AD; and *Śloka-vārttikā*, by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, from7/ 8th c. AD, the subcommentary to *Śābara-bhāṣya*. A little help to understand the *Śloka-vārttika* I will get from the Jayamiśra's commentary to the 13th part of the text, the part named *Ākṛti-vāda*.

TEXTS USED:

Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, ed. by Anantalal Thakur, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Delhi 1997

Mīmāṁsā-darśanam Jaimini-praṇītam Śrīśabarasvāmikṛtena bhāṣyena sahitam (=*The Aphorisms of the Mimamsa by Jaimini, with the commentary of Śavara-svamin*), ed. by Paṇḍita Maheśachandra Nyāyaratna, The Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta 1873

The Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāshya of Patanjali. Volume I, ed. by F. Kielhorn, Education Society's Press, Bombay 1880

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PIOTR MRÓZ, ŁUKASZ W. ŚLIWA

On Diverse Understandings of the Notion of Tolerance. Behaviorism versus Psychoanalysis.

Introduction. Tolerance and power

The basic, most common understanding of the term tolerance pertains to the world of ideas. Two notions of tolerance in particular have been given particular prominence in the history of philosophy and psychology. The first pertains to the Foucauldian[1] discourse of ubiquitous power. Thus, irrespective of a diversity of approaches, the first basic meaning of tolerance is the leitmotiv appearing in the classic works of Plato, Aristotle, Roman philosophers (and legislators), Seneca, Epictetus, Mark Aurelius, Boethius, St. Augustine, St. Thomas, Nicolo Machiavelli, Locke, Voltaire, and the French Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant, Gottfried W. Hegel, Karl Marx, to Carl Schmitt, Giorgio Agamben and Slavoj Žižek. The notion in question became an inalienable part not only of political, religious, and economic discourse but also of philosophy and psychology. In all those domains one deals with differences in power; with those

[1] Paul Michel Foucault (1926–1984), was a French philosopher, historian of ideas, social theorist, philologist and literary critic. He described the relationship between power and knowledge

who hold power, and those who do not. In other words, these fields deal with the set of rules, norms, and values, as established by the ruling class. This is what Karl Marx called the ruling ideology and Harold Bloom referred to as the ruling group or layer of influence[2]. The main characteristic of such *cènacle du pouvoir* was their unattainable and even unrealistic desire to maintain the *status quo* and thus to remove all the threats, menaces, and obstacles that could (under unfavorable circumstances) lead to the loss of influence and finally to the loss of power.

As is commonly known, the ruling classes have always tended to be "conservative," taking measures to establish border-lines beyond which one (a member of a given society) could not even think of going. Serious transgressions were subject to castigation and severe punishment. Thus the empire, monarchy, and democratic states, as represented by an all-powerful emperor (of the eastern type), the king (as a living symbol of the relation with the Ruler of all rulers), and the people (embodied by parliaments and assemblies) respectively, established yardsticks by which norms were established; norms that others were expected to dutifully follow. It was simply unthinkable to introduce changes, transformations, or innovations that would embrace such vital and delicate areas as politics (the division of power), education, art, or even such concrete privileges as unhampered access to public funds or money. In a word, the *cènacle du pouvoir* was to be retained, preserved, continued, and made into an object of future legacy.

Apart from resorting to drastic and ruthless procedures or punishments, or to the establishment of automatic aversions – like the negative reinforcement of Behaviorism, or the harsh suppression of "dangerous" thoughts, feelings and drives, in terms of Psychoanalysis most of power structures (in the widest understanding of the term) try to be flexible. Power was always prudent enough to accommodate a certain level of flexibility in this respect, even at the cost of an adverse impact on its prerogatives. Thus the Hegelian mode of the progress of self-awareness on the part of Absolute Spirit/Consciousness, serves here as a good illustration, an apt example of this progress towards absolute freedom – its' becoming more

[2] Harold Bloom, *The Anxiety of Influence* (Oxford University Press US, 1997).

and more universal. In terms of tolerance, this process gave rise to certain consequences. As the phenomenon of ongoing progress was likely to embrace all consciousness, that is the awareness of status, position held in society, as well as identity this process was not based on the notion of difference and as a result could not work as differentiating factor. All in all, the domain of diverse phenomena that had to be tolerated as incompatible with the given ruling class model was becoming smaller and smaller, hence those who wielded power could feel much safer, while those who were governed were becoming more like their masters. Such was the premonition, or rather the bittersweet foretaste, of the power of tolerance: its application and direct experience.

In this new situation, two parties, so to speak, were to be on par – the powerful who ruled and governed, and those who were ruled, the governed and deprived of power. So in the would-be ideal state (the true utopia), as conceived by one of the most astute, but critical disciples of Georg W. Hegel, Karl Marx, it was the hitherto oppressed proletarian class (deprived of almost all rights) that was to transcend, and even annihilate through revolution, all differences in all domains of social life. This class, which had been alienated from both its own identity and its own products, would create a state of affairs in which tolerance would seem not to be necessary. Tolerance would not be necessary as there would no longer be anything to tolerate, that is, until a different system appears that might itself pose a threat to the whole.

Tolerance and *humanitas*

The second understanding of tolerance, a less obvious one, is strongly connected with what philosophers and psychologists (up to the moment of the so-called death of the subject announced by certain postmodernists) used to call human nature, *essentia*, *humanitas,* as strongly opposed to *existence*. No matter if this trademark of all of us ("us" – human beings, every member of humanity) was created by God or imparted onto mankind by Nature (two fundamental paradigms so aggressively challenged by Existentialism) the essence was responsible for all we do in our lives – private and social. In

other words, it was the *essentia* in general or this particular nature pertaining to each individual, his/her *quidditas*, which underlines – so to speak – all our choices and options, and makes them understandable, rational (or rationalized in the Freudian sense) and finally acceptable or unacceptable. All individuals – irrespective of their social, intellectual, or economic standing participated in the *genus proximum* and *differentia specifica*. What one was expected to do was nothing else but to comply with the rest of his/her society – with the rules, norms, values, and beliefs – all those that Durkheim called *faits social*. Under closer scrutiny, one can see that in this sense the center of power took care of almost all aspects of our existence. That existence was to be a long, onerous and dutiful realization of this blueprint – a blueprint for all of humanity (that is for human nature, human essence). It goes without saying that, on the global scale, it was only reserved for the ethnocentrically privileged groups: those who were European, white, male, Christian, and heterosexual, but also loyal to all prevalent forms of power (both civil and spiritual). Even in the 19th century and the first decades of the 20th (*vide* the dramatic manifestos of Frantz Fanon) the colored, weak, and indigent were thought of as "subhumans." The very notion of the aforementioned essential component of man's nature, the *essential,* shared by all has been "slightly" reformulated. The problem of "being tolerant" towards them assumed a variety of forms and attitudes from total, but rationalized, exploitation to a very limited mutual understanding, vide: *The Heart of Darkness* and the *Highwind in Jamaica.*

Tolerance and the problem of authenticity

As might be surmised, the various forms of a uniform model of human nature (based on rationality, or what in Derridian terms could be called *logocentrism*) were to crumble under attacks from the Kierkegaardian[3] and later the Nietzschean concept of individuality. *Den Enkelte* – the true and authentic individual owes everything

3 The message of Kierkegaard exerted a great influence only several decades after his death.

to an act of faith and hence one's relation to the Individual of all individuals – that *Magt* (that is, the "force" or Transcendence). Society, its norms, and laws are to be ignored if we want to retain our nature, equated with the inalienable *Tilvaerese* – the existence that is mine and only mine.[4] What is critically important here is the fact of transgressing, transcending of all given norms, values and obligations. In the story of Abraham (the true individual acting on the inspiration of the unmediated and hence uncontaminated faith) one can discern a particularly difficult or even impossible decision to become oneself due to having taken this leap into the abyss of the unknown. It is always my act, my choice and my complete responsibility, and it is done with total disregard for others. It is only self-evident that the paradigm of Kierkegaardian individuality, by definition, cannot be tolerant at all. He, that is the true "knight of faith," the authentic individual, will never admit a different point of view, another opinion or an idea different from those arising from his own worldview.

Thus, according to Søren Kierkegaard, the true man of faith stands beyond the given, his reasoning being based on intentional disregard for others: I need not take into account, consider or respect the needs, values, or opinions that are, by nature, so different from "my reality". What is more, as I am tolerated only by God himself, and I hold that the sphere of *sacrum* is reserved solely for me and that it will never be accessible to anyone other than myself. All the signs, all the "calls" coming from the Divinity are addressed to maverick-like individuals whose task is to decipher and then interpret those signs, all-the-while acting as both free and faithful beings. It is obvious that we cannot count on anything – neither the external world, nor knowledge, philosophy, nor theology – for possible instructions. No wonder that the founding figure of the existentialist movement puts it this way:

> And again the communication of it can only be addressed to the individual, for the truth consists precisely in that conception of life which is expressed by the individual. The truth can neither be com-

4 This idea will be repeated time and again in all versions of both atheistic and theistic currents of existentialism .

> municated nor be received except as it were under God's eyes, not without God's help, not without God's being involved as the middle term, He Himself being the Truth. It can therefore only by communicated by and received by the individual, which as a matter of fact can be every living man. The mark which distinguishes such a man I merely that of the truth, in contrast to the abstract, the fantastical, the impersonal, the crowd – the public which excludes God as the middle term. [Søren A. Kierkegaard, "On himself." In: Walter Kauffman, ed., *Existentialism form Dostoyevsky to Sartre*. (New York: Meridian Book, 1968), 87.]

This irrational call from Transcendence itself fills us with the ontological experience of fear and trembling, and imparts onto us the feeling of overwhelming *anxiety*. We are left on our own, alone and with no assistance from others. As a result, tolerance seems to assume the form of a paradox: we do not need to tolerate others – for we are individuals situated beyond the human sphere, beyond the common ken – so to speak – provided we are men of faith. In case we are not, we become prey to others, to the society, functioning, as Kierkegaard calls it, as the *impersonal mechanism*. This seminal concept was readily taken up and expanded by other existential thinkers. The Heideggerian *das Man*[5], the Sartrean *bad faith* (*mauvaise foi*)[6] and *the spirit of seriousness,* and the Camusian conundrum and rut were all expressions of inauthentic existence. The existentialists saw in the concept of being tolerant, an idea inimical to our existence and thus *individuality* and human nature would seem to imply an enormously heavy task that not all of us can face.

Although we have yet to fully explore the mutual relations between existential philosophy and ideas, and the concepts developed by Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, one can see some analogous themes and motives. For one thing, the thought-idioms of these two psychological traditions have gone to great lengths to change the prevalent, traditional notions of freedom, dignity, projects, values and choices – all of which had previously been assumed to pertain to human nature. In the case of Existentialism, it was our inalien-

5 Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 154–5.

6 Jean Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology* (Simon and Schuster, 1956), 89–115.

able individuality that made tolerance actually harmful, while in Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism, tolerance was associated with the psychological make-up or constitution of human beings, hence it was taken as something given. The first one – a psychoanalytical model – based its interpretation of human nature on all those powers which are deeply hidden in the apparatus – in our dynamic, fluid, psychosomatic, self-conflicting, and self-contradictory forces. It was our instincts and drives that constitute the irrational nature of humankind, something that was not so different from what was seen among the animality. Our ever-unpredictable nature composed of three parts, or spheres, 'to wit' the *Id*, *Ego* and *Superego*, was of a biological, animal provenance. These images of humanity as being the result solely of biology, produced a narrow, limited, and too uniform an image of man. It is not the rational "I," the thinking, calculating, and reasoning self, but rather the *Id* – the self, striving to achieve its true *project*: the fulfillment of sexual desire. This *Lust prinzip* was in an evident conflict with the *Ego* and the *Superego*, the latter being the internalized world of norms and obligations that come from "the others" as shaped through tradition, history, and culture.

Individual in psychoanalytical perspective

The demands of the *Ego* and *Superego* (the "higher" more sophisticated domains of mankind: culture, religion, politics) were standing in the way and thus hampering the free access to ever-unsatisfied drives. Such a paradigm of humanity made us slaves, prey to the drives of the libido, and victims of an inner world, one that is full of dark and aggressive forces demanding ever more and more. In the event that we said no to the "true" essence of humanity, these inner drives, we were likely to develop symptoms of acute forms of neurosis or psychosis. The *Ego* and *Superego* "prompt" us to "behave ourselves," by controlling and curbing the drives, emotions, and complexes that bring about our suffering. At the same time, the project to become a rational being proves totally useless. For these two spheres – that of would-be rationality and that of suppressed and stifled desires – were to inevitably clash with each other. Man

is an internally torn apart being: prey to his/her inner world, which is full of all those drives and complexes that are deeply hidden in the layers of his/her psyche. The individual is forced to find his/her way out of this constant duress. First and foremost, one must reconcile the various conflicting desires in order to keep a balance between the *Id*, *Ego* and *Superego*. This is the first connotation of *tolerance/toleration*: to agree with something unknown, to produce some sort of an agreement with the dark, "barbaric" forces that lie within, and to concede to their demands. All in all, tolerance was to eliminate the discomfort and the suffering of the *Ego*. Our "I" – that is, a part of the rational "it" (a very delicate, vulnerable domain), would like to secure peace and quiet, and to rid itself of obsessive thoughts and feelings. In other words, it must cheat and pretend. It must constantly substitute something (e.g. of its primordial nature) for something else (e.g. of a weakened and sublimated form and matter). It stands to reason that the psychoanalytical mechanism of tolerance was to accommodate all those desires – desires that were mostly of a sexual, libidinal nature and which are not acceptable ether to myself or to others. Thus, in its embrace of our inner life, we are fully justified in regarding tolerance as a kind of forced truce, a spurious but not permanent agreement with ourselves.

Sigmund Freud (implicitly) describes tolerance by resorting to such seminal terms like sublimation and rationalization (the latter was a psychoanalytical version of the existentialist bad faith). We produce diverse, conflicting and often even untrue reasons so as to justify things of an unethical and openly sexual nature. Thus, in this sense, tolerance is a kind of a self-defense against the unacceptable (from a cultural, social point of view). We cheat ourselves by performing such activities, as attested to by our escape into the world of fantasy, by our daydreaming, our jokes, and our slips of the tongue. All of these appear out of our attempts to tolerate (accommodate) the wishes that are forbidden, stigmatized, tabooed and denied us by the rigid rules and norms of the "civilized" society we happen to live in. According to Freud and to some extent Carl Gustav Jung, Karen Horney and Erich Fromm, we create art, poetry, and literature only to change the original that is the cathartic, loaded with sexual energy. The main goal of this is to strive for the creation of a different object with weakened sexual energy. Instead

of reveling in *untrammeled libidinal* feats, we sublimate them in order to achieve fame, success and social prestige. All those factors are part and parcel of our social standing in institutions as work, schools, offices and universities. In other words, "they" (the others) are released from the pressure to accept us as alien and incompatible elements that are unable to fit in the wider social structure. The same holds true for us: we are supposed to tolerate them – as they themselves uphold this strange and unnatural balance. If they are not able to uphold this balance, they are likely to become our enemies (that is, of all of society). However, it must be borne in mind that as far as others are concerned, we tend to accept others, to show them tolerance, only if it does not hamper our desires, or infringe upon our libido. It stands to reason that for the psychoanalytical model (paradigm) of social behavior, this is the internal conflict underlying all we undertake, experience and feel. Thus, love, hate, and ambiguity color the very notion of social life. As one of the psychoanalytically minded thinkers, Eric Berne stated that in playing games, by sticking to the rules, we play the role of tolerant individuals not for the sake of honor, dignity, and truth, but in order to maximize the pleasure we take when not being caught when we cheat. [7]This is the original conflict, a constant struggle that keeps the social ball rolling, and makes the notion of tolerance itself a completely spurious concept after all. Let us make one point clear. Contrary to the traditional interpretation of the term in question, tolerance, psychoanalysis will have nothing to do with axiology, truth, beauty, justice, etc. This will always be a tricky game, an attempt to hide something authentic while exposing something which itself only stands for something else.

Question of tolerance in Behaviorism

The other, equally influential paradigm of the psychological model of human nature throwing a deep, penetrating light on the unconventional, nonstandard understanding of tolerance – Behavior-

7 Berne, Eric. *Games People Play – The Basic Hand Book of Transactional Analysis*. New York: Ballantine Books, 1964.

ism – proposes a radically different explanation of human (social and cultural) behavior than psychoanalysis. It is referred to as a reactive model.

Although, we can observe a certain withdrawal of Behaviorism from previously occupied positions in recent years (and that is primarily the whole area of research related to language and cognition), which is the consequence of the development of new research approaches (for example RFT – Relational Frame Theory) and of the criticism that Behaviorism has met from different parts of psychological and philosophical world (Chomsky 1959 and 1977, Boulding 1984, Bandura 1977, Roedinger and Goff 1998, Graham and Horgan, 2000) it remains one of the most influential intellectual and scientifically tendencies of 20th century.

Apart from the insurmountable differences between these two seminal interpretations (that is Behaviorism and Psychoanalysis) of the human constitution, both undertake to completely transform our understanding of human nature and to add a practical element to its metaphysical dimension, and thus, to influence the way individuals, and hence society, function. In this fundamentally utopian project a new society, in which all differences vanish, will be born as the result of the 'magic' of training. John B. Watson – one of the prominent representatives of the movement – categorically declares:

> Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in and I'll guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer, artist, merchant-chief and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors. I am going beyond my facts and I admit it, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for many thousands of years. [John B. Watson, *Behaviorism* (Revised edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), 82.]

This telltale passage reveals at least one fact: in contradiction to the psychoanalytical tenets and assumptions (that we are totally in the hands of unknown, irrational, and dark forces inherent in our apparatus), Behaviorism, in its strong, orthodox version, attempts to overcome and do away with the notion of the "I" as a bundle of

fears, obsessions, anxieties and suppressed libidinal wishes. In other words, Watson, Edward Thorndike and Burrhus Skinner all aimed at getting rid, once and for all, of what is associated with a world that is hidden from our psychological apparatus. The latter was to be scrutinized either by the "celebrated" methods of introspection, or mentalism, as applied by the traditionalist, classical psychologists, or by the "revolutionary" approval of the psychological studies proposed by Freud and his *circle*: the study of dreams, free associations, omissions, slips of tongue (*Fehlleistung, parapraxis, lapsus*)[8], projections and rationalizations. As there is no inner sphere, no hidden domain, we can have free access to the ways people function. It goes without saying that a group of highly specialized social controllers can form a "brave new world":

> The position can be stated as follows: what is felt or introspectively observed is not some nonphysical world of consciousness, mind, or mental life but the observer's own body. This does not mean, as I shall show later, that introspection is a kind of psychological research, nor does it mean (and this is the heart of the argument) that what are felt or introspectively observed are the causes of the behavior. An organism behaves as it does because of its current structure, but most of this is out of reach of introspection. At the moment we must content ourselves, as the methodological behaviorist insists, with a person's genetic and environment histories. What are introspectively observed are certain collateral products of those histories. [Barrhus F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Vintage, 1974), 18–20.]

As has already been mentioned, this breakthrough, this new approach, which was not just reduced to the realm of psychology) entailed giving up what had been taken for granted, and even celebrated, as higher motives (e.g. ethical) allegedly steering our behavior: paternal and maternal love, personal attachment, altruism, dignity, and the freedom or free will. These were – as we were prone to assume – part and parcel of our personality, of our "internal" life. In a word: we can approach human subjectivity, as either a symbol or a syndrome of mental dynamism, only through an unimpeded analysis, a close, unconstrained, intimate relation with a therapist or

8 Sigmund Freud, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (London: Unwin, 1914).

psychoanalytical persuasion. It was understood that only through careful study of the deeply hidden contents of the inner domain, were we able to access our essential core and thereby restructure and ultimately heal at least a part of human psyche. According to Behaviorist, this was an outrageous misconception. Instead, Behaviorism proposed a totally new, reevaluated view of humanity:

> In this way we repair the major damage wrought by mentalism. When what a person does [is] attributed to what is going on inside him, investigation is brought to an end. Why explain the explanation? For twenty five hundred years people have been preoccupied with feelings and mental life, but only recently has any interest been shown in a more precise analysis of the role of the environment. Ignorance of that role led in the first place to mental fictions, and it has been perpetuated by the explanatory practices to which they gave rise. [Burrhus F. Skinner, *About Behaviorism* (New York: Vintage, 1974), 18–20.]

A well-known, if not infamous, behaviorist metaphor describes man as a "black box" whose interior seems inaccessible to us. The only knowable, empirical elements of human nature that could be objectively accessed by careful study was *in-put* and *out-put*, or in their own terminology, *stimulus* and *response*. It goes without saying that one was able to observe, scrutinize, and on the basis of generalized data – draw pertinent conclusions concerning the nature of this mutual relation between stimulus and response. Moreover, by developing various kinds of reinforcement (both negative and positive), Behaviorism would seem to offer much in the way of social engineering. The model could be applied not only to an individual, but also to groups, and even entire classes – in a word: to the whole of society. That was a form of social control that was to be run by specialists:

> We must delegate control of the population as a whole to specialists–to police, priests, teachers, therapies, and so on, with their specialized reinforcers and their codified contingencies. [Burrhus F. Skinner, *Beyond freedom and dignity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1971), 37–81.]

Thus, it seemed as though all good, acceptable, useful, and tolerated reactions were to be reinforced. Such negative aspects of social life as crime, delinquency, underdevelopment, deprivation, anomy and poverty were to be totally abolished. The members of the new *Walden II* type of society were expected (for their own benefit) to closely follow the teachings and commandments of their controllers, for any breach of the law or other regulations would be subject to punishment (negative reinforcement). Behaviorism conceived of an ideal utopian state where even the mere thought of any transgression would evoke a subsequent thought acting as a deterrent, eventually removing the need for negative conditioning and reinforcement. In the fictional outline of a modern utopia *Walden II* (written by B. F. Skinner) one reads that the purpose of Behaviorism was to amend the previous "blueprints for human development":

> I'm not sure I know what you are talking about," said Castle. "Then let me go on. Simons and I began by studying the great works on morals and ethics – Plato, Aristotle, Confucius the New Testament, the Puritan divines, Machiavelli, Chesterfield, Freud – there were scores of them. We were looking for any and every method of shaping human behavior by imparting techniques of self-control. Some techniques were obvious enough, for they had marked turning points in human history. 'Love your enemies' is an example – a psychological invention for easing the lot of oppressed people. The severest trial of oppression is the constant rage which one suffers at the thought of the oppressor. What Jesus discovered was how to avoid these inner devastations. His technique was to practice the opposite emotion. If a man can succeed in 'loving his enemies' and 'taking no thought for the morrow', he will no longer be assailed by hatred of the oppressor or rage at the loss of his freedom or possessions. He may not get his freedom or possessions back, but he's less miserable. It's a difficult lesson. It comes in our program. [Burrhus F. Skinner, *Walden Two* (reissued) (NewYork: Mcmillian, 1976), 96.]

Many critics of this ubiquitous social engineering (as it embraced all aspects of human life, from education, to marriage, and child rearing) pointed to some of the dangerous tendencies and aspects of this approach. First of all, under the process of conditioning, human beings were likely to lose their autonomy as free agents. All

uncomfortable differences, conflicting ideas, iconoclastic views or projects would be regarded as inimical to social stability and security. After all, as Skinner writes, freedom entails anarchy:

> When Milton's Satan falls from heaven, he ends in hell. And what does he say to reassure himself? 'Here, at least, we shall be free.' And that, I think, is the fate of the old-fashioned liberal. He's going to be free, but he's going to find himself in hell. [B. F. Skinner is quoted from William F. Buckley Jr, "The Case against Freedom," *On the Firing Line*, episode 21, September 1971.]

Like in the 'old' Platonic Republic, governed by philosophers, communities trained in Behaviorism would work, function, and think on a unified basis which means that their members would not need to show any tolerance, to wit, to agree with something they would normally disagree with or disapprove of.

The mindset of black boxes – which, according to Behaviorism, we all are – is simple if not trivial: to comply with the reinforced, positive results of training we have received. Since the process of control as initiated in the form of punishment might have been an unpleasant experience (as reward would be a pleasant experience), it would be advisable to attentively and diligently take in and accept all the instructions imposed on to us. Within these teachings, the possibility of Popperian falsification remains an open question, one that was not discussed in the writings of Skinner or other Behaviorists.

The behavioristic assumption that you can eliminate all dissent and aggressiveness, along with the notion that human existence can be totally controlled without being aware of it is ethically and morally disputable (as too is the claim that tolerance is thus unnecessary).

When we play games it is crucial that we learn to stick to the rules, to pay close attention to what our life coaches us, and to what our instructors try to teach us. The very moment we have been successfully taught or trained, we start to comply with the demands and expectations of the group, of the society to which we belong. When we have succeeded in playing the allotted role and filling the allotted function (and thus we are no longer pose a threat to society), we can expect a positive appraisal and in that be gratified. The existence of this ideal state would clearly attest to the removal

of all of our harmful, dangerous and antisocial tendencies, and to the reinforcement of our pro-social ones. Thus, it seems only natural that in such a state, the diverse, dissenting thoughts, feelings, and emotions, as well as irrational obsessions pertaining to the deep unconscious structure of our psyche would be suppressed by this singular, predictable model of social engineering. All individuals would be spared all uncertainties, hesitations, and anxieties, and we would all become more and more like our neighbors, with less pressure to tolerate possible opponents and "alien" elements of a nature different from our own.

As both psychological and social life gain greater transparency and become more predictable, the members of a given community can feel safer. But as the need to accommodate (tolerate) all differences diminishes, the very notion of individuality and privacy becomes weaker and finally non-existent. At this point, freedom and dignity are simply not thought of being as essential as they once were.

> It is a mistake to suppose that the whole issue is how to free man. The issue is to improve the way in which he is controlled. [An interview with B.F. Skinner, *Center Magazine*. March/April, 1972, 63–65.]

Due to the process of training and reinforcement annihilating all that is "different" tolerance becomes obsolete, as do such notions as honor, dignity, and inalienable autonomy.

Like any literary or scientific utopia, the behaviorist project to eliminate the very difference that created the need for tolerance, had good intentions. It was an attempt to remove of all sources of uncomfortable bad feelings as well as their socially harmful consequences. It was an attempt to eliminate dissent and inequality. But the work of Watson and Skinner made us pay a very high price for this "liberation." Having proposed such drastic solutions as total control over such things as education, the arts and science, Behaviorism attempted to turn us into automata whose reactions to certain stimuli would always be predictable, and hence calculable and fully controllable. Consciousness or human awareness is no longer proclaimed to rule over intentioned acts – as by its very nature and essence it implies difference. Within the Behavioristic utopia,

where standardization rules, free will and autonomy are no longer thought to constitute the core of human nature. In other words, in such a world we would be deprived of the very need to negotiate with different "others" and ultimately of the need to tolerate that which does not fit into the generally accepted social structure.

