



Patrycja Kubicha

## BREXIT IN BRITISH AND GERMAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

A Pragmatic Analysis of Chosen Parliamentary Speeches  
in the Context of Relevance Theory



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## Introduction

The following monograph is a revised version of my defended PhD dissertation entitled “A Pragmatic Analysis of the Content and Language of British and German Brexit Speeches in the Context of Relevance Theory”, which was written under the supervision of Jan Kochanowski University Professor Dr. hab. Hans Giessen and Dr. Łukasz Stolarski during my education at the Doctoral School of Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce. The dissertation constituted the main part of my participation in the project „DEVELOPMENT ACCELERATOR of Jan Kochanowski University in Kielce” (No. POWR.03.05.00-00-Z212/18), which was co-financed from European Union resources under the European Social Fund. In this monograph, certain theoretical elements included in the original version are omitted, as they are not of primary importance for the topic of this work, while other ones are added for a better elaboration of certain issues. Apart from that, graphs presenting given results are also inserted.

This work aims to present a linguistic analysis of parliamentary speeches on Brexit delivered by British and German politicians. Thus, it is investigated what was said in these texts and how it was said. The speeches are analyzed on the basis of their transcripts, which are taken from the official British and German websites *Hansard* and *Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentsmaterialien (DIP)*<sup>1</sup>, respectively, where the transcripts of speeches from parliamentary debates are uploaded. The British parties whose speeches are analyzed are the Conservative Party (center-right), the Labour Party (center-left), and the Democratic Unionist Party (right-wing), while the German parties whose speeches are investigated are the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union (center-right), which form one faction in the German parliament, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (center-left), and the Alternative for Germany (far-right). The analysis is conducted in the context of Sperber and

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<sup>1</sup> The English translation is *Documentation and Information System for Parliamentary Materials*, as indicated on the website of the Deutscher Bundestag (German Bundestag).



Wilson's (1986, 1995) relevance theory. On the one hand, the focus is on whether the topics, facts, views, and linguistic elements appearing in the speeches of, e.g., the two center-left parties are similar, despite that one of the parties is from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland<sup>2</sup> and the other one from Germany, and on the other hand, on whether the issues which are mentioned as well as the linguistic elements used in the politicians' texts depend rather on the country from which a party comes, i.e., from the United Kingdom or Germany, instead of on the political orientation. Furthermore, it is also analyzed if given linguistic features of political discourse can be found in the speeches of all of the parties and if certain issues concerning Brexit are mentioned by all of them. Nevertheless, different parties or different types of parties may depict these issues in distinct ways for the purpose of signaling their own point of view.

As the title of the monograph indicates, the concept of relevance theory is crucial for the topic. This particular theory was chosen to investigate the speeches because it can be viewed as very flexible, which enables it to be applied to the analysis of different types of discourse. The details of how it functions are outlined in Chapter 2.

The book is divided into three chapters. The first one is an outline of political and social aspects. It presents the definitions of the following: *political party*; the political *right*, *left*, and *center*; and *Brexit* and further provides a theoretical background on these aspects and on the political parties of the United Kingdom and Germany, whose speeches are analyzed in the practical chapter.

The second chapter is concerned with the linguistic theoretical basis for the work. Thus, it defines *pragmatics*, *relevance theory*, *rhetoric*, and *political discourse* and presents a further theoretical background on these areas.

The third chapter first provides a description of the methodology used to carry out the mentioned analysis and then presents the analysis itself. As stated above, the study is conducted in the context of relevance theory. Moreover, it is also performed with the help of Laurence Anthony's program AntConc and with the help of Microsoft Excel. The primary focus is, on the one hand, on the analysis of the Brexit speeches with regard to the political orientation of the parties and, on the other hand, with regard to the fact if given parties are British or German. The book concludes with the results yielded by the analysis.

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout the rest of the work, the short forms of the name of the country are used, i.e., *United Kingdom* or *UK*.

## Chapter 1

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# Political and Social Aspects

This chapter provides a theoretical background of political and social aspects. Its aim is to shed light on matters concerned with the Brexit speeches analyzed in the practical chapter. It provides the definitions of the following terms as well as facts regarding the aspects they name: *political party*; *right*, *left*, and *center* in political terms; and *Brexit*. Furthermore, the chapter presents an overview of linguistic references and connotations appearing in politics and gives an outline of Brexit and of the British and German political parties whose speeches are investigated in Chapter 3.

### 1.1 Political Party

The first term to be clarified is *political party*. According to *Webster's II New College Dictionary* (2001), a (political) party is “[a] political group organized to promote and support its principles and candidates for public office” (p. 802) and according to *Random House Webster's Dictionary* (2001) “a political group organized for gaining governmental control” (p. 525). Thus, both definitions concentrate on the fact that a political party is a group created in order to have a say in public office, with the second definition focusing specifically on a say in government. Only the first definition, however, underlines parties’ promotion and support of their principles. In the light of the two definitions it is also worth referring to Safire’s (1993) definition of *politician*. The author explains that a politician is someone who undertakes a full-time, typically professional career in government or as a member of a political party. Thus, Safire (1993) underscores both the aspect of a politician’s possibility of being in government and that of him belonging to a political party.

Katz and Crotty (2006) explain that political parties have been treated as the crucial link to democratic governing. They state that a system of parties which is open, oriented towards participants, feasible, and representative, and which works within electoral procedures which are free and fair carries out duties which make the existence of a democratic government possible. Various political commentators have attempted for a long time to provide a description and an explanation of the structure and mobilization of parties and of “the nature of their programmatic appeals to meet the demands of effective governance” (Katz & Crotty, 2006, p. 1). The authors underline that many works show that there are differences between parties with regard to the activities they undertake in parliament and in electoral campaigns as well as in the organization and mobilization of citizens in supporting policy positions and in the development and expression of ideologies of governing “in real-world political terms” (Katz & Crotty, 2006, p. 1). Nevertheless, despite that they differ, political parties also have many mutual features in terms of their approach to the functional roles they fulfill in the society and in terms of their crucial influence on shaping the democratic experience (Katz & Crotty, 2006).

Although the two *Webster’s* (2001; 2001) definitions provided above present a party as focused on winning positions in public office, Katz and Crotty (2006) explain that a number of legal political parties do not exist for the sole purpose of winning elections but because of their ideas, e.g., the USA’s Green Party. However, as the authors further state, political scientists would acknowledge the majority of such third parties as legal political parties. Nevertheless, along with the fact that these parties are treated as legitimate, appear many assumptions of academics regarding what political parties are as well as what they are not and also what they actually should be, which is an even more frequent issue. Political scientists, thus, consider matters such as what tasks parties should carry out if they are supposed to be “mediating institutions” between those who govern and those who are governed, or if parties should be election facilitators giving candidates the access to ballots. Moreover, the scientists also concentrate on how voters behave, i.e., they question if voters act entirely rationally and therefore treat parties as “objects of political utility” or if they actually reject parties and consider other eventual factors when making ballot selections (Katz & Crotty 2006, p. 5-6).

In connection to the above, Katz and Crotty (2006) underline that providing the definition of a political party and an explanation of what its functions should

be is not an objective task. Political scientists have provided various answers over time. Nevertheless, a consensus which arose among political scientists is that political parties make democracy possible. Also Grisham (2014) notes, however, that the definition of a political party is considerably debated and adds that explaining its meaning causes strong feelings. The author underlines that the concept belongs to the most typical terms of political science and, as Katz and Crotty (2006), states that it is variously defined. Grisham (2014) explains that the definition can be formulated on the basis of an examination of its form, i.e., its structure, and/or of the function it performs, namely of the activities carried out by the organization, i.e., by the party. He clarifies that political parties have been defined on the basis of an exploration of certain questions which is concerned with considering both the form and the function. The questions regard what actors create the party, what kind of activities are carried out by it, what the purpose of the party is, and what its domain is (Grisham, 2014).

Grisham (2014) puts forward the following definition of a political party: it is an organization which has a given ideological focus primarily concerned with the election of persons to the central as well as the subnational components constituting the government, thus to the legislative, the executive, or the judicial component. According to the author, the organization aims to implement changes in the political sphere by having influence on the policy and the actions of the government. In this way, it wishes to bring about changes in the political sphere according to its ideology. The changes are to be made by the help of the electoral system. Grisham (2014) speaks of two types of party which may develop. One of them is no political threat to the coalition which is currently in power, as it generally works with the government and is rather adjusted into the government's structure and belongs to the governing coalition, whereas the other type *is* a political threat to the coalition in power. This second kind of party is a so-called loyal opposition party which works according to the organized political structure but concurrently opposes certain policies which the government creates and certain actions which it takes (Grisham, 2014).

Grisham (2014) also mentions an eventual third option, which concerns changing a so-called guerilla movement into a "revolutionary political party" whose aim is to win control over the government by the help of legal means. (A guerilla movement, according to the definition in Grisham's (2014) study, is a group of individuals who are organized into units of military style and employ

different techniques which are similar to terrorism in order to target mainly government and military sites. In this way, they try to win physical control over a geographical territory.)

In general, the above presented theoretical background on political parties shows that there are many concepts regarding how a party may be defined and what its functions are or should be. Although providing the meaning of the term is not simple, it seems that the most popular way of perceiving a political party is as a group whose main aim is to win positions in government for the purpose of carrying out its political goals according to its individually defined principles.

## 1.2 Types of Political Parties

The following subsection is strongly connected with the previous one, as it introduces the presumably most common and most simple classification of parties according to the views which they represent. Thus, the parties of the politicians whose speeches are analyzed in the last chapter are categorized according to this classification, which encompasses three main types of party, namely the *right-wing*, *left-wing*, and *center-wing parties*. Nevertheless, it also needs to be emphasized that a given party may not be, for instance, strictly a right-wing or left-wing party, which is the case with most of the parties whose speeches are investigated in the practical part, for which reason the subsection also provides details on the “subtypes” of the three basic types and introduces certain linguistic features concerned with the categorization of parties according to their characteristics or views. This section of the chapter may, thus, be treated as a continuation of the preceding part, as it gives a deeper insight into the topic of political parties.

Beard (2000) states that the main words used to depict an individual’s or their party’s political alignment in a simple way are *right*, *left*, and *center*. He explains that the words have a metonymic origin concerned with French politics a short time before the outbreak of the French Revolution. The clarification which he provides is that those from the Estates-General who showed support for the policies of the King sat on the right side, whereas the King’s adversaries sat on the left side. Afterwards, *left* began to be used for radical or socialist groups and *right* for nationalist and conservative groups. When these

terms became established, yet another term needed to be used for those whose political views were in between the views of those from the two groups. This third group was, thus, described as the center (Beard, 2000).

Beard (2000) adds, nevertheless, that politics is generally not a simple matter and that there have, therefore, been different gradations of the concepts of right, left, and center. For instance, those who have strong right views are *right-wingers* and those who have strong left views are *left-wingers*. The word *wingers* has its origins in battle and was used to refer to “those on the edge” (Beard, 2000, p. 6). Its more recent origins are in sport. When someone has less radical views, they may be referred to as *right-of-center* or *left-of-center*. In general, however, as Beard (2000) further states, there exists no objective measure concerning the fact on which part of the political scale one is with regard to one’s opinions and ideas. The parties whose speeches are investigated in the practical part are, therefore, categorized according to their official classification on the left-right scale.

Pribble (2013) provides a similar classification to that of Beard (2000). She states that parties’ ideological orientation, i.e., their set of beliefs which they perceive as characterizing a perfect society order and specifying a way for achieving that order, is the primary dimension in terms of which parties differ from each other. In her work, the author describes the politics of Latin America and explains that the left-right distinction, or in other words, the state-market distinction is the main ideological divide between parties. Pribble (2013) categorizes the parties as right/center-right or as left/center-left. She does not simply use the terms *right* and *left*, because she aims to build two large categories which take into consideration all of the parties in Latin America’s system and, thus, classifies right and center-right parties as one group and left and center-left parties as another group. The author also adds that although she is aware that the exact ideological position of each party in the distinction between right and left differs, she maintains that the creation of five different ideological categories would cause the typology to be inconvenient. Nevertheless, the more extensive classification of the mentioned British and German parties in this monograph allows for a deeper insight into the views on Brexit of those parties, especially into the primary issue of whether a specific party or kind of party supported or did not support Brexit. This, thus, also enables a deeper linguistic analysis of the speeches with regard to the politicians’ views on this crucial political matter.

Pribble (2013) continues her theoretical background on the classification of political parties by introducing the second crucial dimension in terms of which parties differ, namely internal organization. Differences regarding parties' organizational structure are meaningful for the following aspects: the distribution of power among a party's sectors, the level of autonomy which political elites have in decision making, and the skill to impose discipline on members. Party organization regards a number of features connected with a party's internal workings. According to Pribble (2013) (as she states with reference to the works of Panebianco (1988) and Duverger (1954)), two general kinds of this organization are depicted in literature, namely electoral professional parties, in other words cadre parties, and mass parties. On the basis of Panebianco's (1988) work, she states that these two types of party are different from each other in terms of the following: the role played by professionals versus the bureaucracy of the party, the strength of the ties in the organization, the significance of leadership in the organization, the financing of the activities of the party, as well as the significance of ideology.

It should be stated that the concept of ideology was not initially used in a negative sense, as it is nowadays. Safire (1993) defines *ideology* as follows: "originally, a system of ideas for political or social action; in current political use, a mental straitjacket, or rigid rules for the philosophically narrow-minded" (p. 349). Although this definition was formulated in the twentieth century, as the publication date indicates, the negative connotations of the concept of ideology exist until today. However, in this monograph the concept is used in the original sense.

Pribble (2013) illustrates yet a third dimension in terms of which there are differences between parties. As she states, this dimension "is related to the predominant linkage strategy used to connect elites with the organization's core constituency" (Pribble, 2013, p. 31). The author explains that the essence of the relation between a party and the electorate is defined by linkage mechanisms. She states that the literature regarding linkage techniques illustrates three general ones, i.e., the programmatic linkage strategy, the clientelistic linkage strategy, and the interest incorporation linkage strategy. She relies here on works by authors such as Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007) and Morgan (2011) and on the basis of the works by these three mentioned authors states that parties which use a programmatic linkage technique "rely on the unconditional

provision of public policy to win votes” (Pribble, 2013, p. 31), while parties using the clientelist linkage technique “administer public goods in exchange for electoral support” (Pribble, 2013, p. 31). With reference to Morgan (2011), she clarifies that the interest incorporation linkage strategy is similar to the latter one with the exception that in the case of the incorporation linkage, goods are rather targeted to social groups and not to individual households.

Pribble (2013) herself, however, puts forward a modified classification of the above mentioned linkage strategies. Instead of into three categories, she classifies the techniques into two groups, namely programmatic and non-programmatic techniques but concurrently introduces three subtypes of the latter, i.e., clientelism, interest incorporation, and charisma. The last one is concerned with the belief that a given leader should be supported because they possess unique personal traits (Pribble, 2013).

As can be seen on the basis of the work of authors such as Beard (2000) and Pribble (2013), there are various ways of categorizing political parties. This categorization can differ, e.g., in terms of which of the three dimensions outlined in this subsection are taken into consideration or even within a given dimension itself, as is the case with the right-center-left political alignment or with the linkage strategies. For this book, the first dimension concerning the so-called ideological orientation of a party is important, which is concerned with the views a party puts forward and the place of these views on the right-left scale. This is crucial in terms of a party’s opinions on the issue of Brexit.

### 1.3 British and German Political Parties

This subsection presents a brief overview of the parties whose speeches are analyzed in the third chapter. First, the three British parties are described and then the three German parties. The aim is to present a description of their policies and structures.

The Conservative Party is a center-right party, (StudySmarter, n.d.) which promotes private enterprise and money, underscores the significance of maintaining a strong military, and works towards preserving traditional cultural institutions and values. This party, along with the Labour Party, which is its main opponent, has dominated UK politics since the First World War (Norton & Webb, 2024).



According to Norton & Webb (2024), British conservatism is very resilient, compared to other conservative movements in Europe, as it has been successful in adapting to changes in social and political agendas. The Conservative Party is made up of certain ideological groups, the most significant two being the centrist “One Nation” bloc, which underscores social harmony and economic interventionism, and the economic-liberal bloc, which advocates a free-market economy. Members of the One Nation bloc include progressives, i.e., supporters of change, and paternalists, i.e., advocates of authority and social order. Occasional disagreements between the two main groups, as well as between other groups, sometimes lead to serious divisions in the party. This lack of agreement grew in the late 1970s and 1980s, when free-market followers of Margaret Thatcher, the “dries”, took over control of the Conservative Party from the “wets”, i.e., from their opponents from the One Nation bloc. The differences between these two groups were especially severe in the context of European integration. While the “dries” had a tendency to be very skeptical of European integration, the “wets” were rather in favor of it (Norton & Webb, 2024). Section 1.5 provides more information on the distinction between the “wets” and the “dries”.

The next political grouping, namely the Labour Party, is a center-left party (StudySmarter, n.d.) promoting the state’s active role in creating economic prosperity and in supplying social services. As opposed to the Conservative Party, it is a democratic socialist party. Since it was founded in the early 20th century, the Labour Party has had a federal structure, which functions in England, Wales, and Scotland. In this structure the party grants its members rights of representation via different affiliated institutions, such as the constituency Labour parties (CLPs), whose duty it is to recruit and organize members in all of the UK’s parliamentary constituencies; trade unions, which play a significant role in the party’s matters; the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), which consists of the party’s members of Parliament; and diverse small socialist groups, e.g., the Fabian Society (Webb & The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024), which is a socialist society that was founded in London in 1884. Its aim was to create a democratic socialist state in Great Britain (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024).

The last British party to be discussed, namely, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) is a right-wing party operating only in Northern Ireland and the

fifth largest party in the UK's House of Commons. In the Northern Ireland Assembly it is the largest party next to Sinn Féin. The party is socially conservative and Eurosceptic. It supports British nationalism and opposes Irish nationalism (StudySmarter, n.d.). The party strongly advocates Northern Ireland's union with Great Britain. It fights for votes from the unionist Protestant community in Northern Ireland with its political opponent, the Ulster Protestant Party. It is organized at the local level, constituency level, and province level. The Executive Committee deals with the party's everyday matters and selects party officers, who formulate party policy, which is then ratified by the committee. The committee consists of five members from every British parliamentary constituency and of the party's leaders and delegates from its youth and university organizations (Arthur, Cowell-Meyers, & The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2024).

The Christian Democratic Union (Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU) is a German center-right party which advocates a free-market economy as well as social welfare programs. It is, however, conservative regarding social issues. The party supports European integration. Moreover, it underscores that it is a "people's party" (German: *Volkspartei*), offering all Germans, who accept its principles, a political home, regardless of region, age, social class, etc. It perceives itself as representing the whole population and not merely specific sectional interests, being open to diverse political matters concerned with small and large businesses, agriculture and labor, and large cities and small towns. The organization of the party is decentralized, as the diverse organizations on the state (German: *Land*), district, county, and local levels, along with certain auxiliary groups, such as labor or youth groups, are autonomous of national control. However, since the unification of Germany, the former party organizations from East Germany have depended on central control more than the corresponding ones from West Germany. What is more, the party's ability to organize support from the mentioned organizations and groups has allowed the party to be successful on the national level (Conradt, 2024).

The CDU's affiliate is the center-right (Knight, 2023) Christian Social Union (Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU) in Bavaria. As such, despite having its own organization, leadership, and structures for raising funds, during elections the CSU does not have candidates outside Bavaria, and the CDU does not have candidates in this part of Germany. The two parties form a faction together in parliament, each of them being represented by cochairmen. The CSU supports

free enterprise and federalism and is an advocate of a united Europe under Christian values. It is more conservative than its partner, the CDU, particularly on social issues, e.g., church-state matters and immigration, and generally has a more nationalist approach in foreign policy. It supports European integration less than the CDU does (Conradt, 2024).

The next party, the Social Democratic Party of Germany (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD) is a center-left political party (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2018) and the oldest party in Germany. It is one of the two main political parties in the country, alongside the CDU. While it supports modernizing the economy in order to fulfill the requirements of globalization, it also emphasizes the need to take care of the needs of workers and of those who are disadvantaged in the society. In terms of foreign policy, the SPD is strongly engaged with the European Union. The local association, or *Ortsverein* in German, is the main unit of the SPD's organization. There are over 12,000 such organizations in the country, and they are arranged into organizations on the subdistrict, district, and state level. A party congress meets every two years at the national level in order to decide on policy and to choose a party leader as well as the representatives of the Executive Committee and the control and arbitration commissions. The said committee is responsible for the party's internal matters and selects the Presidium, consisting of thirteen members, which is the SPD's ruling inner circle. A minimum of two-thirds of the members of the committee and of the Presidium need to be women. The Presidium holds meetings at least once a week at the SPD's headquarters in Berlin, where it specifies and declares the party's stance concerning key issues and schedules the party's important events (Conradt, 2024).

Last but not least, the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD) is a far-right populist and Eurosceptic party, which perceives itself as a support for Christian values (Deutsche Welle, n.d.). It was founded in 2013, mainly due to its Eurosceptic stance in the context of the crisis regarding the euro-zone debt. The party quickly achieved moderate success during regional elections. However, it became very popular when it began focusing on opposing immigration. When the migration crisis in Europe was intensifying, the AfD adopted a strong anti-Islamic position in contrast to Angela Merkel, the then Chancellor of Germany, who was committed to her open-door policy. In 2017 the party, for the first time, entered the German Bundestag. Despite it

being the third largest group in parliament, the mainstream parties, namely the CDU-CSU and the SPD, were uneager to lead coalition talks with it (Kirby, Berentsen, & The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, n.d.).

## 1.4 References and Connotations in Political Language

Another interesting issue regarding political parties as well as individual politicians and politics itself is that of the references and connotations appearing in political language. These are brought about, for instance, by historical matters or even by the use of simple everyday words, as is illustrated below. This section presents such instances used in political as well as in political-journalistic discourse.

As Beard (2000) states, along with new political groupings appear new words to depict them. When the Conservative Party ruled the United Kingdom with a considerable majority in the 1980s this led to a division between the members of the party. Those of them who were against Margaret Thatcher were referred to as “wets” by their adversaries, which was an abusive term used in public schools when speaking of people without courage. In contrast, Thatcher’s supporters called themselves “dry”. Nevertheless, the “wets” then became accustomed with the term which was used to refer to them and also made use of it themselves. This was an example of an important characteristic of political language, namely that abusive words become established and stop being perceived as negative. Another instance of this phenomenon was the primarily abusive use of the word “Tory” when speaking of a British political group in the eighteenth century. The term had been used by the English settlers who came to Ireland to indicate the Irish by whom they were being attacked. In the case of the British political group, the term later became the party’s official name and is also used in the modern days when referring to the Conservatives and it is also used by the members of this party themselves (Beard, 2000).

Beard (2000) further explains that the Conservatives made use of metaphors connected with liquid in order to illustrate their position in their party, whereas the Labour Party made use of metaphors associated with solidity. While radical members were referred to as belonging to the so-called “hard left”, those who were less radical were members of the so-called “soft left”. The Labour Party achieved a victory in 1997 by winning a large majority in the elections. The party’s

leaders had established the term “New Labour” with the goal of describing the party and the policies which it postulated. In this way, they partially attempted to eliminate the use of the metaphor of “hard” and “soft”, as it could bring to mind negative connotations. However, those members of the party who were against certain new policies referred to themselves as “Old Labour” in an attempt to create positive associations with the word “old”, i.e., associations connected with “ideas of true heritage and honesty to the past” (Beard, 2000, p. 7), and thus, to avoid that the ideas appear outdated (Beard, 2000).

Another interesting example of a word with a historical reference is provided by Safire (1993), i.e., *backbencher*. Safire (1993) first gives the following general definition of this term: “a legislator of low seniority; a steadfast supporter of party leaders” (p. 32). Next, he (1993: 32) explains that the word originated in the British House of Commons, where it refers to one who regularly supports the party leadership, which is at the front bench of this House (Safire, 1993).

Beard (2000) draws attention to the fact that the label which one attaches to oneself or that which is attached to someone (or both of these labels) is of high importance in politics. First of all, such labels are useful forms of making quick references for commentators and journalists and, second of all, they frequently give a considerable background concerning the ideological values of the people using them. While they serve as “badges of belonging”, as Beard (2000, p. 7) describes them, in the case of politicians who make use of them when describing themselves, they can bring to mind positive or negative associations when others use them to talk about these politicians. Political labels may also be attached to given political persons and the connotations which they bring about may change over time, as it was in the case of the label “The Iron Lady” used for referring to Margaret Thatcher. First the association was negative, as the description was meant to mean that Thatcher was inflexible and narrow, whereas later the connotation became positive when the label started being used to refer to her determination (Beard, 2000).

Not only in the English language do such changes occur in the meanings of words. As Sękowska (2007) explains, with regard to socio-political vocabulary in the Polish language, the occurrence of special expressions (as she calls them) in public discourse leads to modifications in their meanings, which depend on the type of message conveyed and on the linguistic competence of its sender. To illustrate this she provides instances of the use of the word *prywatyzacja* or

*prywatyzowanie*, which mean *privatization* in Polish. The author clarifies that while the term appears in contexts which indicate its specific economic meaning, such as *prywatyzowanie usług komunalnych* (*privatization of municipal services*) or *prywatyzowanie usług medycznych* (*privatization of medical services*), it is also present in such word combinations which blur its special meaning via direct reference to the primary meaning of the word *prywatny* (*private*), i.e., the basis of *prywatyzacja*. Examples of uses of *prywatyzacja* with this meaning are *prywatyzowanie władzy publicznej* (*privatization of public authority*), *prywatyzacja państwa* (*privatization of the state*), and *prywatyzowanie relacji publicznych* (*privatization of public relations*). As Sękowska (2007) also states, the occurrence of such special terms in Polish political-journalistic discourse is the result of borrowings of foreign words, derivatives based on foreign and native words, and words and word compounds from specialized language varieties entering general language.

It can be concluded that different factors such as historical events, everyday language, or the characteristics, behavior, and views of given individuals or groups engaged in politics may influence the way in which words are used in specific political contexts, and therefore, what associations they bring about. These associations may be, e.g., either positive or negative, depending on how given persons or groups view, for instance, a specific politician or party, as it has been shown above. Moreover, the overall positive or negative connotations attached to an individual or group may change over time, as in the case of Margaret Thatcher or the Tories. Political language may also be affected, for instance, by foreign languages or specialized language varieties, as indicated by Sękowska (2007).

## 1.5 Brexit

The following subsection gives a theoretical outline of the phenomenon of Brexit. It explains the meaning of the term *Brexit*, what the reasons for Brexit were and what its outcome was, and depicts the significance of the phenomenon in terms of the United Kingdom and the European Union.

Brexit had an undoubtedly crucial impact on the EU and on the UK itself. It was the historic moment in EU politics, when the UK decided to leave the

European Union as the result of a referendum which was held on June 23, 2016 (GOV.UK, n.d.) after over forty years of membership (Piper, 2020; Vernon, 2020). Brexit was formally carried out on Jan. 31, 2020 (Wallenfeldt, 2023). *Brexit* means *British exit*. In the year 2010 David Cameron, who was the leader of the coalition between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats at the time, became the prime minister of the United Kingdom and needed to withstand pressure from the United Kingdom Independence Party and from Eurosceptics from his own Conservative Party who called for a referendum concerning the further membership of the country in the European Union. In 2013 Cameron finally promised that such a referendum would be held, providing that his party wins the 2015 election. His party won an absolute majority, and thus, the referendum was carried out (The Economic Times, n.d.).

As reported by *BBC News* (2020), the electorate of the referendum was 46,501,241 people, with a turnout of 72.2%. The overall results in the whole United Kingdom were as follows: 51.9% of the voters chose the option to leave the EU, while 48.1% chose the option to remain in it. A total of 26,033 ballots was rejected. In England 53.4% of the participants voted to leave and 46.6% to remain. Thus, there were more votes to leave, similarly as in Wales, where 52.5% chose the option to exit the EU and 47.5% the option to stay in it. In Scotland, on the other hand, the majority of the participants voted to remain, i.e., 62.0% and only 38.0% voted to leave. In Northern Ireland there were also more votes to remain, namely 55.8%, and 44.2% votes supported the option to leave. Thus, the greatest difference in the voting was observed in Scotland (*BBC News*, 2020).

The attitudes towards the Brexit issue differed inside the British parties themselves. In the Conservative Party, there were both supporters and opponents of Brexit. David Cameron, as indicated above, was against Brexit (*The Journal*, 2019). The Brexit issue deeply divided the party (Ridge-Newman, 2018). However, the party finally demonstrated strong support for exiting the EU, along with leaving the EU Customs Union and Single Market (*The Journal*, 2019).

As *The Journal* (2019) indicates, the Labour Party did not present a clear standpoint on the Brexit issue. As the main oppositional party, it originally took a rather anti-Brexit position. Nevertheless, the then leader of the Labour Party, namely Jeremy Corbyn, had criticized the EU as being too bureaucratic and shifting too closely towards the concept of a European federation. He also criticized the Conservative Party's actions concerning Brexit which he



perceived as inefficient, but it was not clear what he himself would do in the situation. The party then stated it would support another referendum on the Europe vote with the following options: the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by the Conservative Party, a no-deal Brexit, and the option to remain in the EU, underscoring that they would campaign for the latter. Eventually, however, the party decided not to adopt any official position on Brexit in the general election campaign. Nevertheless, it eventually accepted Brexit (The Journal, 2019).