ABSTRACT:

What is presented in this "theoretical impression" is a kind of a glance at a very specific, if not iconoclastic usage of the idea of tolerance (toleration). Tolerance, including its correlated acts, is a (culturally) seminal, and a semantically complex idea, and one that historically has had many various meanings. Today *toleration* is a readiness to allow others to believe or act as they judge best, even when we do not approve of their motives, the mechanisms of their behavior or the basis of such beliefs. Apart from the biological connotation (the ability of an organism to survive in difficult conditions) or the technological one (the permissible error in size of a machine part or manufactured article) and finally a medical connotation (the ability to take a drug without suffering harmful effects) the term tolerance is generally identified with philosophy, culture, politics or religious discourse. In this short essay we will focus on the term "tolerance" in its connection with two of the most influential philosophical-psychological traditions, namely, Psychoanalysis and Behaviorism. We will consider how the term *tolerance* has been formed and understood within these two highly influential currents of Western thought.

KEYWORDS: Freud**,** Skinner, Watson, Kierkegaard, Tolerance, totalitarism, utopia, Psychoanalysis, Behaviorism, Existentialism.

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C. D. SEBASTIAN

Language and Meta-language in the Mādhyamika Buddhist Thought

Nāgārjuna[1] (c. 150 AD) is said to be the founder of the Buddhist philosophical school called the Mādhyamika.[2] Nāgārjuna wrote in Sanskrit and his *magnum opus* is the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*.[3] The term 'Mādhyamika'[4] stands for a 'follower of the *madhyamā prati-*

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1 The history of the influence of Nāgārjuna, one of the greatest Indian thinkers, is even today far from over. Karl Jaspers listed Nāgārjuna among the "great philosophers" (Karl Jaspers, *Die grossen Philosophen*, Vol. 1, Munich, 1959, Pp. 934 – 956) half a century ago and "even today he commands the greatest attention in the Western world in so far as philosophic Mahāyāna tradition is concerned" [Kenneth K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakārikā with an Introductory Essay* (Delhi: Sri satguru Publications, 1993), 3].

2 Mahāyāna comprises of the two main philosophical schools of Buddhism, namely, the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra – Vijñānavāda. The Mādhyamika represents the middle critical phase of Buddhist thought, while the first phase was the Ābhidharmika realism. For a detailed account of the three phases of Buddhist philosophy see: C. D. Sebastian, "Buddhist Philosophy: Its Three Distinct Phases and Basic Thematic Unity", in *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies*, X (2005): 1–16.

3 The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*is also known as the *Mūlamadhyamaka śāstram*, or even simply as the *Madhyamaka śāstram*.

4 The term "*Madhyamaka*" or "*Madhyamaka Darśana*" is an alternative, perhaps an earlier term used for the Middle Way of Nāgārjuna. It is derived from *madhya* (middle) by the addition of *taddhita* suffixes.

pad, the Middle way or Path.' The term 'mādhyamika' is used for both the system and its advocates. The Buddhist and non-Buddhist writers invariably refer to the system as well as the adherents of it as Mādhyamika. This school is also labelled as *śūnyavāda* by the non-Buddhist opponents. The Mādhyamika system has had a continuous history of development from the time of its formulation by Nāgārjuna (c. 150 AD) till 11th century AD.[5] The Mādhyamika system of philosophy, as well as the dialectics therein, is the main foundation of the Mahāyāna tradition.[6]

The present study analyses the riddle of language leading to a meta-language as seen in the philosophy of Mādhyamika Buddhism and looks at it anew.[7] In the first part of the paper we look into the import of the 'silence' of the Buddha and its bearings in the Mādhyamika system. In the second part of the paper we consider the doctrine of two truths as advocated in the Mādhyamika thought and attempt to fathom out the nuances of the unspeakable *paramārtha*. In the third part, which is the concluding part of the paper, we further the discussion on unspeakable *paramārtha*, and bring home the subtle implication of meta-language in Mādhyamika thought that we intent to unravel.

I

The import of the silence of the Buddha and the Mādhyamika perspective of language are taken up in this section. To understand the Mādhyamika perspective of language, it is essential to appraise the silence of Buddha (on metaphysical issues). His rejection of speculative metaphysics indicates that he was aware of

5 T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 1998), 83–103.

6 Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publsihers, 1977), 68.

7 In the present study, the author is furthering the contentions in his paper on "Language and Mind in Mādhyamika" (see C. D. Sebastian, "Language and Mind: A Mādhyamika Perspective", K. S. Prasad (ed), *Language and Mind: The Classical Indian Perspective*, Hyderabad Studies in Philosophy no. 5 (New Delhi: Decent Books, 2008), 33–50), and brings to light the riddle of language as seen in the Mādhyamika system.

the indescribable nature of the real (*paramārtha*). The silence of Buddha is an indication, rather a proposition, that reason cannot describe transcendent reality. Buddha never answered certain questions of metaphysical bearings, because of the insufficiency of human language to express the highest truth, and silence was the best expression of reality.[8] The significance of the silence of the Buddha was known to his followers. However, the philosophical position underlying the silence of Buddha did not get crystallized into a philosophy until the time of Nāgārjuna. The Buddha tried to resolve the conflict of views, by raising the human mind beyond the empirical level (*samvṛti*) to a higher level of reality, where neither existence (*sat*) nor non-existence (*asat*) can be asserted, rather where categories of thought and language do not apply. The unanswered questions are unanswerable because they are about the unconditioned (*asaňskṛta*), and it cannot be characterized by the phenomenal verbal-linguistic constructions. Phenomenal, verbal constructions are linguistically ill-formed when it concerns the real or the unconditioned, as it is virtually impossible to give a picture of it. Such constructions "use personal referring terms, which according to Buddhist thinking have no real referent; hence any answer given directly to them (i.e. to those questions) would necessarily confirm the misleading presupposition that such terms do refer to some real and permanent individual"[9] as well. Thus, the silence of Buddha "can only be interpreted as meaning the consciousness of the indescribable nature of the Unconditioned Reality."[10]

The silence of the Buddha gets explicated in the works of Nāgārjuna. However, Nāgārjuna does not advocate any theory of/on that 'silence.' He is a *prāsangika*,[11] as he does not have any tenet

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8 Abraham Valez de Cea, "The Silence of the Buddha and the Questions about the Tathāgata after Death", in *The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies*, X (5), 2004, 119–141.

9 Steven Collins, *Selfless Persons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 133.

10 T.R.V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, 48.

11 The *Prāsangika* is one who resorts to *reductio ad absurdum* arguments. This is the Mādyamika dialectic. This dialectic is a series of *reductio ad absurdum* arguments (*prasangāpādanam*). *Prasanga* is not to be understood as an apagogic proof in which we prove an assertion indirectly by disproving the opposite. *Prasanga* is disproof simply, without any intention of proving a the-

of his own, and he does not care to frame a theory or a language of his own.[12] The sole aim of Nāgārjuna, it seems, is to free the human mind of the net of concepts (*vikalpa-jāla*) and verbal elaboration (*prapañca*).[13] That is why Nāgārjuna ends his *magnum opus* with the famous verse on the cessation of all views (*sarva-dṛṣṭi-prah āṇāya*). The text goes: "*Sarva-dṛṣṭi-prahāṇāaya yaḥ saddharmam adeśayat; Anukampāmupādāya tam namasyāmi Gautamam.*"[14] The terms *prapañca* and *vikalpa* are used in the Mādhyamika system for verbal and linguistic constructions. It is the 'verbal proliferation' which does not have any worth in Mādhyamika, and verbal proliferations are discarded. Such verbalization or description in language is a sort of distortion of what is real (*paramārtha satya*) perceived or experienced (*paśyati*). Such verbal, linguistic and theoretical constructions, termed as *dṛṣṭi* in Mādhyamika, contaminate the pristine purity of the real, for the real is *nirvikalpa* and *niṣprapañca* (or indeterminate). With his rejection of all views, of all constructive metaphysics, Nāgārjuna advocated the emptiness of all the views (*śūnyatā srava dṛṣṭīnām*), as the text says: "*Śūnyatā sarva-dṛṣṭīnām proktāniḥsaraṇam jinaiḥ; Yeṣām tu śūntyatā dṛṣṭi-stānasādhyān babhāṣire.*"[15] And this is considered the real import of Buddha's silence.

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sis. After Nāgārjuna and his immediate disciple Āryadeva, the Mādhyamika school had a splitting up into two schools, namely, the Prāsangika and the Svātantrika, represented by Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka respectively. Later on Candrakīrti (7th century) becomes the champion of the Prāsangika school.

12 Nagarjuna says, "*Nāsti ca mama pratijñā*", 'I have no proposition', or anything to put forward, for when all things are appeased (*atyantopaś nta*) and by nature isolated (*prakṛtivivikta*), how can there be a proposition? For details see Nagarjuna's *Vigrahavy vartanī* 29 and its commentary.

13 C. D. Sebastian, "*Emptiness Appraised: A Critical Study of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy* by David Burton" in *Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies*, X (4), 2003, 225–229.

14 "I reverently bow to Gautama (the Buddha) who out of compassion has taught the truth of being (*saddharma*) in order to destroy all (false) views)" (The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 27: 30). The translation in the paper is taken from Kenneth K. Inada, *Nāgārjuna: A Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakārik with an Introductory Essay* (Delhi: Sri satguru Publications, 1993).

15 "The wise men (i.e. enlightened ones) have said that śūnyatā or the nature of thusness is the relinquishing of all false views. Yet it is said that those who adhere to the idea or concept of śūnyatā are incorrigible" (The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 13: 8).

As stated above, Nāgārjuna asserts that the heart of Buddha's teaching is the disposal of *prapañca*.[16] *Prapa–ca* is deceptive and illusory, and by saying this Buddha meant *śūnyatā* .[17] The attitude in philosophy consists in being beyond any views and theories, and remaining critical of all rational speculations and verbal constructions of language. It demonstrates the falsity of every philosophical language without claiming to be another. It practices the 'silence' of Buddha, which the Mādhyamika upheld, in just observing the nature of things without uttering a single word, as it is said by Candrakīrti, "*param rtho hi ry ṇ m tuṣṇīmbh vaḥ*" (Freedom is silence).[18] Further, as it has been just stated above, the Mādhyamika does not have any position of his own in order to be able to refute the position of others. Thus, the predicament and crucial trouble with the Mādhyamika is that he cannot say anything, and the moment he says anything, he will contradict himself for he himself has stated "*śūnyatā sarva dṛṣṭinām*"[19] and hence, his own position is *śūnya*, if applied the same parameter. We will be in a position to salvage this situation as we proceed further in the following pages.

II

In this section, having dealt above with the import of the Buddha's 'silence,' let us consider the unspeakable *paramārtha* (if taken in Kantian terminology it could be termed as *noumenon*) that which is not confined in the language we have in common parlance, but requires a meta-language, as delineated in the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*. In his *Mādhyamika Kārikā*, Nāgārjuna clearly declares that one should understand the two-fold truth, namely, conventional or relative truth (*saṁvṛti satya*) and 'the truth in itself' (*paramārtha satya*),

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16 *Sarvopalambhopaśamaḥ prapañcopaśamaḥ śivaḥ; Na kvacit kasyacit kaścid dharmo Buddhena deśitaḥ.* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 25: 24

17 *Tan mṛṣ moṣadharma yad yadi kim tatra muṣyate; Etat tūktam bhagavat śūnyatā -paridīpakam.* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 13: 2

18 A.K. Chatterjee, "The Mādhyamika and the Philosophy of Language", in *Our Heritage: Bulletin of the Department of Postgraduate Research*, XIX (1), 1971, Calcutta: Sanskrit College, 29

19 The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*13: 8

as the entire teaching of the Buddha is based on the two-truths (*dve satye*).[20] Further, he asserts that those who do not understand the distinction between the two truths, do not fathom out the deep significance of the Buddhas' teachings.[21] All Mādhyamika treatises take the two-truths as fundamental to the system.[22]

Language plays the role in the conventional realm (*samvṛti*). We are conventional creatures, and "we are bound by epistemic functions based on empirical and rational data."[23] There is 'a coexistent coevolving nature of the conventional' (*samvṛti*) and nonconventional (*paramārtha*) nature of things. That is why Nāgārjuna says 'without relying on everyday experiential realm, the real realm of thing-in-itself (*paramārtha*) cannot be achieved.'[24] Furthermore, our language is a colourably translucent window,[25] and it will always colour and shape the thing/reality as one wishes to depict it. "Worldly and conventional truth involves emotional and intellectual attachment to what one perceives, and hence the objects of knowledge are considered determinate, bound and fixed."[26] This determined and fixed way of presenting things happens in *samvṛti satya*. If one attempts to describe the reality, one cannot do it without describing it in a language,[27] and thus we will be forced to acknowledge

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[20] *Dve satye samup śritya Buddh n m dharmadeśan ; Lokasamvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ .* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 24: 8

[21] *Ye' nayor na vijānati vibhāgam satyor dvayoḥ; Te tattvam na vijānati gambhīram buddha-śāśane.*" – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 24: 9

[22] See C. D. Sebastian, "Dialectic Philosophy East and West: The Pre-eminence of Mādhyamika Öūnyat ," *The Philosophical Quarterly: Journal of North Maharashtra University's Pratap Centre of Philosophy*, X (1–4), 2004, 79–80

[23] Kenneth K. Inada, "A Theory of Oriental Aesthetics: A Prolegomenon," *Philosophy East and West*, 47(2), 1997, 121

[24] The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*24: 10

[25] It is opposed to the position of Michel Foucault who said "words and phrases in their very reality have an original relationship with truth… The mode of philosophical language is to be etumos, that is to say. Sp bare and simple, so in keeping with the very movement of thought, just as it is without embellishment, it will be appropriate to what it refers to" [Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the College de France 1982–1983*, Graham Burchell (tr) (Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 374–75].

[26] Hsueh-li Cheng, *Empty Logic: Mādhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1991), 40

[27] Hilary Putnam, *Renewing Philosophy*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1992, 123.

the plurality of language games. Let us remember that no language is exempt from context-sensitivity[28] and personal colouring of one's own perception. When one tries to speak of the real, if at all there is one, then that presentation will be biased or one sided, or even partial, as it is only the perception the person concerned. Wittgenstein's counsel was in this line that "what is excluded by the law of causality cannot be described;"[29] and also "whereof one cannot speak of, thereof one must be silent,"[30] as he had no interest in portraying the indescribable. That is why, I take the liberty to say, the golden silence was powerful in the Buddhist tradition.

We try to express the unfamiliar in terms of the familiar. Language always seeks to express the non-physical and non-phenomenal by the analogy of the physical[31] and phenomenal, which is of *samvṛti* level for the Mādhyamika. Hence, the moment we speak of the *paramārtha*, we are phenomenalizing it, and it is not proper in the strictest philosophical sense for the Mādhyamika. Even if one is going to use language as only a symbol, it is inadequate. The symbol is always a material object, or the mental image of such an object; and the *paramārtha* is always non-sensuous. We cannot speak of the *paramārtha* adequately either positively, negatively, both ways and neither way.[32] It transcends both our concepts and the meaning of our words. Whatever our intellect conceives of the *paramārtha* falls short in representing it, so what it is actually could be better represented in our golden silence.

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28 Hilary Putnam, "Reply to Jean-Pierre Cometti", *Revieu Internazionale de Philosophie* 55, 2001, 460–461.

29 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 6.362 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1983), 179.

30 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractutus Logico-Philosophicus* 7, 189.

31 J. Venattumattom, "Truth as Reflected in the Sacred Scriptures", *Jnanatirtha: Journal of Sacred Scriptures*, V (1), 2005, 93.

32 My reference here is to the *Catuṣkoṭi-tarka*. Four and only four views are possible: two are primary and the other two are secondary. Nāgārjuna has clearly systematized these four and formulated them into *catuṣkoṭi* and *Prajñ -p ramit* is *catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta*. Nāgārjuna tries to express the inexpressible through this. Nāgārjuna gives the four views in the 27th chapter entitled "Dṛṣṭi-parikṣ " of the *Mādhyamika Kārikā.* We have these views in the *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 27:2 . Āryadeva in his *Catuḥ-Öatakam* 14: 21 also mentions the same.

It might be asked if the phenomenal (*samvṛti*) has no value at all, it should be rejected, and then how it is possible to speak of the real (*paramārtha*). How is the knowledge of the *paramārtha* possible? Further, if we were rooted in *paramārtha*, there should not be any need for *samvṛti*, and we would not even care to make the distinction between the two. To this we have the answer: Nāgārjuna does not rule out our phenomenal existence (*vyavahāra*). We are in this *vyavah ra* and we need to transcend the tenets of *vyavah ra* to reach the *paramārtha*. *Paramartha* is the end or goal that we seek out to attain by rooting ourselves in the *vyavah ra* or *samvrṛti*.[33] It is possible to realize the *paramārtha* only by the acceptance of our phenomenal existence. So we are advised not to ignore the *samvṛti*, as it is there, but the keynote is *samvṛti* is imperfect and limited. It will never be able to portray the real. However, the real is identical with phenomenal,[34] though the *paramārtha* is the only real.

Discursive thought, logic, and reason cannot reach the real (*paramārtha*) or the knowledge of it. This is the keynote of the entire *prajñā-pāramiatā* literature. The Buddha always couples knowing (*jñāna*) with seeing (*paśya*),[35] for without seeing, knowing has no depths, and the reality will not be comprehended fully without seeing. We find the first item in the *aṣṭ nga-m rga* as *samyag dṛṣṭi*. Nāgārjuna also uses the word 'seeing' (*paśya*) for the realization.[36] This 'seeing' is the "insight" or the experiencing of things in their state of "such-ness" or "that-ness" (*tathat*). This seeing or insight is *Bodhi*. It is the "seeing by means of *prjñ* -eye which is a special kind of intuition enabling us to penetrate right into the bedrock of Reality itself."[37] Let us remember that Indian philosophy in general is "an attempt to transcend the empirical and to lead us to some-

33 *Vyavah raman śritya param rtho na deśyate.* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 24: 10 (a).

34 *Na sams rasya nirvāṇāt kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇam; Na nirv ṇasya saṁs r t kiñcidasti viśeṣaṇam. Nirv ṇasya ca y koṭīḥ koṭīḥ saṁsaraṇasya ca; Na tayorantaram kiñcit susūkṣmamapi vidyate.* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 25: 19- 20

35 D.T. Suzuki, "The Basis of Buddhist Philosophy", in Richard Woods (ed), *Understanding Mysticism*, (New York: Image Books, 1980), 126

36 "*Yaḥ pratītya-samutp dam paśyaīidam sa paśyati, Duḥkham samudayam caiva nirodham m rgam eva ca.*" – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 24: 40

37 D.T. Suzuki, "The Basics of Buddhist Philosophy", 128.

thing beyond."[38] The non-empirical is a kind of seeing, as we have mentioned just above. That is why the insistence on philosophy in India as *darśana*.

The insight is the immediate experience of the unsurpassable reality, and this reality is ineffable (or indescribable) and "can only be characterized in paradoxical or, at least seemingly, contradictory ways."[39] Even such characterization would be imperfect. Yes, it is true that the Mādhyamika presented his philosophy in a language which is again paradoxical. "The Mādhyamika philosophy can be taken to challenge language itself as a useful source of thought, which makes it appear paradoxical, since it is itself expressed in language." [40] However, our experience and insight extend beyond this world, which is called *lokottara* (or transcendental world). That is why Vasubandhu calls it as 'the knowledge that which is beyond the phenomenal world' ("*jň nam lokottaram ca tat*").[41] This experience is ineffable or in the Mah y na terminology it is *nirvikalpa* and *niṣ-prapaňca*. This is indescribable (*av cya*). This reality experienced is just termed as *śūnyatā* in Mahāyāna Buddhism.[42] This *Ös̈ūnyat* or *Tathat* defies all characterization and denotation. No words can express what it is. Thus, this insight is the experience of the unspeakable *paramārtha*.

For natural languages, the roles of grammar and semantics are harder to split apart; there may be no principled way of making this separation in general.[43] However, the language of the Mādhyamika it is different, as he does not subscribe to any language. Further, the critique made by the Mādhyamika was directed against the *drṣṭis*, the language and the way the views are presented. One finds similar

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38 A. K. Chatterjee, "Reasoning in Indian Philosophy" in *Ānvīkṣikī: Research Bulletin of Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy*, III (2), 1970, Varanasi, Banaras Hindu University, 45.

39 Charles Hartshorne, "Mysticism and Rationalistic Metaphysics", in Richard Woods (ed), *Understanding Mysticism*, 415.

40 Oliver Leaman, *Eastern Philosophy: Key Readings* (London: Routledge, 2004), 211.

41 Vasubandhu's *Vijňapti-m trat -siddhi: Trimśik* 29

42 For details of this experience see John Hick, "Mystical Experience as Cognition", in Richard Woods, (ed), *Understanding Mysticism*, 433.

43 Wilfrid Hodges, "Compositional Semantics for a Language of Imperfect Information", *Logic Journal of IGPL* 5 (1997), 539–563

kind of attitude in R.C. Pradhan's statement in his recent book on Wittgenstein, as it goes, "…the idea of having to draw the limits of thought is superseded by the idea of drawing the limits of language. This facilitates the idea of a philosophical critique of language. The critique is no more a critique of thought, but a critique of language."[44] Thus, there is, as Wittgenstein would say, "the limits of language."[45] Hence, one can give good reason for the position of Nāgārjuna in his consideration that all views and speculative systems are uncritical and dogmatic approaches (*dṛṣṭis*), for what is ultimately real is *beyond concepts and language*. One would submit that Nāgārjuna rejects speculative (dogmatic) metaphysics, not because there is no real that is transcendent, but, because of its defective procedure in communicating it in a language game. Nāgārjuna writes about the real (*tattva*) as transcendent to thought, non-relative, non-determinate, quiescent, non-discursive and non-dual.[46]

Our discussion will not be complete unless we take a look at the critics of the Mādhyamika thought. In Indian philosophy, many have appropriated the Mādhyamika dialectic and the language therein, but few have given him credit and appraised him *in toto*. The Mādhyamika has been criticised by many an Indian thinker from inside and outside Buddhism. Among them are the Advaitins, whose own position bears a remarkable resemblance with the Mādhyamika. Öankara dismisses the Mādhyamika Buddhism as "not worth refuting" in his *Tarkap da*,[47] making reference to it in a line or two. His motives are unclear. A critical student

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44 R. C. Pradhan, *The Great Mirror: An Essay on Wittgenstein's Tractatus* (New Delhi: Kalki Prakash, 2002), 149.

45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, G.E.M. Anscombe (tr.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963), 119.

46 *Aparapratyayam ś ntam prapañcairaprapañcitam; Nirvikalpam an n rtham etat tattvasya lakṣaṇam.* ("Non-conditionally related to any entity, quiescent, non-conceptualized by conceptual play, non-discriminative, and non-differentiated. These are the characteristics of reality.") – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*18: 9.

47 The *Tarkap da* of the *Brahmasūtrabh ṣya* is the second part of the second chapter of Öankara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. In the Tarkap da Öankaras refutes logically all the schools of Indian philosophy starting with the S nkhya, which is the main opponent (*pradh na malla*) of Advaita Ved nta. When it comes to the refutation of the Mādhyamika, Öankara just dismisses it with a few lines (see Öankara's *Brahmasūtrabh ṣya* 2:2:32 in

of Indian philosophy might not be inclined to agree with some of the Advaitins' claim that Öankara did not find any merit in the Mādhyamika. One is prepared to give weight to the assertion of the learned scholar Professor A. K. Chatterjee in this regard that Öankara was "apprehensive of his own position being misconstrued as a variation on the theme of śūnyatā,"[48] for the two philosophies are close to each other in their main contentions, and "Öankara anticipated the charge of his preaching a kind of veiled śūnyav da, and tried to ward off it by not spelling out a definitive stand *vis-a-vis* śūnyav da."[49] The sole comment Öankara gives is a duplication of Ny ya criticism on the Mādhyamika that a universal reproof of all *pram ṇas* is self-silencing. Thus, when one undertakes the journey to comprehend the language of Nāgārjuna, the greatest Mādhyamika, the advice of Nāgārjuna will become handy: "*Öūnyat* should be handled with skill; it does great harm if wrongly understood, like snake caught by wrong end."[50] Thus, we submit that the riddle of language leading a glimpse of meta-language is the import of Mādhyamika *śūnyat*.

III

In this concluding section we advance the discussion on unspeakable *paramārtha* and bring home the subtle implication of meta-language in Mādhyamika thought that we intent to unknot. We understand that Nāgārjuna does not put forward a theory as he was a Pr sangika Mādhyamika. It means that the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*does not prove its position by logical argument, but disproves the positions of others. It could be viewed as a supremely transparent example of the limits of logic and language (*catuṣkoṭi-vinirmukta* and *prapañcopaśam*). The M dhymika shows the un-tenability of intellectual dogmatism

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Brahma-sūtras: The Commentary of Öankara, Swami Vireswarananda (tr) (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1993, 200).

48 A. K. Chatterjee, *Facets of Buddhist Thought*, Calcutta, Sanskrit College Research Publication, 1973, 21

49 A. K. Chatterjee, *Facets of Buddhist Thought*, 21

50 *Vin syati durdṛṣṭ śūnyatā mandamedhasam; Sarpo yath dugrhīto vidy v duṣpras dhit* . – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*24: 11

and guides us to get rid of such viewpoints (*śūnyatā sarva dṛṣṭin m*)[51] which is freedom (*nirv ṇa* or liberation) for the Mādhyamika.[52] Thus, the comprehending reader of the *Mādhyamika Kārikā*will come to see through the absurdity of all metaphysical projects.

Then what is that the Mādhyamika speaking of? It is a meta-philosophy. The meta-philosophy is nothing but the *śūnyatā* of the Mādhyamika. "The Mādhyamika philosophy is correspondingly a philosophy of a higher order, and is characterizable only as metaphilosophy."[53] This way of looking at the Mādhyamika makes for a profound reorientation of our perspectives:

> The philosophy of *Öūnyatā* is an invitation to do this type of metaphysical introspection. This introspective awareness is, at the same time freedom, it liberates the spirit from our narrow and dogmatic sectarianism, from the vicious and intolerant confines of subjectivity. This is metaphilosophy, speaking a meta-language.[54]

Thus, may I submit that Nāgārjuna's philosophy is not simply a means of analyzing away metaphysical illusions or biases in ordinary language and usage, but it is a creative enterprise without being arbitrarily speculative. Further, Nāgārjuna was an ardent opponent of canons, and to claim that he had a specific canon of his own will be self-contradictory. Otherwise it would be only another metaphysical construction; its oblique references to reality (*aparapratyaya,* etc.,[55]) are all negative. To say that nothing can be said is not really to say anything, but only a '*façon de parler*', pretence to speak.

The kind of language which we employ for the description of things is that which possesses subject-predicate model. Without referring to the nature of predicates, Nāgārjuna points out that not only predicate creates problems for us but the very mould

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51 The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*13: 8 and 27: 30.

52 *Aprahīṇamasampr ptam anucchinnamaś śvatam; Aniruddhamanutpannam etannirv ṇamiṣyate.* – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*25: 3 (What is never cast off, never reached, never annihilated, non-eternal, non-ceased, and non-produced: this is called *nirv ṇa*).

53 A. K. Chatterjee, *Facets of Buddhist Thought*, 30.

54 A. K. Chatterjee, *Facets of Buddhist Thought*, 31

55 The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*25: 3

of predicate language is prone to engender certain problems for us,[56] because any predicate *qua* predicate is intended to bring out common, shareable or similar characteristics of things. According to Nāgārjuna, the things in the world are uniquely particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), and such that no two of them are similar or identical. On the logico-linguistic level, *śūnyatā* would amount to accepting the utter incompetence of predicate language, where every predicate implies a common property, descriptively used to usher in the nature of a uniquely particular thing. The Mādhyamika never points out an incommunicability of our knowledge in any language whatever, rather he points out its incommunicability through the language we normally have.[57] Syntax and semantics are linguistic phenomena which come into play only when there is a language. The Mādhyamika does not have a first-order language, or it would be vitiated by the same fallacies that it seeks to refute. But this refutation is itself expressed and communicated, and thus utilizes linguistic equipment so there have to be a syntax and a semantics for his use of language. Sentences have to be 'well-formed' (syntax) and have to say something (semantics) even if only about its own incompetence. Language creates pictures of reality and these pictures hold us in thraldom or bondage. So we utilize language to break out of it; and this is what the Mādhyamika meta-language is all about. *Öūnyat* shall be taken as an 'insight into propositionlessness' as all propositions, views, and theories (*dṛṣṭi*) are discarded in the Mādhyamika.[58] It means that no view is adhered to. This is a meta-language which Nāgārjuna is employing. Guy Bugault writes in this regard:

> One should not confuse the fact-system and the symbol system, or as we say in French, *sens* and *siginification*: as Husserl remarked, the "dog" does not bite. So, in brief, *śūnyatā* belongs to the metalanguage first of all. Consequently, asking if a dog bites, or if a king of France is bald or not, only has meaning (*sens*) if dogs and kings are actually

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56 M. P. Marathe, "Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti on Öūnyat*", Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, VII (4), 1980, 533.

57 A. M. Padhye, *The Framework of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy* (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1988), 82.

58 "*śūnyatā sarvadṛṣṭinām*" – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā* 13: 8

> given in experience. Otherwise, it is possible that the question is simply irrelevant.[59]

This meta-language is not "brought about by propositions but by pointing out the contradictions in other propositions which render them false or meaningless."[60] It simply means that "the realm of ultimate meaning is therefore entirely transcendent to worldy convention."[61]

Taking recourse to the 'linguistic turn' in philosophy, we know that "truth is no longer seen as an object of observation, but as the product of a process of intersubjective participation,"[62] and Nāgārjuna is hinting the same in his *śūnyatā*, for reality (*paramārtha*) as such is neither static nor non-static, but it is relational (*pratītyasamutpanna*) and beyond linguistic formulations. This does not mean that the conventional discourse is of no use at all and full of flaws, but only it implies that for ultimate meaning logical reasoning and linguistic paradigms are empty (*śūnya*). It means that "conventional reasoning and theory are truly validated to the extent that they do not claim truth."[63]

Paramārtha is ineffable. According to Nāgārjuna, "where mind's functional realm ceases, the realm of words also ceases."[64] Here Nāgārjuna is not denying the everyday phenomenal experience. But it simply means that the ultimate meaning is ineffable. It is ineffable "not because it negates language, but it is devoid of all mental activity."[65] As quoted above, Nāgārjuna makes it clear when he says: "The characteristic mark of reality is non-conditionality related to any entity, quiescent, non-conceptualized by concep-

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59 Guy Bugault, "Logic and Dialectics in the Madhyamakakarikas," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 11 (1983), 28.

60 Peter Paul Kakol, *Emptiness and Becoming: Integrating Mādhyamika Buddhism and Process Philosophy* (New Delhi: D. K. Printworld, 2009), 211

61 Gadjin Nagao, *The Fundamental Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, John P. Keenan (tr) (Delhi: Sri satguru Publications, 1990), 65–66

62 Peter Paul Kakol, *Emptiness and Becoming: Integrating Mādhyamika Buddhism and Process Philosophy*, 310

63 Gadjin Nagao, *The Fundamental Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, 124.

64 *Nivṛttamabhidh tavyam nivṛtte cittagocare; Anutpann niruddh hi nirv ṇamiva dharmat* . – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*18: 7

65 Gadjin Nagao, *The Fundamental Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, 67.

tual play, non-discriminative, and non-differentiated."[66] This is the mark of the reality (*tattvasya lakṣaṇam*) that could be said in the best way in *samvṛti* level. Explaining the above quoted verse of the *Mādhyamika Kārikā,* Gadjin Nagao writes:

> Once ultimate meaning is seen to exist apart from the generation of words and concepts, there is no differentiation of meaning between self and other, unity and difference, and so forth, as when one being has many descriptions or one term many meanings. Thus, 'the mark of reality' transcends worldly convention absolutely and, as Candrakīrti explains, must be described as the mark of emptiness (*śūnyatālakṣaṇa*).[67]

It is true that "the use of pure reason extended beyond empirical sphere results not in knowledge but in antinomies, that is, contradiction."[68] So language, reason, and logic are not in a position to map and mark the *paramārtha*, but it is only possible with the help of meta-language which the Mādhyamika unknots.

In summing up, one would submit that Nāgārjuna's position is not a 'no-reality view,' but a position of 'no-view about reality,' and it is an ontological non-duality sans holding on to being and non-being. That is what in this paper one would content and submit. For Nāgārjuna, metaphysical illusions arise not only from an extension of concepts beyond their empirical domain but also from their application to this domain. Nāgārjuna does not try to document the reality in a language; rather tries to convey the non-validity of such a language as far as *paramārtha* is concerned. This is the meta-language which we are speaking of in the Mādhyamika thought, and even this meta-language shall be thrown away as any other step in the Wittgensteinian ladder[69] toward that which is really in itself (*paramārtha*).

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66 *Aparapratyayam ś ntam prapañcairaprapañcitam; Nirvikalpaman n rtham etattattvasya lakṣaṇam*. – The *Mādhyamika Kārikā*18: 9

67 Gadjin Nagao, *The Fundamental Standpoint of Mādhyamika Philosophy*, 68.

68 Candrakīrti, *Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakrti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary by Jamgoen Mipham* (Boston and London: Shambhala, 2004), 7

69 "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them,

ABSTRACT

According to the Mādhyamika school of thought there are two truths (*dve satye*), namely *samvṛti satya* (phenomenal or conventional truth) and *paramārtha satya* (*noumenon* or ultimate truth). Words, categories, and even the conceptual and mental constructions expressed in language are *saṁvṛti* distinctions. They have meaning only in their contextual relation, and they do not pinpoint any ontological status of something *per se*. All distinctions we make, such as, subject and object, seer and the seen, cause and effect, or even motion and rest are inter-dependent, and they are relative to each other. All such inter-dependent distinctions (*pratītya-samutpanna*) obtain their meaning only in a contextual relation, and they are *śūnya* (empty) of any ontological status. The present study analyses the riddle of language leading to a meta-language as seen in the philosophy of Mādhyamika Buddhist thought and looks at it anew.

KEYWORDS: Buddhism, language, Mādhyamika, metalanguage, Nāgārjuna, *paramārtha*, *saṁvṛti*, *śūnyatā*, two truths.

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over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed upon it.)" Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, 6. 54, 189.

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9.

MAGDALENA SERAFIN

Amari čhib s'amari zor' (Our language is our strength) – Understanding Roma culture and philosophy through proverbs

Language and culture are intimately intertwined. Nothing defines culture as incisively as its language and also language is determined by culture. The analysis of spoken language used by a certain group of people might be one of the ways to learn about other cultures. The element of language that best summarizes society's values and beliefs is its proverbs. They can be analyzed both as linguistic structures and as well as behaviors, motives or strategies[1]. For scholars in the field of culture it is important to discuss not only that linguistic sense but also social and behavioral one. Richard Honeck in his work 'A Proverb in Mind' asserts that cultural and social contexts enrich the study of proverbs[2]. On the other hand, studying proverbs can help to understand the similarities and differences of other cultures compared to our own. All those sayings, maxims and truisms of some different cultures are used not only to illustrate the differences between cultures but also the basic truth

1 K.J. Lau, P.I. Tokofsky, S.D. Winick, *What Goes Around Comes Around. The Circulation of Proverbs in Contemporary Life*, Logan, Utah 2004, pp. 2.

2 R.P. Honeck *A Proverb in Mind*: *The Cognitive Science of Proverbial Wit and Wisdom,* Mahwah, NJ 1997, pp. 37.

about people's values, beliefs and precepts. Each culture and each native language has its very own proverbs, clichés, idioms or old sayings that are unique to it.

This study offers the analysis of Romani proverbs appearing contemporarily in different written sources but also it includes online ones. In the first part, which examines the definition and origin of proverbs, I would like to show also the meaning of proverbs for the culture. In the second one, I have attempted to trace the most famous proverbs in Romani language to learn more about their spirit.

In all European languages there are terms used by the non-Roma to designate Roma population (Tsigane, Zingari, Gitanos, Roma, Gypsy etc.) For several years now, the term Gypsy has been widely replaced with the term Roma, making the heteronym Gypsy no longer considered politically correct. However, Gypsy, Roma and other related terms are used throughout the present article in compliance with the historical reality and the fact that all of them are sometimes accepted by the people concerned. 'Gypsy' is mostly applied for the past, while the term 'Roma", the plural of Rom, represents the new emerging ethnic identity of this group and it has been adopted in recent years as a generic term at European level by the institutions of the European Union.

Origin, definition and cultural function of proverbs

Scientific research prove the earliest proverbs appeared in Ancient Sumer[3]. The most well known paremiologist Wolfgang Mieder claims that common proverbs of the Indo-European languages originated during three major historical periods. The first source dates back to classical antiquity, in the second one biblical wisdom books appears and third group comes from medieval Latin of the Middle Ages[4]. In Western Europe that medieval intense interest in proverbs peaked in

3 G. Leick *Proverbs of Ancient Sumer*: *The World's Earliest Proverb Collections by Bendt Alster*. In: *Folklore* Vol.110, Annual 1999: 110–111, pp. 110.

4 W. Mieder, *The Nature Of Proverbs.* In: *Forbes* 8/13/2009 [on-line] (Accessed 10 September).

the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries[5]. These days they have been a field of interest to many disciplines including linguistics, anthropology, psychiatry, neuropsychology, and others. Contemporarily in our daily life we can also notice uncontrolled spillover of proverbs into visual art. The visual representations of well- known proverbs might be found on wall paintings, tapestries, postcards or even pots and plates.

Defining a 'proverb' has been a difficult task for scholars from many disciplines over the centuries as there are a lot of differences between ancient and modern, biblical and classical, popular and linguistic understanding what a 'proverb' is. The first attempts to define it have been made by Aristotle in ancient times and since that time a lot of definitions have been born[6]. The most common modern definitions were formed by Archer Tylor[7], Lord John Russell[8], Wolfgang Mieder[9], Neil Norrick[10] and many others linguists, paremiologists and anthropologists so the number of academic definitions might be confusing. Raymond W. Gibbs and Dinara Beitel affirm that scientific attempts to define proverbs Proverbs, book of the Bible. It is a collection of sayings, many of them moral maxims, in no special order. The teaching is of a practical nature; it does not dwell on the salvation-historical traditions of Israel, but is individual and universal based on the have resulted in hundreds of different definitions. They need not be repeated here but for the purpose of the present discourse I will adopt the one proposed by R. W. Gibbs. According to his definition proverbs are 'familiar, fixed, sentential expressions that express well-known truths, social norms, or moral concerns'[11].

Before we start our analysis we should also think for a while about functions of common sayings and maxims in modern society. There is

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5 N. M. Bradbury, *Transforming Experience into Tradition: Two Theories of Proverb Use and Chaucer's Practice*, In: *Oral Tradition Journal*, 17/2, 2002: 261–289, pp. 263.

6 W. Mieder, *Proverbs: A Handbook*, London 2004, pp.1.

7 A. Taylor, *The Proverb*, Cambridge 1931, pp. 3.

8 W. Mieder, *The wit of one, and the wisdom of many: General thoughts on the nature of the proverb.* In: W. Mieder: *Proverbs are never out of season: Popular wisdom in the modern age*, 1993: 3- 40, pp. 25.

9 Ibidem, pp. 24.

10 N. Norrick, *How Proverbs Mean*, Amsterdam 1985, pp. 73.

11 R. W. Gibbs, Jr., D. Beitel, *What proverb understanding reveals about how people think*. In: *Psychological Bulletin*, 118, Iss 1 (Jul), 1995: 133 – 154, pp. 134.

a dispute among proverb scholars about whether the cultural values of specific group of people are reflected in the proverbs they use. A lot of them claims that such kind of influence on culture is possible but to some degree[12]. However, some scholars do not agree that proverbs should be treated as a simplistic guide to cultural values because the old proverbs still in use often reflect past values of a culture while newly created sayings reveal current values[13]. They are also assimilated from other languages, internalized by different communities and adopted as their owns. It is impossible then to analyze speakers morality, beliefs or attitudes simply from the proverbs[14].

On the other hand, 'A proverb is the wit of one, and the wisdom of many'[15], as Lord John Russell once said so it is important to emphasize that proverbs begin to exist owing to one person and then become the property of the general population. As they are passed on from generation to generation and often refer to morals, there is no possibility they do not teach lessons of values especially as they are easily remembered being repeated innumerable times. Being transmitted orally, such popular sayings are quite informative as they are one of the ways people impart the wisdom of their culture to future generations. It is obvious then, they join together past, present and future giving a sense of unity to a culture.

The Romani language

There's no single Romani language. It is a collection of dialects related to Sanskrit and the languages of northern India enriched with Balkan and Greek influences. In Romani language a lot of grammar

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12 See R. P. Honeck, Jon G. Temple, *Proverbs and the Complete Mind*. In: *Metaphor and Symbolic Activity*, 11(3), 1996: 217–232, Ch. Lu, *Eating is not an easy task: Understanding cultural values via proverbs*, In: *Japanese Studies Journal,* special issue: *Regional Cooperation for Sustainable Future in Asia*, 29, 2012: 63–79, W. Mieder, A. Dundes, *The Wisdom of Many: Essays on the Proverb*, 275–283, Madison 1994.

13 Sw. A. Prahlad, *African American Proverbs in Context,* Jackson 1996, pp. 261.

14 W.J. Moon. *African Proverbs Reveal Christianity in Culture: A Narrative Portrayal of Builsa Proverbs.* Eugene 2009, pp. 134.

15 S.A. Bent, *Familiar Short Sayings of Great Men With Historical and Explanatory Notes*, Boston 1887.

rules, phrases and expressions are also adopted from non-Romani languages of the countries they live. It is the reason why nowadays the Roma are unable to communicate with people in India speaking sister languages related to Romani. They have also a lot of difficulties to be understood by a speaker of another dialect of Romani.

When in the 15th century, Gypsies entered Europe via Rumania, their language was completely unknown in that part of the world. 'Amari chib s'amari zor' ('Our language is our strength') – that popular saying among Romani people had special meaning in the past as none of gadje (non-Romani speaker) could use it[16]. Furthermore, Gypsies has made a great effort to protect their language and prevent outsiders from learning it so for centuries it was mysterious language even for linguists.

It was in the 18th century when scholars in Europe recognized that language spoken by Gypsies had derived from India and is the only Indo-Aryan language spoken in Europe since the middle ages.

Although the first example of written Romani dates back to 16th century, the history of the Romani language remains almost entirely undocumented[17]. Until the twentieth century, Romani was an unwritten language and was transmitted only orally. Gypsies did not write chronicles of their history nor did they save stories from the past in any kind of written documents. According to Isabel Fonseca, in the past there were even no words in some Romani languages meaning 'to write' or 'to read'. They had to borrow them from other languages[18]. They also did not have 'bards' who would keep group memory alive longer than a few generations.

Currently there is no standard alphabet used by scholars and native speakers but in 1990 the International Romani Union adopted French linguist's Marcel Courthiade's system for orthographic unification as the 'official alphabet'. At present the majority of academic and non-academic literature in Romani uses a Latin-based orthography.

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16 I. Hancock, *We are the Romani people. Ames am e Rromane dzene*, Hatfield 2012, pp. 139.

17 Ibid., pp. 139.

18 I. Fonesca, *Bury me standing. The Gypsies and their journey*, London 2006, pp. 11.

Common Proverb in Romani culture and their interpretation

Almost every culture has its own proverbs that do not exist elsewhere. They are not absorbed from other languages. They are unique. Romani also uses many idiomatic expressions, and sayings, often with metaphorical meaning so it is not easy task to write dictionaries of Romani and prepare word-for-word translations. 'He is retiring', for instance, in English has its equivalent in Romani phrase as 'Beshel lesko kam' meaning 'His sun is setting'. 'So si tut ando shoro', which means 'What do you have in your head?', would be interpreted as English 'What are you thinking?'[19]

A lot of Gypsy proverbs perfectly reflect the character of the whole group. Most of them are only single words of one line, but others are longer and metaphorical. Their maxims and sayings revealing codified wisdom, passed from generation to another, are called in Romani *garade lava* ('hidden words') because of their not apparent meaning[20].

There are few publications on Roma proverbs. The most comprehensive one is the collection of 1600 proverbs written down and translated by a linguist and a researcher Marcel Courthiade. They come from Central Europe, England, the Baltic countries, Scandinavia, Russia and the Mediterranean area. They were translated into French by M. Courthiade and classified by Stella Méritxell Pradier[21]. Courthiade's study is the only one of its kind collection because Roma proverbs are usually published only in small sets or they are part of monographs (I. Hancock , J. Ficowski, M. Hübschmannová)[22].

Poverty and attitude to work

Amnesty International reports show the Roma as Europe's poorest and most reviled people. That disturbing picture of poverty, exclu-

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19 *Countries and Their Cultures*, [on-line] (Accessed 10 May 2013).

20 I. Hancock, *We are…*, op. cit., pp. 145.

21 M. Courthiade, *Sagesse et humour du peuple rrom : Proverbes bilingues rromani-français*. L'Harmattan, Paris 2006.

22 See: I. Hancock *We are the Romani people. Ames am e Rromane dzene*, Hatfield 2012, J. Ficowski, *Cyganie na polskich drogach*, Warszawa 2013 , M. Hübschmannová, *Romane phenibena/Przysłowia cygańskie*, Tarnów 1981.

sion and rights abuses has existed all over the world wherever the gypsies communities are. Their economic survival and their marginal position at the edge of each society is often mentioned in their own proverbs. They say 'The world is a ladder, in which some go up and others go down' [23]. Unfortunately they go down pretty often. Sometimes popular sayings show their lack of hope to change their existence. 'He is born in dirt, he lives in dirt, he will die in dirt'[24] these words suggests they are conscious how dramatic their situation has been for ages. All the time forcibly evicted to the outskirts of big cities far away from public housing, often without running water or electricity – it is the life most of them have led. Ghetto existence at present in the past times forced them to accept the fact that vast majority of Gypsies has been poor and that situation will never change. 'When do we have a day of fast? When there is no bread and ham in the larder'[25], the Romani asks and answers themselves. But their larder is often empty. Why? The answer is complex. That indigence is due to high unemployment rate among gypsies, lack of education and motivation, discrimination, system of taboos limiting their job opportunities, the way of life they have chosen and many other reasons. All these factors influence stereotypical picture of Romani people presenting them as the laziest society in Europe. But their history has created completely different view on that ethnic group. Leaving India, the main occupations which Gypsies had followed were continued to maximize their chances to survive. They were involved in metalwork, craftwork, all kind of entertainment and of course trading. Still some of the rare jobs survived within their community. But in modern world they are often considered to be the ones who do not work and do not want to work. Work is not the target. *'So nasales avdives, ka rodes les tehàra'* ('What you lose today, you can search for tomorrow')[26], one of the proverbs says, meaning there is no hurry to do something now. It might wait.

Regardless of the biased opinions accusing them of being too lazy to work, the inborn wisdom appearing in their proverbs do not

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[23] *Gypsy proverbs & sayings (62 proverbs)*, [on-line] (Accessed 10.05. 2013).
[24] *Gypsy Proverbs (2)* [on-line] (Accessed 10 May 201).
[25] Gypsy proverbs & sayings **(62 proverbs), [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).**
[26] M. Courthiade, *Sagesse et*…,op. cit, pp.13.

let them forget there are no fruits of the work without efforts as '*Kon či kerel butji, godo te na xal*' ('He who does not work is without food')[27] or 'Winter will ask you what you did in the summer' [28]. According to another Gypsy wisdom it is important to do our best while working because if you do not do your job properly you will not succeed so '*Na le tjiri kher te lichares e pori la sapnjaki; punr-ranges sit e lichares*' ('Don't use your boot to crash a snake's tail; you can crash its head with your bare foot.')[29].

As it was mentioned before, trade is the second nature for Romani people and throughout history most of their activities were closely linked to black market where they were involved in the process of selling goods either produced by themselves or bought from other sources[30]. Sadly, stealing goods was not rare and this way the most common Gypsy stereotypes were built. Nowadays the Roma are often portrayed as thieves or benefit cheats or people traffickers. Their sayings sometimes reveal their specific approach to morality. They often say: 'Life is made up of many little lies and a bit of truth'[31] and what is more, in their proverbs we can see some kind of attempts to justify their immoral activities. 'Where rich people can make honest money, poor people have to steal'[32], 'You cannot walk straight when the road is bent[33] or 'No money, no honour'[34], they tend to say. They do not also seem to feel ashamed using unfair tricks while making business with *gadje*. One of the proverbs says: 'The buyer needs a hundred eyes, the horse thief not one.' Other indicates positive features of a 'good' thief: 'The patient thief is as a tree whose root runs deep as he waits for the sweet fruit'[35].

On the other hand, they daily life experience and a lot of suffering from exclusion, and sometimes violent persecution let them

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27 G. Paczolay, *European proverbs: in 55 languages, with equivalents in Arabic, Persian, Sanskrit, Chinese and Japanese*, Veszprém, Hungary 1997, pp. 466.

28 J. Ficowski, *Cyganie na polskich drogach*, Warszawa 2013, pp. 326.

29 I. Hancock, *We are…,* op. cit., pp. 147.

30 O. L. Sanda , *Different But Equal*, In: *Roma Cultural Diversity Monograph, edit.:* S. McKelvey, J. Ray, P. Riseborough, Boston, MA 2007, pp.25.

31 J. Ficowski, *Cyganie...,op.cit.,* pp. 326.

32 *Gypsy proverbs & sayings* (62 proverbs), [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

33 *Sayings, Proverbs & Quotes. Be Lucky,* [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

34 M. Courthiade, *Sagesse et…*,op. cit, pp.14.

35 *Gypsy proverbs & sayings* (62 proverbs), [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

recognize their lower position in each society and understand that they have never been equal before the law. ' The non-Romani steals a horse, the Romani steals a horseshoe' or 'the Romani steals the chicken the non-Romani steals a farm'[36] – these two sayings suggest that in each society Romani theft is always minor in comparison with non-Romani criminal behaviour.

A theft motif often appears in common Romani maxims as for centuries living below the poverty line have pushed Romani people into different kind of criminal activity, making this kind of behaviour acceptable in some Roma groups. It is important to remember that only a particular group of Roma evolved into a criminal subculture.

Family structure and gypsyhood

In Romani culture, family and tradition are valued above all else. The Roma people say: '*Daśtil te avel tut butlove, kana san korkoro naj tut khanć*' ('What's the point in having a lot of money; if you are alone, you have nothing'[37]). The traditional family structure is patriarchal and the most respected person in the family, usually the oldest male, keeps the family legacy alive. The family is made up of extended family and usually consists of three generations. The feeling of being the part of the family and clan is the first priority to Romani people so they are never like birds who foul their own nests. They say: *'Numaj dileno ćiriklo xindel po kujbo'*[38], meaning: 'Don't speak ill of yourself and the groups you belong to'. And they do not.

Everybody has his own place in that family structure and is respected in some way. One of the proverbs says: 'Children will tell you what they do, men what they think and older people what they have seen and heard'. Children are very important to a Roma family. More children mean a high status among Romani. *'Nane chave, nane*

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36 I. Hancock, *We are...*, op. cit., pp. 146.

37 D. M. Grigore, *Family and Health in the Traditional Rromani Culture*. In: *Roma Cultural Diversity Monograph,* edit.: S. McKelvey, J. Ray, P. Riseborough, Boston, MA 2007, pp.15.

38 G. Paczolay, *European Proverbs...*, op.cit., pp. 466.

bacht' ('If there are no children, it is bad luck')[39] or simply 'More children – more happiness'[40], they say.

What is common to all Roma groups is Romanipen 'gypsyhood' reinforced by slogan *'Sem (hem, isem) Roma sam'* ('We are of course Roma') emphasizing their difference from gadzjo societies. It is declaration of Roma identity delimiting them from Non- Roma. They often say 'A good man can find treasure in poverty, while the fool will perish in the church' which means that we make our own luck only living in accordance with *Romanipen* – customary laws representing the ethos of the whole group and its identity.

The Rhapsody Romani

Not only in their language but also in their music we can find Indian roots such as the bhairava musical scale – type of mouth music known in India and maintained by Romani artists[41]. But Indian trace is followed by a vast variety of ethnic traditions where their music draws from, for example Romanian, Turkish, Jewish, and Slavic. The music is extremely varied to such extant that we cannot describe it as one homogenous unity.

Undoubtedly, Roma culture is full of passion for music and dance. One of the proverbs says: 'Great respect comes back to the musician'[42]. It proves the fact the work of musicians has higher status for The Roma than any other manual work[43]. It is connected with the role of music in daily life of Romani group. First of all, music allows socialization within the family, as it is often played during spontaneous get-togethers or important family celebrations. Secondly, it guarantees the whole family some income that is not dependent on weather conditions or local market and finally, the

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39 *Childhood. Roma In the Czech republic,* [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

40 J. Ficowski, Cyganie..., op. cit. pp.326.

41 I. Hancock, *We are...,* op. cit., pp. 146.

42 M. Courthiade, *Sagesse et humour du peuple rrom : Proverbes bilingues rromani-français*. L'HARMATTAN, Paris 2006, pp. 16.