The Liberal Democrats opposed the UK's exit from the EU and, as it was underscored by *The Journal* (2019) before the then upcoming general election, "they will reverse Brexit by unilaterally revoking Brexit if they manage to form a government majority (highly unlikely)". Also the Scottish National Party (SNP) was against leaving the EU, as the majority of the voters in Scotland had voted to remain. During the election campaign the party's leader Nicola Sturgeon had promised the party would "escape Brexit". Similarly, the Green Party was against the UK's withdrawal from the EU (The Journal, 2019).

A party which strongly advocated for Brexit to be carried out was the Brexit Party. Its members underscored that a no-deal Brexit would be the only true way of delivering on the vote from the referendum (The Journal, 2019).

Andrew Glencross (2016) indicates that the British people had already participated in a referendum in 1975, i.e., two years after the UK had entered the European Economic Community. Two-thirds of the voters, with a turnout at the level of 65%, had chosen the option to remain in the community.

Glencross (2016) presents the Brexit issue with reference to British Euro-scepticism, underscoring that the debate on Europe led in the United Kingdom is distinct from the one based on the Western European tradition. The author indicates differences between the UK and other EU countries, for instance, that the UK had not adopted the euro currency and had not joined the agreement concerning the open Schengen zone. Moreover, the UK's political economy is also unique, i.e., the country's typically large trade deficit is recompensed due to capital inflows which are equally high. Thus, financial institutions, i.e., The City of London, have significant political influence and dominate the economic sphere of the relations with the European Union. British exceptionalism in the EU, however, does not only exist in terms of institutional or structural factors (Glencross, 2016). According to Glencross (2016), the UK treats European integration "purely as a pragmatic and utilitarian foreign policy stripped of



a normative commitment to a European ideal of ever closer union” (p. 8). He underscores that the pure call for the 2016 referendum on Brexit was a signal of the UK’s exceptionalist position based on the belief that the country could simply leave a federalizing EU without any harmful consequences (Glencross, 2016).

It should be mentioned that British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, who had overseen the renegotiations regarding the UK’s membership in the European Economic Community before the 1975 referendum, perceived the EEC as a business agreement (Wall, 2013, as cited in Glencross, 2016). Glencross (2016) states that it was Callaghan’s stance on calculating the advantages and disadvantages of combining powers with other countries in Europe that affected UK politics in 2016.

Ridge-Newman (2018) refers to Ford and Goodwin (2017), according to whom the possible source of the referendum outcome could be the tendencies of a generation with nationalistic and socially conservative views. The traditional supporters of the Conservative Party, especially in England, became dissatisfied with liberal change in the society which had been taking place for many decades and which had been against their own values. About ten years before the referendum, the Conservative Party lost many of their members, activists, and supporters to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), i.e., a right-wing populist party, whose rise as well as Cameron’s decision to carry out the referendum is also proof that the more liberal policies of the Conservatives under Cameron’s leadership were not enthusiastically accepted by many traditional supporters of the party. Nevertheless, Ford and Goodwin (2017) also indicate that since the referendum the UK had become more polarized and divided across voting groups according to age, geographical location, i.e., urban or rural, and the level of education. “There has also been a decline in support for smaller parties and what appears to be a return to two party politics with greater policy distance between left and right” (Ridge-Newman, 2018, p. 32).

According to Clarke, Goodwin, and Whiteley (2017, as cited in Beasley, Kaarbo, and Oppermann, 2021), the decision to carry out the referendum on Brexit was the effect of conflicts within the Conservative Party regarding the role of the UK in Europe and the consequence of increasing support for UKIP. At the time prior to and after the referendum, the debate in the UK was concentrated on matters concerning sovereignty and the relative value it would have for the country (Hobolt, 2016 & Auer, 2017, as cited in Beasley et al., 2021).

The so-called “Leavers”, who were “led by right-leaning parties and populist sentiments, pushed for a British exit from the European stage” (Beasley et al., 2021, p. 3), i.e., for a “Brexit stage right”, underscoring that they wish the UK to regain control from institutions of the European Union. “The Leave side”, as it was referred to, was chiefly represented by UKIP as well as by prominent politicians from the Conservative Party, despite that the Conservatives, as mentioned above, were not unanimous on the Brexit issue. Prime Minister David Cameron led “the Remain side”, which was also assisted by the majority of members of the other parties (Beasley et al., 2021).

The conflict over Brexit remained throughout the national election in 2017, in which the Conservative Party led by Theresa May, who was then the next Prime Minister after David Cameron, lost the majority in Parliament, as a result of the voters’ adverse reaction against the pro-Brexit vote and the course of the process of exiting the EU (Heath & Goodwin, 2017, as cited in Beasley et al., 2021). Due to the continuing conflict in the party, in Parliament, etc. after the election, caused that Boris Johnson took the place of Theresa May as Prime Minister and that there was another election in December 2019, which resulted in a renewed absolute majority of the Conservative Party. This, in turn, caused that a withdrawal agreement on Brexit was passed in January 2020 (Beasley et al., 2021).

Politicians outside of the UK also commented on the Brexit issue. “Spokespersons for EU institutions, international organizations, and many foreign governments made explicit statements against Brexit, arguing that the UK would be weaker outside the EU, that negotiations about the UK’s post-Brexit relationships would not be straightforward, and that Brexit would have negative economic consequences” (Beasley et al., 2021, p. 4). For instance, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble from the Christian Democratic Union indicated that because there is significant interdependence between economies in Europe, the UK’s exit from the European Union would weaken its capability of performing a sovereign role. Also, German Bundestag MPs<sup>1</sup> perceived Brexit as an act which would weaken the UK in the international perspective and believed that the country “would not even be able to play a middle power

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<sup>1</sup> *MP* is an abbreviation for *Member of Parliament*, while the plural form is *MPs* (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023).

role” (Beasley et al., 2021, p. 4). An exception was, for e.g., Donald Trump, who supported Brexit as US presidential candidate and afterwards as the US president (Beasley et al., 2021).

As Ivic (2019) states, “Brexit puts into question the idea of European identity and values as Brexit decided that British is not necessarily synonymous to European” (p. 1). She underscores that the UK’s choice to leave the European community shows that nationalist paradigms and discourses in politics have become reality in Europe, and thus, questioned Europe’s supranational character. The author explains that numerous crises have led the EU to return to the concepts of nations and nationalism as well as binary oppositions; among the rhetoric which is now used are the words *we/they*, *national/postnational*, and *European/non-European*. European values and identity which are the basis of European integration have been questioned. These include common values, multiculturalism, the freedom of movement, the lack of borders, etc. Ivic (2019) further states that Brexit led to the reopening of the gap between conservative, i.e., nationalist, and liberal, i.e., postnational, approaches in Europe, between the European right and left wings of the political scene, and also the earlier existing gap between the eastern and western parts of Europe.

Ivic (2019) states that the EU is founded on mutual narratives representing the key European values which allowed to create European identity, the main function of which it is to bring together the European people. The author underlines that the EU and the narratives promoted by it should be treated as dynamic and not as static. She states that Europe has significantly changed since the Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, followed by the Treaty of Maastricht, on the basis of which the European Union was established in 1992, which was then followed by the Treaty of Lisbon in the year 2007. While in the past, various European narratives have been advocated, all of them promoted postnational values, the goal of which it is to overcome nationalist paradigms as well as fixed concepts concerning identity and borders (Ivic, 2019).

The nationalist narratives have their source in the “rhetoric of exclusion” (Wodak & Boukala, 2015, p. 89), which is based on various binary hierarchies (e.g., *postnational/national*) (Ivic, 2019). Ivic (2019) explains that the terms in these binary oppositions are not given the same value. While one term dominates, the other one is subordinate and described by the negation of the former

one. This gives rise to binary oppositions such as *we/they*, *European/non-European*, and *citizen/alien*, where merely the first terms in the pairs are treated as desirable. Individuals characterized by the second terms are marginalized and identified as “other” (Young, 1989, cited in Ivic, 2019). Wodak and Boukala (2015) state that in this rhetoric, language as well as other symbolic systems are “used to determine and define similarities and differences, to draw clear *boundaries* between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’, frequently via the construction of alleged dangers and threats to ‘Us’, the ‘Europeans’” (p. 89). As Ivic (2019) states, European narratives during times of crisis indicate nationalist exclusionary rhetoric, as contemporary public and political discourse in Europe signal many binary oppositions, such as *Western/Muslim*, *European/non-European*, *democracy/Islam*, *the self/the other*, etc.

Ivic (2019) refers to Mendelsohn’s (2017) words concerning the migration crisis. According to Mendelsohn (2017, as cited in Ivic, 2019), the crisis brought about a moral panic in certain EU member states and receiving immigrants was perceived by politicians in these countries as a threat to the identity and sovereignty of the nation and, consequently, the patriotic responsibility to protect the nation-state had taken the place of the moral obligation to help people in need. Ivic (2019) comments on this as follows: “[t]his represents a step back from postnational values (promoted by the European Union as a supranational political community) to nationalist paradigms. This collision between postnational and national values is also reflected in Brexit which shows various divisions in the contemporary British society, and binary oppositions such as: remainers/leavers, multicultural/national, European/British, postnational, fluid identities/national, fixed identity and so forth” (p. 4).

When touching on the issue of immigration in her inquiry, Ivic (2019) states that British nationalist politicians supporting Brexit have perceived immigrants as “Other”, i.e., as “a threat to national identity and values” (p. 20), and have portrayed the national border as secure, thus, showing their dissatisfaction with the free movement policy of the European Union. The pro-Brexit campaign highlighted nationalist paradigms, the significance of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and the taking of control over the country’s borders in terms of immigration. The campaign was concerned with binary hierarchies such as *self/other*, *Britain/EU*, *British/non-British*, and *citizen/refugee*, which shows a change of paradigm to nationalist paradigms (Ivic, 2019).

Ivic (2019) believes that new narratives in the European Union should underscore the significance of diversity and otherness which are not to be treated as a threat but as a way for maintaining the European Union's social values. She also adds, however, that "the new EU narratives should clearly define European values as a result of deliberation, not a debate among EU citizens. Only in this way, sharp divisions and binary oppositions may be overcome" (Ivic, 2019, p. 21).

According to Ivic (2019), Brexit is evidence that the values and narratives outlined in the treaties of the European Union are not sufficient for the European people to stay unified and that new narratives should be developed via deliberation and not simply via debate which does not help to overcome many binary oppositions. She adds that the EU should be closer to its citizens because nationalist narratives are advocated mainly as a consequence of the fear of others who are seen as a threat. The author underlines that according to many Europeans, the European Union was unsuccessful in coping with crises concerning finances, politics, the coming of refugees, etc. She indicates that a sign of this was that the British people voted for Brexit despite their support for values promoted by the EU, for instance, peace, equality, and the rule of law, as they believe the European Union has lost control and is unable to deal with the crises, and that they themselves can achieve these values. The author also believes that the new narratives in the EU should underscore that change and otherness are an opportunity for better economic and social development in the ageing society in Europe in order to cope with nationalist narratives by which they are portrayed as a threat. She underlines that, both, migration and change, are elemental in society (Ivic, 2019).

## Conclusion

The theoretical background presented in this chapter serves as an introduction into the subject matter of the political speeches analyzed in Chapter 3. It allows for a deeper understanding of what the politicians giving their speeches wanted to convey, with regard to the political orientation of their parties or the country which they come from, namely, the UK or Germany.

## Chapter 2

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# Linguistic Aspects: Pragmatics, Relevance Theory, and Political Discourse

The following chapter presents the linguistic theoretical background for the study. It defines the terms *pragmatics*, *relevance theory*, *political discourse*, and *rhetoric* and provides an outline of what each of them denotes. The chapter, thus, aims to highlight the significance of these aspects for the pragmatic investigation. Among other things, it considers the views of Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson regarding relevance theory, in the context of which the Brexit speeches in the third chapter are analyzed.

### 2.1 Pragmatics

The following section outlines the linguistic branch of pragmatics. It aims to provide a background of some of the main features of this area.

As Huang underscores, “[p]ragmatics is a rapidly growing field in contemporary linguistics” (2010, p. 341). Yule (2006) defines pragmatics as follows: “[t]he study of what speakers mean, or ‘speaker meaning’” (p. 112). He underscores that communication does not merely depend on recognizing the meanings of the words in a given utterance but also on understanding what speakers communicate via these utterances. Yule’s (2006) explanations, thus, give an initial insight into the core of pragmatics, which can be better understood on the basis of the four main areas of this linguistic branch which he illustrates.

The first area described by Yule (1996) regards speaker meaning and is, therefore, concerned with his definition of pragmatics provided above. It can, thus, be deduced that speaker meaning is a key issue in this branch of linguistics. To outline the first area, Yule (1996) explains that pragmatics concerns the study of meaning in the way it is put across by the speaker or writer and comprehended by the listener or reader. He states that it is, hence, more concerned with investigating what one is communicating in one's utterances rather than with what the words and phrases of which the utterances are constructed may mean by themselves.

The next area regards the analysis of contextual meaning. This involves interpreting the meaning conveyed in a given context and the way this context affects what the speaker is saying. For this purpose it needs to be taken into account how speakers arrange what they aim to say depending on whom they are conversing with, where and when this is taking place, and in what circumstances (Yule, 1996). Yule (2006) states that there are different types of context and describes two crucial types of them. The first one is linguistic context, also called *co-text*, which denotes the other words surrounding a given word in a phrase or sentence. This co-text considerably affects how one interprets what the word presumably means. For instance, the meaning of the homonym *bank* in a given situation would be interpreted on the basis of the linguistic context in which it appears. The other type of context presented by Yule (2006) is physical context. For instance, if the word *BANK* is written on the wall of a city building, the physical location will affect how one interprets this word. Although this may appear obvious, it should be noted that not the physical situation creates 'the context' which allows for the interpretation but one's mental representation of the aspects of this situation. Thus, comprehending much of what one reads or hears is concerned with the processing of the aspects of this physical context. This especially regards "the time and place, in which we encounter linguistic expressions" (Yule, 2006, p. 114).

The third area is concerned with the role of the listener as pragmatics also examines how listeners can interpret what is said in order for them to infer what the speaker means. Thus, this concerns how very much unsaid information, or invisible meaning, is understood as part of the speaker's message (Yule 1996). In order to understand what invisible meaning is conveyed in a given utterance, speakers or writers need to depend on many mutual expectations

and assumptions when trying to communicate. Therefore, investigating these expectations and assumptions gives an insight into how always more is communicated than actually said (Yule, 2006).

The last area presented by Yule (1996) is concerned with the question of how the choice between what to say and what not to say is made. The answer is basically concerned with the notion of distance. Social, physical, or conceptual closeness implies that the interlocutors have shared experience. Thus, speakers decide how much should be said depending on the level of closeness between them and their listeners. “*Pragmatics is the study of the expression of relative distance*” (Yule, 1996, p. 3).

Other crucial aspects of pragmatics are outlined by Huang (2010), who states that according to the Anglo-American idea of linguistics as well as the philosophy of language, the definition of *pragmatics* may be formulated as follows: “the systematic study of **meaning** by virtue of, or dependent on, the use of language” (p. 341). The main topics which are concerned with this study are, among other things, implicature, speech acts, presupposition, reference, and deixis, which have their source in the analytical philosophy of the twentieth-century. This approach is referred to as the component view of pragmatics, according to which a linguistic theory comprises many core components, such as phonetics, morphology, and semantics, each of which has a given area of inquiry. Thus, pragmatics is “another core component placed in the same contrast set within a linguistic theory” (Huang, 2010, p. 341).

Huang (2010) outlines the notion of conversational and conventional implicature which was introduced by the British philosopher Herbert Paul Grice (1989). Conversational implicature refers to an utterance meaning implied by the person speaking and inferred by the recipient which goes beyond what the speaker is literally saying. This meaning is deduced “from the speaker’s saying of what is said” (Huang, 2010, p. 341) by means of the cooperative principle and the maxims of conversation connected with the principle. Huang (2010) further underscores that Grice’s theory of conversational implicature has given rise to further research, resulting, for instance, in Sperber and Wilson’s (1995) relevance theory which is discussed more thoroughly later in this chapter.

As opposed to conversational implicature, conventional implicature refers to a non-truth-conditional meaning not deduced “in any general, natural way from the saying of what is said” (Huang, 2010, p. 341); it arises merely from



the conventional elements linked to given lexical items as well as/or linguistic structures (Huang, 2010).

The next aspect described by Huang (2010) is presupposition. He explains that presupposition is a proposition, the truth of which is inferred in the utterance of a sentence. Its primary function is to serve as a kind of precondition for the proper use of that sentence. As Yule (2006) states, presupposition is what a speaker or a writer believes is true or familiar to a listener or a reader. He explains that when using referring expressions such as *he*, *this*, or *Shakespeare*, one typically assumes that the listeners can identify the intended referent. In general, one constructs one's linguistic messages in accordance with broad assumptions concerning what the listeners already know. Although some assumptions may be incorrect, most of them are appropriate (Yule, 2006).

To exemplify the aspect of presupposition, Yule (2006) provides further examples. For instance, if one says *Your brother is waiting outside*, a presupposition is that the person being talked to has a brother. In the case of *Why did you arrive late?*, it is presupposed that the addressee of the utterance arrived late. The question *When did you stop smoking?* indicates that there are at least two presuppositions, first of all, that the person asking the question presupposes that the listener used to smoke and, second of all, that the listener has quit.

When referring to the issue of presuppositions, Huang (2010) also states that "[t]his background assumption will remain in force when the sentence that contains it is negated" (p. 341). Yule (2006) presents the 'constancy under negation' test used to check for presuppositions in sentences, which concerns negating a sentence containing a specific presupposition and verifying if the presupposition stays true. For instance, when one says *My car is a wreck* or *My car is not a wreck*, i.e., the negative version, the presupposition *I have a car* remains true although the sentences have opposite meanings (Yule, 2006, p. 117).

As Yule (2006) indicates, when discussing pragmatics it is also vital to take into consideration the concepts of deixis and reference. Deictic expressions are such expressions whose meanings cannot be interpreted without one knowing the context, especially the speaker's physical context, in which these expressions are used. Instances of such words are *she*, *you*, *it*, *here*, *there*, *yesterday*, *today*, *tomorrow*, *this*, *that*, *now*, and *then*. *Deixis* is a Greek word meaning 'pointing' through language. Deictic expressions can be used to refer to things and people (person deixis), locations (spatial deixis), and time (temporal deixis).

Such expressions are to be interpreted according to the speaker's intention, i.e., one must know to whom, to what place, and to what time the speaker is referring (Yule, 2006).

Reference is "an act by which a speaker (or writer) uses language to enable a listener (or reader) to identify something" (Yule, 2006, p. 115). Such an act can be performed, for instance, via using proper nouns (e.g., *Chomsky*), nouns in phrases (e.g., *my friend*), and pronouns (e.g., *he*). It should be noted that every word or phrase has a given 'range of reference.' For instance, one may use the words *Jennifer* or *she* to refer to numerous entities. The reference of a word or phrase depends on the person who is using it (Yule, 2006).

Another crucial element of pragmatics is the notion of speech acts, which was introduced by John Langshaw Austin (1962), a British philosopher. Following Austin (1962), Huang (2010) explains that speech acts concern the utterance of a linguistic expression, whose function is not only to say things but also to actively do things or perform acts. Just like Grice's theory, Austin's (1962) theory, which was further developed by John Rogers Searle (1969), has remained another pillar of pragmatics (Huang, 2010).

Austin (1962) makes a distinction between what he calls *constatives* and *performatives*. He clarifies that issuing a constative utterance, which means saying it with a historical reference, concerns making a statement, while issuing a performative utterance means doing something via this utterance, e.g., marrying someone, making a bet (e.g., *I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow*), or naming a ship (e.g., *I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth*). He explains that a performative utterance (or a performative sentence or simply a performative) concerns the performing of an action via this kind of (performative) utterance, and that the term *performative utterance* derives from the verb *perform* which is naturally used with the noun *action*. According to Sadock (2010), constatives were descriptive sentences which were the main focus of language philosophers until Austin's time. These were such sentences that at least pretheoretically appeared to be used mostly to say something and not to do something. Sadock (2010) further states that while the differentiation between the two types of utterance is frequently applied in areas such as work concerning the law, in literary criticism as well as in political analysis, it is such a distinction, which, according to Austin's (1962) arguments, was not fundamentally justifiable. In his lectures, Austin (1962) actually wanted to illustrate that all normal utterances

concurrently have a descriptive aspect and an effective aspect, i.e., that saying something also means doing something (Sadock, 2010).

Austin (1962) introduced three key terms regarding Speech Act Theory, i.e., *locutionary act (locution)*, *illocutionary act (illocution)*, and *perlocutionary act (perlocution)*. He explains that the performing of a locution is the pure act of saying something and the performing of an illocution means using a locution to utter something with a specific intention, for instance, to provide information, to ask a question or give an answer to it, or to announce a verdict. To clarify the distinction between these two acts, Austin (1962) says that the performance of an illocution is the “performance of an act *in* saying something as opposed to performance of an act *of* saying something” (p. 99) which, in turn, refers to the locution. The performing of a perlocution is the causing of a reaction among the recipients of the utterance. This means affecting their thoughts, feelings, or actions, those of the speakers themselves, or those of other people, and it may be done with the intention of doing so. Austin (1962) also indicates, nevertheless, that because acts are acts, one must always keep in mind “the distinction between producing effects or consequences which are intended or unintended” (p. 105) and that when a speaker has the intention of producing an effect, it may actually not be produced, or, conversely, when they do not have this intention or have the intention not to produce the effect, it may, however, occur.

Austin (1962) uses examples to illustrate the essence of the three types of acts. He provides the following instance of a locution: *He said to me, ‘You can’t do that’*. The example of an illocution which he provides as referring to this locution is: *He protested against my doing it*. The examples of corresponding perlocutions given by him are *He pulled me up, checked me* and *He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, &c. He annoyed me* (p. 102). As Austin (1962) explains, the consequential effects of perlocutions are such that do not consider such conventional effects as the speaker being committed by what he had promised, as this is concerned with the illocutionary act.

The outline of some of the most crucial elements of the area of pragmatics leads to the discussion of relevance theory which also plays a significant role in this linguistic branch.

## 2.2 Relevance Theory

This section discusses relevance theory, which serves as a basis for the investigation of the political speeches in the third chapter.

Relevance theory was created by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. In their work *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (1995), they begin with a theoretical outline of communication. They state that from the time of Aristotle to the time of modern semiotics, all communication theories were based on the *code model*, as the authors call it, according to which “communication is achieved by encoding and decoding messages” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 2). This means that a communicator encodes their intended meaning into a signal and this signal is, in turn, decoded by the addressees via an exact copy of the code (Wilson & Sperber, 2010). A new model, called the *inferential model* by Sperber and Wilson (1995), was later proposed by philosophers such as Paul Grice and David Lewis. In accordance with this model, “communication is achieved by producing and interpreting evidence” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 2). Thus, in this sense a communicator gives proof of their intention to express a given meaning; this meaning is inferred by the addressees on the grounds of the provided evidence (Wilson & Sperber, 2010). Both models can be combined. Many works have demonstrated that verbal communication is concerned with coding as well as inferential processes (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

Sperber and Wilson (1995) argue that communication can be brought about in numerous ways, especially via the coding and decoding of messages, and via providing proof of an intended inference. Both are appropriate for a different form of communication. Moreover, they are both affected by general constraints with which all types of information processing are concerned. Verbal communication engages code mechanisms as well as inferential mechanisms. In order to create an appropriate description of both kinds of mechanism and of the way they interact, it needs to be noted that one does not depend on the other and that communication is generally not dependent on either one of them (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

It should be underscored that Sperber and Wilson (1995) regard the depiction of communication with regard to intentions and inferences as commonsensical to a given extent. As a speaker, one intends the hearer to realize that it is one’s

intention to inform them about something, whereas, as a hearer, one attempts to understand what information the speaker intends to put across. A hearer is interested in what the speaker means by a sentence solely to the extent that it gives proof of what they mean. The success of communication does not depend on the recognition of the linguistic meaning of an utterance by a hearer, but on their inference of the speaker's 'meaning' from this utterance. Evidence of this is the observation that when a hearer notices that the speaker has not used a word correctly or made some other minor mistake, they typically treat the wrong meaning as insignificant. Nevertheless, this wrong meaning does not need to be imprecise or impossible to decode. It is merely 'wrong' in the sense that the proof it provides of the speaker's intentions is misleading (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) state that relevance theory can be perceived as an attempt to develop a detailed understanding of one of the central claims put forward by Grice (1989), namely that a vital element of the majority of human communication is the expressing and recognizing of intentions. When explaining his claim, Grice (1989) presented the basis for the inferential model of communication, which was the alternative to the code model. Wilson and Sperber's (2010) theory is also based on another central claim of Grice, i.e., that utterances automatically bring about expectations that guide the listener to the meaning conveyed by the speaker. These expectations were outlined by Grice in the context of his Cooperative Principle and four maxims, namely, the maxims of Quality (referring to truthfulness), Quantity (referring to informativeness), Relation (referring to relevance), and Manner (referring to clarity), which are to be observed by speakers (Grice 1961, 1989, as cited in Wilson and Sperber, 2010).

While Wilson and Sperber (2010) agree with Grice that utterances bring forth expectations of relevance, they challenge other features of his account, such as "the need for a Cooperative Principle and maxims, the focus on pragmatic contributions to implicit (as opposed to explicit) content, the role of maxim violation in utterance interpretation, and the treatment of figurative utterances" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 607). They underscore that the main claim of their theory "is that the expectations of relevance raised by an utterance are precise and predictable enough to guide the hearer toward the speaker's meaning" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 607). The goal is to make clear "in cognitively

realistic terms” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 608) to what the expectations add up and in what way they could make a contribution to an empirically credible account of understanding (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

In relevance theory all types of external stimuli or internal representations contributing to cognitive processes can be of relevance to a given person at a given time. Thus, this includes, apart from utterances and other phenomena which can be observed, thoughts, conclusions of inferences, and memories. The reason why utterances bring forth expectations of relevance is that searching for relevance is a key characteristic of human cognition, which can be exploited by communicators. Therefore, the expectations are not raised because of the need for speakers to observe a Cooperative Principle and its maxims or other conventions of communication (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

As Wilson and Sperber (2010) explain, an input, such as an utterance, a sound, a sight, or a memory, is then relevant to someone when it relates to background information which they have access to to make conclusions which they find significant, for instance, via answering a question they were thinking of or improving their knowledge on a given topic. An input is then relevant to a person “when its processing in a context of available assumptions” (Wilson & Sperber 2010, p. 608) produces a *positive cognitive effect*. Such an effect is a beneficial difference to that person’s representation of the world. This may be, for instance, a true conclusion. It is not worth having, on the other hand, false conclusions. These are also cognitive effects, but they are not positive ones (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

The authors state that a *contextual implication* is the most crucial kind of cognitive effect. They explain that this is a conclusion which is deducible from the combination of input and context but not from pure input or pure context. For instance, as they clarify, when one sees the train arriving, one may check the time on the watch, then access one’s knowledge concerning the timetable, and arrive at the contextual implication that the train has arrived late. As they state, this may also itself become relevant via combining with following contextual assumptions which can bring about further implications. The authors explain that other kinds of cognitive effect are the strengthening, the revising, or the abandoning of assumptions which are available. For instance, seeing the train arriving late may confirm one’s impression that the railway service is worsening or cause that one will make a change of plans. In relevance theory

an input has relevance to someone only when its processing produces such positive cognitive effects (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) explain that relevance is also concerned with degree. There are numerous inputs of potential relevance. Thus, choosing a particular input from among other stimuli is not merely a matter of it being relevant, but a matter of it being of greater relevance than other inputs to which one has access at a given time. Therefore, the authors further clarify that relevance can be assessed with regard to cognitive effects and processing effort. They state that “[o]ther things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at that time” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 609). For instance, if the train from the example outlined above arrives one minute late, this may not make a very worthwhile difference to one’s representation of the world, whereas if the train arrives thirty minutes late, this may cause a significant change of one’s plans for the day. Thus, the relevance of both inputs will differ in accordance with these situations. The authors further state that “[o]ther things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower the relevance of the input to the individual at that time” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 609). Depending on the circumstances, a stimulus may be treated as more or less important and given contextual assumptions as more or less available. Moreover, given cognitive effects may be easier or harder to achieve. Therefore, the more effort one needs to use with regard to memory, perception, or inference, “the less rewarding the input will be to process” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 609) and will, as a result, deserve less attention (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

As Wilson and Sperber (2010) underscore, according to relevance theory, humans naturally tend to maximize relevance due to how their cognitive systems have developed. Because of continuous selection pressures to strengthen efficiency, the cognitive system has evolved in such a manner that human mechanisms of perception naturally tend to choose stimuli of potential relevance, mechanisms for retrieving memories tend to trigger assumptions which can be relevant, and mechanisms of inference tend to process them automatically in the most productive way. The First, i.e., *Cognitive Principle of Relevance* describes this tendency as follows: “[h]uman cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance” (Sperber & Wilson, 1995, p. 260; Wilson & Sperber,



2010, p. 610). Inferential communication occurs on the basis of this cognitive background (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) explain that the cognitive inclination to maximize relevance enables, to some extent, the prediction and manipulation of other people's mental states. Knowing about this inclination can lead someone to produce such a stimulus that may attract someone else's attention, trigger suitable contextual assumptions in their mind, and direct them to an intended conclusion. The authors provide the following instance: "I may leave my empty glass in your line of vision intending you to notice and conclude that I might like another drink" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 610). As they clarify, Grice indicated that this is not an instance of inferential communication as the person leaving the glass did not provide any evidence that they had the intention to affect the other person's thoughts in a given way, despite that they (the first person) actually had this intention. They were simply taking advantage of the other person's cognitive inclination to maximize relevance (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) refer to inferential communication as *ostensive-inferential communication*. This type of communication is concerned with the following: the *informative intention*, i.e., "[t]he intention to inform an audience of something" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 611) and the *communicative intention*, namely, "[t]he intention to inform the audience of one's informative intention" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 611). Comprehension is then achieved when the second one of these intentions is fulfilled – when the addressees notice the informative intention. The fulfillment of the informative intention itself depends on the level of the addressees' trust towards the communicator (Wilson & Sperber, 2010). This is an interesting insight with regard to the analysis of the political speeches in Chapter 3. While politicians put forward their views or present different information, the fact whether they achieve their informative intention depends on how much a given recipient of their words believes in what they are saying. Thus, the level of relevance of this input (the politicians' words) for a given person will depend on their level of trust towards a given politician.