43 U. Glaeser, *Stereotypes, Clichés and Prejudices*, Pedagogic Handbook : Impulse Article, Sociology &
Ethnology, Rombase, Graz, Austria, 2005, [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

meaning of their music has also intercultural aspects because the cultural and social interactions between *gadje* world and Romani people have been able to take place mainly through the art of their music. It is visible in a lot of common sayings, how important for that ethnic group, music is. The Romani often say: 'Stay where there are songs'[44] and 'Bad people don't sing'[45]. But they sing, they dance, they play instruments. How does it come they are always situated on the wrong side of the street, city, Europe? After all, their carefree lifestyle fulfilled with music and dancing was always connected with their inborn desire to roam freely without any responsibilities and duties and to lead artistic life. 'We are all wanderers on this earth. Our hearts are full of wonder, and our souls are deep with dreams', the Roma say. A lot of proverbs reflect way of thinking typical for travellers: 'Not all men are like trees; some must travel and cannot keep still' or 'Our caravan is our family, and the world is our family'[46]. Nomadism is part of their history so for some groups of gypsies 'The journey is just as important as the destination'[47] as one of popular maxims says. The exotic stereotype of the nomadic Gypsy reflected in some proverbs

goes deeper than that. It is not only about The Roma's own disposition to roam but also their necessity to escape in fear for exile or deportation. It is difficult to determine whether an actual longing for freedom, or perhaps an attempt to cope with a hostile environment is the truth hidden in the Roma sayings.

All of those maxims present culture's unique viewpoint. But the most touching Romani proverb, world widely known is: 'Bury me standing. I've been on my knees all my life'. It is the essence of the Romani life and it describes the Gypsy plight which is the mixture of their pride and poignancy. It does not let us forget about their dramatic past and not easy present. They were slaves in the two principalities of Moldova and Muntenia for five centuries (from the

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44 *Gypsy proverbs & sayings* (62 proverbs), [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

45 *Gypsy proverbs & sayings* (62 proverbs), [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

46 *Special Dictionary, World Proverbs ,Gypsy Proverbs*, [on-line] (Accessed 10 May).

47 R. Ohebsion. *Proverbs. A Collection of Wisdom* [on-line] (Accessed 10 September).

fifteenth to the nineteenth century) [48], during the colonial period enslaved Gypsies were subjected to expulsions and deportations from British Isles and other western European territories and sent to North America and the Caribbean, where they shared the fate of black slaves working on plantations[49], they suffered alongside the Jews in the Holocaust, they faced persecution in Spain, France and England and discrimination all over the world. But they were also admired, mythologized and romanticized. One side of their portrait is visible in their proverbs, although most of them have never been recorded they became a folklore treasure. Whether called maxims, sayings, or truisms they contain the truth about people's values, spirituality or just the life they lead. We can learn about the Roma through their sayings as they reflect their hidden world and give an idea of their style and spirit.

SUMMARY

Each culture has not only its particular proverbs and sayings, but also maxims, truisms and idiomatic phrases which reflect much of its attitudes and reveal the truth about people's values and beliefs. Even if they are transmitted only orally from one generation to the next, as in the case of Romani people, they preserve the knowledge of internal features of the community. Romani people also use several neologisms and expressions often with metaphorical meaning. Sharing the proverbs can be the way to learn about Roma culture and philosophy. This essay shall explore the concept that the Romani language reflects culture values of this population. The author will analyze popular proverbs in Romani language to reveal the image of Roma people created by themselves.

KEY WORDS: culture values, gypsyhood, proverbs and sayings, stereotypes

48 M. Courthiade *A historical bird's eye view of Gypsophobia and prejudices against the Rroms*, Starsbourg 2008, p. 6.

49 V. Achim, *The Roma in Romanian History*, Central European University Press, Budapest 2004, p. 12–13.

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10.

TERESA MIĄŻEK

The role of the Hindi writer and the idea of communication in modern society in the writings of S. H. Vātsyāyan "Ajñeya"

S. H. Vātsyāyan (1911–1987) has published most of his theoretical texts under his real name, but novels, short-stories and poems – under a nickname Ajñeya, what means "who should not to be recognized". In this paper I use this last name in all those contexts. His literary activity started in the third decade of the 20th century and lasted till the end of his days. He wrote 6 novels, over 60 short-stories and 19 collections of lyrics. His creativity inspired a few generations of Hindi writers and formed new trends and schools in poetry and in prose.

The idea of the role of Hindi writer in modern Indian society can be traced by Ajñeya in most of his writings in the context of an audience. Lotar Lutze, a renowned German scholar of modern Indian literature, calls Ajñeya "the most communication-conscious poet" of Hindi literature[1]. He also points at his tendency for "teaching" as evident in his works[2]. Nirmal Varmā in his essay written in the memory of Ajñeya stresses the author's invisible presence in own

[1] Lutze L., Interview New Delhi, 16–1-1973 [in:] *South Asian Digest of Regional Writing*, Vol. 2 (1973), p. 65.

[2] Ibidem, p. 64.

works and that readers are consciousness of it, they „see not only the scene behind the window, but also that eye, which this scene transforms in creative perception"[3]. Varmā emphasizes the unique skill of Ajñeya to bridge the levels seemingly impossible to conjoin: tradition and modernity[4]. In this paper I focus on some selected works by Ajñeya, which prove his continuous care for the reader. In this context I investigate his idea of the role of modern Hindi writer.

In the interview given to Lothar Lutze Ajñeya admits that "particularly in the contemporary times, the poet always divides himself into two to provide his audience"[5], he has to be a writer and the reader at the same time. Being aware of the possibility of gap in communication with changing Indian literary public Ajñeya himself makes "the greatest effort to bridge it"[6]. In his essay on the role of Indian writers in contemporary society Ajñeya admits that "the Indian writer is writing under greater handicaps than any writer has ever suffered in the history anywhere or at any time"[7]. He expresses such an opinion also in his short-story *Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī* ("Poetry and life. A story") where the narrator, a poet who seeks mastery, finally fails to find any inspiration and in the end of the story pleads the critics to forgive him because he is "a Hindi writer cursed by ill fate"[8]. Similar evaluation of the position of Hindi writer is to be found in another Ajñeya's short-story entitled *Alikhit kahānī* ("Not written story"). Its narrator being a Hindi writer asks the reader: "What other good fortune does a Hindi writer ever get to know?" except "his own fortunate spouse at home"[9]. And the name of narrator's wife is *Lakṣmī* , same as the name of Hindu Goddess of Good Fortune . The situation of Hindi writers, treated by Ajñeya with irony in mentioned short-stories, has been acutely suffered by him in real life. Both stories reflect ongoing conflict in Hindi

3 Varmā N, *Lekhak kī svataĩrtā aur svadharm. Ajñeya kī smṛti mẽ,* [in:] Varmā N., *Bhārat aur Yūrop. Pratiśruti ke kṣetr*, Rājkamal Prakāśan, 1991, p.108.

4 Ibidem, p. 112.

5 Lutze L., op. cit., p. 65.

6 Ibidem.

7 Vatsyayan S.H., *The role of the writer in contemporary Indian society*, [in:] *South Asian Digest of Regional Writing*, Vol. 1 (1972), p. 12.

8 Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā̃*, Dillī 1992, p. 457. All quotation from Ajñeya's short-stories in English translation are done by the author of this paper.

9 Ajñeya, op. cit, p. 230.

literary environment in the 20th century and its main reason – the clash between the traditional Indian poetics and Western influences.

The conflict began with the advent of English education in India in the end of the 19th century and increased due to the massive access to printed books and press later on. Modern standard Hindi, which evaluated from *Khaṛī-bolī* dialect, obtained its literary maturity only in the beginning of the 20th century. It ousted *Brāj*, dialect which dominated Hindi literature since medieval period, from poetry with the lyrics of Maithilīśaraṇgupt (1886–1964) in the *Dvivedī* period of Hindi literature[10]. As a linguistic standard Hindi appeared only in the second half of the 19th century due to previous efforts of Indian writers employed by John Gilchrist in the Hindustani Department of Fort William Collage in Calcutta . It matured as a literary medium first with prose genres. British colonial policy reinforced the process of differentiation between Khaṛī-bolī Hindī and Urdū, two language variants originating from the same dialect. McGregor suggests, that *Khaṛī-bolī Hindī* when accepted as a new medium of literature could mean "definitive parting from the older literary traditions of north India"[11]. In fact the origin of Hindi prose in the end of 19th century took place under mixed circumstances: the strong flow of Western literary ideas through English education, the popularity of some Urdu and Persian genres as *dāstān*[12], as well as the popularity of Sanskrit tales and some works in medieval Hindi dialects, so evident in works of Fort William College writers. There was also strong influence of Bengali literature including its oral folk tradition[13]. In this situation of clash between Western and Indian literary ideas Hindi writers struggled throughout decades for own identity.

Ajñeya figures out diverse levels of tension, of which Hindi writers even in the second half of the 20th century have to remain conscious[14]. Some of them seem to bother Hindi writers still in the 21st century. He lists those levels as follows: "Indian language

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10 Cf. Rutkowska T., Stasik D., *Zarys literatury hindi*, Warszawa 1992, p. 138–139.

11 McGregor R. S., *Hindi Literature of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries*, Wiesbaden 1974, p. 112.

12 Cf. Ibidem, p. 64.

13 Cf. Ibidem, p. 90–98.

14 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of...*, op. cit, p. 4–17.

versus English", "East versus West or Easts vis-à-vis West", "tradition vis-à-vis experiment", "literacy versus education", "identity versus modernity"[15]. The writer argues that awareness of those tensions has to become "the principle of coherence" in works of a modern Hindi writer, "this what holds him together"[16]. Otherwise he will fail to reach new audience and adds nothing to own tradition. In the case of Ajñeya, even his early literary works berry the evidence of the author's constant awareness of diverse levels of conflict. His short-stories like *Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī* („The Poetry and life. A story") from 1934, *Nayī kahānī kā ploṭ* („The plot of new short-story") from 1936 or *Paramparā. Ek kahānī* ("Tradition. A story") from 1939, depict the struggle of a Hindi writer, his conflict between tradition and modernity in search for inspiration, for the proper subject and form of his works[17].

Till the end of his life Ajñeya continued to convince modern Hindi writers about their role in society as he did already in a very precise way in the mentioned above essay. There he points at handicaps generated by the change of the traditional role of Indian poet and change within his audience. Ajñeya seems to emphasize the influence of Indian tradition over westernized ideas on shaping modern Hindi literature. He states: "if there is no Indian literature in India, there is no literature in India"[18]. While analyzing the situation of Hindi writers Ajñeya starts with the role of the poet, because poetry resisted the most to adopt the Hindi *Khaṛī-bolī* standard as its medium and the most important transformation in Hindi literature was to be observed in it. Ajñeya calls this change "moving from a *tradition* into an *actuality* and becoming aware for the first time not only of an audience but of society"[19]. This changed situation affected on the one side the audience, which from elite turned to be public of mass readers, and on the other side – the experience of a poet. Both started to be more personal and less standardized than in classical and medieval Indian literature. Ajñeya argues that since India has

15 Cf. Ibidem, p. 15.
16 Ibidem.
17 Cf. Ajñeya, op. cit, p. 459–463 (*Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī)* and 264–269 (*Nayī kahānī kā ploṭ*).
18 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of…*,op. cit, p. 16.
19 Ibidem, p. 12.

come in tight contact with the West, the Indian writer was losing his influential position in the intellectual world and started to take a secondary place after the painter or the artist. He argues, that the traditional direction of the flow of ideas in India was from literature into art. In the reverse situation the role of a writer becomes even more necessary as he has to find own audience within modern society in India. Ajñeya is convinced that "the writer's relationship is essentially with the audience rather than with society"[20]. He can reject society, but not an audience.

In Indian tradition the relation with the viewer or listener was always essential. Since classical Sanskrit literature the tie between a writer and his audience was mostly between a poet or dramatist and a listener or spectator. The classical poet was writing for *sahṛdaya*, audience "with heart". A term *sahṛdaya* belongs to the realm of old-Indian Sanskrit aesthetics. It was first used in the context of art-experience by Abhinavagupta in 10th century. This special status of the audience is expressed already in *Nāṭyaśāstra*, a treaty on Sanskrit theater, compiled by Bharata between 5th century B. C. and 6th century of our age[21], on which Abhinavagupta commented. In the sixth chapter of this work in the passage of prose placed after verse 6.31 the audience is referred to as *sumanasaḥ prekṣakāḥ*[22], "good-disposed spectators":

> *yathā hi nānā+vyañjana+saṃskṛtam annaṃ* bhuñjānā* rasān āsvādayanti su+manasaḥ puruṣā* harṣa+ādīṃś* ca*adhigacchanti tathā nānā+bhāva+abhinaya+vyañjitān vāg+aṅga+sattva+upetān sthāyi+bhāvān āsvādayanti su+manasaḥ prekṣakāḥ harṣa+ādīṃś* ca*adhigacchanti /*
>
> "In the way persons of a good disposition who are eating cooked dish dressed with various spices, relish [its] tastes and attain enjoyment, etc., so also good-disposed spectators relish permanent motives, which are made apparent through acting of various motives, hav-

[20] Ibidem, p. 6–7.

[21] Cf. *Nāṭyaśātra of Bharatamuni : With the commentary Abhinavabhāratī by Abhinavaguptācārya*, Nagar, R. S. [ed.]. Vol.1–4, Delhi, 2009.

[22] Passages from Sanskrit are translated into English by the author of this paper, if not stated differently. In the transliterated text there are additional marks introduced to replace: composition (+) and sandhi (*).Cf. *Nāṭyaśātra of Bharatamuni...*, op. cit, Vol. 1, p. 285.

> ing the form of [acting by means of] speech, limbs and unaffected behavior and attain enjoyment." [NŚ.prose passage afer 6.31][23]

From this Sanskrit passage it is clear that only good-disposed persons can attain *rasa*, the state of enjoyment. Ajñeya refers to the term *sahṛdaya* and translates it as "the audience with heart" or "like-minded", "like-hearted people"[24]. Is the audience of 20th century Hindi literature put together of "like-minded" listeners, spectators or readers? Ajñeya explains that until the beginning of 20th century the Indian poet could expect that his listeners "have the same kind or discipline or training and the same kind of developed sympathy as he himself"[25]. Till that time poetry in India was to be heard and the role of the writer was "to perform" his own poetry. Moreover the poetry was a kind of transformation of popular themes known from classical literature. The audience was well prepared for it, expected it. "In the past the classical poet was a member of an elite and performed for an elite" – writes Ajñeya[26].

The kind of experience evoked by such performance has been defined in the mentioned sixth chapter of *Nāṭyaśāstra* and delivered till modern times as *rasa*, "taste" or "aesthetic experience" in Sanskrit, with its eight possible variants (NŚ.6.15): *śṛṅgāra* "erotic", *hāsya* "comic", *karuṇa* "pathetic", *raudra* "furious", *vīra* "heroic", *bhayānaka* "terryfing", *bībhatsa* "disgusting" and *adbhuta* "astonishing". Abhinavagupta has added the ninth taste: *śānta* -„calming"[27]. Rūpagosvāmin in the 16th century popularized in *Brāj* literature the *rasa* of *bhakti* – a taste of "devotion"[28].

Ajñeya was well acquainted with Sanskrit tradition of aesthetics from *Nāṭyaśāstra* and its modifications by later theoreticians, he gives

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23 Ibidem.

24 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of...*, op. cit, p. 8

25 Ibidem.

26 Ibidem.

27 For Abhinavagupta's commentary on *śāntarasa* see: *Nāṭyaśātra of Bharatamuni : With the commentary Abhinavabhāratī by Abhinavaguptācārya*, op. cit., Vol I, p. 339–335.
Cf. Warder A. K., *Indian Kāvya Literature*, Vol. 1: *Literary Criticism*, Delhi 1989, p. s. 40–46.

28 Cf. Stasik D., *Opowieść o prawym królu*, Warszawa, 2000, p. 137.

an evidence of it in his literary and theoretical writings[29]. He is convinced that even in the 20th century in India there were readers who demanded from him and his colleagues this kind of re-created poetry.[30] His poem *"Ek sannāṭā bunntā hū̃,* "I weave the silence", could be interpreted as author's manifesto on the act of creation. Its verses depict a reader, who's role is as important as poet's role in the process of creation. Ajñeya uses in this poem a metaphor of weaving as a symbol of creating literature, in which both a poet and the reader partake. The writer gives an evidence of being very much conscious about those two parts involved in a creative process, which as an act of communication is understood by him as communion. This what they both share is a poetic text with its textual canvas, with all its motifs. The text enables communication, therefore must be solid, as Ajñeya states in his poem:

tānā; tānā majbut cāhiye: kahā̃ se milegā?
par koī hai jo use badal degā,
jo use rasõ̃ mẽ̃ bor kar rañjit karegā, tabhi to vah khilegā.

"The wrap must be strong: from where to get it?
But there is someone who will change it,
Who will dip it in juices and color it, and only then it will flourish."[31]

The final effect of poetic creation, as understood by Ajñeya, is a quality shared by the writer and the reader. The role of the audience is even more important in it, in so far as it is the necessary condition for the fulfilment of the writers' idea embodied in the poem. The reader re-creates a poetic text:

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29 For Ajñeya's acquaintance with Sanskrit tradition see my paper: Bigoń T., *Looking for the definition of aesthetic experience Rasa in the writings of Saccidānanda Hīrānanda Vātsyāyana,* [in:] *Asiatische Studien. Etudes Asiatique*, LI.4.1977, s. 1079–1085.

30 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of...,* op. cit, p. 13.

31 For Hindi original text cf. Ajñeya, *Sadānirā. Sampūrṇ kavitāẽ,* Vol. II, Dillī 1986, p. 290. The full text of my English translation see: Bigoń T, op. cit., p. 1082–1083.

phir bānā: par raṅg kyā merī pasand ke haĩ?
abhiprāy bhī kyā mere chand ke haĩ?
pātā hū̃ ki merā man to girtī hai, ḍorā hai.
idhar se udhar, udhar se idhar, hāth merā kām kartā hai.
nakṣā kisi aur kā ubhartā hai.[32]

"Next the woof: but are the colors of my liking?
And the motifs of my choice?
I feel that my mind is the shuttle, is the tread.
From here to there, from there to here. My hand does the work
Someone else's hand fills the contour".

This poem proves that Ajñeya does not deny Sanskrit tradition of *Rasa* its place in modern Hindi literature. He even accepts its symbolic language. The color, *raṅg* in Hindi, in the mentioned poem symbolize "taste" from Sanskrit aesthetics. In some short-stories, like *Darogā Amicand* ("Supervisor Amicand") and *Hīlī-bon kī battakhẽ* ("Hili-bon ducs"), the writer shows how the employ the symbolic value of colors known from *Nāṭyaśāstra* with the aim to reinforce the leading and accompanying motives and serve the construction of the plot[33].

Ajñeya reveals in his writings affirmative attitude towards own literary tradition. He is convinced, that "the poet does not write language, he writes words", as he admitted in his essay *Turculent clay*[34]. Such standpoint allows him to accept and modify "the tradition of the word", but liberate himself from "the tradition of the language". The tradition of Sanskrit as a language has changed in India but its tradition as a word, in the sense of literary values, continues. Ajñeya lists among those everlasting values the Indian concept of *vāc*, "speech" in Sanskrit, which assumes the absolute faith in the uttered word, in its power of recreation. This idea of creative notion of words is recognized by Ajñeya as one among three most important strands in Indian poetic tradition. The other two are: a capacity of new event to be the re-enactment of Vedic *yajña*, the first act of creation,

32 Ajñeya, *Sadānirā*, op. cit., p. 290.
33 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p. 182–188 (for *Darogā Amicad)* and p. 536–542 (for *Hīlī-bon kī battakhẽ*).
34 Vatsyayan S. H., *Turculent clay*, Delhi1982, p. 17.

and finally – the belief in the inherent union of matter and spirit and man with nature[35]. Sanskrit aesthetics belongs to the Indian "tradition of the word". While defining an art experience in his essay *Triśaṅku* ("Triśanku") Ajñeya re-formulates the *Rasa* theory. In it he liberates himself form the traditional language of Sanskrit *rasūtra* known from *Nāṭyaśāstra* and uses a capacity of Hindi as a modern language to re-create it. In this way he delivers ideas of traditional poetics to modern Indian audience and at the same time enriches the tradition of the word. A definition of aesthetic experience from *Nāṭyaśāstra* prose passage after verse 6.31 is following:

> *tatra vibhāva+anubhāva+vyabhicāri+saṃyogād* rasa+niṣpattiḥ* [36]
>
> "In this regard the effect of aesthetic taste [in the sense of experience] is due to conjunction of conditions [of the main motive], expressions [of the main motive] and accompanying motives."

The Sanskrit term *bhāva* should be understood here as the emotional stimuli or motive, which can function as motif in a literary work. Ajñeya renews in Hindi an idea embodied in Sanskrit *rasūtra* in the following way:

> *„yah anubhūti ek hī bhāv se dvārā utpann ho saktī hai, yā anek bhāvo͂ke sammisraṇ se, yā bhāvo͂aur anubhūtiyo͂ke saṁyog se"*
>
> "This experience could be created just through one motive or from the combination of many motives or from the union of motives and experiences."[37]

The renewal of traditional values seems to be for Ajñeya the most important task for Indian writers in modern times. In his understanding of art experience the term *bhāv* plays the key role and term *anubhūti,* meaning "experience" or "sensitivity", corre-

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35 Cf. *The Indian Poetic Tradition*, ed. by Vatsyayan S. H. and Misra V. N., Agra 1983, p. 11–13.

36 For Sanskrit *rasūtra* cf. *Nāṭyaśātra of Bharatamuni,* op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 281.

37 Vātsyayān S. H, *Triśaṅku*, 1973 , p. 41.

sponds with the Sanskrit term *rasa*. Ajñeya employs term *anubhūti* not only in his theoretical essay but also in some short-stories and poems. In the short-story *Tāj kī chāyā mẽ* ("In the shadow of Taj") it appears in the context of "experiencing of beauty" – *sundarya kī anubhūti.* A main hero of the story, Anant, seeks to experience the beauty of Taj Mahal. To take a photo of Taj in the night in the light of full moon became for him the most important task. He and his companion represent in the story new Indian audience. Anant describes himself as "poor man", who does not know the means of art experience. He calls this experience *ras*[38]. This Hindi term is an equivalent of Sanskrit term *rasa,* "taste". Anant is not only willing to experience the beauty of art, he also reflects on its nature:

> *saundarya kā purā anubhāv karne ke liye kyā nirved avasthā zarurī hai? kyā zarurī nahī̃ hai? Saundarya vah hai, jiskī anubhūti mẽ̃ham aihik sukh-duḥkh se pare nikal jāvẽ̃ – yānī bhāvānubhūti se pare cale jāvẽ̃, par saundrya kī anubhūti to svayam ek bhāv hī hai.,*
>
> "Is the dismissal of worldly objects necessary for the highest experience of beauty? Is it not necessary? Beauty is that in the experience of which we would be taken beyond mundane happiness and unhappiness – it means we would be taken beyond experiencing feelings, but the experience of beauty is itself a feeling.

In the moment of experiencing beauty Anant became a poet himself and in this way he could gained immortality together with his companion to whom he dedicated his poem. But at the same time he doubted in such possibility. Thus he forgot about the photo and left the place disappointed and confused.

Indian literary audience in modern times has definitely lost its elite character. A hermetic entity of connoisseurs or *sahṛdaya* turned to be common readers. Moreover it became interested in experiencing other tastes than those explored by the traditional poetics. They expected from literature a depiction of their uncertainty and disappointment or their anger rather than the evocation of traditionally explored tastes of "love in union" *saṃbhoga śṛṇgāra,*

[38] Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p. 458.

or "love in separation" *vipralaṃbha śṛṇgāra* from *Nāṭyaśāstra*, as it was in vogue in classical and medieval literature. Ajñeya's short-story "In the shadow of Taj" illustrates this transformation of the attitude of Indian audience. His other literary works also meet the expectations of new readers. A good proof of it could be such short-stories like *Hīlī-bon kī battakhẽ* ("Hili-bon's ducs"), *Gaiṅgrin* ("Gangrene"), *Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī (*"Poetry and life. A story") or *Paramparā* ("Tradition. A story"), which deal with anger, resignation, disappointment and lack of values.

Ajñeya claims, that the role of modern writer is to renew own literary tradition in such way that it appeals to new Indian society. Still in some short-stories he quotes popularly known verses and couplets from Sanskrit and medieval literature, mostly without pointing at their sources. He assumes that even among modern readers in India there are people familiar with them. In the short-story *Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī* ("Poetry and Life. A story) he quotes works of Jayadeva, Bihārīlal and Viśvanātha, mostly without making the name of the author obvious. The main hero of this story and a narrator in one person, Śivsundar quotes Sanskrit verse: *mukharam+adhīraṃ tyaja mañjīraṃ* without mentioning its source and author[39]. This comes from *Gītagovinda* of Jayadeva, the 4th śloka of its 5th sarga entitled *Sākāṅkṣa-Puṇḍarikākṣa*, and means "Leave this anklet which is jingling so irresistible"[40]. Ajñeya introduces it in the context of "women going for tryst", known in Sanskrit literature as *abhisārikā*, a type of heroine popular also in Indian folk literature. In *Nāṭyaśāstra* this type of heroine is listed among the main ten[41]. Another Sanskrit quotation in this short-story comes from Viśvanātha's theoretical work *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, chapter I.23, and refers to the definition of poetry in Sanskrit: *vākyam rasātmakam kāvyam,* „poetry is a speech endowed with tastes"[42]. In this short-story there is also a line in *Brāj* from *Satasaī* ("Seven hundreeds") of Bihārīlal, a poet belonging to

39 Ibidem.

40 Cf. The *Gītagovinda of Jayadeva. Love song of the Dark Lord,* Stoller Miller, B. [ed.], Delhi1977, p. 145.

41 Cf. NŚ.22.220 [in:] *Nāṭyaśātra of Bharatamuni,* op. cit., Vol. 3, p. 203.

42 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p. 460. For Sanskrit Cf. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, I.23 [in:] *Sāhityadarpaṇa of Sri Viśvanatha Kaviraja*, ed. by Acharya Shesharaja Regmi, Delhi 2005, p. 24.

medieval Hindi literature: *arahar, kapās, īkh, sab kaṭ jāyege*[43], *w*hat means: "all: lentils and cotton and sugar cane will be cut". Only in the case of this couplet the name of an author is given by Ajñeya. Those quotations are introduces by him with the aim to instruct other writers that they must appeal to more than one audience. In the society of the 20th century India both literary traditions exist: the written one and also the oral, folk tradition. While narrating the events from the life of famous Tulsidas and poor Tulsu in another short-story *Alikhit kahānī* ("Not written story"), Ajñeya illustrates how the oral literature originates and functions. Again he seems to instruct other Hindi writers how to appeal to both audiences, the literate and illiterate. He does not hesitate to call the illiterate audience in India the "educated" one, because as he writes in his essay, they may "have the sense of judgment and of literary values" as they know oral literature, the literature of "performers"[44]. But Ajñeya is also aware of the fact, that modern Hindi poets may have problem to write Indian poetry. He admits that most of recognized Indian writers of the 20th century have been educated through the medium of English. For him a foreign poetry is designed to be read and not to be performed as in the case of Indian poetry, so he suggests modern writers to "write rather visual than the oral poem"[45]. In his opinion the decision of Hindi writers to write literature in own language is in such circumstances a kind of "sacrifice" and "a major act of choice"[46]. By making this choice Indian writer shows "new kind of awareness of the relationship with the audience" and for this reason "the Indian modern writing became more self-conscious than other modern writing"[47].

In the poem *Maĩ vahā̃ hū̃* ("I am there") modern Indian audience has been characterized by Ajñeya in all its diversity: educated and uneducated, peasants and workers, artists, politicians and rickshaw-drivers, men and women[48]. The poet calls himself the

43 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p. 459.
44 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of…*,op. cit., p. 12.
45 Ibidem.
46 Ibidem, p. 14.
47 Ibidem.
48 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sadānirā,* op. cit., Vol. I, p. 270–272. See also: Czekalska R., Rodowody poezji hindi, Kraków, 2008, p. 271–274.

bridge, s*etu,* between them . This Hindi term relates to *Setubandhanam*, Rama's bridge known from Sanskrit epos *Rāmāyaṇa,* its 6th book *Yuddha Kanda* ("Book Of War"). The modern writer should be like a bridge that joins "this what is" with "this what will be", this bridge does not start in the emptiness:

vah setu, jo manav kā hāth milne se bantā hai,
jo hr̥day se hr̥day ko, śram kī śikhā se śram kī śikhā ko
kalpnā ke paṅkh se kalpnā ke paṅkh ko
vivek kī kiraṇ se vivek kī kiraṇ ko
anubhav ke stambh se anubhav ke stambh ko milātā hai,
jo manav ko ek kartā hai[49]

"... the bridge
which originates from men's hands put together,
which joins one's heart with the other,
one's intellectual effort with the effort of others,
one's horses of fancy with the horses of others' fancy,
the radiance of one's intellect with the radiance of other's intellect
the astonishment of one's experience with the astonishment of other's experience
which puts a man together again."

In this poem Ajñeya insists that writers should add to the achievements of previous generations. In *„Turculent clay"* Ajñeya writes: : „As long as he [the poet] goes on adding to the tradition, he renews himself, frees himself. This liberation-in-process is the only freedom for a poet."[50] Hindi writers have to enrich own tradition, even if as the builders of bridges between tradition and modernity they would be called "monkeys", as Ajñeya supposes it in his poem "*Jo pul banāyẽge*" ("Those, who make bridges")[51]. This is exact the role, which Ajñeya takes upon himself and encourages other Hindi writers to do the same, even if they will be misunderstood by critics, as in his own case. In some short-stories the writer refers to critics

49 Ibidem, p. 272.
50 Vatsyayan S. H., Turculent..., op. cit., p. 17.
51 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sadānirā, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, p. 307.

as his readers. In in the beginning of *Kavitā aur jīvan. Ek kahānī* („Poetry and life. A story") he address them directly:

> *Zara kān lagākar – nahī̃ kān adhik man lagākar – sun lījiye. Jo gālī āp denā cāhte haī -paṛhkar āp gālī dẽge, vah to niścit hai – use zara ant tak rok rakhiye. "sabr kā phal mīṭhā hotā hai" – kyā patā, āpke sabr kā mujhe milnevālā phal vah gālī bhī mīṭhā ho jāy! Is "kahānī" par kalam ghisne kā pāriśramik mujhe nahī̃ milegā, yah to āp jānte hõge, isliye gālī ke bare mẽ̃ fikrmand hone ke liye āp mujhe kṣamā kar dẽge, yah ummīd hai.*

> "Please, listen to my story and strain your ears, no not the ears, rather the mind. And the words of criticism , which you will surely have after you finish, please save till the end. „The fruit of patience is always sweet" – who knows, maybe this criticism of yours as the fruit of your patience turns to be sweet for me. I would not get a prize for scribing down this story, this you take for sure, so you will forgive me that I care so much for your criticism."[52]

In the end of this short-story he pleads again:

> *…kṣamā kar dījiye ki ākhir maī̃ bhī durbhāgya kā mārā ek hindī-lekhak hū̃, us haisiyat se ākāś ke tare toṛne yā sāmarthya kī ḍīṅg mārnevālā, abhimān kā tikt aur karm kā kaṣāy ras pīnevālā, kaun hotā hūm, maī̃ bhī to 'madhureṇa samāpayet" ke liye mā̃gtā hū̃, sikhāye hue ārt svar mẽ̃ āpkī dayā kā chadām!*

> "…forgive me because I am also a Hindi writer stroke by ill fate. Who I am to ask in this condition for a star from the sky or to boast of my skill, I also feel the bitter taste of proud and the poignant taste of my destiny. I also ask for the "ending full of sweetness" in the well trained tormented voice I beg for a penny of your mercy."

In another short-story entitled " *Naī kahānī kā ploṭ* (The plot of the new short-story") Ajñeya depicts the negative influence of literary critics on Hindi editors and writers as they demand from them the employment of Western ideas. The main hero, Mijam

[52] Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p.457.

Abdul Latif, a journalist working in a literary magazine, has to find interesting plot to weave the story around it, so that it would fit for the editor's page. When, after many trials, he has finally written a realistic story about poverty and hunger of people in India, who were treated as slaves, his text has been torn to pieces by the chief editor. Ajñeya also warns that Indian critics may use the critical apparatus, which is a foreign one, because they all know English, but perhaps no more Sanskrit. He calls this situation "the predicament of all Indian language writers today" [53].

In the short-story *Kalakar kī mukti* ("The liberation of the artist") Ajñeya teachs how to touch new truths even in such hostile environment. In this story main protagonist Pigmalion frees himself form the guidance of the Goddess Aphrodite. The narrator of this short-story reflects:

> *Kahte haĩ ki purāṇ-kāthaẽ sab sarvadā sac hotī haĩ, kyoṅkī uskā satya kāvya-satya hotā hai, vastu-satya nahĩ. Us pratīk satya ko yug ke parivartan nahĩ chū sakte. Lekin kyā pratīk satya bhī badalte nahĩ? Kyā sāmūhik anubhv mẽ kabhī parivartan nahĩ ātā? Vr̥ddhi bhī to parivartan hai aur agar kavi ne anubhav mẽ koī vr̥ddhi nahĩ kī to uskī samvednā kis kām kī?*
>
> "People say that the ancient myths are always true, because their truth is a poetic truth and not the objective one. The passage of time cannot affect this symbolic truth. But do the symbolic truths evolve? Is there never any change in the collective experience? Growth also is a change, what is a use of a poet's sensibility if he can't augment our experience?"[54]

The beautiful statue sculpted by Pigmalion and then broken by him to pieces symbolizes the artist's liberation from the fetters of any guidance. Only after Pigmalion rejected boon and guidance of Aphrodite he was able to create his best masterpieces. Ajñeya suggests that an artist must be free to make his choices, his experience must be personal, individual, his own. Only thus Hindi writers can reach the experience of modern readers, the experience which originates

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53 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of...*,op. cit., p. 14.

54 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sampūrṇ kahāniyā*, op. cit., p

in a private situation of reading a book. In this new situation there is a shift form community situation of listening to a poem or watching performance to very personal situation. "The oral poem expresses the literary theory or time or society – never the person" – argues Ajñeya again in his essay[55]. With the move from oral literature to the written and printed one there is a shift within the order of time in it. Agñeya calls it the "change from a continuously or perpetually flowing time to an intermittent time" or "fluent time"[56]. He regards it as transition from tradition into the "actuality" and becoming for the first time aware of the society and not only of the audience. The society means many different audiences. And the role of the writer is to reach them. Ajñeya warns that the way they have to choose is not easy and save. Their situation is like the one of a tightrope dancer from his poem *Nāc* ("The dance")[57]. The writer compares himself to a dancer who has to watch the rope that it remains tightened, so that he can dance. In fact he runs from one pole to the other trying to lose all tensions and get rest. But if he manages to solve it he falls down, he cannot stop. To keep the line vibrating, tightened, to provide the possibility for dancing, is his sacrifice. Because in the end only dance matters.

...aur vahī merā nāc hai jise sab dekhte haĩ
mujhe nahĩ
rassī ko nahĩ
khambhe nahĩ
rośnī nahĩ
tanāv bhī nahĩ
dekhte haĩ – nāc!

"And this is my dance that all watch it
Not me
Not the rope
Not the poles
Not the light
Not even the span
They watch the dance!"[58]

55 Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of...*,op. cit., p. 11.
56 Ibidem, p. 12.
57 Cf. Ajñeya, *Sadānirā, op. cit.,* Vol. 2, p. 331–332.
58 Ibidem.

A "dance" symbolizes here the art in general. Hindi writer supposed to be like an artist on the rope. In his essay T*riśaṅk*u Ajñeya explains the aim of such sacrifice:

> *Is jāgrūktā kā mukya upakaraṇ hai ek aitihāsik cetnā – arthāt jo kālānukram mẽ bīt gayā hai, atit hai, us ke betīban kī hī nahī̃, uskī vartmāntā kī bhī tikhī aur cir-jāgrat anubhutī.*
>
> "*The main instrument of this alertness is to be aware of own past. This what has occurred in art before, what is past, must be still present, it has not be an experience of its past, but the sharp and lasting experience of its actuality*"[59].

He is convinced that only such attitude of the writer enables the recreation of own tradition in modern times and "perpetual renewal … is a justification for literature today."[60]

To sum up according to Ajñeya the most important role of Hindi writer in modern Indian society is to enable communication between him and his audience, which he has first to determine. Divers factors like influence of Western ideas and reduced education in Sanskrit can endanger this act. The writer has not only to be aware of it, but also response to multilayered tensions. Ajñeya argues that the diversified Indian public could be reach only by renewing own literary tradition, because the sensitivity of readers and even illiterate recipients of literature, is still rooted in it. He encourages Hindi writers to explore old truths in new light and demands from them not only to perform, but also to explain reality to modern audience. Ajñeya suggests that this task for Hindi writers could be a kind of sacrifice, but by undertaking it they provide "the possibility of perpetual renewal of mankind".[61] The reader can participate in it. The tension between the writer and his audience is essential for being creative in literature.

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59 Vātysayān, S. H. T*riśaṅk*u , op. cit., p. 34

60 Cf. Vatsyayan S. H., *The role of…*,op. cit., p. 17.

61 Ibidem.

SUMMARY

This paper deals with Ajñeya's literary and theoretical works, which reflect his belief that the role of Hindi writer in modern society is to renew own literary tradition. S. H. Vātsyāyan (1911–1987) known as Ajñeya, paved his way into the realm of Hindi literature in the fourth decade of the 20th century. Awarded by the Indian Academy of Literature already in 1964, he received the highest Indian literary prize in 1978. The first complete critical edition of his literary output *Ajñeya racanāvalī* appeared only in 2011 published in the series dedicated to the best Indian authors. Ajñeya was also aware that the modernity in Hindi literature demanded the move from „tradition" to "actuality". It required addressing a reader who became mass, but still involved in the oral-audial situation, and who was only gradually shifting to printed texts and private readings. By using the examples from Ajñeya's short stories, poems and theoretical works I depict how the writer describes his "audience". I also make a claim that Ajñeya while focusing on the reader is well acquainted with the Sanskrit theory of *rasa*. He is convinced that a writer has to provide the possibility of the communication, which in the multilayered context of modern Hindi language could be endangered. The perpetual tension between a writer and his audience is shown as the source of creativity for Ajñeya.

KEY WORDS: Indian literature, Hindi Literature, Ajñeya, Indian aesthetics

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11.

RAFAŁ BANKA

Script as a Means of Communication in Xu Bing's Artworks

Introduction

Within traditional Chinese art, the liaison between writing and painting appears to be more evident than in other traditions. This can be largely ascribed to calligraphy which, according to the Chinese tradition, is a genre of painting. The emphasis on the graphic representation of writing, which is quite natural in the case of Chinese characters, modifies the usual perception of writing as a text. Traditional Chinese calligraphy pays utmost attention to how the artist's inner emotional state is rendered by lines, dots or curves. We can state that in calligraphy, script becomes a vehicle for the extralinguistic expression of the artist's individuality that makes a piece of art complete. However, this refined manner of articulating the artist's individuality does not exhaust the function of script in Chinese contemporary art. It is worth exemplifying this state of affairs with Xu Bing's artworks, where the traditional approach to script is approached from a highly critical perspective.

In order to understand completely Xu Bing's work with script, we must resort to his biography. Xu Bing 徐冰 (b. 1955) received

his diploma in printmaking from the Central Academy of Fine Arts, Beijing, in 1987. This shows that he is thoroughly acquainted with printing techniques and that he already worked with script as a student. His interest in the written medium of language is also connected with his family and the political background of the People's Republic of China at that time. Xu grew up in a family of intellectuals. His mother was a librarian, and his father a historian at Peking University. Thus, contrarily to other children, Xu's childhood was spent in the surroundings of numerous books, which he was unable to read at the beginning (Leung et al. 1999: 94). Quite naturally, his contact with books took place more 'superficially', in terms of the script rather than the words or meaning which they conveyed.

Another important preparatory event in Xu's later artistic interest can be ascribed to the Cultural Revolution, which brought him, along with other young people from cities, to the countryside in 1975. Practically, the revolutionary literary education was limited to reading Mao Zedong's works. This experience proved to be extremely important because of another aspect of writing, namely its dominant educational function (Leung et al. 1999: 94). The Chinese script became a vehicle for spreading the communist ideology on a large scale among the masses, who lacked literary refinement.

The two stages can be viewed as two extremes, traditional and revolutionary, encapsulated in Xu's formative years, which resulted in his unprecedented approach to script in Chinese art.

Xu's artworks chronologically reflect his shift in concern with script. This can be described as an interest in script as such, its relation to semantics, its social function, and finally an exploration of how an artist uses script, which results in an original reinterpretation of classical Chinese calligraphy. What inevitably intersperses with all the themes is how script can be referred to communication, its original function.

Script as such

Beyond any doubt, the most important big piece by Xu from the 1980s is *Book from the Sky* (*Tianshu* 天書), which was created between 1987–1991. It is a mixed media installation work consisting of large printed scrolls and books, arranged in the exhibition space. They immediately evoke the context of Chinese calligraphy, but this is where Xu significantly differs in several respects. In calligraphy, a primary artistic importance is attached to 'handwriting', which may reveal the artist's idiosyncrasy, and which is identified with an individualized, personal expression at the very moment when the work is being created. In this sense, it is more precise to refer to calligraphy in terms of performance art, where a piece of calligraphy writing is merely one part of an artistic oeuvre.

Within the above context, *Book from the Sky* liberates itself from calligraphic constraints. Xu uses a printing technique in his creation of script. He carves fonts, which delivers a repetitive effect without leaving even a single trace of the artist's personal touch. This disconnects the work from calligraphy at its very essence. In this way, script is stripped of the layer which would otherwise reveal the emotional state of the artist. The font style was not invented by Xu. He refers to *Songti* 宋體[1], which was a standardized printing style employed by woodblock printers during the Song and Ming dynasties. This particular choice does not only veil Xu's individuality; in fact his intention is to be perceived more as an artisan. This declaration stated in an exhibition hall can lead us to the conclusion that Xu does not intend to be expressed personally in the fabric of the script, in order to make it utterly sterile in this respect.

Considering the above, we can proceed to the more basic, linguistic function of the script. However, what at first glance appears to be Chinese are actually invented characters, the meaning of which cannot be deciphered. Thus, the script does not convey any meaning.

It is interesting to view this aspect from two perspectives. Firstly, it is highly dubious to say that the script consists of char-

[1] Used during Song and Ming dynasties, *Songti* was the official printing script. There was a special guild of craftsmen who were commissioned to carve them. Xu Bing emphasizes that in this way *Songti* was not created by one artisan, which disconnects the authorship from a particular person, thanks to which anonymity is obtained. Cf. Xu 2006: 103.

acters that are graphic representations of meaning. The graphs, which would be a more appropriate term here, do not refer to any denotations, which in turn questions their ontological status as text. However, we do not refuse the arrangement of the graphs the status of script, which constitutes a book. The fact that the book cannot be read yet still remains a book can be defended by, for example, the existence of ancient writing which can no longer be read by anyone, or the conversion of some text into an invented system of writing. They are not refused the status of a text that may potentially yield some sense. It is more a question of our own inability to read it. *Book from the Sky* is a special case as there is no semantic underlay to it[2].

Secondly, we can depart from the fact that *Book from the Sky* is not only a book but also a piece of conceptual art. Within the artistic realm, the requirement for a text to convey some meaning may well be weakened, at least in terms of linguistics. How can it be comprehended in that case? We should look back to Xu's childhood, when he was confronted with innumerable books whose the meaning was inaccessible to him. Our perception of script is somehow similar. We should also bear in mind that Xu as a child wanted to create one book which could encapsulate everything (Leung et al. 1999: 94), which is an impossible enterprise in the case of conventional books. Viewing *Book from the Sky* from this perspective, it can hypothetically convey meaning. In my opinion, the interpretational key can be found in the *Daodejing* 道德經, a most important work of classical *Dao*ist philosophy. In a passage from Chapter 41, which tries to illustrate the meaning of *dao* 道, it is written that: '無隅 [...] 希聲, 象無形' (Laozi 2006: 101). 'The great square has no corners [...] Great music sounds faint. Great form has no shape' (Laozi 1963: 160).

What the above passage conveys is the inexhaustibility of *dao*, inextricably connected with the fact that none of the essential or distinguishing attributes are actualized in the realm

[2] The meaning of *Tianshu* in Chinese is ambiguous, as it also means 'gobbledygook'. This ambiguity can be comprehended by Chinese speakers, but the translated title misleads the non-Chinese audience into an interpretation based on English lexemes in the English translation. Cf. Abe 1998: 178.

of perception. Once forms are given in experience, *dao* becomes nothing more than a finite object of perception, which contradicts its identity.

From this perspective, *Book from the Sky* becomes readable as a text containing every single aspect of the universe without any possible distortion, which could be caused by the finiteness of both linguistic medium and comprehension. This fact is also emphasized by the depersonalized script, which does not assume any particularity in this respect. Whereas calligraphy is intensely saturated with the artist's personality, Xu's artwork remains perfectly complete in the absence of any possible persona.

Book from the Sky operates with a script which is essentially different from that which is employed in Chinese calligraphy. At the same time, it meets Chinese tradition by being nothing but script itself, which is a vehicle to all possible meanings or messages.

It is also important to remark that the script has no pronunciation, although the structure of the graphs is similar to the Chinese characters which contain a phonetic composite. Despite the fact that some Chinese characters have phonetic components, they are not by necessity decisive in determining the pronunciation of the characters which contain them[3]. Pronunciation is known only in the case of the characters which are used in speech. In other words, phonetic competence is bound by necessity to performance. This makes Xu's script even more undetermined and potential rather than concrete.

Script as meaningful text

Xu, however, does not limit himself to the variety of script which distances itself from the semantic layer. In his later works, he discusses the interactions between script, pronunciation and meaning. One such example, *ABC...*, was created in 1991, after Xu's emigration to

[3] According to Zhou, 80 per cent of Chinese characters have phonetic components but our chance of guessing character pronunciation is 39 per cent (quoted by Harrist 2006: 39).

New York, which must have naturally brought the Roman alphabet to his artistic attention.

ABC... consists of fonts carved in wood. They present clusters of Chinese characters, which correspond to the English pronunciation of the Roman alphabet letters. For example, the letter 'W' is represented by the cluster '大布六', pronounced: '*dabuliu*'. The meaning of the sequence of characters in Chinese is 'big', 'cloth' and 'six'. If we consider the relation between the script, pronunciation and meaning, we can evidently observe that the script is managed by pronunciation, and the semantics emerges as a by-product. Shifting our interest to the script, we can state that it means and constitutes a fragment of some text. However, the question of the text being meaningful is at least arguable. Is it then legitimate to state that the script in *ABC...* communicates something?

In my opinion, what surfaces in *ABC...* is how language can be deconstructed. The arrangement of sounds, signs, and meanings in the languages we speak is arbitrary. Language allows us to express our thoughts, discuss facts and ideas, which in turn gives us assurance. However, one of the possible issues pinpointed in Xu's work is that the construction on which our communication is built might sometimes be no more than gibberish. In that case, is script a good medium for communication? If we compare *ABC...* with *Book from the Sky*, the possible answer would be that script can successfully communicate when it remains semantically silent, but not meaningless.

Another perspective that combines script with text can be found in *New English Calligraphy* (*Xin Yingwen Shufa* 新英文書法), which is also alternatively entitled *Square Word Calligraphy*, from 1994. As can be inferred from the title, the work is closely connected to Chinese calligraphy. However, what makes it different is that instead of Chinese characters, English words are written in block style, where one word equals one 'character' block. It is an interactive oeuvre as it involves the audience in the very process of creating calligraphy. When the work was exhibited in Copenhagen, the exhibition space was converted into a classroom, where the audience were provided with brushes, paper and a video manual.

Compared to the previous works, *New English Calligraphy* is different in many respects, one of them being that the script is not printed but written personally, which brings it closer to the traditional art genre. Thus, the calligrapher leaves some of the idiosyncrasy in the created works, which is the most desired feature of Chinese calligraphy. However, Xu's views on individual expression have not changed since *Book from the Sky*. The other side of the coin is that personal involvement exposes the participant to inculcation. In a sense, the script is not only written on paper but also into the one who performs the writing. This can be explained in terms of how the interactive character of the work is achieved by means of education. The process of learning, especially at an elementary level, consists in internalizing patterns by performance, and learning a given script is one of the most typical examples. Xu provides the audience with paper, on which word block contours are marked with thin, red lines. This concept is borrowed from *miaohong* 描紅, exercise books for Chinese elementary school students to memorize and practise the repetitive production of Chinese characters.

The audience becomes involved in the educational project, thanks to which the 'block script' becomes an effective medium of communication, provided that they know the English language. However, we should note that performative learning that develops certain habits instills in us standards which, in the case of script, would be the rules[4] governing the production of given characters or letters. As Xu himself remarks, learning calligraphy is not just learning to write but 'disciplining within a particular cultural framework' (Leung et al. 1999: 94).

This refers us to Xu's biographical background connected with his stay in the countryside at the end of the Cultural Revolution, when the artist was already acquainted with semantics, which enabled his indoctrination with script[5]. In literate civilizations, script is the most essential conserver of culture, and accordingly, the absorption of

4 Depending on a given script, they can be, for instance, stroke order, curves etc.

5 The work can also be set in the context of the 1950s literacy campaign addressed at peasants and workers, the most promising social class who were to cultivate communist ideas.

it is inextricably conducted in the same way. Thus, humans are not only consumers but also the transportation of cultural transmission. This aspect appears to be perceived by Xu as endangerment. It changes the perception of Chinese calligraphy, which is generally regarded as a means of individualized expression. A calligrapher becomes formatted by calligraphy technique and their every single performance is tantamount to the confirmation of previously imposed standards.

This phenomenon can be viewed in the wider context of Pierre Bourdieu's *habitus*, which is defined by the sociologist as:

> a system of durable, transposable dispositions [...] as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively applied to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to attain them. (1990: 53)

It is quite evident that *habitus* is both practice-based and oriented, and its application does not have to be necessarily conscious. This brings the notion very close to the usage of script, a strategy of communicating in a determined way, which is learnt by an individual through their functioning in society. The socialization of individuals also includes education, during which not all things are acquired consciously. In this way, some patterns of behaviour are thought to be highly individual ones, whereas in fact they realize and reproduce the patterns of *habitus*. If we refer *habitus* to calligraphy, the individualized expression becomes not so obvious. It results from reproducing one's personality in a particular way, which follows the paradigm of a particular artistic expression. Thus in calligraphy, individualized script can be a variety of the reproduction of an aesthetic *habitus*.

The role of script can be interpreted even in political terms. Hajime Nakatani places writing in the historical context from Imperial China until the Cultural Revolution as the uncovering of a graphic regime, which is exercised through physical writing (2009: 7). In this sense, it is not we who write the script but it is the script that overwrites itself upon us.

Both of these perspectives confirm that *New English Calligraphy* uncovers the reproductive, unconscious mechanism. It is also a response to the question why Xu distances himself from the traditional calligraphic technique, hidden beyond the *Songti* fonts. In printing, in comparison to calligraphy, the printmaker is more conscious of being an artisan, someone who reproduces some patterns, than a painter-calligrapher, whose approach is strongly motivated by unconstrained expression.

The work should not necessarily be interpreted as a negative statement by Xu. The artist seems to identify himself as a 'facilitator of communication'. This can be testified to by the fact that his educational project featured a follow-up. Some audiences successfully mastered the square calligraphy and started corresponding with Xu. In this way, the new script has enabled a new form of communication in English. On the other hand, the uncovering of *habitus* can also provoke a broader reflection, which does not only concern artistic expression but also personal involvement within scriptural communication, and whether it can pose a threat to human individuality. Every single performance enhances the socially accepted patterns of behaviour that affect our selves. If I am right in contextualizing *Book from the Sky* in the *Daodeijng*, Xu is certainly aware of the fact that linguistic behaviour imposes shapes and forms on *dao*, which ceases to be the uncarved block pu 樸 (Laozi 2006:81)[6], and as a consequence its identity is lost. Accordingly, the script, which is to be a medium of communication, absorbs and forges the impeccable individuality of its user.

Considering the ambiguous rather than precisely uttered message of the work, the artist's statement is more moderate. His square calligraphy creates a new area of scriptural communication. In his other work, he proceeds even further in terms of possible participants. While *Square Word Calligraphy* is dedicated to English users only, *Book from the Ground* (*Dishu* 地書, 2003) challenges a multitude of ethnic languages and bases communication on a 'transcultural' script.

Book from the Ground is a piece of interactive art. It employs a text processing programme which converts input in an

6 Chapter 32.

ethnic language to an iconic script which, according to Xu, can be comprehensible to anyone, despite their particular linguistic background. It is worth remarking that it is an ongoing project as the artist's intention is to enable input in all the languages spoken in the world.