A communicator may signal that they are attempting to communicate in an "overt, intentional way" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 611) by, e.g., touching the addressee's arm and pointing to their empty glass, ostentatiously placing it in front of that person, or simply saying that the glass is empty. Thus, as Wilson



and Sperber (2010) state, ostensive-inferential communication is concerned with using an *ostensive stimulus* which is to attract the recipient's attention and concentrate it on the meaning conveyed by the communicator. They explain that using such a stimulus can bring about clear and predictable expectations of relevance which are not created by other inputs. It results from the Cognitive Principle of Relevance that ostensive stimuli raise expectations of relevance. When the communicator creates such a stimulus, they encourage their recipients to believe that it is of sufficient relevance to be worth the processing effort. As Wilson and Sperber (2010) further clarify, "[t]his need not be a case of Gricean cooperation" (p. 611) because even a communicator who is self-interested, incompetent, or deceptive has the manifest intention for their addressees to believe that the stimulus is of such sufficient relevance, since otherwise, there would be no need for the addressees to pay attention to what is being communicated. These are the grounds for the second principle put forward by the authors, i.e., the *Communicative Principle of Relevance*, which states that "[e]very ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 612). The concept of optimal relevance is to clarify what the addressees "of an act of ostensive communication" can expect when it comes to effort and effect, and thus, "[t]he ostensive stimulus is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort" and "[i]t is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and preferences" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 612). Following from the latter, a politician will present only those facts or views which he is aware of and which he actually *wants to* put across.

Wilson and Sperber (2010: 613) provide further explanations of how the Communicative Principle of Relevance and the, resulting from it, presumption of optimal relevance work. For this aim they present the following relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure: "[f]ollow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects: Test interpretive hypotheses (disambiguations, reference resolutions, implicatures, etc.) in order of accessibility" and "[s]top when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 613). Therefore, the recipient "should take the decoded linguistic meaning" and via a path of least possible effort, "enrich it at the explicit level and complement it at the implicit level" (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 613) to the moment that their interpretation satisfies their expectation of relevance (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) further explain that it is reasonable to adhere to a path which requires the least possible effort for the reason that the speaker is expected to make what they say “as easy as possible to understand” (p. 614), in accordance with their abilities and preferences. The authors further clarify that because relevance varies with effort, the pure fact that it is easy to access a given interpretation causes that it has an initial degree of believability, which is an advantage of ostensive communication. What is more, they state that since there should not be more than only one interpretation, it is also reasonable to stop the interpreting process when the first interpretation meets the addressee’s expectations of relevance. The speaker who, thus, wants to be understood as easily as possible should construct their utterance in such a way, in accordance with their capabilities and preferences, that the first interpretation which meets the recipient’s expectation of relevance is precisely the one which was intended to be conveyed. An utterance which could be interpreted in two different ways, both of them being satisfactory, would lead the recipient to use unnecessary extra effort to select one of them, and, consequently, their interpretation, in the event that there would actually be one, would not adhere to the second clause concerning the presumption of optimal relevance, i.e., “[s]top when your expectations of relevance are satisfied (or abandoned)” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 613). Therefore, on the basis of Wilson and Sperber’s (2010) explanation, it can be stated that politicians delivering their speeches aim to use such language and present such content that will make them understandable to their addressees, i.e., that their addressees’ interpretation of what they are saying will be the one which they intended to put across. Following the path of least effort, the recipients should understand what was meant to be conveyed. As Wilson and Sperber (2010) state, when a recipient follows this path and arrives at a satisfying, i.e., relevant, interpretation, there being no other, contrary, evidence, this is the most credible hypothesis regarding what the speaker meant. They explain that because understanding “is a non-demonstrative inference process”, the hypothesis may actually be false, “but it is the best a rational hearer can do” (Wilson & Sperber, 2010, p. 614).

Wilson and Sperber (2010) explain that in a large number of non-verbal cases, such as pointing to an empty glass, using an ostensive stimulus only provides “an extra layer of intention recognition to a basic layer of information” (p. 614) which the addressees may have understood anyway. They state that

there are also situations when the behavior of the person communicating does not give direct proof for the conclusion that is intended, and thus, merely the presumption of relevance stimulates the recipient to take the effort to deduce the meaning. An example which they provide is inviting somebody for a drink via miming the act of taking a drink. In both mentioned cases, the number of meanings that can be put across in a non-verbal way is limited to those that the person communicating can evoke in the recipient via focusing their attention on observable elements of the environment, such which pre-exist or such which are produced for this very purpose. On the other hand, in verbal communication, a very broad range of meanings can be put across, despite that an independently identifiable fundamental layer of information which the addressee should comprehend does not exist. The authors further explain that this is possible because utterances encode *logical forms*, i.e., conceptual representations (these may be fragmentary), which have been manifestly selected by the speaker to provide as an input to the process of inferential comprehension. Consequently, verbal communication can reach such a level of explicitness which cannot be achieved in non-verbal communication. This difference can be observed between pointing to a table with glasses, ashtrays, etc., and simply saying that one's glass is empty (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

According to relevance theory, identifying explicit content is perceived as equally inferential and as equally dependent on the Communicative Principle of Relevance as is the deducing of implicatures. As Wilson and Sperber (2010) explain, the comprehension procedure for dealing with both explicit and implicit content is divided into the following subtasks: building a suitable hypothesis regarding explicit content, i.e., *explicatures*, by decoding, reference resolution, disambiguation, and other such "pragmatic enrichment processes"; creating a reasonable hypothesis concerning "the intended contextual assumptions", i.e., *implicated premises*, and formulating an appropriate hypothesis concerning "the intended contextual implications", i.e., *implicated conclusions* (p. 615). These subtasks are not sequentially ordered, but the mentioned hypotheses are developed simultaneously with regard to expectations that might be revised or clarified as the utterance itself develops (Wilson & Sperber, 2010).

Blakemore (1992) explains that Sperber and Wilson (1986) "call the result of fleshing out the semantic representation of an utterance an *explicature*" (p. 59). She provides the following example of a conversation between two people:

- (1) A: Did you enjoy your holiday?  
 B: The beaches were crowded and the hotel was full of bugs.

As she clarifies, A's question allows the hearer to access a context in which the assumption in the first one of the following produces suitable contextual effects, especially the implicature in (3):

- (2) The beaches at the holiday resort that the speaker went to were crowded with people and the hotel where he stayed was full of insects.  
 (3) The speaker did not enjoy his holiday.

The assumption in (2) is an explicature, as it is determined by developing the semantic representation of the utterance in B's answer in (1), while (3) is an implicature, which can only be deduced after (2) has been derived (Blakemore, 1992).

Another crucial relevance-theoretic notion is that of a cognitive environment. As Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain, “[a] *cognitive environment* of an individual is a set of facts that are manifest to him” (p. 39) and “[a] fact is *manifest* to an individual at a given time if and only if he is capable at that time of representing it mentally and accepting its representation as true or probably true” (p. 39). The authors state that being manifest means being perceptible or inferable. They further explain their concept of manifestness, extending it from facts to assumptions in general. They clarify that any assumption can be manifest to someone, regardless of it being true or false. Assumptions are manifest in one's cognitive environment if this environment gives enough evidence for these assumptions to be accepted (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Carston (2002) provides the following definition of one's cognitive environment (in relevance-theoretic terms): “the set of assumptions that are manifest to an individual at a given time” (p. 376). A mutual cognitive environment is such “a cognitive environment which is shared by a group of individuals and in which it is manifest to those individuals that they share it with each other” (Carston, 2022, p. 378).

An interesting example of the implementation of relevance theory, especially the notions of *explicature*, *implicated premise*, and *implicated conclusion*, is presented by Pinar (2013). In her paper, Pinar (2013) aims to outline in what way humorous interpretations are brought about in a selection of political billboards published by the British Labour Party during the election campaigns

in the UK in the years 1997, 2001, and 2005. The author underscores that the relationship between the verbal and visual aspects of the billboards needs to be considered for the messages conveyed in them to be understood properly. She intends to demonstrate that decoding and interpreting the billboards relies on factors such as the viewer's access to their background assumptions and beliefs which create the context in terms of which the processing of new incoming information takes place. In her work she explains the differentiation between explicatures, implicated premises, and implicated conclusions.

Pinar (2013) states that the sender of the messages in the billboards is the agency which created the billboards and, simultaneously, also the Labour Party, who consented to the agency's proposals, while the intended recipients are the electorate. She believes that the main goal of the party was to carry a political message across, and thus, to receive votes, and concurrently underscores that the messages are decoded as having a humorous effect. She demonstrates that messages which are to be perceived as humorous are not in all cases decoded as such. With the help of relevance theory the author investigates the factors which are involved as well as the way humor is brought about via the incongruity-resolution theory of humor, which she also uses for her analysis. As she explains, according to the latter theory, humor is noticed at the moment that the incongruity between a concept which is involved in a given situation and the real objects believed to be in a relation to this concept is realized (Pinar, 2013).

As Pinar (2013) explains, Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995, 1987) created relevance theory on the basis of Gricean principles in the 1980s, proposing that Grice's conversational maxims should be reduced to one principle of relevance, and introducing two principles of relevance i.e., the cognitive and communicative principles as well as the dichotomy between explicatures and implicatures, which does not directly correlate with the distinction between what is said and the implicatures which had been recommended by Grice.

In her work, Pinar (2013, p. 14) underscores two concepts of relevance theory which she treats as crucial for her analysis, namely that relevance is relevance to a given individual and that there is a contrast between strong and weak communication, the former normally bringing about only one interpretation and the latter tending to generate ambiguity to some extent. According to the author, it appears that weak communication is the type concerned with political advertising, as the sender wishes their message to allow for various

interpretations. Following Forceville (2005), she underscores that “[t]his relates well with the fact that political billboards have a multitude of individual addressees with widely different cognitive environments” (Pinar, 2013, p.14) and, as she adds, with distinct ideologies, who will, consequently, interpret the billboards on the basis of these facts (Pinar, 2013).

One of the Labour Party’s billboards analyzed by Pinar (2013) is one from the 1997 election campaign, which presents John Major, i.e., the then Prime Minister, and Kenneth Clarke, who was the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time and a candidate in the election. The author underscores that the analyses (of all the investigated billboards) presented by her are her own and that, thus, not all the postulated ideas and deduced implicatures may be shared by everyone. She relates this to Sperber and Wilson’s (1986, p. 142) claim that “relevance is relevance to an individual” and, consequently, the interpretation of the billboards depends on the viewers’ background knowledge and on the either strong or weak communication which is transmitted by the sender (Pinar, 2013).

Pinar (2013) begins with the investigation of the word and image explicatures, then analyzes the implicated premises, and ends with a brief outline of the implicated conclusions. She starts the analysis of the said explicatures by stating that the billboard with Major and Clarke contains a visual metaphor, namely that Major and Clarke are Laurel and Hardy. As she explains, the billboard represents the two politicians as if they were the two comedians Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy, who were very popular in the past. They presented comic situations in which they experienced difficulties and behaved incongruously. The visual metaphor in the billboard depicts a combination of the physical traits of Major and Clarke with the physical traits of the two comedians. Pinar (2013) states that decoding it is crucial for the construction of a correct hypothesis regarding the billboard’s content and that through enrichment the viewer of the billboard uses their background knowledge about the comedians and the comic situations presented by them to determine the meaning of the text on the billboard, i.e., “Britain has dropped to 21st in the world prosperity league. Another fine mess”. She adds that also the non-co-presence in time as well as the number of communicators should be considered as many young people who have very distinct cognitive environments might not be able to associate the political leaders with the comedians because they are not aware of the collective cognitive environment needed to identify the comedians and the types

of situations in which they usually participated. Pinar (2013), thus, referring to Forceville (2005), further states that it can be claimed that the text of the billboard causes ambiguity. “Another fine mess” is the catchphrase of the two comedians, which, according to Pinar (2013), may have two interpretations in the case of the billboard. On the one hand, it may simply be referring to the catchphrase, but, on the other hand, it can also be referring to the rest of the text, namely “Britain has dropped to 21st in the world prosperity league”, where *drop* carries a negative meaning. Via disambiguation and reference resolution, the viewer is led to the interpretation that the two politicians, similarly to the two comedians, are not able to make progress and have, therefore, caused that the UK fell to the 21st place in the mentioned league, which is “another fine mess”, in this case, among others, for the UK (Pinar, 2013).

Pinar (2013) explains that the implicatures are clear if the viewer has the appropriate background knowledge and is aware of the assumptions in order to deal with the new information. She explains that when the viewer already knows what the visual metaphor means, has appropriately decoded the text, and has deduced the implicatures, then the humorous effect is brought about via the incongruity-resolution process. She states that the incongruity is demonstrated in the words “Another fine mess”, because, if taken seriously, the fact that the Conservative Party has caused that the UK is in an unwanted situation is a negative phenomenon. However, it is the resolution of the incongruity that leads to the humorous effect once the viewer accesses their background knowledge concerning the two comedians (Pinar, 2013).

Following from her analysis, Pinar (2013) deduces the following implicated premises: similarly to Laurel and Hardy, the two politicians are not able to bring about any real progress, even when it comes to the simplest undertakings. The author again underscores that one must possess knowledge of the two comedians’ films to deduce the intended contextual assumptions. The implicated conclusion which Pinar (2013) puts forward is that it is not sensible to vote for the Conservative Party, provided that one does not wish the UK to be “in a mess”. Instead, one should vote for the Labour Party (Pinar, 2013).

Pinar (2013) concludes that in the case of all the investigated billboards, the interpretation of the messages conveyed in the billboards is dependent on one’s access to background beliefs and assumptions that create a context on the basis of which the processing of new incoming information takes place.



With reference to Pinar's (2013) analysis, it can be deduced that also the way in which the recipients of the Brexit speeches (investigated in the practical chapter of this book) interpreted these speeches depended on their access to their background knowledge and views, which had an effect on how relevant the politicians' speeches were to them.

The theoretical background on relevance theory and its functioning in practice on the examples presented by Pinar (2013) highlights the significance of how the intentions one has when conveying a message affect the way one puts this message across. The presented issues also stress the importance of how the interpretation on the part of the addressee depends on their cognitive background.

## 2.3 Rhetoric and Political Discourse

The following subsection is devoted to an overview of rhetoric and political discourse, i.e., two interconnected areas. The outline of these topics is to serve as an introduction to the essence of the political speeches investigated in the third chapter.

Wodak (2010) states that the field concerned with language and politics is extensive and deals with research regarding the language and discourse of particular politicians, the diverse ways in which politics is presented in the media as well as the patterns of communication which appear in political organizations. It also encompasses macrotopics including language politics and language change connected with political change. Rhetoric, i.e., an area belonging to the oldest academic disciplines, involved characteristics of political communication already in ancient times (Wodak, 2010). McNair (2003, as cited in Pinar, 2013) states that political communication is "*purposeful communication about politics* which includes all forms of communication undertaken by politicians and other political actors for the purpose of achieving specific objectives" (Pinar, 2013, p. 11). Załęska (2008, as cited in Kubicha, 2021) defines rhetoric as any such form of communication whose aim it is to consciously influence the recipients via persuasion. As she further explains, it is also possible to have such influence on someone by fulfilling the norms of speech in a given culture. The latter insight is interesting in terms of this work,



as the British and German politicians delivering the Brexit speeches use their own native languages, and thus, abide by the norms of their language, which is embedded in their culture. What they say is to have a certain effect on their recipients, i.e., it is to lead them to regard the messages conveyed in the speeches as relevant. As Bralczyk (2004, p. 7) states, “language is the most natural tool of persuasion, also of public persuasion” [own translation]<sup>1</sup>.

As Wodak (2010) explains, “political linguistics” or *Politolinguistik*, which was developed in the late 1960s as a new methodological approach, was the initial endeavor to create a new discipline for exploring political discourse. It made use of numerous linguistic sub-disciplines, such as media research, pragmatics, and text linguistics (Wodak, 2010). Okulska and Cap (2010) state that in the last decades the discipline of political linguistics (PL) has become “a uniquely *heterogeneous* and *fragmented* domain” (p. 3) and that it is considerably affected by other disciplines with which it is related. While scholars bring about their own developments concerned with the relationship between this discipline and the other fields, they are rather unanimous on how it is defined, i.e., as an area involving studies on language in mostly (but not only) political settings complemented via investigations on power positions and on the ways languages are socially perceived in the society “as means of struggle for cultural/communal superiority and dominance”, i.e., research on language politics (Okulska & Cap, 2010, p. 3).

Another interesting insight is expressed by Grześkowiak-Krwawicz (2018), who underscores that political reality and political language are so strongly connected that comprehending them separately is not possible because they influence each other. She explains that the reality affects the discourse, whereas the specific way in which given political ideas, institutions, etc. are named causes that they are perceived in a particular way. Thus, sometimes only after certain phenomena or processes are given names, are they “seen”. When certain ideas or concepts are not mentioned in a political dictionary, they are not noticed in the reality either (Grześkowiak-Krwawicz, 2018).

Johnson and Johnson (2000) indicate that political discourse is concerned with the formal exchange of beliefs which are based on reason and which should

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<sup>1</sup> Original Polish version: „Język jest najbardziej naturalnym narzędziem perswazji, także publicznej...” (Bralczyk, 2004, p. 7)

result in the undertaking of different courses of action with the aim of solving a certain social issue. They explain that the intention is to involve all the citizens in the decision-making process and convince others via true information and logic as well as explain which course of action would be the most suitable in order to solve the issue. Political discourse can be defined as a way in which decisions are made in a democracy (Johnson & Johnson, 2000). As mentioned by Stănculete (2019a), political discourse is perceived as a dialogue between politicians and their citizens.

Chilton (2004) states that political discourse refers to using language in ways which people as 'political animals' perceive as 'political'. He outlines his propositions regarding this field. The first proposition is that "[p]olitical discourse operates indexically" (Chilton, 2004, p. 201). This means that someone's choice of language or characteristics of the language may implicitly indicate political distinctions, for instance, choosing to speak a certain language instead of another one, speaking with a regional accent or one connoted with a given social class, making use of words which are associated with given political ideologies, or addressing someone else with the help of such forms that signal either distance or solidarity. Therefore, group boundaries and the bonding within then can be expressed in an indexical way (Chilton, 2004).

The next proposition is "[p]olitical discourse operates as interaction" (Chilton, 2004, p. 201). The author explains that one interactive mode is indexicality itself, but also various other forms of interacting which are aided via the structure of language exist. He states that indexicality frequently appears in verbal interaction. For instance, conflicts or cooperation may be implicated by overlaps and interruptions. Interactions often indicate bonding and boundaries, and rank and role (Chilton, 2004). Commenting on this proposition, Wodak (2010) states that any types of interaction, such as dialogues or debates, help to find mutual world representations, to signal agreements or disagreements.

Chilton's (2004) next proposition is "[i]nteraction functions to negotiate representations" (p. 201), representations meaning the use of language adjusted to the communicating of perceptions of 'the world'. The author states that communication is partially to serve the coordination of one's world conceptions and certain shared representations may also be presumed, e.g., speakers presume that the relevant community shares given presupposed meanings or that there is a certain maxim of quantity that is locally accepted and that the hearer will

arrive at a certain implicature. According to Chilton (2004), when investigating political texts, frequently it is obvious that hearers could not comprehend the language-in-use without expecting to affirm their pre-existing knowledge about roles, values, institutions, etc., which are present in a specific polity. Such presumptions are essential for making implicatures. They are special types of cognitive ‘frames’. The author calls them ‘presumptions’ due to “their normative and sometimes coercive characteristics” (Chilton, 2004, p. 202). This insight on political discourse is particularly interesting in terms of relevance theory, as given recipients’ understanding and acceptance of given politicians’ words presumably strongly rely on their knowledge of the situation being mentioned by the politicians, on the politicians’ political orientation, on their previous speeches, etc.

Another interesting proposition is “[r]ecursive properties of language subserve political interaction” (Chilton, 2004, p. 202). As Chilton (2004) states, “[p]olitical actors need to guess what their rivals are up to” (p. 202), explaining that this would not be possible without the language-independent cognitive ‘theory of mind’ ability. He clarifies that one needs to divide one’s representations of the world that one perceives as ‘real’ or ‘true’ from the ones one believes others to have. This, as he states, requires meta-representation. One has to have the ability to think that someone else “thinks that *p*” and, concurrently, not accept *p* as true, which occurs in natural language (Chilton, 2004, p. 202).

Chilton’s (2004, p. 202) next proposition is “[m]odal properties of language subserve political interaction”. As he explains, presumably every language has grammaticalized modal expressions connected with concepts including certainty-doubt, social obligation-compulsion, etc., and if it lacks such a grammaticalized system, such as modal auxiliaries, then numerous other ways exist that allow for the formulation of a propositional attitude. He explains that, for instance, the English language has grammaticalized concepts regarding social obligation or scales of certainty and clear ability, as in ‘she can swim’ and that it can also put propositions in ‘hypothetical’ mental space in order to perform many types of processes involving reasoning. This includes using ‘unless’, ‘if’, ‘in the event that’, etc. What is more, confirming ‘credibility’, asserting ‘rightness’ as well as ‘legitimizing’ truth claims are involved in a political strategy which engages many language mechanisms (Chilton, 2004). Wodak (2010) comments on this point made by Chilton (2004) by stating that many claims presented by politicians remain unclear, while other ones are claims for confidence, trust,

truth, credibility or legitimization of positions or actions, and that, thus, the use of modal verbs such as *can* or *must* in the English language indicates this.

The next proposition is that “[b]inary conceptualisations are frequent in political discourse” (Chilton, 2004, p. 202), i.e., despite that conveying scales ranging from probability to possibility and the level of legality and acceptability in society is possible via lexical potential, there is a tendency in a significant part of political discourse to make “antonymous lexical choices” (Chilton, 2004, p. 202) as well as other such choices which are to lead hearers to make mental models of binary character. As Chilton (2004) indicates, this tendency is visible, e.g., in the following: representations of the politics of a given party, political interaction, and the creation “of group identity and the fear of foreigners” (Chilton, 2004, p. 203). This can be referred back to Ivic (2019), whose work is outlined in the first chapter. As she states in the context of Brexit, binary oppositions and the ideas of nations and nationalism have been the result of various EU crises, and therefore, words such as the personal pronouns *we/they* appeared in the political rhetoric. It can be observed that the use of different personal pronouns is of high significance in political speeches. The distinction between *we* and *they* is frequently clearly underscored. As Wodak (2010) underlines, the discursive construction of the pronouns *us* and *them* in every textual genre which is used politically is of highest significance in persuasive rhetoric and the use of binary concepts also serves to ascribe numerous features to these pronouns which underscore positive or negative associations.

According to Stănculete (2019b), pronouns in political speeches generally are supposed to position the speaker in relation to the listeners, i.e., as someone separate from a group, a group member, someone who shares the addressee’s views, or someone who has opinions other than the addressee’s. In her article, the author analyzes the use of the personal pronouns *I* and *we* in two political speeches with regard to how democracy is presented in these speeches, of which one was delivered by Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase on Dec. 21, 2000 and the other one by British Prime Minister Tony Blair on May 1, 1997 (Stănculete 2019b). Stănculete’s (2019b, pp. 126, 129) investigation reveals that *I* appears in Năstase’s speech 88 times and in Blair’s speech 60 times, while *we* is used 60 times in Năstase’s speech and 137 times in Blair’s, respectively. According to the author, whether the two politicians choose one or the other pronoun depends on how they perceive democracy, namely the prevailing use

of *I* reflects the “assumption of the entire responsibility and desire to place one’s own personality and ideas in the foreground” (Stănculete, 2019b, p. 133), while the frequent use of *we* emphasizes the concept of a ‘team’; the latter considerably better matches the idea of democracy (Stănculete, 2019b). The author states that because Năstase mostly uses the personal pronoun *I*, he underscores that democracy does not have a particularly significant meaning for him, whereas, the personal pronoun which is most frequently used by Blair is *we*, which indicates that he is more than the Romanian Prime Minister connected with the concept of democracy and that he attempts to respect it via strengthening the idea of the ‘team’, i.e., his political party (the Labour Party), in which all the members are obliged to perform, and via treating himself as a part of this team. Via using *we* he also underlines that he acknowledges the democratic participation of the UK citizens in political life as they are also included in the meaning of *we* in certain statements he makes in his speech (Stănculete, 2019b).

Another proposition put forward by Chilton (2004) is “[p]olitical representations are sets of role-players and their relations” (p. 203). As he explains, political texts and talks regard “assuming, negotiating or imposing discourse ontologies” (Chilton, 2004, p. 203), which refers to the representations of existing people, places, objects, and so on, and the relations which appear among them (Chilton, 2004). The author states that this encompasses issues such as who does what to whom or what they did, what they might do, or what they will do; when and where this is done; and who or what brought about what. According to the author, it seems that language is naturally constructed in a way that enables one to communicate these types of representations via allowing one to attach semantic roles to expressions. Coherent language use makes it possible “to maintain continuities in which players ‘exist’ along with their roles” (Chilton, 2004, p. 203) via linguistic phenomena (e.g., anaphora) and conceptual abilities enabling it to search for and find concurrent reference across sentences. What is more, achieving coherence strongly depends on cognitive frames. Political discourse depends on specific types of presumptive frames (Chilton, 2004).

Another idea of Chilton (2004) is that “[p]olitical discourse draws on spatial cognition” (p. 203), although not exclusively, as he clarifies, but the issue of space is very significant. In terms of linguistics and cognitive science, the claim is concerned with the proof that metaphorical shifts, e.g., from *spatial* base domains are crucial in conceptualizing abstract domains (Chilton, 2004).

Moreover, “[p]olitical discourse involves metaphorical reasoning” (Chilton, 2004, p. 203). Chilton (2004) explains that cross-domain metaphorical mappings enable the drawing of inferences not possible to be drawn with the help of direct proof or direct experience. Metaphors in political discourse are frequently forms of reasoning, for instance, about policies and the future itself, and not merely linguistic ornamentations (Chilton, 2004).

The next idea put forward by Chilton (2004) is that “[s]patial metaphors make concepts of the group and identity available” (p. 204). He explains that there are such source domains initiating from spatial cognition that appear in political discourse numerous times, the path image schema and the container image schema being especially notable ones. While the former, due to its involvement in conceptualizing time and action, occurs in political discourse as a way of portraying plans, policies, the history of a nation as well as concepts such as ‘progress’, the latter is crucial for conceptualizing various groups of different sizes, for instance, families and states (Chilton, 2004, p. 204).

What is more, “[p]olitical discourse has specific connections to the emotional centres of the brain” (Chilton, 2004, p. 204). According to Chilton (2004), it is debatable whether there actually are *particular* emotions which could be treated as ‘political’, but there are certain “politically relevant feelings”; e.g., territorial identity, love for one’s family, or fear of trespassers. Emotions of this type may be inherent and may be triggered in an automatic manner when it comes to the using of language politically (Chilton, 2004, p. 204).

Last but not least, “[p]olitical discourse is anchored in multi-dimensional deixis” (Chilton, 2004, p. 204). Chilton (2004) states that it depends on the junction of certain cognitive deictic dimensions. He proposes the intersection of time, space, and modality but also underscores that the model actually needs to be multi-dimensional. For example, the space dimension consists of several forms, which are metaphorically extracted from each other. The most crucial claims are as follows: “discourse worlds require entities in it to be relativised to the self” (Chilton, 2004, p. 204), i.e., to the speaker, who, however, can identify themselves with the listener and the third parties. Furthermore, role-players present in the discourse world are in a ‘position’ which is rather close to the idea of ‘me’ or ‘us’. The self is at the junction which is not merely conceptualized as ‘here’ and ‘now’; it is also visualized as ‘right’ and ‘good’. As the author further explains, the claim provides an answer to the question about where

identity comes from. He states that the nervous system in people has inherent ways of creating the sense of personal identity, adding that, however, a part of this subjective experience of one's personal identity as well as presumably the whole experience of group identity rely on communication, which is considerably linguistic. Identity is revealed in discourse via locating other people on the axes regarding time, space, and rightness, which presumes "the centrality and fixity of the self" (Chilton, 2004, pp. 204-205).

Chilton's (2004) insights reflected in his above presented propositions are very interesting and practical guidelines for the investigation of the Brexit speeches in the third chapter, as his ideas on political discourse create a clear perception of this field, with a strong focus on the building of group identity.