The script, whose iconicity is shifted to the very verge of making it most intuitive to anyone, allows communication between users who do not share the same language. In this way, Xu's artwork transcends cultural limitations. The function of the script, apart from its intuitive character is worth another examination. It is interesting to notice that in spite of being attached to meaning, the script at the same time has no pronunciation. In fact, it can be pronounced in any language. This brings the artwork close to *Book from the Sky*, where script also does not contain any phonetic indications. However, what makes the works significantly different is that in Book from the Ground the script conveys meaning. There is also an interesting parallel between the two works, which can be attributed to the *Daodejing* context. *Book from the Sky* seems to realize the unrealized potential of *dao*, which is expressed only to be inevitably annihilated. For this reason, its script has no communicative function. Despite the fact that the script in Book from the Ground is the vehicle of communication, its phonetic layer remains untouched as it is not given any standard pronunciation, thanks to which it can be manifested by any possible phonetic system.

Considering the chronological grounding of the works, we can state that in his artistic discussion of script as a medium of communication, Xu has reached a compromising solution that allows the script to be a tool for linguistic interaction, which concurrently remains considerably undetermined on some levels. Thanks to this, at least to some extent, the artworks remain convergent with *Dao*ist linguistic scepticism.

Script as graphic medium

The relation between script and text does not exhaust Xu's reflections upon communication. He addresses it in a highly complex

way in *Landscape Landscript* (*Shanshui Xiesheng* 山水寫生, 1999), a collection of sketches drawn during the artist's trip to Nepal.

This trip would appear to be entirely essential for the contextualization of this particular artwork. Chinese painting tradition aims at sharing the artist's experience of scenery, and it has even developed special techniques, such as multiple perspectives, which allow the viewer to be engrossed in the picture by means of what can be described a 'disinterested' wandering. The fact that the trip is to be undertaken within a piece of art without a determined destination brings it close to *Dao*ist philosophy, which aims at approximating *dao* in a way that is more intuitive than systematic.

The fact that language introduces categories which classify our experience questions its utility in the cognition of *dao*. However, similarly to *Dao*ist philosophers, who wrestled with the problem, Xu discusses the usage of script in a different rather than semantic way. If we take a closer look at his landscapes, we will discover that they are constructed of Chinese characters. Thus, the primary, semantic role is exchanged for that of a brick that constructs scenery in the same way as painted lines. The script is essential here in transmitting the emotional state of the artist experiencing landscape, and it does not suggest it in an imposing, determined manner, as would be in the case in, for example, a descriptive passage. This brings Xu's script strategy very close to how the usage fable-language *yuyan* 寓言 is described in Chapter 27 of the *Zhuangzi* 莊子. The fable-language consists in telling stories, thanks to which the listener does not concentrate on the particular meanings of words or utterances but rather on the story itself (*Zhuangzi* 2004: 947). In this way, the interpretative focus is shifted from category thinking to a more intuitive and holistic comprehension. As for the piece by Xu, speech functions more as imagery bricks.

Landscape Landscript is significantly different from the above pieces in that it addresses the issue of script in a most traditional artistic way. The exploration of script through landscape painting concurrently examines how traditional Chinese painters employ Chinese characters. Both in calligraphy and landscape painting, which also consist of inscriptions, the characters, apart from be-

ing another means of brushwork expression, maintain the same expressive importance in terms of the semantic layer. Considering this, Xu's artwork is a proposition for a different approach to script not only in communication on a general level but also more specifically in visual arts. Employing the characters on a more elementary level of meaning — for instance, composing a field with a repetition of the character '*cao* 草' (which in Chinese stands for 'grass') — is definitely secondary to the 'architectural' function in creating the fabric of an oeuvre. In other words, we can state that the architecture cancels out the character's meanings.

Communication beyond script

Finally, we can address the issue of communication in a different way — i.e. if it can be successful without script or even language. If so, what kind of communication would it be?

This question is also present in Xu's art, particularly in his provocative installation A *Case Study of Transference* (*Yi ge Zhuanhuan Anlie de Yanjiu* 一個轉換案例的研究, 1994), which is also known as Culture Pigs. The installation involves a male and a female pig in what can be described as a peculiar pigsty, which is lined with books in many languages. The two pigs are printed with different scripts, one being inexistent Chinese characters, while the other involves nonsense words in English.

The printed script considerably puzzles the audience, who try to decipher the message printed on the animals. The task seems to be even more futile as they are confronted with two separate scripts that, as the installation title suggests, are to interact with each other. While engrossed in putting together the jigsaw puzzle, the pigs, which physically 'carry' the script, end up mating. The shunning not only of semantics but also semiotics is a great challenge for humans, but as the installation proves, it is not a problem for animals.

If we relate the work to the notion of being confined by Baudrillard's *habitus*, the animals are printed with a cultural code, which is a vehicle for a particular culture. The pigs, because of their ignorance of the script, do not develop any *habitus* relative

to it and do what is natural for them. In contrast, the act of public copulation is considered to be particularly obscene by the audience, mainly because of their habituation by a particular culture. This dichotomy shows the power of scriptural transfer in forging one's behaviour.

The work also reveals that there is communication other than linguistic, located far beyond script. Despite the meaning of script or lack of, it constitutes only a kind of optional, ornamental feature. This does not disconnect script from its original function of conveying meaning but serves to make it transparent.

Conclusion

We can state that Xu's works constitute a series of investigations into script, where he explores the phenomenon of communication, which is not always necessarily linguistic. The wide-scope and multiple approach towards the issue over many years has been achieved by considerably different approaches.

Being an artist, Xu is naturally interested in exploring personal engagement in work creation and shows that this kind of activity is both complex and dangerous. He uncovers that the streaming of the artist's individuality through script is materially processed, and as a result their 'output' individuality is unavoidably negotiated. The process also leaves an indelible mark on the artist, whose *habitus* increases in the degree of determination.

But script is not merely a tool for shaping one's *habitus*. By applying various methods of examination, Xu deliberately deconstructs the phenomenon of script on at least two levels. Within the realm of art, script does not abandon its semantic function. Although it possesses aesthetic and expressive features, the primary quality of conveying meaning remains central, which can be exemplified by, for example, poetic inscriptions. Xu challenges this state of affairs and has been undeniably successful. He also analyses the phenomenon of communication more generally, beyond art, to reach the conclusion that script can exist apart from its apparently indispensable linguistic property. This twofold deconstruction undermines the original identity, or even ontological status of script.

The deconstructionist presentation together with the disclosure of the oppressive character of script does not limit Xu's investigations exclusively to the issue of Chinese culture. The observations derived from the particular background of Chinese calligraphy and Cultural Revolution propaganda experience in fact address the more universal issue of communication, which is present in every particular culture.

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12.

BRANISLAV MESZAROS
PIOTR MRÓZ

Tolérance – mot magique ou magie des mots ?

C'était une sombre époque. Les mages noirs, répandant la peur et la crainte, poussaient, avec leurs mains ensanglantées, le monde vers les abîmes du désespoir. C'est là que quelques rescapés éclairés, afin d'éviter le pire, à l'image des rabbins et de leur Golem, par la simple force de leurs esprits, à l'aide de la magie des mots, ont invoqué la Tolérance. Avec ce mot magique entre leurs mains, le monde s'est procuré l'arme ultime, ou plutôt l'arme de la dernière chance, dans leur combat contre « vous savez qui », contre cet être maléfique qu'on nomme Intolérance. Mais, pour le petit poucet, la tâche s'est avérée très lourde, et peut-être même trop. Non seulement que la Tolérance devait faire preuve d'une patience extrême pendant que ces créateurs se querellaient sur sa nature et son usage, elle devait porter et supporter, comme une sorte de péché originel, tout ce que les gens ne voulaient pas porter et supporter eux-mêmes. Ainsi, sans même que les discussions ne s'apaisent, qu'elle se retrouvât complètement ensevelie, et cela à tel point que plus personne ne savait où elle se trouvait effectivement. Au fil du temps, l'histoire de la Tolérance est passée pour une légende et la légende est devenue un mythe. Plus personne ne savait où elle se trouvait, plus personne ne se souvenait

à quoi elle ressemblait. Toutefois, heureusement, les recherches de la disparue n'ont pas été complètement abandonnées et les humains ne cessaient d'user de la magie des mots pour la faire revenir, car même si les mages noirs d'antan ne sont plus là, le spectre maléfique qui hante l'humanité n'a jamais réellement disparu de l'horizon.

Voici une manière presque poétique pour commencer ce petit essai sur la tolérance qui depuis si longtemps préoccupe le commun des mortels vu qu'elle semble détenir en elle quelque chose, certes, de difficilement saisissable et encore plus difficilement définissable, mais qui semble nécessaire pour le bien-être des humains et des sociétés. Tolérance, ce sujet fleuve qui se jette dans l'océan de nos maux. Les tentatives pour établir en quoi elle consiste sont légion et leur richesse est impressionnante. Essayons donc, à notre tour, de nous plonger dans ce sujet si vaste afin d'entrevoir, au moins en partie, non seulement son histoire (fortement simplifiée, on l'avoue) mais également, et surtout, sa complexité.

* * *

Il semble que tout a commencé avec la lente libération de la raison du monde étroit des vérités premières et des dogmatismes de toutes sortes. Les premières à être visées étaient la liberté des croyances, c'est-à-dire du culte, et la mainmise de l'église sur les sociétés d'une manière générale. La tolérance a alors été appelée à la rescousse, vu les atrocités commises en son absence. C'était en quelque sorte un cri de secours devant l'acharnement, entre autres, des guerres de religions et de l'inquisition qui par leur ampleur commençait à perdre aux yeux des contemporains toute crédibilité et surtout le sens. Et il était temps car, comme l'a écrit Locke dans sa *Lettre sur la tolérance*[1], il n'était pas nécessaire de combattre les autres croyances vu que cela, d'un côté, ne remettait pas, ou ne devait pas remettre en cause, l'état ou la société en difficulté, étant donné que quelque part ça ne les concernait pas, et de l'autre, qu'il est

[1] Locke John, *Lettre sur la Tolérance*, Paris, Flammarion, col. Le Monde de la philosophie, 2008, 1è^re^ éd. 1992.

de toute façon difficile et contre-productif, et en fin de compte inutile, de combattre les pensées enfuies et inaccessibles, ou de forcer les gens à changer leurs croyances sans sincérité d'acte de leur part. Non seulement que l'on voulait donner à tout un chacun la liberté de confession mais également séparer les états(-nations), en pleines mutations constitutives, de l'emprise des églises, afin que chacun reconnaisse les sphères d'influences et d'actions qui lui sont propres, sans entraver le fonctionnement de l'autre. Cette séparation se basait sur une notion de tolérance, comprise de nos jours comme négative, c'est-à-dire non pas dans le sens de « allons vers » mais « partant de », issue de sa signification première, historique, à savoir supporter quelque chose, dans notre cas supporter l'autre. Supporter, car on ne peut pas faire autrement, au moins à l'époque, pour éviter le pire. Supporter, comme porter un fardeau, quelque chose de contraignant mais nécessaire et inévitable. Mais également comme quelque chose de temporel dont la durée n'est pas éternelle. On supporte dans l'espérance que les autres, les supportés, se transforment à notre effigie ou admettent, d'une manière ou l'autre, sans les forcer bien sûr, qu'ils sont dans l'erreur, et si ça ne marche pas, qu'ils nous laissent alors en paix. Bref, c'est à la fois une sorte de mal nécessaire, le seul remède du moment à la cataracte des guerres de religions et « *l'apanage de l'humanité* »[2] qui en tant qu'ingrédient de base sert à nourrir la paix entre les hommes. Comme le dit Breczko, en paraphrasant Legutko[3], « *il s'agit d'un 'projet minimum' au nom de la paix, du commerce et de la 'tranquillité d'esprit'* »[4]. La tolérance négative, axiologiquement neutre, car ne cherchant pas, ou au moins ne remettant pas en question, les vérités absolues du moment, pouvait alors, en toute tranquillité, embrasser le monde.

La lune de miel n'a pourtant pas duré très longtemps. En effet, le monde a changé. Les croyants ont à peu près appris à cohabiter. Les régimes féodaux et absolutistes étaient, au-fur-et-à-mesure, remplacés par les démocraties, ou du moins faisaient semblants

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2 Voltaire, *Dictionnaire philosophique*, Tome VII, article Tolérance, section II, Paris, Lequien fils, 1829, p. 369.

3 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Acana, 1997.

4 Breczko Jacek, « Tolerancjonizm (Ryszarda Legutko krytyka tolerancji) », *Colloquia Communia* : 92, 1, Białystok, 2012, p. 2.

que c'est ainsi. Et même l'esclavage, du moins en sa forme institutionnalisée, a été aboli. Ce paysage idyllique, même si obscurci par des guerres dont l'envergure et la désolation dépassaient tout l'imaginable, montre, malgré tout, la puissance de la raison qui a depuis monopolisé la pensée occidentale. Mais la raison veut aller encore plus loin ; elle essaye de construire un nouveau monde dans lequel le *Moi*, omniprésent et omnipotent, peut baigner sans entrave dans l'océan de la liberté. La raison de *comprendre* a été remplacée par la raison de l'*action*. Il fallait tout faire pour que l'individu, qui en tant qu'unité presque ontologique, puisse jouir de sa liberté. Très vite, alors, des questions ont commencé à être posées sur la nature trop « inerte », trop « passive », pour ne pas dire trop « laxiste » de la tolérance, telle qu'elle a été envisagée en ses débuts. Pourquoi subir le statu quo, pourquoi ne pas le changer ? Déplaçons la montagne au lieu de la contourner sans cesse. Ainsi la tolérance combattante a commencé à émerger en fustigeant l'ordre établi des valeurs, des traditions, des doctrines et de tout ce qui était connoté avec le passé rigide, étouffant et non-progressiste. Grâce à cette volteface « *la tolérance ne serait alors plus aveugle, non-engagée, indifférente par rapport au résultat du conflit entre les différentes parties ; tout au contraire, elle deviendrait un élément important dans ces affrontements, en renforçant les uns et en privant de l'appui les autres* »[5]. Ce changement de nature de la tolérance et surtout de la manière de l'appréhender était dû au fait qu'avant c'était principalement la liberté du culte qui était visée, une fois acquise, ce fut le tour à toutes les autres libertés qui commençaient, tout doucement, pour ne pas dire timidement, à émerger dans les esprits des gens. Ce n'est plus la foi ou l'église qui était prise pour cible mais l'état lui-même, ou plutôt la société au sens large, la société en tant qu'institution, la société en tant que système. Le système, par définition oppressif, qui par le simple fait d'être toléré, faisait de nous des coupables. Ce que cette tolérance version 2, appelée positive, devait combattre était surtout, au début, au moins selon Mill, la rigidité de la société, dont le regard, biaisé par les mœurs trop étroites, constituait une sorte d'instrument spécifique d'oppression, puis, selon Marx, le

5 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Arcana, 1997, p. 161.

système lui-même. Ainsi, au-fur-et-à-mesure, les prérogatives de la tolérance pensée de cette manière se sont largement élargies. Là où, au moins en ces débuts, les fondements axiologiques des principales valeurs restaient encore relativement peu touchés, au pire, soumis à des discussions, dont la coloration avait, certes, une légère teinte de relativisme ou de scepticisme, mais ne présageant, en réalité, rien de méchant, vu qu'il ne s'agissait en principe que d'une sorte d'appel à l'écoute de l'autre, les affrontements plus ou moins directs avec ceux-ci ne tardaient pas, pour autant, à se manifester. Il faut rappeler que ladite tolérance négative servait, si on peut le dire ainsi, uniquement à pouvoir vivre 'tranquillement' dans le monde tel quel. Le monde, comme une donnée empirique, subit comme la pluie contre laquelle on sort un parapluie ou on se cache. La tolérance positive, pour sa part, n'entendait pas cela de la même oreille. Il n'y a que les animaux qui subissent ! L'homme, dans sa grandeur a la possibilité, et même le devoir, de changer le monde dans lequel il vit. Comme le dit Benasayag « *pour l'homme de la modernité, plus d'Icare, plus de Prométhée, bref, plus de principes, sacrés ou pas, qui s'interposent entre l'homme devenu sujet et ce qu'il considère comme sa liberté, à savoir la domination totale du monde et du réel* »[6]. C'est l'homme qui crée l'histoire et pas l'inverse. L'homme est la mesure de toute chose, y compris de son destin, point barre, fin de discussion, pourrait-on penser. Pourtant, c'est justement là où les difficultés commencent. Car comment construire le meilleur des mondes, qui en décide et de quelle manière convaincre tous les autres qu'ils se trompent, sur leur propre vision des choses, et persistent obstinément dans leurs erreurs supposées ? Résiliés, n'ayant pas pu découvrir la vérité, certains ont conclu qu'elle n'existe pas. D'autres disaient encore que de toute façon, au moins pour le sujet qui nous concerne, elle n'est pas nécessaire. Ainsi, là où Locke prêchait encore l'humilité devant la vérité et Mill essayait d'affronter le problème de celle-ci par une discussion constructive menée par des individus rationnels et libres, Rawls[7] en a conclu, vu que la discussion ne mène nulle part, qu'il faut l'écarter de la vie

6 Benasayag Miguel, *Le mythe de l'individu*, Paris, La Découverte, 1998, p. 15.

7 Rawls John, *Liberalizm polityczny*, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN SA, Biblioteka Współczesnych Filozofów, 1998.

politique car de toute façon, la démocratie a la primauté devant la philosophie, comme nous le dit Rorty[8] ; puis les postmodernistes ont achevé l'uvre de désolation en la supprimant complètement comme quelque chose de non-catégoriel et non compatible avec le relativisme doux de la réalité sociale et politique car, comme Legutko commente, avec mordant, cette situation, « *pour sauver la tolérance, il faut abandonner les traditionnels critères d'évaluation et dans les projets plus ambitieux – la métaphysique classique et épistémologie dans lesquelles la catégorie de la vérité puisait sa force. Il faut supprimer, une fois pour toute, tout sentiment de certitude philosophique qui permettait de porter un regard plein de mépris des uns sur les autres, et qui présupposait que la réalité possède en son essence un fondement objectif que les penseurs découvrent, à l'aide de leur force d'esprit, et imposent aux ignorants. Quand ce postulat perdra son pouvoir, l'intolérance sera débarrassée de son aiguillon* »[9]. Nulle vertu n'est plus nécessaire. Nulle valeur ancestrale n'est plus valable. Nulle philosophie, et surtout elle, dans sa forme classique, avec ses catégories et hiérarchisations obscures et ringardes, ne doit plus se mettre en travers du chemin de la nouvelle vision du monde telle que la raison l'a imaginée ou du moins a essayé de le faire. En gros, plus d'*horreur métaphysique*, plus d'*angoisse du néant*, mais vive la légèreté de l'être pas si insoutenable, vive la sainte inconscience ignorante pas si désagréable, vive l'insouciante esthétique de la vie quotidienne pas si angoissante. Toutefois, malgré cela, certains ont très vite compris que même si « *la nature est axiologiquement neutre et si on ne veut pas vivre dans un néant axiologique on doit déterminer comment on peut imposer à la nature les valeurs et les normes de conduite* »[10]. Il faut alors trouver de nouveaux paradigmes qui, pour leur part, ne mettent nullement en cause, paradoxalement, la seule vérité absolue, silencieusement admise, sur la liberté de chacun et sur le caractère universel de notre conception du monde. Certes, on ne sait pas encore très bien en quoi, par exemple, cette liberté

8 Rorty Richard, *Obiektywność, relatywizm i prawda. Pisma filozoficzne. Tom I*, Warszawa, Fundacja Aletheia,1999.

9 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Arcana, 1997, p. 168.

10 Brożek Bartosz, « Normatywność w etyce i prawie », (in) Brożek A. (*et al.*), *Fenomen normatywności*, Krakow, Copernicus Center Press, 2013, p. 127.

ultime consiste mais c'est certainement uniquement une question de temps, vu la volonté qui y préside. On dénigre le réel, on bannit le parallèle et on se contemple dans le virtuel. Voilà, « *l'homme, messie de lui-même, s'est converti en sa propre promesse* »[11].

Le relativisme ambiant du passé s'est transformé, au-fur-et-à-mesure, en nouveau paradigme du temps moderne et postmoderne. De plus, comme si ce n'était déjà pas suffisant, la raison si optimiste dans la quête de la domination de la nature, commence à sentir la complexité abyssale du monde dans lequel on est immergé, et cela malgré sa résistance pour l'admettre à voix haute. Le sentiment pesant qui s'en dégage n'épargne personne. Ainsi, « *si nous voulions de manière schématique caractériser notre époque, nous pourrions dire que c'est une époque d'inquiétude, où la conscience de la complexité nous plonge dans l'impuissance, où le futur, qui jadis nous fascinait, car chargé de promesses, se révèle désormais lourd de menaces apocalyptiques* »[12].

La complexité du monde qui n'est plus uniquement la somme de ses parties mais une nouvelle réalité qui émerge dans un processus constant de transformations et de métamorphoses, rend d'autant plus visible la fragilité de l'être humain, et cela aussi bien en tant qu'individu qu'être social qu'il est. Paradoxalement, la réaction de l'homme à cette situation oppressante est justement de tout refouler. L'homme a une tendance à se voir « *comme un îlot de stabilité dans un monde en perpétuel changement* »[13]. D'ailleurs, cette attitude concerne non seulement lui-même mais également l'ensemble des concepts qu'il développe. En plus de cela, restant cloîtré dans sa phase esthétique, comme l'aurait dit Kierkegaard, « *chaque individu se perçoit en effet comme cette entité radicalement séparée de tout, vierge de toute appartenance et se promenant de par le monde comme si les autres, les choses, la nature, les animaux, etc., étaient là tel un décor posé tout exprès pour que sa vie puisse s'y dérouler* »[14]. Comment alors parler de la tolérance, et cela même en sa forme positive, si, mis à part le paradigme de la liberté, ce qui

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11 Benasayag Miguel, *Le mythe de l'individu*, Paris, La Découverte, 1998, p. 16.

12 *Ibid.* p. 11.

13 Frith Chris, *Comment le cerveau crée notre univers mental*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2010, p. 227.

14 Benasayag Miguel, *Le mythe de l'individu*, Paris, La Découverte, 1998, p. 10.

régit nos sociétés de nos jours, est une inébranlable croyance en un autre paradigme, qui va de pair avec le précédant, à savoir celui de l'intérêt personnel ?

Comme on peut le voir, sous ses airs tout à fait anodins, le terme tolérance constitue, si on s'y prend à en éclaircir les notions et les concepts qui se cachent derrière, un problème loin d'être si simple qu'il prétend être. En s'approchant, on se rend très vite compte, que de nombreux volets, aussi bien au sens diachronique que synchronique, rendent sa conception plus qu'ambivalente. Son évolution dans le temps ainsi que son application contemporaine nous renvoie à de nombreuses représentations qui en interactions directes avec d'autres notions et concepts se constituent en réseaux d'interdépendances aux frontières floues et ambiguës. Tout cela pour dire que quelle que soit la manière dont on aborde la notion de tolérance, malgré les réductions et les généralités qui s'imposent, on ne peut que difficilement la traiter en dehors de la complexité dont elle est partie intégrante. La quête de définitions, toujours limitatives, nous donne un faible aperçu, non seulement de ce que ce terme veut démontrer ou montrer, mais également, et ce qui, d'ailleurs, est peut-être même plus important, de ce qu'il veut cacher ou ce qui y est caché, suite à une approche définitoire qui est, par sa nature, tributaire d'une contextualisation historique, sociétale, etc. Toutefois, vu la place qu'elle occupe de nos jours, on ne peut pas passer à côté d'elle comme si de rien n'était car « *objectivée et signalée par quelque lanterne rouge, ou intériorisée et magnifiée comme vertu altruiste de charité oblative, la tolérance fait partie de la panoplie de la modernité occidentale* »[15]. Bref, comme le dit Legutko, paradoxalement, et malgré les carences définitoires, « *dans le folklore politique moderne la tolérance a acquis une position proche du sacré* »[16]. Mais qu'a-t-on en fait sacralisé ?

Le sens commun, dominé par la novlangue de nos jours, nous semble présenter la tolérance sous des auspices complètement différents que cela était le cas il y encore un certain temps. Prenons,

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15 Sahel Claude, *La tolérance. Pour un humanisme hérétique*, Paris, Ed. Autrement, Série Points, 1991, p. 7.

16 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Arcana, 1997, p. 155.

par exemple, la Déclaration de principes sur la tolérance de l'UNESCO[17]. On y trouve ceci – « *la tolérance est le respect, l'acceptation et l'appréciation de la richesse et de la diversité des cultures de notre monde, de nos modes d'expression et de nos manières d'exprimer notre qualité d'êtres humains* », ou encore « *la tolérance est l'harmonie dans la différence* ». Comme on peut le voir, la tolérance y est décrite comme résolument positive et résolument active et qui n'est plus « *ni concession, ni condescendance, ni complaisance* ». De plus, la tolérance est à la fois l'« *obligation d'ordre éthique* » et la « *nécessité politique et juridique* ». Elle constitue, comme cela est dit dans la déclaration, « *la clé de voûte des droits de l'homme, du pluralisme (y compris le pluralisme culturel), de la démocratie et de l'État de droit* » car « *la tolérance est une vertu qui rend la paix possible et contribue à substituer une culture de la paix à la culture de la guerre* ». Comme le dit Zarka « *la tolérance dans ses nouveaux enjeux* [c'est-à-dire en tant que théorie générale de la coexistence] *doit permettre de sauver la dimension de l'universalité sans nier la spécificité des différences* »[18]. Bref, sans la tolérance, pas de répit dans la guerre incessante pour le monde de demain.

La tolérance, en tant que vertu ultime, tente de donner un autre sens non seulement à l'homme lui-même mais à la société toute entière. Cette réduction voulue de l'homme en un bon samaritain qui, dans sa bonté, refoule tous ses penchants 'maléfiques' devient toutefois une vision assez inquiétante, vu la charge masochiste qu'elle contient. Ainsi, là où « *la tolérance négative était liée aux vertus, les vices et les traits de caractère* », c'est-à-dire en prenant l'homme tel quel, y compris le bon, comme le mauvais qu'il a en lui, la tolérance positive, « *liée aux différents idéaux politiques – égalité, justice, diversité, liberté, fraternité, etc.* »[19], demande, en fait, comme un programme politique, la transformation de l'homme et la création d'une nouvelle société régie par la logique de la tolérance, hissée au rang d'une divinité absolue, en prenant pour sienne une hypothèse

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17 Déclaration de principes sur la tolérance de l'UNESCO (1995), [accès] : unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001518/151830fo.pdf.

18 Zarka Yves Charles (*et al.*) (dir.), *Les fondements philosophique de la tolérance, Tome 1, Etudes*, Paris, PUF, 2012, p. VIII.