Another crucial view is put forward by Stănculete (2019a), who states that political discourse is embodied via creating given reactions among the audience. She explains that as such, a discourse that is well-constructed is vital for the appropriate delivery of the message which is to be put across because the speaker can select the adequate words for building their discourse so that it is understandable and suitable in the context. This idea is undoubtedly essential when thinking of political discourse in terms of relevance theory as a politician who wants to cause a given reaction among their audience, for instance, among other politicians, when discussing the plans for dealing with a social issue, or among potential voters, needs to choose the right words in order for their discourse to be constructed in such a way that will allow the listeners to build a clear understanding of the message which the politician is transmitting and therefore perceive it as relevant. Depending on their personal views, the recipients may, however, agree or disagree with what the politician is saying.

## Conclusion

The areas outlined in this chapter, i.e., pragmatics, relevance theory, political discourse, and rhetoric can be perceived as connected, at least to a given extent. Pragmatics, especially relevance theory concerned with cognition, as well as political discourse and rhetoric are crucial areas with regard to the Brexit speeches investigated in Chapter 3.

## Chapter 3

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# An Analysis of Chosen Parliamentary Speeches on Brexit by British and German Politicians in the Context of Relevance Theory

The following chapter presents an analysis of chosen speeches on Brexit delivered by British and German politicians. The study is conducted in the context of relevance theory. It is preceded by a description of the research materials (the speeches), an outline of the methodology used to carry out the analysis, and a description of the purposes for this investigation.

### 3.1 Research Materials

The materials chosen for the analysis are transcripts of parliamentary speeches on Brexit retrieved from official British and German government websites, namely from *Hansard* and from *Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentsmaterialien (DIP)*, respectively, where the written versions of the speeches from parliamentary debates are stored. Fifty speeches were chosen in the case of each of the following British political parties: the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and fifty speeches each in the case of the following German parties: the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) (for convenience, however, these two parties are treated and referred to as one party in this book because they form one faction in the German parliament), the Social Democratic Party



of Germany (SPD), and the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Thus, a total of three hundred texts are investigated. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Conservative Party and the CDU and CSU are categorized as center-right parties, the Labour Party and the SPD as center-left parties, and the DUP and the AfD are right-wing parties, more specifically, the AfD is a far-right party.

Concerning the analysis of the speeches on the basis of the parties' political orientation, the speeches of Conservative Party members are compared with speeches by members of the CDU and CSU, the speeches of the Labour Party politicians are juxtaposed with those of the SPD, and the speeches of the DUP politicians are compared with speeches delivered by members of the AfD. The first four mentioned parties were chosen because these are and were the main British and German parties. The DUP and AfD were also chosen because, as parties on the right wing (the AfD being a far-right party), which have seats in the British and German parliaments, respectively, they presented a different discourse on Brexit in the sense that they supported Brexit, whereas in the case of the Conservative Party and Labour Party part of the politicians supported Brexit (although Labour Party members were rather against Brexit) and part of them were against it, and the CDU/CSU and SPD opposed Brexit. Thus, the right-wing rhetoric was characteristic in this sense.

The possibility of analyzing speeches by members of other parties was also explored, among others those of the Scottish National Party (center-left), the Liberal Democrats (center to center-left), or Die Linke (German: The Left, left-wing). However, as these parties are left-oriented, their stance on Brexit was negative, which was expressed in the speeches of their members. Thus, because the two main German parties also expressed their dissatisfaction with Brexit and the Labour Party in a significant extent as well and the Conservative Party partly supported and partly opposed Brexit, it was decided that the rhetoric of parties which unanimously support Brexit should also be analyzed in order to draw a clear distinction between pro- and anti-Brexit rhetoric, and thus, for this reason the speeches by DUP and AfD members were chosen, apart from the speeches delivered by the four other parties.

The analyzed speeches were delivered in the years 2016-2022. All of them were given starting with the period after the referendum on Brexit up until less than three years after the UK left the EU. Speeches from different years within this time span were selected, with the aim of enabling a proper representation

of Brexit speeches from this period. Moreover, speeches of different politicians from the mentioned political parties were chosen randomly. These choices allowed for a proper balance and objectivity in the research. It also needs to be stated, however, that many of the analyzed speeches were delivered in 2019 for the reason that the Brexit issue was very popular at that time. This was the period before Brexit was officially brought about (on Jan. 31, 2020). The high significance of the Brexit debate at the time is further underscored via the fact that this was the year when the Brexit Party was created in the UK (in April), i.e., the party whose very aim was to bring Brexit about. The party was launched by Nigel Farage after Theresa May and the EU had agreed to delay Brexit (Kellner, 2023).

The overall choice of speeches allowed to conduct a thorough analysis of the discourse of the politicians during a span of time which was crucial for the Brexit issue, i.e., the time directly after the referendum until a time in which certain implications of Brexit had become visible. The time span 2016-2022 shows how the Brexit topic had developed but also, on the other hand, presents considerable constancy of the politicians' opinions expressed on given issues.

The investigated texts encompass such speeches in which the topic of Brexit itself and the issues concerned with it are of primary concern (the Brexit-related issues are the Brexit referendum, the economic consequences of leaving the European Union, the future relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, etc.) as well as speeches, in which the topic of Brexit is intertwined with other issues, i.e., it does not then function as the main topic of a given speech, but its mentioning in that speech indicates the strong impact it had on the politicians and the matters they mention.

The analyzed transcripts may slightly differ from the original delivered speeches, i.e., language mistakes, etc., may have been corrected. The content (meaning), however, remains unchanged (UK Parliament, 2023; Deutscher Bundestag, n.d.). The minor differences, thus, do not inhibit the possibility of a proper analysis of the texts.

### 3.2 The Methods of Analysis

The study is conducted in the context of Sperber and Wilson's (1995) relevance theory. The program AntConc (version 3.5.9 for Windows from the year 2020) created by Laurence Anthony was used to carry out this analysis.

The speeches of different politicians from the chosen political groups are texts of different people, but the key for the analysis is the political orientation of the different parties. The speakers from a given party typically present a common stance on Brexit, regardless of the time (within the mentioned time span) when a speech was given. The unanimous stance of the politicians in a given party on the Brexit issue and on Brexit-related matters was visible via the opinions expressed, with the exception of Conservative Party members, part of whom were advocates and part of whom were opponents of Brexit and with the exception of Labour Party members, among whom some expressed a pro-Brexit position, although the stance towards Brexit was generally rather negative in the case of this party.

As stated above, the speeches selected for the analysis are taken from *Hansard* and from *DIP*. The texts were chosen with the help of search boxes on these websites, chiefly via the entering of the terms *Brexit*, *Brexit speeches*, or *Brexit-Reden* (when searching for the German speeches) into the boxes. In the case of transcripts from meetings of the German parliament, which are presented on the website in the form of PDF documents, mainly the search term *Brexit* was also entered into the search boxes directly in the documents, which allowed for a thorough search of the speeches in which Brexit was mentioned. Other search terms were lexemes such as *Austritt* (*leaving*), *Verbleib* (*remaining*), *Referendum* (*referendum*), and *Großbritannien* (*Great Britain*). The issue of the UK leaving the EU or remaining in it had been decisive for the conducting of the 2016 Brexit referendum, for which reason these lexemes also appeared in speeches regarding Brexit.

The speeches are analyzed via the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. The quantitative analysis is performed with the help of AntConc and Microsoft Excel, while the qualitative analysis also makes use of these tools and is further conducted with the help of relevance theory. As Kothari (1984) states, quantitative techniques are concerned with the use of symbols, numbers, and other such mathematical expressions.

Mullen (1995) explains that qualitative research is not concerned with a particular approach but rather indicates the development of a combination of interests and the shift towards variety of inquiry. Sherman and Reid (1994, as cited in Mullen, 1995) provide the following definition of qualitative research: “research that produces descriptive data based upon spoken or written words and observable behavior” (p. 1). In terms of this explanation, relevance theory can be depicted as a means of carrying out qualitative research. It allows for a comprehensive qualitative analysis of the investigated transcripts of the Brexit speeches, which are written texts of words that had been spoken. This, thus, further elaborates that this linguistic investigation is a type of qualitative research.

The next two subchapters provide a more detailed explanation of the use of AntConc and of relevance theory for the analysis.

### 3.3 AntConc

The program AntConc was created by Laurence Anthony, who works as a professor and as a coordinator of Technical English at the Center for English Language Education of the Faculty of Science and Engineering at Waseda University in Tokyo (Anthony, 2022). AntConc is a free corpus analysis program for text analysis. There are different versions of the program for given computer operating systems, e.g., Windows. Various tools are available in AntConc, which make it possible to study different aspects of a text or texts. Laurence Anthony also provides links to his films on the use of AntConc on his YouTube channel (Anthony, 2020).

As stated in the previous section, the version of the program used for the analysis of the speeches in the practical chapter is version 3.5.9 (year 2020) for the Windows operating system. The transcripts of the speeches are first uploaded as TXT files into the program with the help of the “select texts” option. The tools used for the analysis are Concordance and File View. The former allows to search for given words or phrases in one or more plain text files (TXT files) at a time by typing an appropriate search term into the “search term” box. After choosing the option “search results”, the frequency of the words or phrases appears and the highlighted results (the words or

phrases) are displayed in the context in which they occur in a given text or texts. After selecting one of the results, the particular text in which the word or phrase found via the search appears is shown in the File View tool and all of the words or phrases which were found via the search are marked in the text. Therefore, then a greater part of the context can be seen. Thus, the options make it possible to conduct both a statistical as well as a contextual, and hence, linguistic analysis of the texts. For these reasons AntConc was chosen for the investigation of the Brexit speeches. It allows to view many speeches simultaneously and therefore to investigate search terms in them, e.g., *Brexit*, and the context surrounding these terms. Apart from using AntConc to examine particular words, it is also applied to carry out the thematic analysis, i.e., to determine what themes occur in the speeches and what facts and opinions are presented. All of the speeches of a particular party are uploaded into the program simultaneously and the speeches are viewed, read, and investigated in the File View tool. Information concerning the topics along with fragments of the speeches in which these topics appear are noted in an MS Excel spreadsheet. The analysis of the topics allows to deduce which of the topics and the facts and opinions concerning them are mentioned by members of the same party or parties.

### 3.4 The Implementation of Relevance Theory

The analysis is based on Sperber and Wilson's (1996) relevance theory. Among other things, it draws on their claim that relevance is relevance to an individual. Thus, the level of relevance of a particular utterance in a given speech can vary from listener to listener, depending on their cognitive background. Therefore, the analysis conducted in this chapter is primarily based on the perspective which British (in the case of the British speeches) and German listeners (in the case of the German speeches) would most probably adopt.

In the context of relevance theory it needs to be noted that in order to understand what is being said about Brexit in all of the speeches, the listeners need to know about the phenomenon of Brexit itself, i.e., depending on the specific context, they need to be aware of the motivations for Brexit, the result of the referendum on Brexit, etc. They also need to know about aspects concerned with

other topics appearing in the speeches. This knowledge forms their cognitive environment, i.e., the assumptions that are yielded at the time when they hear specific utterances, which, depending on the level of this knowledge, allows them to interpret in a given way what the speakers say, and thus, to determine to what extent they themselves find this relevant. The knowledge of the English and German language also plays a crucial role in the interpretation process. This belongs to the recipients' cognitive environment as well. The language used can depend on certain cultural aspects, and therefore, on what is adequate for the listeners to understand what is said.

### 3.5 The Purpose of the Analysis

The investigation is concerned with what themes, facts, and views the politicians delivering the speeches present in them and with which linguistic means they do this. The linguistic elements which are analyzed are, e.g., metaphorical expressions or the way in which the audience is addressed.

The aim is to determine whether the politicians from two parties of the same type, e.g., the two center-left parties, present similar issues (themes, facts, and views) and use similar linguistic means in their speeches. On the other hand, the study is to portray if these aspects rather depend on whether the party by whose members specific speeches are given is a British or a German party. The research is also to indicate what mutual aspects of content and language appear in all of the speeches.

Speeches concerning the topic of Brexit were chosen for analysis because Brexit had a significant impact on the political sphere of the United Kingdom and the European Union as the theoretical background on this event in the first chapter and the investigation of the speeches indicate. The consequences of the UK's withdrawal from the EU can still be observed. The speeches by British politicians were chosen for analysis because Brexit affected the United Kingdom directly, as a phenomenon having taken place in the UK itself. The speeches by German politicians were selected in order to investigate how the topic was presented by an EU country which was also affected by Brexit, although in a different scope than the UK. The topic of Brexit was crucial in Germany, and thus, spoken about frequently by politicians there, which allows

for a thorough investigation of their speeches. What is more, another reason for choosing German speeches for the analysis is that Germany itself plays a leading role in the EU, which is also underscored in the different speeches.

### 3.6 An Analysis of Brexit-Related Terms and of Chosen Utterances in Which They Appear in the Speeches

The first part of the analysis was concerned with investigating four terms that were particularly significant for the topic of Brexit, and thus, appeared in the speeches. In the case of the British speeches these were *Brexit*, *referendum*, *leave*, and *remain*, while in the case of the German speeches these were *Brexit*, *Referendum*, *austreten*, and *bleiben*, i.e., German equivalents of the British words. These terms were also analyzed in their different grammatical forms. *Austreten* and *bleiben* were chosen for analysis as the equivalents of *leave* and *remain* because they are the typical translations of these two British words found in the speeches. In the case of *leave*, also equivalents such as *auscheiden* and *aussteigen* or their related forms were found, but these were only individual cases and as such had no significant impact on the overall results and conclusions of the study. In the case of *remain*, no other equivalents other than *bleiben* were identified.

The reason for choosing these particular lexemes are as follows: *Brexit*, as the name of the phenomenon of the UK's withdrawal from the EU, was chosen as a naturally occurring word in the speeches; *referendum* and *Referendum* were selected because it was the 2016 Brexit referendum that had led to the decision about the UK's exit from the EU, and therefore, the lexeme denoting this referendum was also used in the speeches; and the words *leave* and *remain*, which were vital in the Brexit referendum campaign, and their German equivalents, were, thus, also meaningful in the speeches.

The terms were analyzed with the help of AntConc. Fifty speeches at a time were uploaded into the program, i.e., speeches delivered by members of one of the parties. A given search term was entered into the AntConc search box and the results achieved in the search were saved with the help of the "Save Output" function as a plain text file (a TXT file) and copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet, where a statistical analysis was conducted. The particular steps of

this analysis are presented in the following part. Chosen utterances in which the investigated terms appear as well as other chosen fragments of the speeches are then analyzed in relevance-theoretical terms. At the end, all the AntConc results from the analysis of the total three hundred speeches are analyzed as a whole in the context of this theory.

### 3.6.1 Conservative Party

#### 3.6.1.1 *Brexit*

First, the speeches of members of the Conservative Party were uploaded into AntConc and *bre\** was entered as the search term<sup>1</sup>. It was not written simply as *brexit\** because in certain transcripts there were instances of words not written in the usual form, e.g., *Brexit* once appeared as *Bre[xit]*. Thus, the search for particular lexemes with the help of a search term consisting only of the first syllable or first letters of the lexeme and an asterisk helped to minimize the risk of an occurrence of this word being omitted from the search<sup>2</sup>. The search was also verified with the help of the search term *br\** (438 results were produced) and the search term *brex\** (135 occurrences appeared) to check if still any other ways of writing *Brexit* appeared, but they did not. A search with *brex\**, which contained fewer letters, naturally yielded fewer results, which allowed to verify the first search with *bre\** in a more simple way.

The search with *bre\** yielded 158 results, which were then copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet. Words other than *Brexit* or not related to *Brexit*, i.e., in this case words other than *Brexit*er, were manually omitted from the results. Moreover, it was checked if all the utterances with *Brexit* belong to the actual speaker, as other members intervened by asking questions or making comments during the speeches. Thus, each of the speeches were read in the File View tool

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<sup>1</sup> By default using the asterisk in AntConc searches indicates that not only one particular word or one particular form of a word is to be searched for but all words that, e.g., begin with given letters or end with given letters, depending on which part of the search term the asterisk is inserted.

<sup>2</sup> This was crucial especially in the case of the German speech transcripts as they had been written in such a format, in which part of a word was frequently written in one line and the second part of it in the next line of the text.



in AntConc, which allowed to deduce whether *Brexit* was used by the politician giving the speech. Any occurrences of *Brexit*, i.e., in questions or comments of other members were not taken into consideration. Occurrences of *Brexit* or of the other analyzed Brexit-related terms which appeared in quotes by other people and were used by the speakers in their own speeches were investigated, however, as they were embedded in the actual speeches. This was the case, for instance, with Paul Scully’s speech. Nevertheless, occurrences of the terms appearing in headings of different parts of certain speeches or in introductions by the person chairing the debate were not considered.

After the omission of the irrelevant results, a total of 129 occurrences were left. As verified with another AntConc search with the term *brexiteer\**, the word *Brexiteer* itself appeared 3 times among the 129 occurrences (2.33%), out of which once in the plural form *Brexiteers*. This term referred to those who supported Brexit (Cambridge Dictionary, 2023). The singular form *Brexiteer* appeared in Bob Seely’s speech and Liam Fox’s speech, while the plural form *Brexiteers* occurred in Andrea Jenkyns’s speech. The 126 remaining occurrences were occurrences of *Brexit* (97.67%).

In MS Excel it was counted how frequently the words *Brexit*, *Brexiteer*, and *Brexiteers* appeared in the case of a given speech. The number of occurrences in the case of each speech is presented in the table below, where it is also displayed in the form of percents (the number of occurrences in a specific speech was divided by the total number of 129 occurrences and multiplied by 100%). “House of Parliament” refers to the chamber of Parliament to which the politician (“Speaker”) who gave the speech belonged at the time of giving the speech at that particular House. The name of the given House is shortened to “Commons” (House of Commons) or “Lords” (House of Lords).

Table 1: The Frequency of *Brexit* and *Brexiteer\** in Conservative Party Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Andrea Jenkyns	Jan. 14, 2019	10	7.75	Commons
Anne Main	Mar. 29, 2019	4	3.10	Commons
Ben Bradley	Jan. 14, 2019	6	4.65	Commons
Bob Seely	Apr. 3, 2019	6	4.65	Commons

Table 1 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Boris Johnson	Oct. 19, 2019	8	6.20	Commons
Boris Johnson	Dec. 30, 2020	5	3.88	Commons
Crispin Blunt	June 26, 2017	1	0.78	Commons
David Hunt	Dec. 6, 2018	7	5.43	Lords
Dominic Grieve	Apr. 1, 2019	1	0.78	Commons
Dominic Grieve	Mar. 29, 2019	3	2.33	Commons
Dominic Raab	Mar. 29, 2019	5	3.88	Commons
Edward Leigh	Apr. 1, 2019	2	1.55	Commons
Ian Lang	Jan. 25, 2018	4	3.10	Lords
Ian Duncan	Jan. 25, 2018	2	1.55	Lords
John Gardiner	Oct. 20, 2016	1	0.78	Lords
John Redwood	Mar. 29, 2019	1	0.78	Commons
Liam Fox	Jan. 11, 2021	3	2.33	Commons
Liam Fox	May 20, 2020	1	0.78	Commons
Mark McInnes	Jan. 25, 2018	14	10.85	Lords
Martin Callanan	Jan. 13, 2020	1	0.78	Lords
Martin Vickers	Apr. 3, 2019	1	0.78	Commons
Michael Gove	Feb. 27, 2020	1	0.78	Commons
Paul Scully	Jan. 14, 2019	16	12.40	Commons
Philip Hammond	Nov. 22, 2017	2	1.55	Commons
Ranbir Singh Suri	Jan. 25, 2018	3	2.33	Lords
Robin Hodgson	Dec. 5, 2018	1	0.78	Lords
Suella Fernandes	June 26, 2017	3	2.33	Commons
Susan Williams	Mar. 11, 2022	3	2.33	Lords
Theresa May	Mar. 29, 2019	13	10.08	Commons
William Cash	Mar. 29, 2019	1	0.78	Commons
Total		129	100.00	

\* including the plural form

The frequent use of the word *Brexit* by part of the speakers may indicate that they wanted to underscore the significance of Brexit itself. For instance, Andrea Jenkyns (Jan. 14, 2019) used the word *Brexit* nine times and also the word *Brexit* once. *Brexit* appears in different parts throughout her speech, which signals that she is strongly focused on the matter of leaving the EU.

In the following fragment of her speech, Jenkyns argues that the UK should leave the EU on WTO terms, instead of according to the terms which Prime Minister Theresa May had negotiated with the EU:

*Leaving on WTO terms should not panic the UK. There are positives to leaving under such a deal when compared with the Prime Minister's disastrous deal. If we want to take back control of our money, our laws and our borders, keep our £39 billion and trade freely with the rest of the world, a clean WTO Brexit will achieve that. Some in this place have warned that negotiating a new free trade agreement with third parties will be more difficult and we will not be able to achieve such good terms as those negotiated through the European Union, but I believe that argument is flawed.*

The use of *panic* in *Leaving on WTO terms should not panic the UK* signals that, according to Jenkyns, WTO terms are an optimal option for leaving the EU, which should not cause fear among the other politicians or the people in the UK in general. Because other politicians indicated their scepticism towards leaving on WTO terms with a so-called “no-deal Brexit” or “hard Brexit”, Jenkyns refers to their cognitive environment concerning this scepticism, indicating that she herself is aware of their stance towards this option.

She further states that there are advantages of leaving on WTO terms instead of according to May's *disastrous deal*. The adjective *disastrous* adds emotionality to her words, which underscores Jenkyn's negative stance towards that deal. Thus, this should maximize the relevance of her utterance to her target listeners (as well as to everyone who knows English and who is aware of certain details of the Brexit situation), who are other members of Parliament and probably other British citizens listening to the debate via mass media, i.e., they should clearly understand that Jenkyns is very strongly against the deal. Jenkyns, thus, implicates that her listeners should not agree

to this deal either, especially the other politicians who will need to vote for or against the deal.

The politician also states that *a clean WTO Brexit* will make it possible *to take back control* of the UK's money, laws, and borders, which, as she implies, were otherwise under the control of the EU and which would remain under EU control if the Prime Minister's deal was accepted. The phrase *a clean WTO Brexit* indicates Jenkyn's stance that a clean, or hard, Brexit which allows the UK to leave the EU along with leaving the EU's single market and customs union (Macmillan Dictionary, 2023) will be possible thanks to WTO terms. She, thus, draws on her listeners' cognitive background, indicating that she is aware that they know what the meaning of a clean Brexit is, i.e., that it is concerned with leaving on WTO terms. Using the phrase *can*, thus, also add to the relevance of what she is communicating. If she had used the phrase *leaving on WTO terms* instead of *a clean WTO Brexit*, she might not have indicated as clearly that it is a clean Brexit that is possible thanks to such terms. She underscores that this is the form of Brexit that she supports. Thus, her listeners, assuming that they believe what she is saying, should find this opinion relevant, especially those who themselves think that this is the way in which the UK should leave the EU.

Jenkyns also underscores the aspect of *free trade* with other countries which a WTO Brexit would make possible. Again, she indicates that she is a supporter of free trade. She also states that she does not agree with the argument of those *who have warned that negotiating a new free trade agreement with third parties* would not allow to achieve terms as good as those negotiated via the EU. She then supports this by stating:

*We all know that the EU is cumbersome; it is over-bureaucratic and full of red tape. For free trade agreements to be signed off in the EU they must be approved by every member state, so the economies and priorities of 27 nations, including individual regions, must be considered.*

She, thus, explicitly refers to the fact that, according to her, she and her listeners are aware that the EU is cumbersome, which can mean in this context that its actions are complicated and not fast and effective enough. Jenkyns emphasizes this opinion by criticizing the large amount of bureaucracy with

which she believes the EU is concerned, implying that this bureaucracy is the reason for the EU's considerable lack of effectiveness.

The use of the personal pronoun *we* indicates collectivity; its signals that Jenkyns identifies herself with her country and citizens. This is especially clear in utterances like the following:

*When negotiating our own free trade deals, we can be proactive and seek out opportunities. We can be flexible while the EU is rigid. We can be fast and nimble while the EU is slow and cumbersome. The UK will be free and liberated to sign free trade agreements with the exciting economies of tomorrow.*

Jenkyns additionally emphasizes the meaning of *we* via repetition and the use of the modal verb *can* in the phrase *we can be*, with the help of which she shows her determination and her strong support for the UK to be able to sign free trade agreements with other countries, which can help develop the UK's economy. The use of *we* and *can* and the repetition of *we can be* function as stylistic devices that optimize the relevance of Jenkyn's utterance, as they should yield the cognitive effect among her listeners that she strongly believes in the UK's potential to develop economically via signing free trade deals with other countries.

In the following fragment, Jenkyns uses the word *Brexit* four times:

*My constituents know best: they know how best to run their lives and spend their money, and they know what is best for their country. They voted for Brexit, and Brexit must prevail, be that under a WTO Brexit or under a better deal than that agreed by the Prime Minister. My constituency, the Yorkshire and the Humber region and the country voted to leave the EU. We need to leave the European Union and its institutions and take advantage of the opportunities that Brexit can deliver.*

She begins with asserting that her constituents are aware how to take care of their own lives in the best possible way and how to spend their money and that they know what is the best for their country. In this way she explicitly praises

her constituents, which serves as a type of introduction to what she says next, i.e., that they voted for Brexit and that Brexit must be delivered, which can be deduced from the preceding fragment of her speech, in which she says that the British people decided to leave and that *their decision must be upheld*. Thus, in this way she is stating that the result of the Brexit referendum conducted in 2016 must be honored, which is an idea which appeared in many of the other investigated speeches. Via the use of repetition in *They voted for Brexit, and Brexit must prevail* and via the use of the modal verb *must*, she emphasizes the significance of delivering Brexit, according to what the majority of the citizens had voted for. These linguistic elements, i.e., repetition and the use of the modal verb, similarly as in the case of the previously cited fragment, serve the maximization of the relevance of what Jenkyns says, as they underscore her strong opinion that Brexit needs to be delivered. Jenkyns also again mentions leaving the EU on WTO terms and the deal negotiated by Theresa May. Repeating her opinion in this fragment also optimizes the relevance of her message, as she again underscores that she is against May's deal and that she supports the possibility of a WTO Brexit. It should also be noted that she implies that WTO terms are not the only Brexit option which she supports, but that she would also support leaving on a better deal than the one negotiated by Theresa May.

At the end of the fragment, Jenkyns states explicitly that the UK needs to leave the EU and its institutions and take advantage of Brexit opportunities. This way the implicature can be formed that, according to Jenkyns, Brexit brings opportunities. This again is a topic which is mentioned in different speeches by politicians who support leaving the EU.

The sheer fact that topics such as the need to honor the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum and the opinion that Brexit brings opportunities is repeated in different speeches serves the optimization of the relevance of the utterances concerning these topics. It can be stated that every politician who underscores the importance of these issues maximizes the relevance of the fact that previous politicians who mentioned this before them had also stated these opinions. At least a person who has heard the previous utterances (and who believes what the politicians are saying) should experience the contextual effect that these are highly significant aspects that the politicians aim to highlight.

### 3.6.1.2 Referendum

The next term searched for in AntConc in the Conservative Party speeches was *referen\**, which allowed to search for *referendum* and related words or other forms in which *referendum*, etc. could appear in the given speech transcript. A total of 91 occurrences were displayed. The results were copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet. Words other than *referendum* or *referendums* (no other words related with *referendum* appeared) were not taken into consideration as well as occurrences of *referendum* which were not said by the politician giving the speech but by other members of Parliament speaking in between parts of the actual speech by making comments or asking questions. Two other searches were conducted, one with the search term *refer\** which presented 105 occurrences and one with the search term *re\** which provided 1486 results. This also allowed to search not only for occurrences of *referendum* and words or forms related to it but also for occurrences of *remain* which is analyzed later in this chapter. The purpose of the two extra searches was to check if other searches of *referendum* and related forms had not been omitted in the first search. However, no other occurrences of *referendum* written in a different form were found.

After the deletion of words other than *referendum* or words related to *referendum*, it was found that there were a total of 83 occurrences of *referendum* (81 hits) and *referendums* (2 hits). The singular form *referendum* constituted 97.59% and the plural form *referendums* 2.41% of all the occurrences. As the calculations in Excel indicate, in 65.06% (54 out of 83) of the cases, *referendum(s)* was used to refer to the 2016 Brexit referendum, whereas in the other 39.94% (29 out of 83) of the cases it was used to talk about other situations, e.g., a possible second referendum on Brexit, which some politicians or British citizens had advocated for in order, e.g., to repeat the referendum in the belief that the result in 2016 had not been based on facts. In other cases the word *referendum* was used to talk about a possible Scottish independence referendum concerning the leaving of the United Kingdom by Scotland, e.g., as a consequence of the result of the Brexit referendum for the reason that a large majority of Scottish citizens had voted for the UK to remain a member of the European Union. In one case, i.e., in Andrew Mitchell's speech, in which the plural form *referendums* was used, it referred to both the EU referendum which took place in 2016 and to a second referendum concerned with leaving the EU, which he strongly opposed. *Referendums* also

appeared in Ben Bradley's speech. The tables below illustrates the statistical results achieved in MS Excel regarding the use of the words *referendum* and *referendums* by each speaker who used them with regard to the 2016 Brexit referendum. As stated above, there were 54 occurrences of this use in total.

Table 2: The Frequency of *Referendum* in Conservative Party Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Andrea Jenkyns	Jan. 14, 2019	2	3.70	Commons
Andrew Mitchell	Mar. 29, 2019	1	1.85	Commons
Antoinette Sandbach	Apr. 3, 2019	1	1.85	Commons
Ben Bradley	Jan. 14, 2019	2	3.70	Commons
Bernard Jenkin	Dec. 30, 2020	1	1.85	Commons
Bob Seely	Apr. 3, 2019	1	1.85	Commons
Boris Johnson	Oct. 19, 2019	2	3.70	Commons
Chris Patten	Apr. 18, 2018	1	1.85	Lords
Crispin Blunt	June 26, 2017	2	3.70	Commons
David Cameron	June 29, 2016	1	1.85	Commons
David Cameron	June 27, 2016	4	7.41	Commons
David Hunt	Dec. 6, 2018	3	5.56	Lords
David Morris	Jan. 11, 2021	1	1.85	Commons
Dominic Grieve	Apr. 1, 2019	1	1.85	Commons
Gavin Barwell	Jan. 13, 2020	1	1.85	Lords
Ian Duncan	Jan. 25, 2018	2	3.70	Lords
John Baron	Apr. 3, 2019	1	1.85	Commons
John Gardiner	Oct. 20, 2016	2	3.70	Lords
John Redwood	May 20, 2020	1	1.85	Commons
Liam Fox	Dec. 30, 2020	1	1.85	Commons
Martin Callanan	Jan. 13, 2020	1	1.85	Lords
Martin Vickers	Apr. 3, 2019	2	3.70	Commons
Paul Scully	Jan. 14, 2019	10	18.52	Commons
Peter Bottomley	Dec. 30, 2020	2	3.70	Commons
Theresa May	Mar. 29, 2019	5	9.26	Commons
William Cash	Mar. 29, 2019	3	5.56	Commons
Total		54	100.00	



It is worth discussing the above mentioned use of the word *referendums* by Andrew Mitchell. He states:

*Equally, I think that the House massively underestimates the dangers of advancing towards a second referendum. The anger, irritation and annoyance of our constituents will be palpable, and in my judgment, it would be very likely to solve nothing at all. Imagine the nightmare of the country reversing the earlier vote and voting 48:52 to remain. What would that mean for our democracy? What would that mean for the votes of the people in both those referendums? For this House to advance down the route of another referendum would in my view be a very serious mistake indeed. However, if the Government cannot do a deal that the House of Commons will accept, and if the House of Commons cannot come to an agreement in the way that I have described, the ineluctable logic of that position is that it will have to be referred again to the British people, and in my view that would be an absolute disaster.*

The rhetorical questions which Mitchell poses serve the optimization of relevance by producing the contextual implication that conducting a second referendum would be highly undemocratic. This is further underscored via the use of the metaphor *advance down the route of another referendum*. The metaphor with *nightmare* produces the implicature that if the voters chose the option of remaining in the EU in a second referendum, the British citizens would perceive this as a very negative phenomenon. Actually this would rather be the stance of those opting to leave, which is probably weakly implied here, as those who would vote for the UK to remain in the EU would presumably be satisfied with a result that would indicate this is the preferred option. Therefore, the implicature can be derived that Mitchell takes the side of those who had voted to leave because this was the option that the majority of the voters had chosen in the 2016 referendum. The politician also indirectly criticizes those in the House who do not see the danger which a second referendum would bring. This is an implicature derived from *I think that the House massively underestimates the dangers of advancing towards a second referendum*. He continues by saying *The anger, irritation and annoyance of our constituents will be palpable, and in my judgment, it would be very likely to*

*solve nothing at all*, which produces the bridging implicature<sup>3</sup> that the danger of a second referendum lies in the fact that the British constituents would be very angry and frustrated, should there actually be a second referendum on Brexit.

Mitchell also implicitly criticizes the government for not being able to overcome difficulties with agreeing on a deal with the EU that would be appropriate for the UK. In his speech he also mentions the need for compromise, and thus, that the House should vote for Prime Minister Theresa May's deal, although he does not believe it is a considerably good agreement. Thus, he calls the House of Commons to *come to an agreement* and, as it can be interpreted, to vote for the deal because, otherwise, as he implies, the decision *will have to be referred again to the British people* (i.e., a second referendum would have to be conducted), which he believes *would be an absolute disaster*, which he makes explicit.

It is worth mentioning that Mitchell uses a combination of formal and informal language. The last utterance of the fragment itself is an example of this because in this utterance Mitchell uses the formal word *ineluctable* and the more informal word *disaster*. An example of formal language is also the word *advance* in this context, whereas an instance of informal language is the use of the metaphor *nightmare*. The use of formal and informal language serves as a stylistic device which makes the language more vivid, and therefore, adds to the emotionality of Mitchell's speech, which should serve the maximization of relevance among the listeners as it is aimed at focusing their attention more strongly on what he is saying.

It should also be noted that in the analyzed fragment the politician is signaling via implicature that he cares for the citizens of his country, and thus, wants the best possible option for the UK. For this reason he puts forward his arguments with strong determination. The idea of taking care of citizens appears in the speeches of all the parties, which is, thus, a crucial mutual element of these speeches.

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<sup>3</sup> A bridging implicature is a type of implicature needed to determine "the reference of a referring expression in a following utterance" (Blakemore, 1992, p. 127). Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain that the notion *bridging implicature* was put forward by Herb Clark and his co-workers, e.g., in Clark (1977), Clark and Haviland (1977), and Clark and Marshall (1981). Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain that they themselves also make use of this notion in their relevance-theoretic account.

Another interesting fragment from Mitchell's speech is:

*I find myself in a minority in the House of Commons. I think the House overstates the dangers of no deal. I do not believe there is such a thing as no deal. I think that, were we to leave with what is called no deal, there will be a whole series of smaller deals, some temporary and some more permanent, and some stops, so I do not worry as much as many of my colleagues do about the dangers of no deal.*

Mitchell indicates that he is not against a possible no-deal option between the UK and the EU after Brexit, which was also the view put forward by Andrea Jenkyns, whose speech was investigated earlier and who actually advocated strong support for such an option. In this fragment Mitchell mentions the aspect of dangers as in the case of the previously cited fragment. However, in the case of this fragment he explicitly states that he does not believe that there actually is such an option as no deal because even leaving with a so-called no deal will lead to many smaller deals. Thus, he further implies that he does not particularly believe in the danger of a no-deal option.

It should be noted that Mitchell uses the first person personal pronoun *I*, in which way he speaks about his own opinion that may not be shared by other politicians in the House. He emphasizes this by stating *I find myself in a minority in the House of Commons*. This itself hints that the Conservative Party was not unanimous on Brexit issues, which is a fact that can be formed as an assumption as part of the cognitive environment of Mitchell's listeners when they hear this utterance. If the Conservative Party agreed on all Brexit issues, Mitchell would have probably used the personal pronoun *we* when expressing his opinions and would not have stated that he is in a minority.

The following fragment in his speech also deserves consideration:

*I do not like the deal. I have concluded that it is the least worst option. I am particularly worried about the backstop, but above all the central point that I am worried about, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood) mentioned, is that the way that we have gone about this has breached the fundamental rule, which certainly applied when I used to go to ministerial meetings in*

*Brussels, that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. It is the failure to endorse that cardinal principle of negotiating with the EU that has let us down so badly.*

In this fragment Mitchell states that it is an EU principle *that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed*. This rule is also mentioned in German speeches, which indicates another mutual characteristic of the British and German speeches. Mitchell underscores that because this rule had not been upheld, this caused considerable problems for the UK in the negotiations with the EU. Again, the utterance in which he expresses this combines both formal and informal language. *Endorse that cardinal principle* is a formal expression, whereas *let us down so badly* is informal. This, like the examples from the first cited fragment, makes Mitchell's language more vivid and emotional, which serves the optimization of relevance. In this utterance he uses the personal pronoun *us*, in which case, as opposed to the case in the other cited fragments, he speaks collectively of himself and of a group to which he refers, which can be interpreted as the whole UK or as the UK government. He also implies that not applying to the mentioned EU principle was a failure of the UK government.

In this fragment Mitchell also expresses the explicature that he does not like the deal negotiated with the EU by the Prime Minister Theresa May and that he is worried about the Irish backstop. As Wallenfeldt (n.d.a.) explains, the Irish backstop was to help keep an open border between Ireland (an EU member state) and Northern Ireland after Brexit. This meant that there would be a customs arrangement between Northern Ireland and the EU if the UK and the EU were not able to "reach a long-term agreement by December 2020" (Wallenfeldt, n.d.a). However, those who were against the backstop put forward the argument that it could cause regulatory barriers between Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Wallenfeldt, n.d.a). Thus, Mitchell presents himself as an opponent of the backstop, this way drawing on the listeners' cognitive environment that they are aware of the fact that the backstop could come into being. He expresses the implicature that this backstop would cause problems for the UK. The backstop was to protect the Good Friday agreement (Wallenfeldt, n.d.a), a type of peace agreement signed between Ireland and Northern Ireland on Good Friday in 1998 (BBC, n.d.; Wallenfeldt, n.d.b).

Another linguistic element which should be noted is the use of the phrase *my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood)*, which is a typical way of referring to a member of Parliament who belongs to the same party as the speaker (i.e., referring to that member by calling him a *Friend*), as it is an expression of the dignity of the House and respect shown towards the Chair of the debate and makes comments and criticism less direct (UK Parliament, 2010). The name of the member, in this case *John Redwood*, is added by Hansard in the transcript and is, thus, not part of the actual speech (as can be deduced on the basis of the information in UK Parliament, 2010). Therefore, by calling John Redwood by his title and not by his name, Mitchell applies by a parliamentary rule and this way the context, i.e., the cognitive environment for the listeners is formed, who are aware or may become aware on hearing this way of referring to a member of the House by another member of the House that this is the proper way to mention other members in the British Parliament. Listeners who do not know this may become aware of it after hearing such forms of referring to members of the House several times. Then, they will automatically accept this as relevant.

### 3.6.1.3 *Leave*

The search term *leav*\* was entered into AntConc, which allowed to look for the word *leave*<sup>4</sup> and its related forms. This word, along with *remain*, was crucial in the Brexit referendum campaign. The AntConc search resulted in 208 occurrences, which were then copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet and out of which 197 results of *leave(s)* and *leaving* were left after parts with utterances by other intervening members of Parliament were deleted. Excel calculations indicated that 172 occurrences out of the 197 (87.31%) were used in the sense of the UK leaving the EU and that 25 of the occurrences (12.69%) were used in a different sense. Thus, *leave* in the appropriate form appeared considerably more frequently in the sense of the UK leaving the EU than in a different context. This underscores the crucialness of the Brexit debate.

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<sup>4</sup> Another study conducted on the use of *leave* and *remain* in the Brexit context in British political speeches can be found in Kubicha (2022).

Another AntConc search was conducted with the search term *left\** in order to find instances of the past tense form of *leave*. The analysis of the results indicated that *left* had been used 16 times in total in the investigated speeches. No other forms related to *left* had been used. The word was used 3 times by other politicians who intervened while the speakers were giving their speeches, and thus, these examples were deleted in the MS Excel spreadsheet, into which the results of the search had been copied. Therefore, 13 instances of the use of *left* were taken into account. 53.85% (7 out of 13 occurrences) of the time, the word was used in the sense of the UK leaving the EU, and in the case of 46.15% (6 out of 13) of the occurrences, it was used in a different sense, i.e., with a different meaning. All in all, there were a total of 179 out of 210 (85.24%) instances of *leave* (in the appropriate form) and *left* referring to the UK leaving the EU. The occurrences which had a different meaning amounted only to 31 out of 210 (14.76%). The following table shows how frequently, also in percent form, the word *leave* in the appropriate form was used in the sense of the UK leaving the EU in the particular speeches in relation to the overall number of the 179 occurrences.

Table 3: The Frequency of *Leave* in Conservative Party Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Andrea Jenkyns	Jan. 14, 2019	11	6.15	Commons
Andrew Mitchell	Mar. 29, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Antoinette Sandbach	Apr. 3, 2019	4	2.23	Commons
Ben Bradley	Jan. 14, 2019	29	16.20	Commons
Bernard Jenkin	Dec. 30, 2020	2	1.12	Commons
Bob Seely	Apr. 3, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Boris Johnson	Oct. 19, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Boris Johnson	Dec. 30, 2020	3	1.68	Commons
Chris Patten	Apr. 18, 2018	2	1.12	Lords
Crispin Blunt	June 26, 2017	3	1.68	Commons
David Cameron	June 29, 2016	9	5.03	Commons
David Cameron	June 27, 2016	6	3.35	Commons
David Morris	Jan. 11, 2021	3	1.68	Commons
Dominic Grieve	Apr. 1, 2019	4	2.23	Commons

Table 3 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Dominic Grieve	Mar. 29, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Edward Leigh	Apr. 1, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Gavin Barwell	Jan. 13, 2020	4	2.23	Lords
John Baron	Apr. 3, 2019	4	2.23	Commons
John Gardiner	Oct. 20, 2016	3	1.68	Lords
John Redwood	Mar. 29, 2019	2	1.12	Commons
John Redwood	May 20, 2020	3	1.68	Commons
Liam Fox	Jan. 11, 2021	1	0.56	Commons
Liam Fox	Dec. 30, 2020	4	2.23	Commons
Mark McInnes	Jan. 25, 2018	6	3.35	Lords
Martin Callanan	Jan. 13, 2020	1	0.56	Lords
Martin Vickers	Apr. 3, 2019	8	4.47	Commons
Michael Gove	Feb. 27, 2020	1	0.56	Commons
Paul Scully	Jan. 14, 2019	32	17.88	Commons
Stephen Barclay	Apr. 3, 2019	1	0.56	Commons
Theresa May	Oct. 23, 2017	4	2.23	Commons
Theresa May	Oct. 9, 2017	7	3.91	Commons
Theresa May	Mar. 29, 2019	15	8.38	Commons
William Cash	Mar. 29, 2019	2	1.12	Commons
Total		179	100.00	

Paul Scully uses the word *leave* four times in the following fragment:

*The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party basically want to pretend this never happened. They just want to unpick the referendum. For various reasons, they want not to leave the UK. At least that is an honest position. The Lib Dems write things like “Let’s have a people’s vote,” followed by “#ExitFromBrexit”. That clearly demonstrates the angle they come at this from. I have yet to meet someone who voted to leave and still intends to leave who says, “I tell you what, before we do, shall we just test the water by having a second referendum?”.*

At the beginning of this fragment the politician criticizes two opposition parties in the UK parliament, namely the Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party (SNP), blaming them in a rather ironic manner for not honoring the result of the 2016 referendum and wanting a second referendum on Brexit, which he conveys as an implicature. Scully himself strongly objects to a second referendum, similarly as Andrew Mitchell.

The following part of the fragment *The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party basically want to pretend this never happened. They just want to unpick the referendum* contains a type of bridging implicature as the meaning of the first utterance *The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National party basically want to pretend this never happened* becomes clearer after the second utterance is heard, i.e., *They just want to unpick the referendum*. In the latter Scully states rather metaphorically that the Liberal Democrats and the SNP want to *unpick* the referendum that resulted in a majority of votes for the option to leave. *Unpick* also functions as an informal word, which adds emotionality to the utterance, thus potentially focusing the listeners' attention more on what he is saying and this way optimizing the relevance of his message.

Scully further criticizes the two parties via irony<sup>5</sup> by using a quotation in: *I have yet to meet someone who voted to leave and still intends to leave who says, "I tell you what, before we do, shall we just test the water by having a second referendum?"*. It, thus, can be treated as an echoic use, as it is called by Sperber and Wilson (1995), as the speaker indicates that there is no person who voted to leave in the referendum and still wants to leave and who concurrently would be advocating a second referendum. He, thus, "echoes" the opinion which he attributes to the Liberal Democrats who think that conducting a second referendum would be a proper action to take and indicates his negative attitude towards this opinion<sup>6</sup>. Thus, the implicated conclusion can be derived that

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<sup>5</sup> Sperber and Wilson (1995) present ironic utterances as a type of echoic utterances. They believe that verbal irony is concerned with expressing an attitude implicitly and that an ironical utterance's relevance at least partially depends on the information which it communicates about the attitude of the speaker to the echoed opinion.

<sup>6</sup> Sperber and Wilson (1995) explain that an echoic utterance is an utterance which achieves relevance because the speaker who states it expresses their attitude towards someone else's thought via their own interpretation of that thought. As such this is a second-degree interpretation (Sperber & Wilson, 1995).



a second referendum from Scully's point of view is not an idea which should be considered as it would be against the democratic will of the people who had voted to leave in the first referendum. In another utterance he states in a more explicit way that he does not believe a second referendum would bring a good solution; he says: *A second referendum is unlikely to resolve anything.*

Scully, as opposed to Mitchell and Jenkyns does not support leaving without a deal on WTO terms. He states:

*Some people describe leaving with no deal as leaving on World Trade Organisation terms. As I was preparing for the debate, I had a Twitter chat with a constituent, who said, "Well, it's not no deal; it's WTO arrangements." That is fine—people can call it what they want—but WTO arrangements do not cover non-trade issues. The WTO is only about trade; the withdrawal agreement goes so much further than that. I would be comfortable leaving with no deal if we were properly prepared, and we had done everything we could to have as orderly a departure as possible. As I said, I believe the withdrawal agreement, although it is not perfect, allows us to do that.*

Thus, Scully mentions that a constituent stated that leaving with a so-called "no deal" is not actually a lack of deal, but that it means leaving on WTO terms, which is similar to the opinion expressed by Mitchell in his speech that leaving with no deal would actually mean leaving on terms concerned with different smaller deals. Scully underscores that WTO arrangements, however, are not concerned with issues other than trade, as opposed to PM Theresa May's withdrawal deal negotiated with the EU, which does also encompass issues apart from trade. Therefore, he implies that he would not be satisfied with a relationship between the UK and the EU which would be concerned only with trade matters, believing that a relationship with the EU in areas other than only trade would be beneficial for the UK. Moreover, Scully's utterance *I would be comfortable leaving with no deal if we were properly prepared, and we had done everything we could to have as orderly a departure as possible* entails<sup>7</sup> the proposition that the UK is not properly prepared to leave the EU with no deal.

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<sup>7</sup> More on entailment can be found, e.g., in Blakemore (1992) and Sperber and Wilson (1995).

It should be noted that in Scully's speech, all the four lexemes, i.e., *Brexit*, *referendum*, *leave*, and *remain*, were used more frequently than in any other speech by another politician from the Conservative Party. This is largely due to the fact that Scully gave a long speech with about 3280 words in which he cited what constituents wrote in their petitions concerning leaving the EU or remaining in it. The investigated lexemes frequently appeared in those citations.

#### 3.6.1.4 *Remain*

The next lexeme which was searched for was *remain*. Thus, the search term *remain*\* was investigated in AntConc, which provided 68 occurrences of the term *remain* and forms and words related to it, namely *remaining*, *remainer*, *remains*, and *remainder* (which was not concerned with remaining in the EU). The results were copied into an Excel spreadsheet. The occurrences in utterances of other members who intervened during the actual speeches were not considered, and thus, 62 occurrences were left. The search with *re*\* mentioned above in the subsection concerning the lexeme *referendum*, did not yield any other occurrences of *remain* or its related forms, apart from the ones found in the search with *remain*\*.

The results indicate that the word *leave* (in the appropriate form, e.g., *leave*, *leaving*, and *left*) was used considerably more often than the word *remain* and its related forms. As indicated in the earlier subsection, in the sense of leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom, *leave* in its different forms occurred 179 out of 210 times (85.24%), while in a different sense, the lexeme was used 31 out of 210 times (14.76%).

*Remain* (18 times), *remaining* (once), and *remainer* (twice), on the other hand, appeared only 21 out of 62 times, i.e., 33.87% of the time, in the context of the UK remaining in the EU, whereas in a different context these forms as well as *remains* and *remainder* were used 41 out of 62 times, amounting to 66.13%. The table below shows the frequency (in percent form) of the occurrence of *remain* (in given forms) and *remainer* in the context of the UK remaining in the EU (out of 21).

Table 4: The Frequency of *Remain* and *Remainer* in Conservative Party Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Andrew Mitchell	Mar. 29, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Anne Main	Mar. 29, 2019	4	19.05	Commons
Antoinette Sandbach	Apr. 3, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Ben Bradley	Jan. 14, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Bob Seely	Apr. 3, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Dominic Grieve	Mar. 29, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
John Redwood	Mar. 29, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Mark McInnes	Jan. 25, 2018	3	14.29	Lords
Martin Vickers	Apr. 3, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Paul Scully	Jan. 14, 2019	6	28.57	Commons
Theresa May	Mar. 29, 2019	1	4.76	Commons
Total		21	100.00	

In her speech, PM Theresa May states the following:

*The deal that we have agreed and the arrangements and proposals that we have put forward absolutely apply to the 48% who voted remain, because they recognise the necessary balance between delivering on the result of the referendum and doing so in a way that protects jobs, livelihoods and people's security.*

In this fragment May underscores that the deal which she has negotiated with the EU is an appropriate deal for both leavers and remainers as it allows to deliver on the referendum result as well as guarantees the protection of jobs, livelihoods, and security of the British citizens. This should lead to the implicature that May honors the result of the referendum, and thus, cares for delivering it to satisfy the leavers and that she also wants to satisfy the remainers by arranging a deal with the EU which will take care of crucial aspects concerning the British citizens. Therefore, May depicts herself as a Prime Minister who cares for her citizens, which is an implicated conclusion that can be derived from the mentioned implicatures.

### 3.6.2 Labour Party

The next party in whose speeches the Brexit-related terms were investigated was the Labour Party. For this purpose, the fifty Labour Party speeches were first uploaded into AntConc. The following subsections present the analysis.

#### 3.6.2.1 *Brexit*

The search for the term *bre\** in AntConc provided 189 occurrences. After the deletion of utterances with words starting with *bre* other than *Brexit* or other than words related to *Brexit* and of the utterances made by other MPs, the remaining occurrences amounted to 169, which were chiefly occurrences of *Brexit* (164 occurrences, i.e., 97.04%) itself. The remaining occurrences were *Brexiteer* (once, 0.59%) and *Brexiteers* (4 times, 2.37%). The search was verified with the search term *br\**, which produced 353 results, among which, however, there were no other instances of *Brexit* or terms similar to *Brexit*, apart from the ones found via the search with *bre\**. The following table presents the frequency of *Brexit* and of *Brexiteer* in the singular and plural forms in the case of each of the speeches in which these words occurred.

Table 5: The Frequency of *Brexit* and *Brexiteer* in Labour Party Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alex Norris	Jan. 14, 2019	3	1.78	Commons
Alfred Dubs	Oct. 11, 2018	7	4.14	Lords
Andrew Adonis	Oct. 11, 2018	10	5.92	Lords
Anthony Giddens	Oct. 20, 2016	9	5.33	Lords
Barbara Scott Young	Oct. 20, 2016	8	4.73	Lords
Cat Smith	Dec. 30, 2020	1	0.59	Commons
Daniel Zeichner	Oct. 13, 2022	3	1.78	Commons
Darren Jones	May 20, 2020	2	1.18	Commons
Diane Abbott	Dec. 30, 2020	1	0.59	Commons
Dianne Hayter	Jan. 13, 2020	1	0.59	Lords
Dianne Hayter	Sept. 4, 2018	14	8.28	Lords

Table 5 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Ellie Reeves	Dec. 30, 2020	2	1.18	Commons
Frederick Ponsonby	Mar. 11, 2022	1	0.59	Lords
Giles Heneage Radice	Jan. 13, 2020	3	1.78	Lords
Hilary Benn	June 26, 2017	4	2.37	Commons
Hilary Armstrong	Oct. 11, 2018	4	2.37	Lords
Ian Lucas	Mar. 29, 2019	2	2.37	Commons
Ian Murray	Mar. 29, 2019	4	1.18	Commons
Jack McConnell	Jan. 25, 2018	3	2.37	Lords
Jennifer Chapman	Dec. 6, 2021	3	1.78	Lords
Jeremy Corbyn	Mar. 29, 2019	11	6.51	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	Oct. 23, 2017	5	2.96	Commons
Joan Bakewell	Dec. 6, 2018	2	1.18	Lords
Julian Hunt	Oct. 20, 2016	3	1.78	Lords
Liz Kendall	Mar. 29, 2019	4	2.37	Commons
Margaret Beckett	Apr. 1, 2019	1	0.59	Commons
Margaret Jones	Oct. 20, 2016	9	5.33	Lords
Mark Hendrick	Mar. 29, 2019	3	1.78	Commons
Mary Goudie	Mar. 11, 2022	2	1.18	Lords
Meg Hillier	Mar. 29, 2019	3	1.78	Commons
Nick Thomas-Symonds	Mar. 29, 2019	4	2.37	Commons
Pat McFadden	Mar. 29, 2019	2	1.18	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Apr. 3, 2019	1	0.59	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Feb. 27, 2020	3	1.78	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Jan. 14, 2019	6	3.55	Commons
Paul Murphy	Dec. 6, 2018	5	2.96	Lords
Peter Hain	Dec. 6, 2018	4	2.37	Lords
Rupa Huq	Jan. 11, 2021	2	1.18	Commons
Thomas McLaughlin McAvoy	Jan. 25, 2018	7	4.14	Lords
Yvette Cooper	Apr. 3, 2019	6	3.55	Commons
Total		169	100.00	

In his speech on Mar. 29, 2019, Jeremy Corbyn uses the word *Brexit* in the following fragment:

*Today, she is asking us to take a punt on the withdrawal agreement and hope for the best for the political declaration. It is not good enough; the two are linked. Nothing demonstrates that linkage better than the backstop. The political declaration is incredibly vague, containing as it does a spectrum of possible outcomes, and nothing is even close to being resolved. That makes it even more likely that the UK would fall into the backstop, which would create regulatory divergence between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK, as the right hon. Member for East Antrim (Sammy Wilson) said. We also know that it endures indefinitely, thanks to this Parliament prizing the Attorney General's legal advice out of a very reluctant Government. Labour will not vote for a blindfold Brexit, and passing the withdrawal agreement today without the political declaration would be just that.*

In this fragment Corbyn criticizes PM Theresa May for wanting the House to vote for her withdrawal deal which she negotiated with the EU and for trying to separate the withdrawal agreement from the political declaration, which is connected with the deal. He expresses the implicature that doing so would bring risks for the UK, which he indicates, e.g., via the informal expression *take a punt*, which due to its informality can maximize the relevance of his utterance by making the listeners focus more on the message he is conveying. Corbyn also implies that he is against the Irish backstop. This opinion was also expressed by Conservative Party MP Andrew Mitchell, which indicates some similarity between the opinions of the Conservative Party MP and the Labour Party MP.

Corbyn speaks for his whole party by stating that *Labour will not vote for a blindfold Brexit, and passing the withdrawal agreement today without the political declaration would be just that*, which yields the implicature that he identifies himself with his party, which is against May's actions concerning the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration. Furthermore, he uses the metaphor *blindfold Brexit* to imply that voting for the PM's withdrawal deal without agreeing on the political declaration simultaneously would lead to uncertainty for the UK.

Corbyn abides by the parliamentary rule of referring to other MPs by their titles and not by their names via calling Sammy Wilson (a DUP MP) *the right hon. Member for East Antrim*. As Wilson is from a different party than Corbyn, Corbyn uses the word “Member” instead of “Friend”, according to parliamentary rules (UK Parliament, 2010). Thus, when listeners know the rules about how MPs are to refer to each other during debates, this information forms part of their cognitive environment, and therefore, they can derive the implicature that Corbyn is abiding by these rules.

### 3.6.2.2 Referendum

The next search concerned *referendum* and related terms. The search with the search term *referen\** yielded 73 results. The extra search with *re\**, which provided 1013 occurrences, did not produce any “extra” occurrences to be considered. After deleting irrelevant occurrences from among the primary 73 results, 57 occurrences of *referendum*, *referendums*, and *referenda* were left. *Referendum* appeared 54 times (94.74%), *referendums* once (1.75%), and *referenda* twice (3.51%). Whereas 43 of the 57 hits (75.44%) occurred in the sense of the 2016 Brexit referendum, 14 hits (24.56%) appeared in a different sense, e.g., they were used to refer to a second possible referendum on Brexit or to a possible referendum on the further membership of Northern Ireland in the UK. The following table presents how many times *referendum*, *referendums*, and/or *referenda* appeared in each speech in the meaning of the Brexit referendum which was conducted in 2016.

Table 6: The Frequency of *Referendum* in Labour Party Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alex Norris	Jan. 14, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Alfred Dubs	Oct. 11, 2018	2	4.65	Lords
Barbara Scott Young	Oct. 20, 2016	1	2.33	Lords
Diane Abbott	Dec. 30, 2020	2	4.65	Commons
Giles Heneage Radice	Jan. 13, 2020	1	2.33	Lords

Table 6 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Graham Stringer	Jan. 14, 2019	7	16.28	Commons
Hilary Benn	June 26, 2017	2	4.65	Commons
Jack McConnell	Jan. 25, 2018	4	6.98	Lords
Jennifer Chapman	Dec. 6, 2021	1	2.33	Lords
Jeremy Corbyn	June 27, 2016	4	9.30	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	Mar. 29, 2019	2	4.65	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	June 29, 2016	1	2.33	Commons
Julian Hunt	Oct. 20, 2016	1	2.33	Lords
Liz Kendall	Mar. 29, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Margaret Beckett	Apr. 1, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Margaret Jones	Oct. 20, 2016	1	2.33	Lords
Meg Hillier	Mar. 29, 2019	4	9.30	Commons
Nick Thomas-Symonds	Mar. 29, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Apr. 3, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Jan. 14, 2019	1	2.33	Commons
Paul Murphy	Dec. 6, 2018	1	2.33	Lords
Thomas McLaughlin McAvoy	Jan. 25, 2018	1	2.33	Lords
Yvette Cooper	Apr. 3, 2019	3	6.98	Commons
Total		43	100.00	

Diane Abbott (Dec. 30, 2020) speaks about her position on the 2016 referendum result in the following utterance:

*In closing, I have the greatest respect for the result of the 2016 referendum, but this shoddy deal falls shorts. It fails the British people and fails my constituents, and I have to meet my responsibilities as a Member of the British Parliament and vote against it today.*



Her use of the words *I have the greatest respect for the result of the 2016 referendum* has a rather poetic<sup>8</sup> overtone, which is to underscore that she strongly honors the result. A weak implicature that may be expressed here is that, e.g., as a member of the Labour Party or generally as someone wanting the UK to remain in the EU (Buchan, 2019), she may not be trusted by those who support Brexit that she is honoring the result. However, the contextual conclusion that should be derived is that the result of the referendum should be implemented.