19 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Arcana, 1997, p. 173.

sur la nature humaine plus que douteuse. De plus, dans le monde de la globalisation, c'est-à-dire d'un « *processus d'unification techno-scientifico-économique du globe* »[20], et dans lequel la culture, qui n'est pas, par ailleurs, présente dans cette liste, est « *de plus en plus assimilée à "la jouissance du dernier sujet consumériste capitaliste, s'amusant avec les nouvelles possibilités grisantes de création que le monde toujours plus important de produits semble offrir"* »[21], on peut trouver très étrange tous ces discours prêchant la tolérance de la diversité, en sachant que le monde se dirige (semble-t-il) de toute façon vers une lente et progressive uniformisation et dans lequel l'aliénation identitaire (et ce qui va avec culturelle), semble être de plus en plus accrue. La difficulté réside ici non dans le fait de constater encore les différences et d'apprendre à vivre avec (d'ailleurs, si la différence est une richesse, alors il faut la défendre et non la tolérer, on ne tolère pas notre porte-monnaie !), mais dans la perte progressive, suite au nihilisme postmoderne (toujours présent, même si un peu adouci), des repères (identitaires, culturels, etc.) et cela dans le sens que si tout le monde est différent alors personne ne l'est. On se retrouve alors à l'état de nature 'à la Hobbes', sauf que la guerre de tous contre tous sera menée sur le champ de bataille de l'identité et de la culture. Ce sentiment d'aliénation et déracinement, vu que l'homme est un être éminemment social, renforce par la suite un sentiment de nécessité, comme une sorte d'autodéfense, de construction ou d'assimilation d'une quelconque autre identité, qui comblerait le vide et donnerait un certain cadre, tel un décor, à la vie. Toutefois, cela comporte également un danger de retomber dans le communautarisme le plus diverse qui peut mener la vie dure à la tolérance et cela aussi bien en sa forme positive que négative. De plus, et ce qui est encore plus grave, cela peut également engendrer, au-fur-et-à-mesure, une situation, où « *ce ne sont plus les individus qui, éventuellement, composent des communautés ou se constituent en communautés auxquelles ils adhèrent volontairement, mais des communautés ontologiquement premières qui, littéralement, « font »*

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[20] Morin Edgar & Ramadan Tariq, *Au péril des idées. Les grandes questions de notre temps*, Paris, Presses du Châtelet, 2014, 1è[re] éd. 2012, p. 116.

[21] Cerroni-Long E. Liza, « Le multiculturalisme, l'éducation et l'état : perspectives anthropologiques », *Colloque Vers un pluralisme constructif*, Siège de l'UNESCO, Paris, 28–30 janvier 1999, p. 5.

les individus en leur collant à la peau une identité collective, pas forcément choisie »[22]. Bref, une sorte de va-et-vient que la raison, dont on est si fier, a un peu de mal à maitriser. Ainsi, à force de tout déraciner, il ne faut pas s'étonner que le sol se dérobe, parfois, sous nos pieds.

La plupart, voire tous les idéaux politiques se basent sur une conception spécifique, car issue de leur besoins, de la nature humaine. Mais quelle est donc la nature de cette nature ? En principe, on suppose qu'elle est soit bonne soit mauvaise. Ainsi on cherche à en fournir les preuves tant pour l'une que pour l'autre. Il faut avouer que l'aspect méchant, égoïste et, par extension, utilitariste de l'homme prédomine assez largement. Toutefois, malgré cela, les essais pour fournir les contrépreuves ne manquent pas non plus. Alors, à force de chercher, certains pensent qu'on l'a trouvée. Bienvenue dans le monde de la tribu de l'atoll Ifaluk (ou Ifalik) en Micronésie où la violence physique est (presque) inexistante. Et effectivement, selon les récits, cette tribu représente l'antipode des sociétés occidentales où la violence et l'agression est omniprésente à tel point qu'elle fait même partie de l'héritage culturel. Cependant, l'interprétation de ce phénomène n'est pas si simple qu'on le pense. Voici un extrait : « *l'incident le plus grave d'agression au cours d'une année fut qu'un homme a touché l'épaule d'un autre, une violation qui a abouti au paiement immédiat d'une forte amende* »[23]. On constate, immédiatement, que la nature de la « violence » est anecdotique, au moins selon notre optique. Ce qui est par contre intéressant est le fait que cette « agression » ait été punie sur le champ par une amende. C'est un fait remarquable, pourquoi y a-t-il un système de répression, ici représenté par le fait de devoir infliger une amende, si la société est prétendument non-violente et cela par nature ? Pourquoi cela n'a pas été traité, par exemple, comme un accident tout à fait anodin qui ne mérite même pas qu'on s'y attarde ? En plus, la prétendue non-violence de la tribu d'Ifaluk, ne dit nullement que la violence n'y est pas présente. Celle-ci, peut-être, n'englobe pas tout

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22 Laurent Alain, *La société ouverte et ses nouveaux ennemis*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2008, p. 210–211.

23 Lecomte Jacques, *La Bonté humaine. Altruisme, empathie, générosité*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014, p. 347.

simplement le même spectre d'actions comme c'est le cas dans les sociétés occidentales. La non-violence intériorisée en tant qu'acte de survie d'une petite communauté est plus que compréhensible. Il faut quand même rappeler que la population ne fait que quelques centaines d'individus et qu'elle vit, ou du moins vivait à l'époque des faits, dans une autarcie relative. Rien d'étonnant alors qu'ils étaient tous sous le choc en voyant pour la première fois les films offerts par les militaires américains, dans lesquels la violence 'à l'occidentale' fait partie intégrante du décor. Par ailleurs, il ne faut pas non plus oublier que la violence a de multiples facettes. Celle des gens d'Ifaluk n'englobe pas, semble-t-il, les agressions physiques (ajoutant 'graves', pour faire bonne figure), mais, comme on l'a déjà évoqué, cela ne dit pas que la violence n'y est pas présente. Même dans nos sociétés occidentales, personne ne prétend qu'il faut tolérer les meurtriers mais combien de fois est-on confronté à la problématique de la tolérance face, par exemple, à une personne qui fait partager de force ses goûts musicaux à tout son voisinage ? C'est aussi une sorte de violence, mais plus douce, pourrait-on dire.

Dans un sens assez semblable, c'est-à-dire, en remettant en question le fondement malsain des hommes, est également allé Simon Wiesenthal quand il a écrit, par rapport aux nazis, qu'« *aucun d'entre eux n'est né assassin* »[24] car tous victimes d'un conditionnement fort spécifique. Et effectivement, « *des hommes peuvent faire atrocement souffrir et tuer, mais ils le font parce qu'ils sont alors des pions entre les mains de décideurs bellicistes, non en raison d'un instinct qui ne cherche qu'à se réveiller* »[25]. Même si cela ne donne pas de preuves de la bonté humaine, cela ne contredit pas non plus, que la violence ne fait pas partie de notre nature. Pour cela, il suffit de se rappeler la fameuse expérience de Stanford[26] de 1971. Appelée également « *Effet Lucifer* », elle a été menée par Philip Zimbardo sur les situations carcérales et elle a mis à nu certains comportements qui émergent spontanément dans les situations comme celle de l'expérience. De plus, et ce qui est encore

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24 Wiesenthal Simon, *Les Fleurs de soleil*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1999, 1è^re^ éd. 1969, p. 160.

25 Lecomte Jacques, *La Bonté humaine. Altruisme, empathie, générosité*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014, p. 101–102.

26 Zimbardo Philip, *The lucifer effect: understanding how good people turn evil*, New York, Random House, 2007.

plus troublant, que même après les diverses critiques qui visaient tous les niveaux de l'expérience, comme la couche méthodologique ou éthique, et qui devaient mettre en doute le procédé lui-même, comme également, et surtout, les résultats fort embarrassants, on assiste quelques années plus tard à une réalité dont la ressemblance n'est que des plus flagrantes avec celle de Stanford, à savoir, la prison d'Abu Ghraib. Comme le dit Milgrame (cité dans Lecomte) « *des gens ordinaires, dépourvus de toute hostilité, peuvent, en s'acquittant simplement de leur tâche, devenir les agents d'un atroce processus de destruction* »[27]. Alors, l'homme n'est ni bon ni mauvais, peut-on penser après Kant, c'est (peut-être) le regard de l'autre qui nous conditionne, pourrait-on dire après Sartre, ou en le paraphrasant – ce sont les attentes (supposées) des autres qui nous conditionnent ; alors cherchons le coupable ailleurs. En d'autres termes, « *l'individu, comme dans une caricature cartésienne, doute de tout sauf de lui* » [28].

Mais qui est donc cet être dont on n'arrive pas à dessiner les contours et encore moins le contenu ? On peut dire qu'il est tout à fait normal que l'homme ait tant de difficultés à s'auto-définir car c'est tout simplement un être dont la complexité égale celle du monde lui-même. Les diverses recherches, comme surtout celles en neurosciences, n'arrêtent pas de nous montrer l'étendue des profondeurs dans lesquelles il faut s'aventurer pour recueillir quelques réponses aux questions qui étaient à la base de ce plongeon et qui en guise de récompense donnent davantage de questions nouvelles que de réponses attendues.

Par exemple, l'un des moteurs de la tolérance semble être l'altruisme. Le but est de prouver qu'on est par nature altruistes. Cependant, l'idée de l'altruisme ne fait pas l'unanimité. Pour les uns ce n'est, malgré les apparences, qu'un égoïsme refoulé ou caché et pour les autres, c'est l'empathie innée qui est à la base de celui-ci, c'est-à-dire de l'aide désintéressée visant uniquement le bien-être d'autrui. Le concept égoïste de l'altruisme est d'ailleurs vivement critiqué par les adeptes de la psychologie positive qui trouvent, comme le fait par exemple Jacques Lecomte, que les arguments pour un tel

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27 Lecomte Jacques, *La Bonté humaine. Altruisme, empathie, générosité*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2014, p. 111.

28 Benasayag Miguel, *Le mythe de l'individu*, Paris, La Découverte, 1998, p. 20.

fondement de l'altruisme sont erronés. Par exemple, selon lui, il ne s'agit pas d'égoïsme quand une personne porte secours d'une manière spontanée[29] car il n'a pas le temps de réfléchir et de peser les pour et les contre. Toutefois, il semble, que la relative méconnaissance des mécanismes des automatismes qui sous-tendent de tels actes ne permet pas, pour le moment, d'en décider si rapidement. Sans oublier que, l'activation de ces automatismes dépend de nombreux facteurs comme, par exemple (et étrangement), du nombre de personnes qui se trouvent sur le lieu de l'accident. Plus ce nombre est élevé, plus le comportement des individus dans de telles situations sera influencé et les automatismes altérés. De même pour l'argument contre le plaisir que procure l'aide apportée. Lecomte, par exemple, dit que le plaisir est un effet secondaire. Toutefois, ici aussi on peut supposer que venir en aide peut être envisagé non comme but mais tout simplement comme moyen. L'optique n'est ainsi pas la même. Tout cela n'est pas pour dire que l'empathie ne peut pas être à la base de l'altruisme (pur). A ce stade, il est tout simplement difficile d'en juger d'une manière parfaitement tranchée. On peut voir cela comme une sorte de mise en garde car les processus qui régissent notre comportement envers autrui sont peut-être beaucoup plus complexes pour les enfermer si rapidement dans des cases ainsi définies. Autrement dit, il ne faut pas fermer les yeux devant le fait que certaines motivations peuvent être égoïstes car cela semble être, en partie, inhérent à notre nature, et que cela ne remet pas en question le fait que l'homme est peut-être effectivement bon, à l'instar de Rousseau, mais trop « *stupide et borné* »[30] pour s'en rendre compte. A la marge de tout cela il faut toutefois admettre que le livre de Lecomte sur la bonté humaine constitue une exception, très plaisante, dans ce paysage morose du pessimisme ambiant des sociétés modernes qui, basées sur leurs propres mythologies *scientifiquement établies*, recherchent désespérément leurs héros mythiques de la grâce et du salut.

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29 Sans oublier que le fait de porter secours peut également provenir du lointain passé où cela jouait sur la survie de toute une communauté. On sauve l'autre pour se protéger soi-même. La nature est avant tout pragmatique même si parfois un peu fantaisiste.

30 Rousseau Jean-Jacques, *Du contrat social*, (in) *Rousseau*, Paris, Flammarion, col. Le monde de la philosophie, n° 5, 2008, 1ère éd. 1971, p. 355.

Un autre exemple, sur lequel on peut s'attarder, est le concept de conscience, tant de fois abusée, par la nature de sa simplification, qui ressort de nos jours comme un phénomène beaucoup plus complexe qu'il faut, ou qu'on a envie qu'il soit. A présent, « *en neurosciences, on ne considère plus la conscience comme un processus unique et général. Elle semble impliquer une multitude de systèmes spécialisés largement distribués et de processus distincts* »[31]. L'homme n'est alors pas habité par un seul « *homoncule* » mais par toute une armée d'« *homoncules* », pourrait-on dire. Toute réaction de l'homme est alors le résultat d'un processus terriblement complexe dont la conscience n'est qu'« *un trait qui émerge* »[32] dans une constante évolution, transformation et métamorphose. L'homme de demain n'est pas celui d'aujourd'hui. En plus de cela, même si nos connaissances sur la psychologie individuelle avancent petit à petit « *nous commençons à peine à comprendre la neuroscience des influences dues aux interactions sociales* »[33]. Par exemple, pendant longtemps, on croyait que les préjugés constituaient un des vices les plus infâmes. Pourtant, de nos jours, on est obligé de constater qu'au contraire, ils constituent un des outillages les plus fondamentaux dans nos relations avec autrui car « *la capacité à évaluer les autres personnes est essentielle pour évoluer dans le monde social* »[34], et c'est pour cela que « *nous sommes prédisposés au préjugé de façon innée* »[35]. En fait, « *toutes nos relations sociales commencent avec un préjugé* »[36] qui de leur côté « *commencent avec des stéréotypes* »[37]. La raison en est très simple, « *les stéréotypes sociaux constituent le point de départ de nos interactions avec les gens que nous ne connaissons pas* »[38] et « *préjuger nous permet de commencer à deviner, et peu importe si la première supposition est fausse, du moment*

31 Gazzaniga Michael S., *Le libre arbitre et la science du cerveau*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2011, p. 114
32 *Ibid*. p. 114.
33 *Ibid*. p. 158.
34 *Ibid*. p. 159.
35 Frith Chris, *Comment le cerveau crée notre univers mental*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2010, p. 225.
36 *Ibid*. p. 225.
37 *Ibid*. p. 225.
38 *Ibid*. p. 225.

que la suivante est corrigée en fonction de l'erreur »[39], en sachant que « *les fausses croyances peuvent toujours être éliminées car elles entraînent de mauvaises prédictions* »[40]. Toutefois, même si, en soi, préjuger n'est pas un vice, vu que cela nous est nécessaire dans nos relations sociales, on ne peut pas dire que cela est dépourvu de sa partie sombre. « *Nous comprenons que le comportement des gens dépend de leurs croyances, même lorsque ces croyances sont fausses. Et nous apprenons très vite à contrôler leur comportement en leur transmettant de fausses croyances. C'est la face obscure de la communication* »[41] et pas seulement. Peu importe la vérité, s'il suffit d'user et d'abuser de la magie des mots. Ainsi le dictionnaire de la novlangue ne cesse de s'enrichir quotidiennement. Actuellement c'est le tour au « terrorisme » qui devient le fer de lance de ceux qui comme des larbins à la botte du *ministère de la Vérité*, enfermés dans leur tour d'ivoire, prennent un certain roman de fiction pour un manuel d'action. Bref, même si on ne cherche pas nécessairement la vérité absolue, l'omniprésence et l'omnipotence de l'aspect de cette logique qui tente de tout dénaturer en prenant l'air de la *belle parole* plus ou moins institutionnalisée, dont la manifestation la plus funeste est le *politiquement correct*, est plus qu'inquiétante.

Ceci est d'autant plus inquiétant que même la justice, qui est censée encadrer ces libertés proclamées par la tolérance positive, n'est pas épargnée par les doutes et les fondements hypothétiques des bases sur lesquelles elle doit délibérer. Par exemple, pour faire court : le nihilisme (normatif) prêche un certain subjectivisme car reposant, par exemple, sur les émotions ou les attitudes sans leur valorisation ; le réductionnisme, plus rationnel, se rapproche vers une notion plus élargie du droit mais toujours fortement contextualisé car soit émergeant des comportements sociaux des individus en prenant la forme d'une sorte de règles sociales 'standards', soit prenant une forme plus conventionnelle de consensus juridique, une sorte de « *jeux de lois* »[42]; ou encore celui de l'autonomisme normatif, le bac à sable des adeptes du droit positif, qui pour sa part

39 *Ibid*. p. 224.
40 *Ibid*. p. 244.
41 *Ibid*. p. 239.
42 Brożek Bartosz, « Normatywność w etyce i prawie », (in) Brożek A. (*et al.*), *Fenomen normatywności*, Krakow, Copernicus Center Press, 2013, p. 137.

ressemble davantage à une machine à déduire, qui comprend, par ailleurs, en tant qu'élément nécessaire et largement suffisant, ses propres bases, sur lesquelles il se fonde, comme une sorte de fiction (on parle bien de la morale !). On voit très bien cette gradation d'échelle depuis laquelle on regarde la scène : partant du niveau de l'individu, on termine au niveau de la société. Partant du niveau bas qui peut présupposer que l'homme est bon, on termine au niveau où l'homme est supposé mauvais et où il faut développer des règles et des procédures externalisées afin d'échapper à l'imperfection de l'homme et de son jugement pour pouvoir bien encadrer ses penchants maléfiques. Le jeu de l'interdit pour le bien de tous. Ceci dit, il faut avouer que c'est aussi une manière de régler le problème de la tolérance car tout encadrer (pour ne pas dire tout interdire) revient à ne plus faire appel à la tolérance ; celle-ci, en fait, ne sera plus nécessaire. D'ailleurs, c'est peut-être pour cela qu'un nouveau concept rencontrant une ascension fulgurante, à savoir la dignité, commence petit-à-petit à grignoter du terrain sur celui de la tolérance car plus facile à manier du point de vue du système normatif des règles de conduite. Est-ce le signe d'un déclin progressif de la tolérance ?

Que peut-on alors faire de la tolérance avec toutes ces difficultés qui nous guettent en permanence ? C'est peut-être effectivement uniquement la question de l'éducation et de la sensibilisation qui en tant qu'une sorte de lanterne rouge nous signale à chaque fois que nos préjugés peuvent, voire doivent être modifiés, qu'il faut procéder à une sorte de mise à jour de nos stéréotypes. Comme le dit Kant « *l'homme ne peut devenir homme que par l'éducation* »[43] car « *il n'est que ce qu'elle le fait* »[44]. Ainsi, pour le faire, Zarka, par exemple, nous propose une réflexion sur une sorte d'« *éducation des peuples à la tolérance, c'est-à-dire à la raison, à la connaissance de l'histoire, aux valeurs de liberté et de solidarité* »[45] vu que « *l'homme de la modernité se pense et se vit comme cet animal inachevé* »[46], ou encore autrement, « *l'individu, l'homme de la modernité n'est*

43 Kant Emmanuel, *Traité de pédagogie,* Paris, Félix Alcan, 1886, p. 42.

44 *Ibid.* p. 43.

45 Zarka Yves Charles (*et al.*) (dir.), *Les fondements philosophique de la tolérance, Tome 1, Etudes*, Paris, PUF, 2012, p. XIV.

46 Benasayag Miguel, *Le mythe de l'individu*, Paris, La Découverte, 1998, p. 12.

'pas encore' et, dans sa mélancolique incomplétude, il ne vit qu'un présent de frustrations, d'oublis et de manques. Il ne se pense pas comme le maître accompli du monde : il se conçoit comme projet, en attente. »[47]. Alors, afin d'achever cet accomplissement de l'homme, Zarka (comme d'ailleurs tant d'autres, y compris l'UNESCO) envisage directement une sorte de « *programme universel d'éducation de l'humanité* »[48]. Toutefois, par rapport à cela, on ne peut pas ne pas penser à ce cercle vicieux de la régression à l'infini dans le piège duquel sont tombés tant d'autres y compris Rousseau (par ailleurs, lui-même une parfaite antithèse de ses propres thèses) qui oublie de nous dire comment Émile, l'embryon d'une nouvelle société, peut être rendu social si personne ne l'a été au préalable. Jette la pierre qui sans faute. Bref, le piège (pour ne pas dire la tragédie) de l'homme *nouveau* voire l'homme *universel*, ne consiste pas tant que ça à l'impossibilité d'imaginer un tel homme, les philosophes et les poètes sont là pour ça, mais plutôt à l'impossibilité de dire comment y parvenir (même si les politiques le tentent sans relâche, malgré le handicap de leur myopie). Mais c'est peut-être la question-même qui est tout simplement mal posée.

Dans l'histoire de l'humanité, et de ses différentes conceptualisations, il y avait toujours une tendance à opposer ce qu'il y a, à ce qu'il peut, voire doit être. C'est une tendance tout à fait normale et compréhensible car issue de notre volonté de dépassement du présent et cela quel que soit le regard qu'on lui porte. La difficulté consiste, toutefois, en un ancrage temporel trop localisé, c'est-à-dire de chercher une sorte d'immédiateté réalisatrice par rapport à notre volonté qui envisage le monde sous un aspect trop linéaire et pas suffisamment complexe où la complexité ne concerne pas uniquement l'objet lui-même mais également la temporalité de celui-ci. La contextualisation du présent, si en plus elle se base sur les contextualisations du passé, ne peut pas être automatiquement transposable aux contextualisations futures, méconnues et imprévisibles. A titre presque d'anecdote, il suffit de convoquer ici le fameux *exemple* de l'effet papillon qui met en difficulté toute

47 *Ibid*. p. 16.

48 Zarka Yves Charles (*et al.*) (dir.), *Les fondements philosophique de la tolérance, Tome 1, Etudes*, Paris, PUF, 2012, p. XIV.

appréhension trop simpliste du futur et cela malgré le sentiment de responsabilité pour le monde de demain qu'on est censé prendre pour sien, comme le veut Jonas[49]. Bref, les processus sociétaux sont tout simplement beaucoup trop complexes et en plus beaucoup trop lents et cela malgré certaines accélérations dont on pense être les témoins de nos jours[50]. Il faut laisser le temps au temps et accepter le rythme qui régit l'histoire dans son ensemble. Ou autrement, il faut être patient car qui ne connait pas l'adage 'vite fait, mal fait'. De toute façon, on peut dire que l'homme nouveau naît tous les jours et que l'homme universel, c'est la part de chacun, à tout instant. La recherche de l'être ultime dans une éprouvette, ou par un conditionnement, est à la fois ridicule, par le simple fait que quelqu'un y pense, et effrayante, par le simple fait que quelqu'un en ait envie. Il faudrait, peut-être de nouveau revenir, pour mieux comprendre, à une conceptualisation méthodologique de la nature humaine, comme cela était le cas au temps de Hobbes ou Rousseau, mais en prenant, cette fois-ci, comme donne, l'ensemble des données et des connaissances dont on dispose à son sujet, y compris celles issues, par exemple, des recherches en neurosciences.

Que dire alors sur la tolérance en guise de mot de fin ? A l'issue de tout ce qui a été dit, il semble être évident qu'on ne peut pas se contenter d'une dichotomie si vulgairement simpliste et cela d'autant plus qu'elle ne résout pas grand chose. Si tout le monde est bon, alors la tolérance n'a pas de sens. Si tout le monde est mauvais alors la tolérance n'est pas possible. Faudrait-il alors peut-être mieux reconsidérer la tolérance, telle qu'elle domine actuellement et l'élargir convenablement afin qu'elle n'enferme pas l'être humain dans des carcans toujours trop limitatifs, et par là foncièrement faux, mais qu'elle prenne en compte cet être avec l'ensemble de ses traits qui le caractérisent et se manifestent en lui car « *la tolérance – indépendamment de son sens exact – émerge de l'ensemble des vertus, des vices, des instincts, des habitudes et traditions, par contre sans eux, ou en opposition avec eux, ou dans une forme abstraite, comme*

49 Jonas Hans, *Le principe responsabilité. Une éthique pour la civilisation technologique*, Paris, Flammarion, 1999.

50 Rosa Hartmut, *Aliénation et accélération. Vers une théorie critique de la modernité tardive*, Paris, La Découverte, Série Poche, 2014, 1ère éd. 2012.

quelque chose d'indépendant, elle est creuse et dénuée de sens. Et si c'est ainsi, alors non seulement qu'il n'y a rien d'inapproprié dans le fait de la relier continuellement aux autres formes de comportements moraux, la tolérance pure, lavée de toutes ses significations connexes, doit être considérée comme douteuse, et séparée d'eux – comme nuisible »[51]. Ou autrement, pour faire court, il faudrait sans doute rendre la tolérance plus tolérante et cela aussi envers elle-même afin que ce mot magique ne soit pas uniquement le produit d'une astucieuse magie des mots de l'espoir aveuglé sans lendemain.

51 Legutko Ryszard, *Etyka absolutna i społeczeństwo otwarte*, Kraków, Arcana, 1997, p. 158–159.

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13.

DAWID ROGACZ

Knowledge and truth in the thought of Jizang (549–623)

Background: Madhyamaka on Knowledge and Truth

Buddhist epistemology and philosophy of langugage is widely considered as one of the subtlest traditions in this philosophical area and obviously one of the most prominent currents in the philosophy of the East at all. There are various reasons for this state of affairs. Firstly, according to Buddha, the majority of metaphysical questions are meaningless. They are purely theorethical and uncertain, because one should rather obtain salvation in a sorrowful world. As a result, metaphysics cannot be Buddhist *philosophia prima*. Secondly, Buddha insisted on individual practice and meditation. Any philosophical concept should be tried in practice to decide whether it is (or not) an expedient mean to salvation[1]. It is not empirism in the Western sense, because we are *trying*, not *proving*, the concept: it has more pragmatical and ethical, not only epistemological, character. Nevertheless, we could say that experience and knowledge of oneself tends to be the measure for merely intellectual ideas.

[1] It was later developed in the doctrine of expedient means (scr. *upāya*), based on the Lotus Sutra.

Thirdly, Buddhists denied the substantive view of the world and the soul, represented by Brahmans. The fundamental doctrine of co-dependent arising shows us that every view ought to be conceived as linked with one's karma and his (or her) individual experiences. Epistemology seems to be a good tool to criticize such substantive systems as Astika. The last reason, probably the most skeptical one, is basic to understanding Nagarjuna's philosophy of language.