She also indicates her position on the *shoddy deal* negotiated by the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, implying that it is not the appropriate deal for the United Kingdom. Another implicature that can be derived is that by deciding not to vote for this deal, Abbott presents herself as a person who cares for the British citizens.

### 3.6.2.3 Leave

The search conducted with the search term *leav\** presented 102 hits, out of which 94 of the occurrences were considered after the rest were deleted in the MS Excel spreadsheet. The forms of *leave* which occurred are *leave*, *leaves*, *leaving*, and *leavers* (referring to those who supported leaving the EU). The first one of these appeared 61 times (64.89%), the second one 3 times (3.19%), the third one 29 times (30.85%), and the fourth one once (1.06%). While 77 of the 94 occurrences (81.91%) referred strictly to the UK leaving the EU, 17 of the occurrences (18.09%) concerned a different topic. As the speeches themselves indicate, some politicians advocated remaining in the customs union after Brexit. *Leave* occurred in the sense of the UK leaving the EU 49 out of 61 times (80.33%) and 12 out of 61 times (19.67%) with a different meaning, e.g., it referred to leaving the common EU single market. *Leaves* appeared in the Brexit sense once out of 3 times (33.33%) and twice out of 3 times in a different

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<sup>8</sup> Sperber and Wilson (1995) put forward their notion of a *poetic effect* (which can be achieved, e.g., via metaphors), explaining that this is an effect of an utterance, in the case of which most of the relevance is achieved via a broad range of weak implicatures. Poetic effects influence the cognitive environment shared by the speaker and the listener by marginally increasing the manifestness of various assumptions which are weakly manifest, i.e., via creating common impressions instead of common knowledge (Sperber & Wilson, 1995). More on poetic effects can be found in Blakemore (1992).

context (66.67%). 26 out of 29 hits of *leaving* (89.66%) occurred in the Brexit sense and 3 out of the 29 occurrences (10.34%) appeared with a different meaning. The single occurrence of *leavers* (100.00%) appeared strictly in this sense.

Another AntConc search was conducted with the search term *left\** in order to find utterances with *left*, the past tense of *leave*. There were 23 results of the search (in which *left* chiefly occurred as the past tense of *leave*, rather than in the meaning “the opposite of right”). One occurrence was not relevant for the analysis, as it occurred in an intervention of a different politician during one of the actual speeches, and thus, 22 results were taken into consideration. *Left* occurred 10 out of 22 times (45.45%) in the Brexit sense and 12 times (54.55%) in a different sense. Therefore, in total, there were 87 occurrences of *leave* (in the appropriate forms and tenses) and *leavers* in the sense of the UK leaving the EU. The table below depicts these results for the specific speeches.

Table 7: The Frequency of *Leave* and *Leavers* in Labour Party Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alex Norris	Jan. 14, 2019	2	2.30	Commons
Alfred Dubs	Oct. 11, 2018	3	3.45	Lords
Andrew Adonis	Oct. 11, 2018	2	2.30	Lords
Anthony Giddens	Oct. 20, 2016	3	3.45	Lords
Cat Smith	Dec. 30, 2020	6	6.90	Commons
Daniel Zeichner	Oct. 13, 2022	1	1.15	Commons
Dianne Hayter	Jan. 13, 2020	1	1.15	Lords
Dianne Hayter	Sept. 4, 2018	3	3.45	Lords
Ellie Reeves	Dec. 30, 2020	3	3.45	Commons
Giles Heneage Radice	Jan. 13, 2020	4	4.60	Lords
Graham Stringer	Jan. 14, 2019	6	6.90	Commons
Hilary Armstrong	Dec. 6, 2021	1	1.15	Lords
Hilary Benn	June 26, 2017	6	6.90	Commons
Ian Murray	Mar. 29, 2019	3	3.45	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	June 27, 2016	3	3.45	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	June 29, 2016	1	1.15	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	Mar. 29, 2019	3	3.45	Commons

Table 7 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Jeremy Corbyn	Oct. 23, 2017	2	2.30	Commons
Julian Hunt	Oct. 20, 2016	3	3.45	Lords
Liz Kendall	Mar. 29, 2019	1	1.15	Commons
Margaret Beckett	Apr. 1, 2019	5	5.75	Commons
Mark Hendrick	Mar. 29, 2019	3	3.45	Commons
Pat McFadden	Mar. 29, 2019	1	1.15	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Apr. 3, 2019	4	4.60	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Feb. 27, 2020	1	1.15	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Jan. 14, 2019	9	10.34	Commons
Peter Hain	Dec. 6, 2018	2	2.30	Lords
Rita Donaghy	Dec. 6, 2021	2	2.30	Lords
Yvette Cooper	Apr. 3, 2019	1	1.15	Commons
Total		87	100.00	

Giles Radice (Jan. 13, 2020) uses the word *leaving* in the following fragment: *Boris Johnson has said that leaving the EU will offer the UK a bright future. We shall see about that.* He states explicitly what Boris Johnson had promised about leaving the EU. Nevertheless, Radice himself is sceptical about this, which is reflected in *We shall see about that.* Radice echoes Johnson's words via the use of the metaphor of *a bright future*, which implies that although Johnson believes that Brexit will bring opportunities for the UK, Radice rather takes an opposite or at least sceptical stance on this.

#### 3.6.2.4 Remain

The next term searched for in AntConc was *remain* and its related forms with the help of the search term *remain\**. 39 results appeared, out of which 36 were considered for analysis. While 14 of the hits (38.89%) occurred in the Brexit sense, 22 (61.11%) were used with a different meaning. *Remain* appeared 21 times in total in the 36 occurrences (58.33%), *remains* 4 times (11.11%), *remaining* 6 times (16.67%), *remained* 3 times (8.33%), and *remainers* twice (5.56%).

In the 14 occurrences which appeared in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU, the word *remain* occurred 9 times (64.29%), *remaining* and *remainers* each appeared twice (14.29%), *remained* once (7.14%), and *remains* was not present in this context. The table presents the results in the case of the individual speeches.

Table 8: The Frequency of *Remain* and *Remainers* in Labour Party Speeches Used with Regard to the UK remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alan Howarth	Apr. 18, 2018	1	7.14	Lords
Alex Norris	Jan. 14, 2019	1	7.14	Commons
Alfred Dubs	Oct. 11, 2018	1	7.14	Lords
Cat Smith	Dec. 30, 2020	1	7.14	Commons
Ellie Reeves	Dec. 30, 2020	2	14.29	Commons
Graham Stringer	Jan. 14, 2019	2	14.29	Commons
Jeremy Corbyn	June 27, 2016	1	7.14	Commons
Margaret Beckett	Apr. 1, 2019	1	7.14	Commons
Paul Blomfield	Jan. 14, 2019	1	7.14	Commons
Paul Murphy	Dec. 6, 2018	1	7.14	Lords
Peter Hain	Dec. 6, 2018	2	14.29	Lords
Total		14	100.00	

As it can be seen, similarly as in the case of the Conservative Party, also the politicians of the Labour Party used *leave* considerably more frequently than *remain* in their speeches. It should be noted that *leave*, furthermore, usually appeared in the sense of the UK leaving the EU. In certain cases it was used to refer to the UK leaving the EU common single market, etc. *Remain*, on the other hand, was used less frequently in the Brexit sense but rather in other contexts with different meanings. It should be noted that the analyzed speeches are ones that were delivered after and not before the referendum. Thus, the result of the Brexit referendum had caused a significant further debate on leaving the EU, as the referendum had directed the politicians to carry Brexit out. While before the referendum, both options *leave* and *remain* may have had equal significance, after the referendum the option to leave became the option to

be followed. This, therefore, can be perceived as a crucial explanation for the much more frequent use of *leave* instead of *remain* by the politicians. *Leave* focused on the future, while *remain* became a past option (some politicians, however, advocated for a second so-called confirmatory referendum, as some speeches indicate).

This is crucial in the context of relevance theory. The world knowledge, or cognitive background, of the speakers and their recipients helped both groups notice the significance of the topic. The Brexit context, and thus, the option which had been chosen by the majority of the voters, i.e., the option to leave was emphasized by the politicians in their speeches.

An example in which all of the four Brexit-related terms appear is the beginning of the following utterance by Alfred Dubs (Oct. 11, 2018):

*As we came to debate Brexit and approached a vote on the referendum, it seemed to me that, even if one was a supporter of leave—and I certainly was not—there was one argument to vote for remain: the Good Friday agreement, because that in itself would pose difficulties if we voted to leave the EU. So it has proved. Very few people would challenge the assertion that we face enormous difficulties as a result of trying to deal with the Good Friday agreement. We do not yet have any answers. Perhaps the Government will announce something in the next day or two, but we certainly have no answers yet. I have heard people say that we should forget about the Good Friday agreement because it has outlived its usefulness. I think that that is absolutely wrong. We are entitled to get more advice and guidance from the Government—perhaps we will get it today—as to the way forward.*

By focusing the addressees' attention on the four terms concurrently, Dub can make his utterance highly relevant. The politician emphasizes his opinion on the UK's withdrawal from the EU by implicitly, but clearly, indicating that he was not a supporter of the option to leave the EU, but an advocate of remaining in it. He then refers to the listeners' cognitive background concerning the Good Friday agreement, to which, he believes, Brexit is a threat. In the earlier part of his speech, the politician manifests his strong support

for this agreement, which he again indicates in the cited utterance. He also implies that the UK government, consisting of members of the Conservative Party, needs to deal with the issue of how to protect the agreement in the face of Brexit.

### 3.6.3 Democratic Unionist Party

The next party in whose speeches the Brexit-related terms were investigated was the Democratic Unionist Party. The following subsections present the analysis.

#### 3.6.3.1 *Brexit*

The search for *bre*\* in the speeches of members of the DUP provided 151 results, which were then copied into Excel, and the results which were not occurrences of *Brexit* or a *Brexit*-related term as well as occurrences of *Brexit* appearing in comments or questions of other politicians to the proper speech were deleted, leaving 117 results. *Brexit* was used 116 out of the 117 times (99.15%) and *Brexiters* was used only once (0.85%). The latter appeared in the speech by Sammy Wilson on Dec. 30, 2020.

The table below shows the results for the given speeches, in which the word *Brexit* and *Brexiters* (only one occurrence among the speeches) appeared.

Table 9: The Frequency of *Brexit* and *Brexiters* in DUP Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Carla Lockhart	July 15, 2021	5	4.27	Commons
Carla Lockhart	Nov. 30, 2021	1	0.85	Commons
Carla Lockhart	Sept. 1, 2020	1	0.85	Commons
David Simpson	Jan. 14, 2019	4	3.42	Commons
David Simpson	Oct. 10, 2018	1	0.85	Commons
Emma Little Pengelly	June 26, 2018	4	3.42	Commons
Emma Little Pengelly	Nov. 22, 2017	5	4.27	Commons
Emma Little Pengelly	Oct. 29, 2019	6	5.13	Commons
Gavin Robinson	Sept. 21, 2020	2	1.71	Commons

Table 9 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Gregory Campbell	Feb. 20, 2017	1	0.85	Commons
Gregory Campbell	Jan. 30, 2019	3	2.56	Commons
Ian McCrea	Jan. 14, 2020	7	5.98	Lords
Ian Paisley	Feb. 7, 2022	1	0.85	Commons
Ian Paisley	June 26, 2017	2	1.71	Commons
Ian Paisley	Sept. 5, 2016	5	4.27	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	Apr. 24, 2017	5	4.27	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	Dec. 20, 2019	2	1.71	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	July 13, 2022	4	3.42	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	July 15, 2021	2	1.71	Commons
Jim Shannon	July 20, 2016	6	5.13	Commons
Maurice Morrow	Jan. 14, 2019	2	1.71	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Oct. 11, 2022	1	0.85	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Sept. 5, 2017	6	5.13	Lords
Nigel Dodds	Jan. 16, 2019	5	4.27	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Apr. 24, 2017	3	2.56	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Dec. 4, 2018	1	0.85	Commons
Nigel Dodds	July 8, 2019	7	5.98	Commons
Paul Girvan	Dec. 4, 2018	3	2.56	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Dec. 30, 2020	2	1.71	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Apr. 24, 2017	9	7.69	Commons
Sammy Wilson	July 15, 2021	3	2.56	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Mar. 29, 2019	1	0.85	Commons
Wallace Browne	Mar. 25, 2019	1	0.85	Lords
Wallace Browne	Oct. 11, 2018	1	0.85	Lords
William Hay	June 27, 2017	3	2.56	Lords
William Hay	Nov. 20, 2018	2	1.71	Lords
Total		117	100.00	

Jeffrey Donaldson (Dec. 20, 2019) uses the lexeme *Brexit* in the following utterance:

*We supported Brexit. We want Brexit to happen, and we acknowledge and recognise that the Government have won a mandate to take forward their withdrawal agreement. But there is a major contradiction at the heart of that agreement that causes us great concern. At one level, the agreement does say that Northern Ireland should continue to have unfettered access to the rest of the UK for trade. But then there are customs arrangements that inhibit our ability to have that unfettered access. That is our major concern—one that we hope the Government can address.*

The explicature that can be derived from Donaldson's utterances at the beginning of the fragment is: *We, the DUP, supported Brexit and we want Brexit to happen.* The repetition of the word *Brexit* implies that the politician strongly supports the decision about the UK leaving the EU. He later implies that the withdrawal agreement negotiated by the British government with the UK is, however, not appropriate for Northern Ireland, as the customs arrangements between the EU and Northern Ireland would inhibit internal trade between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK.

In the context of the DUP's position, the cited fragment implies that Donaldson is criticizing the idea that the relation between Northern Ireland and the EU should be different after Brexit than the relationship of the rest of the UK with the EU. The fact that the DUP is against such a situation should be recalled by the listeners on hearing Donaldson's utterance, as a part of their cognitive environment. The politician refers to the position of some politicians that in order for the open border between the Republic of Ireland (an EU member) and Northern Ireland to remain, Northern Ireland could stay in the EU customs union and single market, which was a proposal put forward in the negotiations between the EU and Theresa May. Donaldson and his party, nevertheless, do not agree with this idea, which he implies in his utterance.

In connection with the cited fragment from Donaldson's speech it is also worth mentioning the fragment with the word *Brexiters* from Sammy Wilson's speech (Dec. 30, 2020):



*Let me finally say that we will not be voting for this deal today, and I think the reasons are obvious. We are excluded from many of its benefits. That does not mean we have any common cause with the petulant remainers in this Parliament who want to undo the referendum; it is because we are disappointed Brexiteers. It is because we are people who believed that the United Kingdom should leave and should leave as a whole, and that is not happening, and for that reason we will not be voting for this deal today.*

Wilson refers to his party when he says *we are disappointed Brexiteers*. This, therefore, implies the DUP's pro-Brexit stance. Wilson draws a contrast between Brexiteers and *petulant remainers* and implies that the latter do not want to honor the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, as opposed to Brexiteers, for whom the result is highly significant, which he underscores via the phrase *we are people who believed that the United Kingdom should leave and should leave as a whole*. This is, therefore, an example of the use of the word *leave*, i.e., one of the Brexit-related terms analyzed in this section. The repetition of *leave* in the mentioned utterance serves the maximization of the relevance of Wilson's utterance, as it underscores his party's determination in aiming towards Northern Ireland's withdrawal from the EU together with the rest of the UK, which is meant by *the United Kingdom should leave and should leave as a whole*.

In the cited fragment Wilson criticizes Prime Minister Boris Johnson's deal negotiated with the EU. He believes that Northern Ireland, which he refers to as *we*, is excluded from many Brexit benefits, which can be deduced on the basis of the rest (earlier part) of his speech and on the grounds that Wilson's party, namely the DUP, operates in Northern Ireland, for which it is, therefore, responsible. This is a fact that forms part of the cognitive environment of a listener who is aware of it. The use of *we* implies that Wilson is referring to Northern Ireland because in the previous fragment of his speech, he indicates that the DUP does not want this part of the UK to be disadvantaged because of the government's deals with the EU. This implicature can also be derived via the mentioned fact that the DUP operates in Northern Ireland. The optimization of relevance is also achieved via the fact that at the beginning of this fragment and at the end, Wilson says *we will not be voting for this deal today*, this way

strongly indicating that his party (*we*) is against the Prime Minister's deal, and will, therefore, not support it.

In general, the DUP chiefly addresses matters concerned with Northern Ireland in the context of Brexit as it operates in that part of the UK. The party underscores that Northern Ireland needs to leave the EU along with the rest of the United Kingdom as they believe in the unity of the United Kingdom and are against Northern Ireland remaining in the EU, which was advocated by some. This underscores the DUP being a unionist party and, as such, supporting the union of Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

### 3.6.3.2 *Referendum*

The next term searched for was *referendum* with the help of the search term *referen\**. AntConc found 38 occurrences. The search was checked with the search term *re\**, which resulted in 1275 occurrences, among which no other occurrences of *referendum* or *remain* (for which the results will be presented later) were found. After the omission of occurrences other than *referendum* or related words and of utterances which were not part of the actual speech, 31 out of the 38 results were considered. While 17 of the 31 occurrences (54.84%) referred to the Brexit referendum conducted in 2016, the remaining 14 occurrences (45.16%) were used in a different sense, e.g., 7 of the 31 occurrences (22.58%) were used to refer to a second Brexit referendum which given politicians advocated, whereas the remaining 7 were used in a different sense (22.58%). This accounted for 50.00% (7 out of 14) of the instances of *referendum(s)* which were used to refer to a different situation than a second Brexit referendum. The other instances, i.e., 7 out of 14, referred to other contexts, e.g., to the conducting or possible conducting of a referendum on the further membership of Scotland or Northern Ireland in the UK (in these parts of the country).

The results for *referendum* in the singular and plural forms in the sense of the 2016 Brexit referendum are presented below.

Table 10: The Frequency of *Referendum* in DUP Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Gavin Robinson	Sept. 21, 2020	1	5.88	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	July 13, 2022	2	11.76	Commons
Jim Shannon	July 20, 2016	1	5.88	Commons
Maurice Morrow	Jan. 14, 2019	1	5.88	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Nov. 20, 2018	1	5.88	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Sept. 5, 2017	1	5.88	Lords
Nigel Dodds	Jan. 16, 2019	1	5.88	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Dec. 4, 2018	2	11.76	Commons
Paul Girvan	Dec. 4, 2018	1	5.88	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Dec. 30, 2020	2	11.76	Commons
Wallace Browne	Nov. 20, 2018	1	5.88	Lords
William Hay	June 27, 2017	1	5.88	Lords
Total		17	100.00	

In his speech Nigel Dodds (Dec. 4, 2018) takes the same stance as Jeffrey Donaldson (Dec. 20, 2019) and Sammy Wilson (Dec. 30, 2020). He states:

*This House has, fundamentally, a duty to respect the clear will of the people of the United Kingdom as delivered in the referendum and to deliver our exit from the EU as one United Kingdom. I regret to say that the withdrawal agreement put forward by the Prime Minister and a majority but not all of the Cabinet falls short of that objective.*

An implicature derived from this utterance is that Dodds supports delivering on the 2016 referendum result. However, as he further implies, the government's withdrawal agreement is not allowing to deliver this result for Northern Ireland, which Dodds criticizes. By using the phrase *as one United Kingdom*, he indicates the importance of the unity of the United Kingdom, to which Northern Ireland belongs, and which means that the whole UK should leave the EU on the same terms.

The fact that DUP politicians underscore the significance of the unity of the United Kingdom several times, and thus, Northern Ireland's importance in it, optimizes the relevance of the utterances in which they emphasize this, as the repetition of this fact by different politicians of the same party indicates that it is of high significance to them and that they, thus, want their listeners to believe that this is the case.

### 3.6.3.3 *Leave*

The next lexeme searched for was *leave* and terms connected with it with the help of the search term *leav\**. There were 99 results. After deleting the irrelevant occurrences, 96 occurrences were left. Among these results the forms *leave*, *leaves*, and *leaving* appeared. *Leave* occurred as the verb *leave* as well as an adjective in the phrase *leave voters*. The analysis of the results indicated that 60 of the occurrences were used in the sense of the whole UK leaving the EU, i.e., in the sense concerned with the 2016 referendum vote. This accounted for 62.50% of the results. The remaining 36 occurrences, i.e., 37.50%, were used in a different context, e.g., in the sense of the UK leaving the EU customs union or in the sense of Northern Ireland leaving the EU.

The next term searched for was *left*, the past tense of *leave*, via the search term *left\**. The investigation resulted in 19 occurrences, out of which only 2 appeared in the sense of the UK leaving the EU (10.53%) and 17 in a different sense (89.47%). While 115 occurrences were analyzed in total (*leave*, *leaves*, *leaving*, and *left*), 62 of them were used in the context of the UK leaving the EU (53.91%) and 53 in a different sense (46.09%). The following table presents the results in the sense of the whole UK leaving the EU.

Table 11: The Frequency of *Leave* in DUP Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
David Simpson	Jan. 14, 2019	1	1.61	Commons
David Simpson	Oct. 10, 2018	2	3.23	Commons
Gavin Robinson	July 10, 2018	1	1.61	Commons
Gavin Robinson	Sept. 21, 2020	1	1.61	Commons
Ian McCrea	Jan. 14, 2020	1	1.61	Lords

Table 11 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Ian McCrea	Nov. 20, 2018	1	1.61	Lords
Ian Paisley	June 26, 2017	2	3.23	Commons
Ian Paisley	Sept. 5, 2016	3	4.84	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	Dec. 20, 2019	2	3.23	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	July 13, 2022	3	4.84	Commons
Jeffrey Donaldson	July 15, 2021	1	1.61	Commons
Jim Shannon	June 10, 2020	2	3.23	Commons
Jim Shannon	July 20, 2016	5	8.06	Commons
Maurice Morrow	Jan. 14, 2019	1	1.61	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Nov. 20, 2018	2	3.23	Lords
Maurice Morrow	Sept. 5, 2017	5	8.06	Lords
Nigel Dodds	Jan. 16, 2019	3	4.84	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Apr. 24, 2017	1	1.61	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Dec. 4, 2018	1	1.61	Commons
Nigel Dodds	July 8, 2019	1	1.61	Commons
Paul Girvan	Dec. 4, 2018	6	9.68	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Dec. 30, 2020	3	4.84	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Apr. 24, 2017	1	1.61	Commons
Sammy Wilson	July 15, 2021	1	1.61	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Mar. 29, 2019	5	8.06	Commons
Wallace Browne	Mar. 25, 2019	2	3.23	Lords
Wallace Browne	Oct. 11, 2018	3	4.84	Lords
William Hay	Nov. 20, 2018	2	3.23	Lords
Total		62	100.00	

### 3.6.3.4 *Remain*

The next lexeme which was searched for was *remain* and related words with the help of the search term *remain\**. AntConc found 48 occurrences, out of which 46 were taken into consideration as occurrences of *remain* or related lexemes in the actual speeches. A significant majority of the occurrences did not strictly refer to the UK remaining in the EU. Many of them referred to issues concerned

with Northern Ireland. Merely 9 of the 46 occurrences (19.57%) referred to the UK remaining in the EU, while the other 37 occurrences (80.43%) were used in a different sense. 3 out of the 9 occurrences (33.33%) were occurrences of *remainers*, which appeared in speeches by Sammy Wilson, twice in the speech delivered on Dec. 30, 2020 and once in the speech on July 15, 2021. For instance, on Dec. 30, 2020 Wilson begins his speech by saying:

*I am glad that in two days' time we will be finally leaving the EU. That is something that my party and I personally campaigned for, and it is something that would probably not have happened had it not been for the votes and crucial debates in this House when remainers tried to undermine the result of the referendum,*

where he clearly indicates that he is against the remainers trying to present the 2016 Brexit referendum result as meaningless.

The table below presents the results for the given speeches, concerning the total of 9 occurrences of *remain* and *remainers* in the context of the whole UK leaving the EU.

Table 12: The Frequency of *Remain* and *Remainers* in DUP Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Ian Paisley	Sept. 5, 2016	1	11.11	Commons
Jim Shannon	July 20, 2016	3	33.33	Commons
Nigel Dodds	Dec. 4, 2018	1	11.11	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Dec. 30, 2020	2	22.22	Commons
Sammy Wilson	Apr. 24, 2017	1	11.11	Commons
Sammy Wilson	July 15, 2021	1	11.11	Commons
Total		9	100.00	

It should be noted that, as the British speeches indicate, the neologisms *leaver(s)* and *remainer(s)* were crucial terms relating to the Brexit issue. Calling supporters of Brexit *leavers* and opponents of Brexit *remainers* allowed for a relevant way of referring to these people. It is a shorter, more simple way of

referring to them instead of saying, e.g., *those who supported the option to leave the EU* and *those who supported the option to remain in the EU*. The neologisms also underscore the significance of the Brexit issue itself, and thus, the impact it had on the English language. This, thus, even further maximizes the relevance of utterances in which *remainer(s)* and *leaver(s)* are used. It should, therefore, be the most optimal way for the politicians giving their speeches to refer to these two groups of people on the two opposing sides of the Brexit debate, when speaking to other members of Parliament and indirectly to British citizens who may be listening to the debates as well.

The term *Remainer* (in the plural form) is also used in a speech by the SPD politician Birgit Honé (Feb. 15, 2019). She states: *Selbst sogenannte Remainer, also Freunde der Europäischen Union, gehen mittlerweile davon aus, dass ein Brexit nicht mehr abgewendet werden kann* (Even so-called remainers, i.e., friends of the European Union, are now assuming that Brexit cannot be turned away anymore). This indicates that the notion of *remainers* gained considerable popularity due to its significance and was, thus, also used in German political discourse, like other anglicisms, which will be discussed later. It should be noted that Honé calls remainers friends of the EU, this way implying that she herself is a friend of the EU and not a supporter of Brexit, which can also be seen on the basis of her speech in general and on the basis of her other speeches.

The above discussion of the Brexit-related terms and of chosen contexts in which they appear in the speeches leads to the analysis of these terms' equivalents in the German speeches in the next section.

### 3.6.4 Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union

The next parties whose fifty speeches were analyzed in AntConc were the Christian Democratic Union and the Christian Social Union. The steps of the analysis are presented below.

#### 3.6.4.1 *Brexit*

The first term investigated in AntConc, as in the case of the British parties, was *Brexit*. The search term *bre\** was entered into the search box, which provided a total of 204 results. The search was checked with *br\** to investigate if no other

instances of *Brexit*, etc. appear. No other such instances occurred. After the omission of the irrelevant utterances, as in the case of the British speeches, 191 occurrences remained. Among these results, the term also appeared in the genitive case as *Brexits*.

It may be surprising that the word *Brexit* was used more often in the speeches by the CDU/CSU than by members of the three British parties, as Brexit directly influenced the UK. Perhaps by using *Brexit* so frequently, the German politicians wished to indicate their dissatisfaction concerning Brexit, and thus, maximize the relevance of this position. The CDU and CSU politicians showed unanimity in their stance towards Brexit, i.e., they all indicated that they did not support it.

In both, the British and German speeches, the phrase *hard Brexit* or *harter Brexit* appears, which refers to the idea of a no-deal Brexit, i.e., Brexit carried out without a deal between the UK and the EU. It should be noted that the speeches delivered by the politicians of the CDU and CSU contain compounds with hyphens formed with the term *Brexit*. The compounds are included in the 191 results. These make up 14.14% of all the occurrences with *Brexit*. They are as follows: *Brexit-Ausschuss* (*Brexit committee*), *Brexit-Befürwortern* (*Brexit supporters*), *Brexit-Minister* (*Brexit minister*), *Brexit-Sonderberater* (*Brexit special advisor*), *Brexit-Partei* (*Brexit Party*), *Brexit-Übergangsgesetz* (*Brexit transitional law*), which appears 10 times (once in the genitive case *Brexit-Übergangsgesetzes* in Katja Leikert's speech on Nov. 9, 2018), *Brexit-Verhandlungen* (*Brexit negotiations*), *Brexit-Desaster* (*Brexit disaster*), *Brexit-kritisch* (*Brexit critical*), *Brexit-Referendum* (*Brexit referendum*), *Brexit-Anpassungsgesetzgebung* (*Brexit adjustment legislation*), *Brexit-Steuerbegleitgesetz* (*Brexit Tax Accompanying Act*), which appears twice, *Brexit-Diskussionen* (*Brexit discussions*), *Brexit-Debatte* (*Brexit debate*) – twice, and *Brexit-Verträge* (*Brexit agreements*). Hyphenated compounds are frequent in the German language, and thus, the fact that the mentioned “*Brexit* compounds” are used indicates that this is a natural way for the German politicians also to speak about issues concerned with Brexit. Thus, this can also be perceived as a sign of optimizing relevance, as creating such compounds allows to convey the message in a more simple, understandable way.