Madhyamaka is a widely varied philosophical school with a half-millenium tradition and long-lasting influence. Nevertheless I would delimit my subject to the thoughts of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, because Jizang, who lived between 549 and 623, could not have known later thinkers. It concerns also Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka, because the time needed for reception of their ideas (especially of the division of Madhyamaka into the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika) was too short. The main idea of Nagarjuna's philosophy is that all phenomena are empty; videlicet there is no substance (*svabhāva*). It means that all things arise and perish in dependence on other things, that everything is conditioned. There is no being existing by its own nature or essence, like God, and no being existing apart from other beings, like spirit. *Śūnyatā* can be treated as a reinterpretation of the fundamental Buddhist doctrines, such as dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and no-self (*anātman*)[2]. This philosophical explication of Buddha's teaching helped Nagarjuna with the refutation of metaphysics of non-Mahayana schools: Sarvastivāda and Sautrāntika. Nevertheless, the main aim of his endeavour was not particular, because his most famous conclusions, especially the epistemological ones, are as general as it is possible.

If there are no intrinsic natures, words cannot have constant referents appertaining to them from the act of birth in perpetuity. Words do not have *svabhāva*. Enclosing the complexity of the chain of conditions in simple words is the first step to the illusion of essentialism. Grasping the meaning, we tend to think of it as something outside our minds; not changing them, we conceive the things in the same way as their names: as unchangeable, distinguishable atoms of the world. Such was the ontology of dharmas, enunciated in Vasu-

[2] J. Westerhoff, *Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka. A Philosophical Introduction*, Oxford University Press, New York 2009, pp. 21–32.

bandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*. In fact, our language is about any thing, because of the bankruptcy of the idea of denoting, as long as „thing" means the same as „substantion"; in Jay Garfield's translation: "whatever grasping there is, does not exist through essence"[3]. Moreover, Nagarjuna shows the demise of the correspondence conception of truth. It stems from the impossibility of comparison between the sphere of thought and the immutable sphere of things. Greatness of Nagarjuna relies on the fact that he showed the self-contradiction of this concept of truth, disregarding his own statements: we call it *reductio ad absurdum*, Mādhyamikas called it *prasanga.* In the „Reversal of Dismissal", *Vigrahavyāvartani,* the Buddhist philosopher writes that criteria of correct cognition should be proved, but they cannot be proved by other criteria because these criteria also ought to be proved by other criteria, and so ad infinitum: this mistake is called by him *anavasthā* (*regressus ad infinitum*). They cannot also be unproved because this is dogmatism. Nagarjuna called it the wrong argument, (*upanyāsa*), inasmuch as criteria established apart from the objects of the correct cognition are the criteria of nothing. Finally, they cannot be proved by themselves because this is a vicious circle (*svatah siddhi*)[4]. This commentary is key in the perspective of the thought of Jizang. The question is: is Madhyamaka itself free from this reflection? Is *śūnyatāvāda* true?

Of course, it cannot be true in the abandoned sense. If we still think of truth as of a correspondence between things and thought, the answer is: Madhyamaka is neither true, nor false, neither true and false, neither true nor false. The fourfold negation or *catuṣkoṭi* shows us that even the last option shares the premises of the classical concept of truth. The answer is possible thanks to Nagarjuna's theory of two truths: "a truth of mundane conventions (*saṁvṛti-satya*) and a truth of the ultimate (*paramārtha-satya*)"[5]. Differently from earlier Buddhists, Nagarjuna does not think of *paramārtha-satya* as of a hidden essence of the universe, but rather

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3 J. Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*, Oxford UP, New York 1995, p. 61.

4 Nagarjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartani* 31–33.40–51. Source: J. Westerhoff, *The Dispeller of Disputes. Nagarjuna's Vigraha-vyāvartani*, Oxford UP, New York 2010, pp. 30–35.

5 J. Garfield, *The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way*, p. 68.

regards it as an emptiness. An acquaintance with conventional truth leads to the knowledge of the ultimate truth, which is necessary to achieve the *nirvāṇa*. Because of this relation Nagarjuna could say that truth about emptiness is empty itself and there is no self-contradiction. Self-reference, which has blown so many philosophical systems, is not the problem of the Middle Way.

Āryadeva held that point of view. Later controversy between the Prāsaṅgika and the Svātantrika involved the problem of the nature of *saṁvṛti-satya*. The Svātantrika Madhyamaka claims that things are causally efficient because of their conventionally intrinsic reality. The Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka, namely Candrakīrti, argues that things are causally effective just because they are empty and their *niḥsvabhāva* is the conventional truth. The disputation is eventually about whether the ultimate truth denies or clarifies the conventional truth, which is overdrawn.

Three Treatises School: Chinese Madhyamaka

Madhyamaka school was introduced to China as one of the first schools of Buddhist philosophy, at a time when Buddhism was being rapidly sinicizated: in 374 Dao An (*Dào Ān*, 道安), who lived between 312 and 385 AD, compiled the very first Chinese version of Tripitaka canon. His translations largely influenced on Kumarajiva; he himself accepted the main points of Madhyamaka view, saying that, original emptiness is the true nature of all phenomena, the Absolute, which is a basis for the mundane truth"[6]. Dao An wanted Chinese Buddhists to know not only philosophical treatises, but also practical rules concerning everyday life of monk (namely Vinaya). This dream was embodied by famous pilgrimage of Faxian (*Fǎ Xiǎn*, 法显). He had been travelling throughout Asia for about fourteen years, covering circa 15,000 km; when he came back to Chang'an, he was seventy six years old. Faxian believed that Maitreya was watching over spreading the Buddhist faith in China[7].

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6 H. Dumoulin, *Zen Buddhism: A History. India and China*, Macmillan Publishing, New York 1988, p. 67.

7 Fa-hien, *A Record of Buddhist Kingdoms*, transl. J. Legge, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1886, pp. 18–28.

Faxian wrote his ,,Record of Buddhist Kingdoms" because of recommendations made by Kumarajiva. Undoubtedly, the latter was inspired by great monk[8]. Kumarajiva (scr. *Kumarajiva,* chin. *Jiūmóluóshí* 鸠摩罗什), who lived between 344 and 413, is just as concerned as the first patriarch of the Three Treatises School. Born in Kucha (in what is now the province of Xinjiang), from an early age showed uncommon abilities: it is rumoured that he was learning by heart about a thousand lines of Buddhist scriptures per day[9]. At the age of nine, Kumarajiva and his mother came to Kashmir, when he became a disciple of Indian monk, Bandhudatta. After arriving in Kashgar, he started to study scriptures of Sarvastivāda school, but he converted to Mahayana; then he came back to Kucha. When the late Jin dynasty (chin. *Jìn Cháo*, 晋朝) conquered his home town, he learned to speak Chinese; in 401 he moved to the contemporary capital city, Chang'an, when at king Yaoxing's bidding, he devoted himself to the work of his life – translation of Buddhist canon. It is estimated that Kumarajiva had translated up to 300 Buddhist texts, 51 of which were lost, while 61 have survived to our times in a pristine condition. Needless to say, Kumarajiva did not translate on his own: when translating *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* he was helped by about five hundred monks, in turn when translating one of the most important sacred text of Mahayana Buddhism, the Lotus Sutra, he was supported by all over two thousand monks[10]. For the purpose of this paper the most important is that Kumarajiva translated the three treatises of which Chinese Madhyamaka took its name: *Mūlamādhyamakakārikā – Zhōnglùn* (中論), Nāgārjuna's *Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra – Shíèrménlùn* (十二門論) and Āryadeva's *Śatakaśāstra – Bǎilùn* (百論). Usually *Māhaprajñāparamitopadeśa – Dàzhìdùlùn* (大智度論) is added as the fourth text. Kumarajiva, unlike Xuanzang (*Xuánzàng,*玄奘), who preferred to translate Indian texts literally, tried to convey the essence of the Buddhist writings using vernacular notions. Nevertheless, it did not mean the defection of original ideas. For instance, Kumarajiva did

8 J. Edkins, *Chinese Buddhism*, Truebner & co., London 1880, p. 91.

9 Chou Hsiang-Kuang, *History of Chinese Buddhism*, Indo-Chinese Literature Publications, Delhi 1956, p. 57.

10 *Ibidem*, p. 60.

not choose Chinese *wú* (無) for *śūnya*, because this word had its very special meaning in the Neo-Daoist metaphysics (chin. *Xuànxué*, 玄学); he used *kōng* (空) instead. Translation of main Mahayana concepts looks as follows[11]:

Sanscrit	Chinese
śūnya	kōng, 空
prajñā	bōrě, 般若
mahāparinirvāna	dà bān nièpán, 大般涅槃
dharmamudrā	fǎyìn, 法印
bhūtatathātā	zhēnrú, 真如
ṣadhetu	liù yīn, 六因
saṁsāra	lúnhuí, 輪迴
bodhisattva	púsà, 菩薩

We can also rebuild Kumarajiva's own philosophy from the letters between him and Huiyuan (*Huìyuǎn*,慧遠, 344–416), named First Patriarch of the Pure Land School of Buddhism, which were rushed into „The Essentials of Mahayana", *Dàchéng dàyīzháng* (大乘大義章). Huiyuan is asking Kumarajiva for explaining dharmadhatu. Kuchanian monk answers that dharmas do not have their own nature or rather: their nature is lack of nature, emptiness. They all arise and cease in dependence on each other. Kumarajiva claims that also dharma of arising has no real being (*sadbhūta*) and all the dharmas are non-arising, non-ceasing and having the nature of nirvāna. He argues that a different point of view leads to contradiction: to regress to infinity in tracking the ultimate basis of reality or to absurd questions about what was before the beginning. Indeed, he rejects most of ontological categories, including such pairs of concepts as being/non-being, cause/effect, past/future, which seem to be inadequate tools to describe the emptiness[12].

[11] Source: S. Beal, *The Buddhist Tripitaka as it is known in China and Japan. A Catalogue and Compendions Report*, Clarke & Son, Devonport 1876.

[12] R. Robinson, *Early Madhyamaka in India and China*, Wisconsin UP, Madison 1967, pp. 92–7.

The most significant disciple of Kumarajiva, Sengrui (*Sēngruì*, 僧睿), who lived between 352 and 436 and became the succeeding patriarch of the Three Treaties School Distinctive feature of Sengrui was exceptional piety, which he had for Amitabha Buddha – at the end of his life he officially joined the community of Huiyuan. Sengrui lamented that Buddhist tradition of meditation, dhyana (which will be later known for its Chinese name *chan* and Japanese *zen*), had been neglected. Sengrui expounded his views in the prefaces to translated works, and above all, in the preface to „Zhonglun". As he noted, the doctrine of emptiness, rejecting all dualities, was primarily created as a remedy for pervasive suffering. Similarly, the notion of the unity of samsara and nirvana is opposed to the rationalist soteriology of Hinayana and the Neo-Taoist speculation[13].

Nevertheless, the greatest and, according to the tradition, also the first disciple of Kumarajiva was Sengzhao (*Sēngzhào*, 僧肇), living between 384 and 414. He is the link in the chain between Jiūmóluóshí and Jizang. Originally fascinated to Neo-Taoism, he converted to Buddhism after he had read the Vimalakirti Sutra. Despite early age and Taoist past, he rapidly mastered Buddhist philosophy, to such extent, that at the age of twenty seven he assisted Kumarajiva at the one of his journeys; then he became his private secretary during translation of Madhyamaka texts. His main work entitled „Treatise concerning the Cause" (chin. *Zhàolùn*, 肇論) consists of four parts:

- first part – „Things do not change" (*Wùbùqiānlùn*, 物不遷論)
- second part – „The Emptiness of the Non-Absolute" (*Bùzhēnkōnglùn*, 不真空論)
- third part – „Prajñā is not knowledge" (*Bōrěwúzhīlùn*, 般若無知論)
- fourth part – „Nirvana has no name" (*Nièpánwúmínglùn*, 涅槃無名論).

The third part is the most interesting one: it is devoted to the attempt of explication of prajña: divine knowledge of every buddha, transcending temporal and spatial borders, independent and absolute. Prajña, conceived in such a way, would interfere with the doctrine of emptiness (co-dependence of everything). Sengzhao

13 *Ibidem*, p.119.

states that there is no contradiction there, because prajña is not the same as knowledge. Emptiness excludes the existence of objects (resp. objective substances), but objects are always the objects of knowledge, not of prajña[14]. In his treatise Sengzhao alleges some further arguments for his thesis:

1. Something that is known is related to something that is not known: temporarily or fundamentally. But in wisdom there is no ignorance, so it is not knowledge.

2. Wisdom is nameless and formless (empty of *namarupa*), therefore it cannot be said that it exists or not, just like knowledge. So wisdom is not knowledge.

3. Holy Mind intuits everything, but it is not knowledge, because he cannot make a mistake and without not knowing there is no knowing. So etc.

4. In the intuition the knowing and the known exist conjointly, but knowledge is defined as generated by the object. So etc[15].

The conclusion is simple and quite startling: names do not have designations; prajña cannot be expressed in language. In this sense prajña is identical with epistemological emptiness, being the topic of Nagajuna's „*Vigrahavyāvartani*". What is more interesting, Sengzhao expressed his conclusion concerning the nature of wisdom in language of Neo-Taoist metaphysics, which (as we can see) was not finally left by him. He wrote that in wisdom there is no difference between substance and function (noumenon and phaenomenon), namely: between the Way in which the world exists independently from the subject and the Way of how the world manifests to the subject. Notwithstanding, the content of his thought is undoubtedly Buddhist: in „The Emptiness of the Non-Absolute", Sengzhao argues that emptiness cannot be treated as non-existence and identified with the original non-being (*běnwú*, 本無).

Sengzhao gives us some very general statements (or maybe rather counterstatements) about cognition and knowledge at all; he emphasizes also soteriological dimension of Madhyamaka's epistemology. All of the thinkers above, from Nagarjuna to Sengzhao, were

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14 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton UP, New York 1963, pp. 343–4.

15 R. Robinson, *Early Madhyamaka...*, pp. 123–126.

necessary to mention to understand the thought of Jizang correctly. His philosophy surmounts some period and the problems he had to cope with gain their mature and subtle form.

Jizang's Theory of Knowledge and Truth

Jízàng (549–623 A.D.), born in Jinling (金陵), according to the "Further vitae of the famous monks" (续高僧传, *Xù gāosēng zhuān*), became a monk at the age of seven. After the succession of the Tang Dynasty in 617 he became the head abbot of four new Buddhist temples in metropolitan Chang'an. He was very prolific writer: it is estimated that he wrote about fifty books, mainly commentaries, which is quite peculiar for such a sceptical thinker. The most important are: "Meaning of the Two Levels of Truth" (*Èrdí yī,*二諦意), "Treatise on the Mystery of the Mahayana" (*Dàchéng xuánlùn,* 大乘玄論), "Essay on the Two Levels of Truth" (*Èrdí zhāng,* 二諦章), "Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises" (*Sānlùn xuányī,* 三論玄義) and the commentaries on three treatises: *Zhōnglùn*, *Bǎilùn* and *Shíèrménlùn*[16].

Jízàng's contribution to the development of Mādhyamaka embraces both ontology and epistemology. In the first point of *Sānlùn xuányī* he criticizes existing Buddhist concepts of causality, using technically *catuṣkoṭi*[17]. It is not possible that there are effects without causes, i.e. that spontaneity of phenomena does not need a Creator (as preach Taoists), or that there are only causes (as teach materialists), because the cause exists only in relation to the effect and vice versa. The cause is not the same as a result, too, whereas the abandonment of both the causes and effect is equal to the rejection of the law of karma. Nagarjunian tetralemma, applied to the critique of the recent doctrines of causality looks as follows: neither causes, nor effects, neither causes and effects, nor neither causes nor effects:

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[16] A. Fox, *Jizang* [in:] I. McGreal (ed.), *Great Thinkers of the Eastern World*, HarperCollins, New York 1992, pp. 105–106.

[17] Jizang, *Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises*, pt. 1 [in:] Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy*. Princeton UP, New York 1963, pp. 361–367. Also in *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*: TSD 45: 1–7.

$$\neg\exists x[C(x)] \,\&\, \neg\exists x[E(x)] \,\&\, \neg\exists x[C(x) \,\&\, E(x)] \,\&\, \neg\exists x[\neg C(x) \,\&\, \neg E(x)]$$

Jízàng also criticized the concept of the four causes in abhidharma: if they are produced by something else, they are not the ultimate cause. If they (C) have their own causes (C'), these causes (C') also have another causes (C"), and so on ad infinitum. If we settle ourselves in some cause, it means that this cause has self-existence, therefore it does not need anything except itself to be itself; but if it does not need an effect to be itself, namely: the cause, this is no longer a cause. In the next part of the text created adversary attacks Madhyamaka itself: the Middle Way assumes the nonexistence, for instance preaching the nonexistence of being and non-being (this method resembles by the way Plato's *Parmenides*). Jizang replies that this non-being is adopted pragmatically and temporarily as a remedy for the contrary statement; when the disease recedes, the cure will be postponed. To sum up, co-dependent arising can be understood neither in the category of (self-)existence nor non-existence. "The true nature of all dharmas is not directly expressible in language and realizable in thought", writes Chinese[18].

This pragmatical approach provides us to the central concept of "refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views", *bóxiè xiànzhēn (*驳谢现真), which was enunciated in the "Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises". As we remember, Prāsaṅgikas claimed that Mādhyamaka is only a negative method of refuting views, but Svātantrikas believed that it has also its own, undoubted view. Although Jízàng cannot have been a witness of this dispute, he subverted the salience of this argument: refutation of erroneous views is always the illumination of right views, and *vice versa*. All beliefs are empty because they depend on their rejections. Two opposite beliefs (statements) share the same premises and the horizon of possible continuations. Tetralemma is transcending these artificial oppositions, such as nothingness/absolute, false/truth, samsara/nirvana, and so on.

Nevertheless, Madhyamaka is also empty; we already know it from *Zhōnglùn* (XIII, 8): "if someone thinks of emptiness as an existing thing, he cannot be saved even by all Buddhas". Jízàng

[18] *Ibidem*, p. 368.

writes about malignant attachment to the doctrine of emptiness in quite poetic words: "it is like water able to extinguish the fire, if the water itself could ignite, what would be used to extinguish it? Nihilism and eternalism are like fire and emptiness can extinguish them. But if someone insists on adherence to emptiness, there is no cure which could help him"[19]. In this perspective, the doctrine of emptiness seems to be the reinterpretation of the doctrine of expedient (skr. *upāya*, ch. *fāngbiàn*, 方便) means. *Śūnyatā* means that we are not attached to any extreme view, because it won't help us with our liberation. Jízàng quotes the "Fame for Purity": "The Buddha is unattached to the mundane world and is like the lotus flower. He is always skilful in entering into the paths of emptiness and silence"[20]. Although the method of Jízàng is called *bóxiè xiànzhēn*, we cannot treat *xiè* and *zhēn* as falseness and truth in criticized sense; Jizang knew it – he asked himself: ,,if there is no statement and counterstatement, there is no *zhēn* and *xiè*; so why it is written here about the refutation of *xiè* and the illumination of *zhēn*?"[21]. *Zhēn* and *xiè* should rather be translated as "appropriate", "advisable" and "inappropriate", "inadvisable". Jízàng is not nihilist (despite the fact that he is to some extent a sceptic), because he does not forbid us to have our own beliefs. They probably have personal, emotional, maybe also pedagogical, value, but we cannot be excessively tied to them: we cannot on the basis of our beliefs judge other beliefs as incorrect. "If the illness of attachment to the being went down, the cure of emptiness is abandoned and finally it is known that sacred way has nothing to do with being and non-being. Originally there was nothing to affirm and there is now nothing to negate"[22].

Jizang shows also his pragmatic approach to the crucial doctrine of two truths: "the

two truths are just means of instruction and are not concerned with objects and principles"[23]. If two truths were opposite principles,

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19 Jizang, *Meaning of the Two Levels of Truth*, pt. 1 [in:] Hsueh-li Cheng, *Empty Logic*, Motalil Banarsidass Publ., Delhi 1991, p. 49.

20 Jizang, *Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises*, p. 368.

21 Jizang, *Meaning of the Two Levels of Truth*, p. 50.

22 *Ibidem.*

23 Jizang, *Profound Meaning of the Three Treatises*, pt. 2 [in:] Liu Ming-Wood, *Madhyamaka Thought in China*, Brill, Leiden 1994, p. 140.

Madhyamaka would into substantialism. Adversaries of Madhyamaka would also say that dualism of two truths is not in fact different from other dualisms, which were eradicated by Middle Way. According to Cuma Ozkan, "the essence of the Buddha's teachings is the rejection of dualistic thinking, the ontological understanding of two truths poses a serious threat to emptiness. In addition, Jizang points out the soteriological function of two truths because it helps people understand the Buddha's message"[24]. Jizang claims that to prevent misunderstandings we should distinguish four levels of two truths[25]:

1. *First level*. "Existence" is taken as the mundane truth and "emptiness" as the supreme truth.

What is taken by Svatantrikas as Madhyamaka's conclusion, Jizang faces as a starting point. ,,Ordinary people" claim that dharmas possess being, whereas ,,saints and sages" know that all dharmas are empty. This level should enable people to renounce worldly truth.

2. *Second level*. "Existence" and "emptiness" are mundane truths and "non-duality" is the supreme. "Non-duality" means "neither emptiness nor existence". Applied to the famous conclusion of the twenty-fifth chapter of the ,,Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way", non-duality sounds: ,,neither the cycle of life and death nor Nirvana".

3. *Third level*. "Duality" and "non-duality" are mundane truths, "neither duality nor non-duality" is called the supreme truth. According to Jizang, duality is one-sided, while non-duality is central, but both are extremes: they are called worldly truth.

4. *Fourth level*. "Differences" are the mundane truth, "non-difference" and "non-dependence" is the supreme truth and the principle. By "differences" Jízàng understands tetralemma created from the negation of the third level: "neither duality, nor non-duality, neither duality and nor-duality, nor neither duality nor duality". In fact, the tetralemma itself is abandoned for non-difference and non-dependence on any doctrine.

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[24] C. Ozkan, *A Comparative Analysis: Buddhist Madhyamaka and Daoist Chongxuan (twofold mystery)in the early Tang (618–720)*, MA thesis at University of Iowa, Iowa 2013, p. 37.

[25] Jizang, *Essay on the Two Levels of Truth*, pt. 1 [in:] Chan Wing-tsit, *A Sourcebook...*, p. 360–1. TSD 45:90–1.

In my opinion, Jizang's list of levels is not finite, and it could not be finite, because – according to *bóxiè xiànzhēn* method – every view has its opposition. Jizang writes: „The four kinds of Two Levels of Truth all represent the principle of gradual rejection, like building a framework from the ground"[26]. The *sìzhōng èrdí* concept shows that justifying the assumptions of our beliefs (in this case non-directly, by showing that the opposite views are false), we fall into the trap of infinite regression. Nāgārjuna and Jízàng raise an issue of the limits of our knowledge, demonstrating that the classic model of truth and rationality is self-contradictory. We could compare it with the so-called Münschausen trilemma, created by the contemporary philosopher, Hans Albert, to prove self-contradiction of the principle of sufficient reason. Justifying belief, we have to choose between [1] infinite regress (A because B, because C, ad inf.), [2] vicious circle (A because B, B because A, or: D, because B, etc.) and [3] dogmatism, which is refuted from the starting point[27]. As we have already seen, Nāgārjuna used this trilemma explicitly in *Vigrahavyāvartani*, writing about [1] *anavasthā*, [2] *svatah siddhi* and [3] *upanyāsa*. Jízàng also used this approach in his crtique of causality, writing that [1] chain of causes leads to infinite regress, [2] ultimate causes cannot be established by ultimate causes, [3] causes do not have self-existence. In fact, whole philosophy of Jizang resembles this trillemma: [3] he refuted dogmatism because of his doctrine of emptiness, close to the doctrine of skilful means; [2] he showed a vicious circle in the method of refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views (A because not-B, not-B because A); [1] finally, he demonstrated infinite regress of our assumptions in the *sìzhōng èrdí*. What is interesting, according to Jízàng, Madhyamaka itself is not free from these limitations: [3] it is also empty, [2] it is right only when nihilism and eternalism are wrong and vice versa, [1] its basic notion of two truths leads to *regressus ad infinitum*. As we can see, the thought of Jizang is very

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[26] *Ibidem*, p. 90.

[27] In Polish: H. Albert, *Nauka i poszukiwanie prawdy. Krytyczny realizm i jego konsekwencje dla metodologii*,
transl. D. Sadowski, W. Bensari, [in:] P. Dehnel (red.), *Krytyczny racjonalizm*, Wrocław 1992, p. 63.

consistent and coherent. At the same time, his scepticism has not nihilistic, but rather pragmatic and soteriological face.

Jizang is at the same time the greatest and the last philosopher of Sanlun school, brought to Japan by his disciple Ekan (kor. *Hyegwan*) as Sanron, when it eventually died out. According to Chan Wing-tsit, there are three reasons for this state of affairs: firstly, his philosophy was too Indian; secondly, it was too abstractive; thirdly, it was also too sceptical for incipient Chinese Buddhism[28]. In my opinion, it is quite an injurious remark, also for Chinese. Even if Jizang's philosophy is Indian in its core, it very often uses many notions typical for Chinese philosophy. Just like Sengzhao, Jizang relates to the fundamental Neo-Daoist division into substance and function: „Correctness in substance means that it is neither absolute nor worldly, and correctness in function means being both absolute and worldly"[29]. Personally, I doubt that Jizang had no disciples not because he was too abstractive, it is rather because there was nothing left to say in Chinese Madhyamaka after him. We cannot talk for a long time about the limits of our knowledge; therefore the rest was left for practice ("the rest is silence"), which has been done by Chan Buddhism. Apart from the historical significance of his philosophy, which is obvious, I tried to emphasize its intercultural importance and original contribution to the development of epistemology at all.

SUMMARY

The aim of this paper is to evoke the Jizang's theory of knowledge and truth in terms of contemporary philosophy. Firstly, I am presenting main parts of Madhyamaka thought, especially those concerning human knowledge and cognition, enunciated in Nagarjuna's "*Vigrahavyāvartanī*". Secondly, I am raising an issue of the acceptance of Madhyamaka in the area of Chinese thought, which provides us with the question of inception and development of the *sānlùn zōng*, Three Treatises School. Thirdly, I am expounding main points and key notions of the Jizang's philosophy: the crucial concepts of "refutation of erroneous views as the illumination of right views" (*bóxiè xiànzhēn*) and „the Four Levels of the Two Kinds of Truth" (*sìzhōng èrdí*).

28 Chan Wing-tsit, *A Sourcebook....*, p. 359.

29 *Ibidem*, p. 368.

I try to explicate and develop these ideas in terms of modern epistemology, which is in the first instance related to the Münschausen trilemma.

KEY words: Jizang, Sanlun, Three Treatises, Madhyamaka, Nagarjuna, Buddhist epistemology, theory of two truths, Chinese Buddhism, Münschausen trilemma

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