The stance of the CDU and CSU politicians on the UK leaving the EU is clearly negative. All of them criticize and regret the decision which had been



made by the majority of the British voters in the referendum on EU membership. This is indicated, for instance, in the compound *Brexit-Desaster*. The negotiations with the UK are perceived as a difficult situation. Brexit is seen as unfortunate for Germany as the UK was treated as an important trade partner and is to be treated as such in the future relationship between the UK and the EU, which is perceived as more difficult due to the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

The results of the occurrence of *Brexit* and of the mentioned hyphenated "*Brexit* compounds" are portrayed below. The column "House of Parliament" indicates whether the politician giving the speech belonged to the lower (Bundestag) or upper chamber (Bundesrat) of the German Parliament at the time of giving the speech and that the given speech was delivered at the chamber to which the speaker belonged.

Table 13: The Frequency of *Brexit* and "*Brexit* Compounds" in CDU and CSU Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alexander Dobrindt	Oct. 17, 2018	3	1.57	Bundestag
Alexander Radwan	Jan. 31, 2019	1	0.52	Bundestag
Angela Merkel	Oct. 17, 2018	1	0.52	Bundestag
Antje Lezius	Feb. 21, 2019	5	2.62	Bundestag
Antje Lezius	Jan. 31, 2019	7	3.66	Bundestag
Christoph Ploß	Nov. 9, 2018	8	4.19	Bundestag
Detlef Seif	Feb. 13, 2020	7	3.66	Bundestag
Detlef Seif	Jan. 17, 2019	3	1.57	Bundestag
Detlef Seif	Oct. 17, 2018	3	1.57	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Dec. 13, 2018	12	6.28	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Jan. 17, 2019	5	2.62	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Oct. 17, 2018	3	1.57	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Nov. 9, 2018	4	2.09	Bundestag
Fritz Güntzler	Feb. 21, 2019	3	1.57	Bundestag
Fritz Güntzler	Jan. 31, 2019	7	3.66	Bundestag
Guido Wolf	Dec. 15, 2017	9	4.71	Bundesrat
Hans Michelbach	June 24, 2016	2	1.05	Bundestag
Hans Michelbach	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.52	Bundestag

Table 13 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Heribert Hirte	Jan. 17, 2019	4	2.09	Bundestag
Jürgen Hardt	Feb. 13, 2020	3	1.57	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Dec. 13, 2018	3	1.57	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Feb. 13, 2020	9	4.71	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Jan. 17, 2019	2	1.05	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Oct. 17, 2018	2	1.05	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Nov. 9, 2018	4	2.09	Bundestag
Katrin Staffler	Feb. 13, 2020	1	0.52	Bundestag
Lucia Puttrich	Dec. 15, 2017	6	3.14	Bundesrat
Lucia Puttrich	Feb. 15, 2019	15	7.85	Bundesrat
Lucia Puttrich	Feb. 14, 2020	12	6.28	Bundesrat
Mark Helfrich	Jan. 17, 2020	5	2.62	Bundestag
Matthias Hauer	Feb. 21, 2019	10	5.24	Bundestag
Matthias Hauer	Jan. 31, 2019	5	2.62	Bundestag
Michael Frieser	Jan. 31, 2019	1	0.52	Bundestag
Peter Aumer	Feb. 21, 2019	6	3.14	Bundestag
Peter Aumer	Jan. 31, 2019	4	2.09	Bundestag
Peter Altmaier	Jan. 31, 2019	3	1.57	Bundestag
Peter Hauk	Dec. 17, 2021	1	0.52	Bundesrat
Ralph Brinkhaus	Oct. 17, 2018	3	1.57	Bundestag
Sebastian Brehm	Jan. 17, 2019	3	1.57	Bundestag
Thomas de Maizière	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.52	Bundestag
Thomas de Maizière	Nov. 9, 2018	2	1.05	Bundestag
Ursula Groden-Kranich	Jan. 17, 2019	2	1.05	Bundestag
Total		191	100.00	

It is worth mentioning the single occurrence of *Brexiters* in the CDU/CSU speeches, which appears in Katja Leikert's speech given on Feb. 13, 2020 in the following fragment:

*Bei allem Ärger über die Schmutzkampagne der Brexiteers und die nach wie vor teils feindselige Rhetorik der britischen Regierung – und da bitten wir auch um Abrüstung –: Wir Europäer wollen in den kommenden Monaten den Grundstein für eine erfolgreiche gemeinsame Zukunft legen. Wir wollen nicht, dass dieses Drama wie bei Shakespeare endet. Wir strecken die Hand aus und hoffen darauf, dass die Hand in Großbritannien auch ergriffen wird. (Despite all the anger about the Brexiteers' smear campaign and the, like before, partially hostile rhetoric of the British government – and we ask for disarmament here –: In the upcoming months, we Europeans want to lay the foundations for a successful mutual future. We do not want this drama to end like in Shakespeare. We are reaching out our hand and hope that this hand will be taken in Great Britain<sup>9</sup>).*

Leikert's use of the word *Brexiteers* (synonymous with *leavers*) indicates how crucial it was in the Brexit debate, similarly to the terms *leavers* and *remainers*, and which, thus, was even used in German political discourse. In relevance-theoretic terms, by using the anglicism *Brexiteers*, Leikert shows that it is the most optimal way to refer to the supporters of Brexit, whom she criticizes in a very emotional way in the cited fragment. The anglicism, as a foreign English word concerned directly with Brexit, should focus her listeners' attention and, in this way, maximize the relevance of her utterance. This is also possible via the emotionality which she adds to her criticism via *Schmutzkampagne* (*smear campaign*) and *teils feindselige Rhetorik* (*partially hostile rhetoric*). By saying *da bitten wir auch um Abrüstung* (*and we ask for disarmament here*), she is being rather sarcastic as *Abrüstung* (*disarmament*) is a metaphor referring to war. Thus, the *partially hostile rhetoric* of the British government is depicted by her as a "war" led by this government with the EU, which, by contrast, wants to *reach out its hand* to the UK, hoping that it will be *taken* by the UK. Thus, the implicatures depicted in her use of the metaphors optimize the relevance of her utterance, strongly indicating her stance on the, according to her, negative behavior of the British government in the Brexit negotiations with the

<sup>9</sup> The presented translations of fragments from German speeches have been done by the author of this monograph.

EU. The awareness of the listeners that she is talking about the negotiations is their cognitive environment, which is formed by the fact that she mentions the ongoing negotiations earlier in the speech and by the fact that the problems with the negotiations are generally known to the other politicians taking part in the debate, as well as, presumably, to other listeners who may be watching the debate via mass media.

What is more, Leikert draws a comparison between the ongoing *drama* (used as a metaphor) caused by Brexit and the dramas written by the British writer, William Shakespeare, indicating a British cultural aspect, i.e., Shakespeare's works, which can help her listeners visualize her negative stance, and this way find what she says more relevant.

The metonymic use of *Großbritannien* referring to the whole UK is also noticeable. This is an aspect of the language in both the German and the British speeches (in which, e.g., *Britain* is used as an abbreviation of *Great Britain*), a general linguistic characteristic. As Great Britain encompasses England, Wales, and Scotland, the use of *Großbritannien* or *Britain* in the speeches may indicate the strong connotation of the UK with this part of the country. However, the whole UK encompasses Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Furthermore, the phrase *wir Europäer* (*we Europeans*) in Leikert's speech shows that Leikert identifies herself with Europe, or more specifically in this context, with the European Union, which contrasts with the British vision of sovereignty depicted via Brexit.

Therefore, all of the mentioned linguistic elements used by Leikert allow her to convey her message in an optimal, clear, relevant way based on facts known by her listeners and new assumptions which, along with these facts, may become a part of their cognitive environment.

#### 3.6.4.2 *Referendum*

The next analyzed term was *Referendum* and related terms. The search for *re\** resulted in 492 hits. One instance of *Referendum* was found in the form *Refe- rendums* (the genitive case of *Referendum*), due to technical elements of how the speech transcript had been written (part of the word was in one line and the next part in another line of the text). The search *refe\** was then conducted, providing 12 hits. The search with *re\** had not provided any other

occurrences of any form of *Referendum* other than those found with the help of the search term *refe\**. One of the results was not the term *Referendum* or any related term and was, thus, not taken into consideration. 9 out of the 11 remaining occurrences (81.82%) of the word *Referendum* concerned the 2016 Brexit referendum, while the other 2 hits (18.18%) referred to a possible second referendum (*ein zweites Referendum*) on Brexit. The table below presents the results for the given speeches for the 9 occurrences which referred to the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Table 14: The Frequency of *Referendum* in CDU and CSU Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alexander Radwan	Jan. 31, 2019	1	11.11	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Oct. 17, 2018	1	11.11	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Nov. 9, 2018	2	22.22	Bundestag
Kai Whittaker	June 28, 2016	1	11.11	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Feb. 13, 2020	1	11.11	Bundestag
Lucia Puttrich	Feb. 14, 2020	1	11.11	Bundesrat
Matthias Hauer	Jan. 31, 2019	1	11.11	Bundestag
Ralph Brinkhaus	June 28, 2016	1	11.11	Bundestag
Total		9	100.00	

### 3.6.4.3 *Austreten* (Leave)

German press articles on the Internet mention the issue of *Austritt* (leaving) or *Verbleib* (remaining) of the UK in the EU (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2021; Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg, n.d.). These German nouns and their corresponding verbs were analyzed as equivalents of the English *leave* (*leaving*) and *remain* (*remaining*). The issue of German equivalents of the British terms was already discussed earlier in this chapter.

The noun *Austritt* and the corresponding verb *austreten* were searched for in the CDU and CSU speeches with the help of the search term *austr\**. This provided 104 occurrences, out of which 101 occurrences were taken into consideration after the irrelevant occurrences had been deleted. The search was

verified with *aus\**, which yielded 491 results and allowed to find 6 more instances of *Austritt* (written as *Aus- tritt*) and related words among these results, i.e., hyphenated compounds with *Austritt*. Such compounds were also found in the first search. Among them were, e.g., *Austrittsabkommen* (*withdrawal* or *exit agreement*) and *Austrittsprozess* (*withdrawal* or *exit process*).

The searches were also verified with *tritt\**, as, due to German grammar, the form *austritt* (third person, singular) of the verb *austreten* could occur in a sentence/utterance in the form *tritt...aus*, with *aus* being at the end of the sentence/utterance. The search resulted in 13 occurrences of *tritt*. However, none of the utterances contained the verb *austritt* in the mentioned form. The search for the term *ausgetreten*, i.e., a past tense of *austreten*, allowed to find 3 more results. A search was also conducted with the search term *trete\** which could appear in the phrase *trete(n)...aus\**, which would be a form of *austrete* (first person singular) or *austreten* (first person plural or third person plural). The search with *trete\** resulted in 4 occurrences, of which none, however, were instances of the mentioned forms of *austreten*. In total 110 occurrences were analyzed. The MS Excel calculations indicated that 97.27% of the occurrences (107 out of 110) were used with regard to the UK leaving the EU, while 2.73% (3 out of 110) were used with a different meaning, once in the context of Anglo-Saxon companies leaving the EU and twice in the context of the hypothetical idea of Germany leaving the EU.

The following table presents the results for each speech concerning the use of *austreten*, *Austritt*, and hyphenated compounds with *Austritt* in the sense of the UK leaving the EU.

Table 15: The Frequency of *Austreten*, *Austritt*, and “*Austritt* Compounds” in CDU and CSU Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Angela Merkel	Oct. 17, 2018	5	4.67	Bundestag
Angela Merkel	Nov. 21, 2018	5	4.67	Bundestag
Angela Merkel	Feb. 22, 2018	2	1.87	Bundestag
Antje Lezius	Feb. 21, 2019	4	3.74	Bundestag
Antje Lezius	Jan. 31, 2019	4	3.74	Bundestag

Table 15 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Christoph Ploß	Nov. 9, 2018	5	4.67	Bundestag
Detlef Seif	Jan. 17, 2019	2	1.87	Bundestag
Detlef Seif	Oct. 17, 2018	3	2.80	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Dec. 13, 2018	6	5.61	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Jan. 17, 2019	6	5.61	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Oct. 17, 2018	4	3.74	Bundestag
Florian Hahn	Nov. 9, 2018	6	5.61	Bundestag
Fritz Güntzler	Feb. 21, 2019	3	2.80	Bundestag
Fritz Güntzler	Jan. 31, 2019	4	3.74	Bundestag
Guido Wolf	Dec. 15, 2017	5	4.67	Bundesrat
Heribert Hirte	Jan. 17, 2019	3	2.80	Bundestag
Jürgen Hardt	Nov. 9, 2018	1	0.93	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Feb. 13, 2020	3	2.80	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.93	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Oct. 17, 2018	4	3.74	Bundestag
Katja Leikert	Nov. 9, 2018	2	1.87	Bundestag
Katrin Staffler	Feb. 13, 2020	4	3.74	Bundestag
Lucia Puttrich	Dec. 15, 2017	3	2.80	Bundesrat
Lucia Puttrich	Feb. 15, 2019	6	5.61	Bundesrat
Lucia Puttrich	Feb. 14, 2020	2	1.87	Bundesrat
Mark Helfrich	Jan. 17, 2020	1	0.93	Bundestag
Matthias Hauer	Jan. 31, 2019	2	1.87	Bundestag
Peter Aumer	Feb. 21, 2019	1	0.93	Bundestag
Peter Aumer	Jan. 31, 2019	9	8.41	Bundestag
Thomas Schäfer	Feb. 15, 2019	1	0.93	Bundestag
Total		107	100.00	

Another German synonym of *leave* investigated in AntConc was *ausscheiden*. The search was conducted with the help of the search term *ausscheide\**. Four results appeared, twice as a verb (*ausscheiden* and *ausscheidet*) and twice as a noun (*Ausscheiden* and *Ausscheidens*). Each time the words were used in

the context of the UK leaving the EU and once simultaneously also in the context of the UK leaving the European Economic Area (EEA). A search with *ausgeschieden*\* was also conducted, but the past tense *ausgeschieden* did not appear and neither did any related word (e.g., *ausgeschiedene*, which functions as an adjective).

The fact that there were considerably more results of *austreten* (in the appropriate forms) rather than of *ausscheiden* (in the proper forms) further underscores the fact indicated in the mentioned German articles on Brexit that *austreten* was the dominating equivalent of the English *leave* used in the discourse of the German politicians.

#### 3.6.4.4 *Bleiben (Remain)*

The word *bleiben*, meaning *remain*, was searched for in different forms with the help of the search term *bleib*\*. 46 occurrences appeared, out of which 45 were taken into consideration, as one utterance with the word occurred in a comment by a different politician during one of the speeches. Only 2 out of the 45 occurrences (4.44%) appeared in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU. There were also instances of *bleiben* in the context of the UK and EU remaining close partners. A search with *geblieben*\* (*geblieben* is a past tense form of *bleiben*) was also conducted, which resulted in 1 occurrence but not in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU. The noun *Verbleib*, which corresponds to the verb *bleiben*, was investigated in AntConc via the search term *verbleib*\* which accounted for 7 results. *Verbleib* was used 3 times (42.86%) in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU, whereas it was used 4 times (57.14%) in a different context, twice (out of 7, i.e., 28.57%) in the context of the UK remaining in the EU customs union. A search with *ver*\* was also conducted to check if there are any more occurrences of *Verbleib* written in a different form. The search provided 831 results, but no extra occurrences of *Verbleib* were found among the 831 results. Thus, altogether *bleiben* and *Verbleib* were used 5 times in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU. The table below presents the results for the specific speeches, in which the terms occur with this meaning.



Table 16: The Frequency of *Bleiben* and *Verbleib* in CDU and CSU Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Florian Hahn	Dec. 13, 2018	1	20.00	Bundestag
Matthias Hauer	Feb. 21, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Kai Whittaker	June 28, 2016	1	20.00	Bundestag
Peter Aumer	Jan. 31, 2019	2	40.00	Bundestag
Total		5	100.00	

Overall, there were considerably fewer examples of *verbleiben* and *Verbleib* than of *austreten* und *Austritt*, which is understandable since the Brexit referendum had resulted in a majority of votes for leaving the EU, and thus, the continuing Brexit debate was then focused on the aspect of leaving the EU. *Leave* was also used more often in British speeches than *remain* for this reason. This signals that speaking about the UK leaving the EU rather than remaining in it became the more relevant topic to mention in the speeches after the referendum.

### 3.6.5 Social Democratic Party of Germany

Next, the occurrence of the term *Brexit* and related words in the speeches of the SPD were investigated.

#### 3.6.5.1 *Brexit*

The term *bre\** was entered into the AntConc search box. The search provided 171 occurrences. It was checked with *br\**, which produced 522 results. No other instances of *Brexit* or related terms were found among these results. 150 occurrences of *Brexit*, including the genitive form *Brexits*, and “*Brexit* compounds” (as in the case of the CDU/CSU speeches) were taken into consideration after other irrelevant instances were omitted from the 171 results. The table below presents the specific results for each speech, in which the 150 hits appeared.

Table 17: The Frequency of *Brexit* and “*Brexit Compounds*” in SPD Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Andrea Nahles	Oct. 17, 2018	3	2.00	Bundestag
Andrea Nahles	Nov. 21, 2018	3	2.00	Bundestag
Andrea Nahles	Feb. 22, 2018	1	0.67	Bundestag
Angelika Glöckner	Feb. 21, 2019	3	2.00	Bundestag
Angelika Glöckner	Jan. 31, 2019	3	2.00	Bundestag
Anna Kassautzki	Apr. 8, 2022	1	0.67	Bundestag
Bärbel Bas	Sept. 9, 2022	1	0.67	Bundestag
Birgit Honé	Dec. 15, 2017	1	0.67	Bundesrat
Birgit Honé	Feb. 15, 2019	14	9.33	Bundesrat
Birgit Honé	Dec. 17, 2021	2	1.33	Bundesrat
Birgit Honé	Feb. 14, 2020	4	2.67	Bundesrat
Christian Petry	Oct. 17, 2018	2	1.33	Bundestag
Christine Lambrecht	Jan. 31, 20193	3	2.00	Bundestag
Dagmar Schmidt	Feb. 21, 2019	7	4.67	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Feb. 13, 2020	1	0.67	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Jan. 17, 2019	7	4.67	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Nov. 9, 2018	2	1.33	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Dec. 13, 2018	8	5.33	Bundestag
Helge Lindh	Feb. 21, 2019	1	0.67	Bundestag
Ingrid Arndt-Brauer	Jan. 17, 2019	6	4.00	Bundestag
Jens Zimmermann	Jan. 17, 2019	7	4.67	Bundestag
Jens Zimmermann	Oct. 17, 2018	4	2.67	Bundestag
Johann Saathoff	May 15, 2018	2	1.33	Bundestag
Johannes Schrap	Jan. 17, 2020	1	0.67	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	Apr. 12, 2019	8	5.33	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	Dec. 13, 2018	1	0.67	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	June 28, 2016	3	2.00	Bundestag
Kirsten Lühmann	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.67	Bundestag
Lothar Binding	Feb. 21, 2019	5	3.33	Bundestag
Markus Töns	Jan. 17, 2019	4	2.67	Bundestag
Martin Burkert	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.67	Bundestag
Martin Schulz	Oct. 17, 2018	1	0.67	Bundestag

Table 17 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Metin Hakverdi	Feb. 13, 2020	1	0.67	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Feb. 21, 2019	6	4.00	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Jan. 31, 2022	5	3.33	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Nov. 9, 2018	1	0.67	Bundestag
Michael Müller	July 6, 2018	3	2.00	Bundesrat
Michael Roth	Dec. 15, 2017	5	3.33	Bundesrat
Michael Roth	Jan. 17, 2020	2	1.33	Bundesrat
Michael Roth	Feb. 14, 2020	1	0.67	Bundesrat
Olaf Scholz	May 15, 2018	2	1.33	Bundestag
Sigmar Gabriel	Mar. 30, 2017	6	4.00	Bundestag
Sören Bartol	Jan. 31, 2019	2	1.33	Bundestag
Thomas Oppermann	June 28, 2016	4	2.67	Bundestag
Wiebke Papenbrock	Jan. 14, 2022	1	0.67	Bundestag
Total		150	100.00	

There were 31 hyphenated compounds with the word *Brexit* in the corpus of the SPD transcripts. These made up 20.67% of the 150 occurrences of *Brexit*. The following compounds were found: *Brexit-Deal* (*Brexit deal*), *Brexit-Frage* (*Brexit issue*), *Brexit-Steuerbegleitgesetz* (*Brexit Tax Accompanying Act*, 4 times), *Brexit-Übergangsgesetz* (*Brexit transitional law*, 4 times), *Brexit-Anpassungsreserve* (*Brexit Adjustment Reserve*), *Brexit-Prozess* (*Brexit process*, twice), *Brexit-Verhandlungen* (*Brexit negotiations*, 7 times), *Brexit-Abkommen* (*Brexit agreement*), *Brexit-Debatte* (*Brexit debate*), *Brexit-Referendum* (*Brexit referendum*, 3 times), *Brexit-Entscheidung* (*Brexit decision*), *Brexit-Befürworter(n)* (*Brexit supporter(s)*, 3 times), *Brexit-Bezug*, and *Brexit-Ära* (*Brexit era*).

It is worth citing a fragment from the speech by Heiko Maas (Dec. 13, 2018), who uses both the word *Brexit* and *Referendum*:

*Der weitverbreitete und sicherlich nachvollziehbare Wunsch, den Brexit rückgängig zu machen, ist etwas, dem wir alle außerordentlich nahestehen, aber wenn man sich die gegenwärtigen Umfragen*

*in Großbritannien anschaut, dann stellt man fest, dass sich seit dem Referendum trotz einer außerordentlich chaotischen Debatte, die dort geführt wird, nicht viel geändert hat. Auch das muss man zur Kenntnis nehmen. (The widespread and surely understandable wish to undo Brexit is something that we all support very much, but when one looks at the current polls in Great Britain, then one finds that not much has changed since the referendum, despite the extraordinarily chaotic debate that is taking place there. One must also take that into consideration).*

Maas implies that he is an opponent of Brexit and identifies himself with other politicians who do not support it either. He further implies that although the debate over Brexit in the British parliament is chaotic and that this should lead those who had voted to leave to change their minds and wish to remain, this is not happening. Thus, another implicature that can be deduced is that Maas does not approve of the way Brexit discussions are led in the British parliament. The phrase *Der weitverbreitete und sicherlich nachvollziehbare Wunsch, den Brexit rückgängig zu machen* (*The widespread and surely understandable wish to undo Brexit*) can be treated as an element which brings about a poetic effect and which, thus, emphasizes the view that avoiding Brexit would be the proper decision. The phrase may also be perceived as echoic because Maas is not only referring to his own attitude but also to the attitudes expressed by other politicians.

### 3.6.5.2 *Referendum*

The next term searched for was *Referendum* and terms related to it with the help of the search term *refe\**. There were 21 results, out of which one was omitted, as it occurred in an utterance by another politician who intervened during the actual speech. Another search was conducted with *re\**, which resulted in 491 occurrences, among which one extra occurrence of *Referendum* in the form *Re-ferendum* was found. (The way in which certain words are written is the effect of how the PDF document with the speeches was formatted, e.g., part of the word *Referendum* was in one line and the second part was in the following line). Thus, a total of 21 occurrences were investigated.

In total, 66.67% (14 out of 21) of the occurrences of *Referendum*, including one occurrence of *Referendumergebnisses* (i.e., the genitive form of *Referendumergebnis*, which means *referendum result*), were used with regard to the Brexit referendum conducted in 2016, whereas 33.33% (7 out of 21) appeared in a different sense, i.e., 23.81% (5 out of 21) occurred in the context of a possible second Brexit referendum and 9.52% (2 out of 21) in a different context (once the lexeme was used to refer to a possible independence referendum in Scotland and once to referenda in France and in the Netherlands, in which case the plural form *Referenden* (1 occurrence out of 21, i.e., 4.76%) was used). The following table presents the results for given speeches concerning the use of the words *Referendum* and *Referendumergebnis* with regard to the 2016 Brexit referendum.

Table 18: The Frequency of *Referendum* and *Referendumergebnis* in SPD Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Birgit Honé	Feb. 15, 2019	1	7.14	Bundesrat
Birgit Honé	Feb. 14, 2020	1	7.14	Bundesrat
Heiko Maas	Dec. 13, 2018	1	7.14	Bundestag
Jens Zimmermann	Oct. 17, 2018	3	21.43	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	Dec. 13, 2018	5	35.71	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	June 28, 2016	2	14.29	Bundestag
Thomas Oppermann	June 28, 2016	1	7.14	Bundestag
Total		14	100.00	

The fact that the majority of the occurrences appeared with regard to the 2016 Brexit referendum is a natural consequence of the speeches being concerned with Brexit, and thus, with the outcomes or possible outcomes of Brexit from the point of view of the politicians delivering the speeches. The referendum which took place is, therefore, mentioned more frequently than, e.g., the possibility of a second referendum on Brexit.

### 3.6.5.3 *Austreten (Leave)*

The search for instances of *austreten* (in its given forms) and *Austritt* was conducted with the help of the search term *austr\**, which yielded 77 results, out of which 68 were investigated as occurrences from the actual speeches. The remaining occurrences were not part of the speeches but of introductions by the leader of the debate or of comments by other politicians. Next, the search was verified with the search term *aus\**, which resulted in 502 occurrences, out of which 6 extra results were found which had been used in the speeches with regard to the UK leaving the EU.

Another search was conducted with a past tense form of *austreten*, i.e., *ausgetreten*. One result appeared, which concerned the fact that the UK left the EU on Jan. 31, 2020. The utterance with this occurrence was found in the speech by Michael Roth, which he gave on Feb. 14, 2020 as the Minister of State for Europe at the German Federal Foreign Office.

The search was then verified with *tritt\**, but no occurrences with *tritt...aus* were found. The search was also conducted with *trete\**. 7 occurrences appeared, but apart from one, which was also found during the search with *aus\**, no other occurrences with other forms of *austreten* were found.

Then, a total of 75 results were analyzed, out of which 74 (98.67%) were occurrences referring to the UK leaving the EU, while the remaining one (1.33%) was used in the sense of leaving the EU customs union and single market and the European Economic Area by the UK. This utterance appeared in the speech given by Michael Roth on Dec. 15, 2017. Among the other 74 results were hyphenated compounds such as *Austrittsabkommen* and *Austrittsvertrag*, both meaning *withdrawal* (or *exit*) *agreement*. The table below presents the 74 results for the given speeches concerning the use of the words *austreten*, *Austritt* and the “*Austritt* compounds” with regard to the UK leaving the EU.

Table 19: The Frequency of *Austreten*, *Austritt* and “*Austritt* Compounds” in SPD Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Angelika Glöckner	Feb. 21, 2019	1	1.35	Bundestag
Angelika Glöckner	Jan. 31, 2019	4	5.41	Bundestag
Birgit Honé	Feb. 15, 2019	3	4.05	Bundestag
Birgit Honé	Feb. 14, 2020	4	5.41	Bundestag
Christian Petry	Feb. 22, 2018	1	1.35	Bundestag
Christine Lambrecht	Jan. 31, 2019	6	8.11	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Jan. 17, 2019	6	8.11	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Nov. 21, 2018	2	2.70	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Nov. 9, 2018	5	6.76	Bundestag
Heiko Maas	Dec. 13, 2018	5	6.76	Bundestag
Jens Zimmermann	Jan. 17, 2019	1	1.35	Bundestag
Jens Zimmermann	Oct. 17, 2018	2	2.70	Bundestag
Lothar Binding	Feb. 21, 2019	1	1.35	Bundestag
Markus Töns	Feb. 13, 2020	1	1.35	Bundestag
Markus Töns	Jan. 17, 2019	1	1.35	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Feb. 21, 2019	4	5.41	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Nov. 9, 2018	1	1.35	Bundestag
Michael Roth	Dec. 15, 2017	5	6.76	Bundesrat
Norbert Spinrath	June 28, 2016	5	6.76	Bundestag
Olaf Scholz	May 15, 2018	2	4.05	Bundestag
Sigmar Gabriel	Mar. 30, 2017	8	10.81	Bundestag
Thomas Oppermann	June 28, 2016	3	4.05	Bundestag
Michael Roth	Feb. 14, 2020	1	1.35	Bundesrat
Katarina Barley	Dec. 13, 2018	1	1.35	Bundestag
Total		74	100.00	

#### 3.6.5.4 *Bleiben* (Remain)

The next lexeme searched for in AntConc was *bleiben* with the help of the search term *bleib*\*. 48 results appeared and all of them were taken into consideration, as there were no comments or questions of other politicians during the

speeches in which these results occurred. Only 4 occurrences appeared strictly with regard to the UK remaining in the EU, although other results were also connected with this issue. The search term *verbleib*\* was also investigated. The search provided 8 results, but only one referred to the issue of the UK staying in the EU. The search for *geblieben*, a past tense form of *bleiben*, provided only one occurrence, which was not concerned with the UK remaining in the EU. In total, there were 57 occurrences, out of which 5 (8.77%) were used in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU, whereas 52 (91.23%) appeared in a different sense. The results for each speech in which *bleiben* (in the appropriate grammatical form) and *Verbleib* were used with regard to the UK remaining in the EU are presented in the table below.

Table 20: The Frequency of *Bleiben* and *Verbleib* in SPD Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Heiko Maas	Jan. 17, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Katarina Barley	Dec. 13, 2018	1	20.00	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Feb. 21, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Metin Hakverdi	Jan. 31, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Norbert Spinrath	June 28, 2016	1	20.00	Bundestag
Total		5	100.00	

### 3.6.6 Alternative for Germany

The next speeches, in which the Brexit-related terms were investigated in Ant-Conc, were those given by AfD politicians. The following subsections present the analysis.

#### 3.6.6.1 *Brexit*

The lexeme *Brexit* was searched for with the help of *bre*\*, which resulted in 148 occurrences. It was verified with a search with the search term *br*\*, which presented 462 results, but no other occurrences of *Brexit* were found among them, apart from those already found via the *bre*\* search. 128 out of the 148



occurrences were taken into consideration after utterances with *Brexit* stated by other politicians during the actual speeches and words beginning with *bre*\* other than *Brexit* were deleted. The following table presents the results for the particular speeches, in which the lexeme *Brexit* and “*Brexit* compounds” were used.

Table 21: The Frequency of *Brexit* and “*Brexit* Compounds” in AfD Speeches

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Albrecht Glaser	Feb. 21, 2019	2	1.56	Bundestag
Albrecht Glaser	Jan. 31, 2019	2	1.56	Bundestag
Alexander Gauland	Oct. 17, 2018	9	7.03	Bundestag
Alexander Gauland	Mar. 21, 2019	4	3.13	Bundestag
Alexander Gauland	Apr. 12, 2019	2	1.56	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	May 16, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Oct. 17, 2018	4	3.13	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Mar. 21, 2019	6	4.69	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Feb. 22, 2018	2	1.56	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Dec. 9, 2020	1	0.78	Bundestag
Andreas Bleck	May 6, 2021	1	0.78	Bundestag
Armin-Paulus Hampel	Nov. 21, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Christian Wirth	Sept. 10, 2020	1	0.78	Bundestag
Corinna Miazga	Jan. 30, 2020	1	0.78	Bundestag
Enrico Komning	Jan. 31, 2019	3	2.34	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Dec. 13, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Dec. 13, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Nov. 21, 2017	1	0.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	June 8, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Jochen Haug	Apr. 4, 2019	6	4.69	Bundestag
Lars Herrmann	Sept. 26, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Dec. 12, 2017	8	6.25	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Dec. 13, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Feb. 13, 2020	8	6.25	Bundestag

Table 21 (continued)

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Martin Hebner	Jan. 17, 2019	2	1.56	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Oct. 17, 2018	5	3.91	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Nov. 9, 2018	13	10.16	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Feb. 21, 2019	14	10.94	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Nov. 21, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Apr. 23, 2021	1	0.78	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Oct. 9, 2020	1	0.78	Bundestag
Peter Boehringer	May 15, 2018	2	1.56	Bundestag
Peter Felser	Mar. 23, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
René Springer	Jan. 31, 2019	7	5.47	Bundestag
Roman Reusch	Nov. 26, 2020	3	2.34	Bundestag
Rüdiger Lucassen	Dec. 12, 2017	1	0.78	Bundestag
Siegbert Droese	July 2, 2020	1	0.78	Bundestag
Siegbert Droese	Feb. 23, 2018	1	0.78	Bundestag
Stefan Keuter	Jan. 17, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Thomas Seitz	Feb. 21, 2019	1	0.78	Bundestag
Ulrike Schielke-Ziesing	Nov. 24, 2022	1	0.78	Bundestag
Total		128	100.00	

The AfD party's speeches contain the following hyphenated compounds formed with the word *Brexit*: *Brexit-Steuerbegleitgesetz* (*Brexit Tax Accompanying Act*), *Brexit-Befürworter* (*Brexit supporters*, twice), *Brexit-Drama* (*Brexit drama*), *Brexit-Unterhändler* (*Brexit negotiators*), *Brexit-Vertrag* (*Brexit agreement*), *Brexit-Teil* (*Brexit part*), *Brexit-Deal* (*Brexit deal*), *Brexit-Begründung* (*Brexit justification*), *Brexit-Chaos* (*Brexit chaos*), *Brexit-Entscheidung* (*Brexit decision*, twice), *Brexit-Referendum* (*Brexit referendum*), *Brexit-Übergangsgesetz* (*Brexit transitional law*), and *Brexit-Verhandlungen* (*Brexit negotiations*).

As the results in the case of all the six parties indicate, the lexeme *Brexit* was used frequently by all of them, which is a natural consequence of the fact that the speeches were concerned with the Brexit debate. This lexeme was, thus, of particular significance, a term coined to refer to the exit of the United

Kingdom from the European Union. Therefore, it can be stated that the term itself carries relevance as everyone familiar with the UK's withdrawal from the EU will automatically relate this term to this phenomenon when hearing it. The very mentioning of the Brexit issue in those speeches which were not specifically focused on Brexit indicates the high significance of the issue and the politicians' eagerness to mention it, regardless of the given politician's or party's stance towards it.

### 3.6.6.2 Referendum

The next term searched for was *Referendum* as well as terms related to it with the help of the search term *refe\**. This yielded 7 results, which were then copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet. All the results were occurrences of *Referendum*. Another search was then conducted with the search term *re\** to check if no other hits of the word *Referendum* or of related terms were to be found in the speeches. The search resulted in 479 occurrences, out of which one extra occurrence, apart from the 7 other results which had already been obtained, was an occurrence of *Referendum*. Thus, there was a total of 8 occurrences of *Referendum*, out of which 5 (62.50%), as the further analysis showed, referred to the 2016 Brexit referendum, while the remaining 3 (37.50%) were used in a different sense, considered with Germany itself. The table below presents the results concerning the use of *Referendum* in the sense of the 2016 Brexit referendum in the case of the given speeches.

Table 22: The Frequency of *Referendum* in AfD Speeches Used with Regard to the 2016 Brexit Referendum

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Alice Weidel	Feb. 22, 2018	1	20.00	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Dec. 13, 2018	1	20.00	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Oct. 17, 2018	1	20.00	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Feb. 21, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Jochen Haug	Apr. 4, 2019	1	20.00	Bundestag
Total		5	100.00	

The results achieved in the case of all the parties indicate that the lexeme *referendum* or *Referendum* was generally used more frequently by the British politicians rather than by the German politicians. An exception may be the DUP, which did not use the word that often, despite this party's strong support for delivering on the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum. The generally more frequent use of the word by British rather than by German politicians can be an indication that the British politicians were more inclined to refer to the Brexit referendum as this had been a crucial event for their country, the result of which actually led to the implementation of Brexit. Thus, the word *referendum* can be perceived as carrying more relevance for the British than for the German politicians in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum. However, in the case of both British and German listeners, the knowledge about this particular referendum and its consequences allowed to form (to some extent) the listeners' cognitive environment, which was a basis for them to interpret the relevance of the term *referendum* and the utterances in which it occurred.

### 3.6.6.3 *Austreten* (Leave)

The next search term investigated (in AfD speeches) in AntConc was *austr\**. The search yielded 45 results, which were then copied into an MS Excel spreadsheet and analyzed. 40 of these occurrences were further investigated after the irrelevant results were deleted. Among the 40 results were occurrences of *austreten* (one occurrence), *Austritt*, the adjective *austretende* (*leaving*, one occurrence), and hyphenated compounds with *Austritt*, such as *Austrittsabkommen* and *Austrittsvertrag*. Next, the search was verified with the help of *aus\**, which resulted in 376 occurrences, out of which 3 were "extra" occurrences of *Austritt* in the form *Aus- tritt(s)*. One of these was not considered in the further analysis, as it appeared in a comment by a politician not giving one of the actual speeches. The search for words or forms connected with *austreten* was also conducted with the help of *tritt\**, which resulted in 9 occurrences, but no new occurrences for analysis were found, i.e., there were no occurrences of *tritt...aus*. The search was also conducted with *trete\**, which presented 2 results, of which one of them was relevant for the analysis and appeared in the form *treten...aus* in the sense of the UK leaving the EU. Another search was conducted, with the form *ausgetreten*, but no occurrences were found. Thus,

in total 43 results were considered for further analysis, and 36 of them were found to be concerned with the UK leaving the EU as a result of the 2016 Brexit referendum. The table below presents the details concerning these 36 results. Other occurrences also mentioned leaving the EU, but, e.g., they regarded the issue that other EU member states might want to leave in the future. The issue of leaving was also mentioned with regard to the historical aspect of the UK's possibility of leaving the EEC, which, however, had not come into being.

Table 23: The Frequency of *Austreten*, *Austritt*, and “*Austritt* Compounds” in AfD Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Leaving the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
Albrecht Glaser	Feb. 21, 2019	2	5.56	Bundestag
Alexander Gauland	Feb. 22, 2018	1	2.78	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Oct. 17, 2018	1	2.78	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Mar. 21, 2019	2	5.56	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Dec. 9, 2020	1	2.78	Bundestag
Corinna Miazga	Jan. 30, 2020	1	2.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Dec. 13, 2018	1	2.78	Bundestag
Harald Weyel	Jan. 17, 2019	1	2.78	Bundestag
Jochen Haug	Apr. 4, 2019	1	2.78	Bundestag
Lars Herrmann	Sept. 26, 2019	1	2.78	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Dec. 12, 2017	1	2.78	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Dec. 13, 2018	7	19.44	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Feb. 13, 2020	1	2.78	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Oct. 17, 2018	3	8.33	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Nov. 9, 2018	3	8.33	Bundestag
Martin Hess	May 6, 2021	1	2.78	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Jan. 17, 2019	1	2.78	Bundestag
Norbert Kleinwächter	Feb. 21, 2019	3	8.33	Bundestag
René Springer	Jan. 31, 2019	2	5.56	Bundestag
Stefan Keuter	Jan. 17, 2019	1	2.78	Bundestag
Total		36	100.00	

#### 3.6.6.4 *Bleiben (Remain)*

The search term *bleib\** was then used to search for *bleiben* and related terms. This produced 20 occurrences, out of which 17 were considered as instances appearing in the actual speeches. The majority did not appear in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU. Next, the search term *verbleib\** was investigated. AntConc found 4 occurrences, out of which all were taken into consideration for further analysis after checking in MS Excel if they appeared in the actual speeches or if they occurred in comments or questions of other members who intervened during the speeches. All 4 occurrences appeared in the actual speeches.

The term *geblieben* was then searched for, which resulted in two occurrences, of which one was considered for further analysis. Overall, 22 occurrences were analyzed. Only 3 (*bleiben*, *verbleiben* (also meaning *remain*), and *Verbleib*) out of the 22 occurrences (13.64%) appeared in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU (each once), whereas the 19 (86.36%) other occurrences appeared with a different meaning. The table below shows the results for the specific speeches regarding the 3 occurrences appearing in the former sense. *Bleiben* appeared in Springer's speech, *verbleiben* in Weidel's speech, and *Verbleib* in Hebner's speech.

Table 24: The Frequency of *Bleiben*, *Verbleiben*, and *Verbleib* in AfD Speeches Used with Regard to the UK Remaining in the EU

Speaker	Date of speech	Number of occurrences	Percent (%)	House of Parliament
René Springer	Jan. 31, 2019	1	33.33	Bundestag
Alice Weidel	Mar. 21, 2019	1	33.33	Bundestag
Martin Hebner	Oct. 17, 2018	1	33.33	Bundestag
Total		3	100.00	

The following example with the crucial Brexit-related words *Brexit*, *Referendum*, *Austritt*, and *Verbleib* appears in the mentioned speech by AfD politician Martin Hebner (Oct. 17, 2018):

*Zum Thema Brexit: Am 23. Juni 2016 haben die Bürger des Vereinigten Königreichs in einem Referendum, in einer Entscheidung*

*aller Bürger, über den Verbleib in der EU abgestimmt. Die Mehrheit der Bürger hat für einen Austritt votiert. Die Kommentare in den meisten deutschen Medien waren in dem Falle vernichtend. Es fehlte – im Übrigen auch bei vielen hier – der Respekt vor dem Willen der Bürger, vor dem Votum der Bürger. (Concerning Brexit: On June 23, 2016 the citizens of the United Kingdom voted in a referendum, in a decision of all citizens, over remaining in the EU. The majority of the citizens voted to leave. The comments in most of the German media were in this case devastating. There was a lack – by the way, also from many here – of respect for the will of the citizens, for the vote of the citizens.)*

In this fragment, Hebner emphasizes the relevance of his utterance via the use of the mentioned four significant lexemes. At the beginning, he directly focuses the addressees' attention on the fact that he will be talking about Brexit. By providing the date of the referendum on Brexit, he underlines the significance of this event, and thus, of the will of the majority of the British voters to leave the EU. He strongly criticizes those German media and politicians in the Bundestag who made, as he states, *devastating* comments regarding this decision. The use of the adjective *devastating* adds particular emphasis to his opinion that these comments were very disrespectful towards the will of the voters opting to leave. Hebner also highlights this by using repetition in *in einem Referendum, in einer Entscheidung* (*in a referendum, in a decision*) and in *vor dem Willen der Bürger, vor dem Votum der Bürger* (*for the will of the citizens, for the vote of the citizens*). All of these stylistic treatments add emotionality to the politician's utterance, and therefore, can bring about its greater relevance.

### 3.7 The Results of All the Parties


The following section presents the results for all the parties concerning the frequency of the use of a given lexeme. It is to serve a clear comparison (a visualization) between the frequencies of the parties' use of the given word. The tables and graphs in this section are a summary of the previous tables.

The following table and graph present the number of occurrences of the term *Brexit* and related terms, i.e., of *Brexit* and of the hyphenated compounds with *Brexit* (in the German speeches), in the case of the particular parties.

Table 25: The Number of Occurrences of *Brexit* and Related Terms in the Speeches of Particular Parties

Conservative Party	Labour Party	DUP	CDU/CSU	SPD	AfD
129	169	119	191	150	128

Graph 1:



As the results indicate, despite that there was quite a large difference between the smallest (119) and the largest (191) number of occurrences, the lexeme *Brexit* was used frequently in the case of all the parties, i.e., more often than 100 times and less often than 200 times. The term, thus, fulfilled a crucial function in the speeches, as a naturally occurring element of texts on the topic of Brexit. By using it in given contexts, the politicians wanted to indicate the relevance of the topic and of their opinions on the matter.


The next table and graph present the overall results for *referendum* and *Referendum* and the plural forms of these words as well as for *Referendumergebnis* (*referendum result*), which appeared in an SPD speech.



Table 26: The Number of Occurrences of *Referendum* and Related Terms in the Speeches of Particular Parties

Conservative Party	Labour Party	DUP	CDU/CSU	SPD	AfD
54	43	17	9	14	5

Graph 2:



The results indicate that there were considerable differences between the number of occurrences of *referendum* and related terms in the speeches of the particular parties. There was a significant difference between the highest (54 and 43) and lowest (5 and 9) results. It can be clearly seen that the word *referendum* or *Referendum* was used with a varying frequency by the different parties. While the German politicians seldom used the lexeme, the politicians from the Conservative Party and Labour Party used it much more frequently. The DUP did not use it that often. Nevertheless, it used the lexeme more often than the German parties, slightly more often than the SPD. Generally, it can be stated that, although the 2016 Brexit referendum was mentioned by all parties, the British parties were more eager to underscore the word *referendum*, which can be a signal that this issue had considerable importance to them, thus maximizing the relevance of their utterances concerning the referendum. An


important issue was the call for honoring the referendum result, which was emphasized by both British and German politicians.

The next table and graph present the results for the lexeme *leave* or *austreten* and words related with them.

Table 27: The Number of Occurrences of *Leave*, *Austreten*, and Related Terms in the Speeches of Particular Parties

Conservative Party	Labour Party	DUP	CDU/CSU	SPD	AfD
179	77	62	107	74	36

Graph 3:




The results indicate that there were significant differences between the parties concerning the use of the word *leave* or *austreten* and other words related with them. However, the terms, regardless of the number of occurrences in the case of a given party, were important in the Brexit context presented in their speeches. It may be surprising that the AfD used the lexeme the least frequently since this party strongly underscored the fact that the majority of UK voters had chosen the option to leave. Nevertheless, the AfD showed their support for the decision of the British voters via other linguistic means, outlined in the next section (4.4).

The following table presents the results achieved for *remain* or *bleiben* and their related forms.

Table 28: The Number of Occurrences of *Remain*, *Bleiben*, and Related Terms in the Speeches of Particular Parties

Conservative Party	Labour Party	DUP	CDU/CSU	SPD	AfD
21	14	9	5	5	3

Graph 4:



As the results indicate, the lexemes *remain* and *bleiben* as well as their related terms were not used frequently in the sense of the UK remaining in the EU. Although the Conservative Party used the word considerably more often than, e.g., the AfD, the word still did not appear often in its speeches. *Remain* was used much less frequently than *leave* in the Brexit sense, which indicates that the issue of leaving had become much more significant after the 2016 Brexit referendum than the issue of remaining. By speaking frequently about the aspect of leaving, the politicians drew on the cognitive environment of their listeners who were aware of the fact that the result of the 2016 referendum had indicated that the majority of the voters want the UK to leave the EU. Thus, the

aspect of leaving was emphasized in the speeches, as the Brexit debate after the referendum was focused on the matters concerned with leaving, such as Brexit negotiations between the UK and the EU and the aspect of a further referendum which was advocated by some politicians.

### 3.8 An Analysis of Themes Appearing in the Speeches and of Chosen Utterances in Which They Occur

The next part of the analysis was concerned with determining the themes which appeared in the speeches. The fifty speeches of one party at a time were uploaded into AntConc, which allowed to read them more easily with the help of the File View tool. The main themes from each speech were entered into an MS Excel spreadsheet, along with citations reflecting them. This allowed to investigate which themes appeared in the Brexit debate or in connection with this debate. The purpose was to determine which of them played primary roles in the case of the speeches of each party, whether this indicated if one party or more talked about a given theme, and which themes or facts and opinions concerning these themes appeared mainly in the British or German speeches or in the speeches of the particular types of parties, namely center-right, center-left, or right-wing and far-right. Chosen utterances concerning given themes are investigated in terms of relevance theory. Thus, the analysis of these utterances is conducted in the same way as that of the utterances embedding the Brexit-related terms in the previous section.

#### 3.8.1 Conservative Party

The first speeches to be analyzed from the thematic perspective were those of the Conservative Party members. The following themes occurred in their speeches: the withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU<sup>10</sup>, the issue of Northern Ireland and the Irish backstop, formally the Northern Ireland Protocol (Curtis, 2018) (and thus, the importance of the Good Friday Agreement and the aspect

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<sup>10</sup> May's withdrawal agreement had been rejected three times by the House of Commons, as stated by Sandford (2020).

of British-Irish relationships), a component of the withdrawal agreement negotiated by Theresa May with the EU (Curtis, 2018). Part of the politicians from the party indicated their support for the deal which Theresa May negotiated with the EU, while others were against it, perceiving it as harmful to the UK.

Other fundamental issues which appeared in the speeches were the importance of honoring the result of the 2016 referendum on Brexit and the matter of British sovereignty, freedom, and democracy concerned with it. EU control was criticized and the EU was even depicted as inhibiting the development of the UK. A crucial matter which was mentioned was also the importance of the UK's friendship with the EU. Many politicians underscored that they want the UK to maintain a relationship of partnership and friendship with the EU after Brexit.

Furthermore, the economic aspects of Brexit were also mentioned. Crucial themes included the matter of the UK remaining in the EU single market and customs union. Other subjects which were raised were the issue of security, a possible second Brexit referendum (an idea criticized by Brexiteers in the party), the issue of a possible no-deal scenario, and thus, a free trade arrangement with the EU, the idea of taking back control from the EU after Brexit, and the idea of stopping paying fees to the EU after the withdrawal. The aspect of signing free trade agreements with other countries after Brexit also occurred. However, the possible danger of Brexit not being delivered was mentioned as well.

Other aspects which appeared in the speeches were: Brexit as a means of opportunities, the idea of global Britain, the significance of the unity of the United Kingdom, and the end of free movement to the UK after Brexit.

Further themes included the achievements of the UK and of the Conservative Party government, the importance of taking care of the British citizens by the government, environmental protection in the UK, and criticism of other parties, e.g., the Labour Party and the Scottish National Party.

In her speech on Oct. 9, 2017, Theresa May mentions the aspect of the UK's membership in the EU customs union and single market, stating that the country will not remain in these arrangements, as the British citizens had voted to take back control from the EU:

*I have been clear that when we leave the European Union we will no longer be members of its single market or its customs union. The*

*British people voted for control of their borders, their laws and their money, and that is what this Government are going to deliver. At the same time, we want to find a creative solution to a new economic relationship.*

In this utterance May explicitly states her stance on the UK's further membership in the EU single market and customs union. She then implies that since the British citizens voted for control of the country's borders, laws, and money, then leaving these two EU arrangements is the proper way to deliver on the referendum result, in which these expectations were expressed by the voters. The repetition of *their* in *their borders, their laws and their money* underscores this idea, and thus, serves the optimization of the relevance conveyed by May's utterance. May also explicitly states, however, that the government (*we*) wants to find a *solution to a new economic relationship* with the EU. By using the word *creative* she indicates that this should be an optimal relationship. May's utterance can yield the contextual implication that she and her government care for the future relationships between the UK and the EU.

In another speech on Mar. 29, 2019, Theresa May states that the government's withdrawal agreement with the EU delivers on the referendum result, emphasizing that it is the best possible deal for the UK economy:

*Can I say to the hon. Gentleman, as I have said to the House before, that if he looks at the economic analysis and the different types of Brexit that could take place, he will see that the deal that delivers on the result of the referendum and has the best economic outcome for this country is the deal that the Government have put forward?.*

May uses a rhetorical question to answer to MP Geraint Davies who expresses his dissatisfaction with the deal. This way she aims at optimizing the relevance of her utterance, as a rhetorical question should cause a listener to reflect on its content.

Another fragment worth considering is the following one from Ranbir Singh Suri's speech (Jan. 25, 2018):

*My Lords, Brexit must be a moment of national renewal. Should it appear to be a moment of national stagnation, any changes that we make can be reversed by future generations with ease. With that in mind, let us turn to the future of the union.*

The phrase *Brexit must be a moment of national renewal* may be interpreted as the opinion that Brexit brings opportunities. *National renewal* functions as an element of more sophisticated language, bringing about a poetic effect, and can, thus, produce different weak implicatures, such as the implicature that Brexit is a means of opportunities or that it is a way to introduce new measures in the UK, which will help the country prosper. Suri then also uses the metaphor *turn to the future of the union*, implying that he wants to speak about the future of the United Kingdom in the context of Brexit. It should also be noted that he addresses his listeners with the words *My Lords*, which is an element of parliamentary language that can also be found in the other analyzed speeches which were given in the House of Lords. Such recurring expressions in the speeches indicate that this is the proper way to address other members of the House, which is a contextual implicature derived from investigating the speeches.

Suri further speaks of his support for devolution. He states the following:

*I have been a consistent supporter of devolution in this place, and I have also been looking at the case for an English Parliament, which might strengthen the union. Brexit provides a chance to send a great number of powers to our three devolved Parliaments, especially on rural affairs, and I have been disappointed to see the ongoing tussle between the Government and the devolved Administrations.*

Suri specifies that Brexit is an opportunity for devolution by stating metaphorically that it allows *to send a great number of powers* to the three devolved parliaments in the UK, namely those in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The metaphor can be interpreted as referring to politicians who would work in those parliaments to serve the people of the three mentioned regions of the UK.

Another MP, Philip Hammond (Nov. 22, 2017), states that supporting the development of the skills of British citizens will positively influence the country's growth. He mentions this in the following fragment:

*Backing skills is key to unlocking growth nationally, but far too much of our economic strength is concentrated in our capital city. If we are truly to build an economy that is fit for the future, we have to get all parts of the UK firing on all cylinders. That is what our modern industrial strategy is all about.*

The informal, metaphorical expression *get all parts of the UK firing on all cylinders* adds emotionality to his utterance and shows his determination to support the development of the UK. As a metaphor, the expression achieves its relevance via different implicatures. One such implicature, for instance, may be that the UK's economy will prosper when different branches in all areas of the UK will be developed. Another implicature may be the sheer fact that Hammond wants to take part in working towards this progress.

Later in his speech he emphasizes this message by stating:

*We will also make over £1 billion of discounted lending available to local authorities across the country to support high-value infrastructure projects – a Conservative Government giving power back to the people of Britain, and driving prosperity and greater fairness across our United Kingdom.*

Thus, *giving power back to the people of Britain* can be interpreted as taking back control from the EU over the UK's own plans for development as a result of Brexit. It is also implied that Hammond and the rest of the Conservative Party government care for the British people. The politician indicates that he identifies himself with his party. These implicatures can yield the next implicature that as a strong party, the Conservative government can bring about its plans of leading the UK to prosperity. In general, the cited fragment further underscores Hammond's determination and should, therefore, maximize the relevance of what he says, assuming that the listener believes him (as is the case with all the speeches).

The importance of sovereignty for the British people is depicted, for instance by Martin Vickers, who states:



*Needless to say, I strongly disagree with my hon. Friend. The people voted to leave the structure of the economic union, and they wanted to slam the door closed. They wanted a clean break. They were not thinking about our future relationship; they said, "We've had enough of the existing relationship".*

Vickers answers this way to MP Antoinette Sandbach when she mentions that the referendum did not concern the future relationship with the EU but the UK's membership in the EU itself and that as such it should not be taken into consideration when deciding about the shape of the future relationship. Vickers emphasizes the British people's determination to leave the EU to end the existing relationship with it by using the phrases *clean break* and *slam the door closed*, which, as informal expressions, allow him to add emotionality to what he says, and thus, indicate that his view is meaningful. Despite that the two phrases also function as metaphors in this utterance and can, as such, yield weak implicatures, the main message that Vickers is attempting to bring about is then elucidated in the following two utterances of the fragment, i.e., that because the British citizens no longer want the existing relationship with the EU, they voted to leave the EU, which can, thus, be interpreted as a bridging implicature.

Furthermore, "*We've had enough of the existing relationship*" functions as an echoic utterance due to the quotation which Vickers attributes to the British people who voted for the UK to leave the EU. The politician expresses his attitude towards the citizens' vote to leave, indicating that he supports this decision.

### 3.8.2 Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union

The next politicians whose speeches were analyzed from the thematic perspective were members of the CDU and CSU parliamentary faction. The themes which appeared in their speeches were as follows: accepting diversity in Europe and the need for unity in this diversity, the idea of Europe and the EU as "one", the demand for reforms in Europe, Germany as a leader of innovation in the EU, the prosperity in Europe thanks to the mutual cooperation of the EU member states, the need for a tight partnership with the UK after Brexit, the significance of the Brexit negotiations, and the fact that the future relationship with the UK

cannot be disadvantageous for the EU (the danger of the UK becoming more competitive at the cost of the EU and the idea of no “cherry picking” for the UK during the Brexit negotiations with the EU). It was also underscored that the UK will remain a part of Europe after Brexit. The Brexit chaos was described as being caused by the British government, while the EU was praised for its achievements.

The politicians expressed their regret about Brexit and depicted Brexit as a tragedy and a drama but concurrently underscored the need for honoring the referendum result. The CDU and CSU indicated that the EU is working towards a proper withdrawal deal with the UK but that the UK is causing problems by voting against the deal in the House of Commons, which can lead to an unwanted hard Brexit; the hope for a regulated Brexit with a withdrawal agreement was expressed. Simultaneously it was underscored that Germany must be prepared for the case of a hard Brexit. It was emphasized that the UK will be treated as a third country after Brexit and that Brexit shows how precious the EU is and that certain successes are only possible on the European and not on the national level. However, it was also stated that the British should not be punished for Brexit.

Another theme was Brexit’s negative impact on German economy. The faction also highlighted the danger of Brexit becoming a model for other EU member states who may want to leave the EU in the future. It was emphasized that the UK must have the possibility of rejoining the EU. The importance of helping those affected by Brexit by making appropriate laws in the Bundestag was highlighted and the bills of such laws were discussed during the debates.

Furthermore, the possibility of a second Brexit referendum was depicted as an either positive or negative idea. Brexit was portrayed as a warning that the weaknesses of the EU need to be considered and that trust must be restored in the EU. The EU itself was described as a peace project.

Moreover, politicians from the faction expressed their concern about the Irish border issue after Brexit and emphasized the importance of protecting the Good Friday Agreement, also mentioning the importance of the EU’s own relationship with Ireland. Other themes included dealing with migration and climate change (e.g., the significance of the EU’s Green Deal), the significance of the French-German partnership in the EU, and the need for strengthening the EU.

CDU and CSU members also indicated that they are against nationalism and populism, which they believed had led to Brexit. They also underscored the importance of EU elections in the shaping of the EU. Other issues presented in the speeches were the need for working together on security issues in the EU, the mutual responsibility and solidarity of EU member states, and the importance of free movement in the EU. It was also highlighted that the German government takes care of its citizens and that Germany has a good position in world trade. Germany's success in innovation and the importance of German market economy and digitalization in the country were also mentioned.

In her speech on Feb. 14, 2020, Lucia Puttrich states that Brexit is a warning that shows that there is a need to speak about EU weaknesses and about what can be improved. She also states, nevertheless, that the strengths of the EU must be underscored. Puttrich says:

*Sehr geehrte Damen und Herren, der Brexit mahnt uns. Er ist ein Ereignis, bei dem wir zwei Dinge tun müssen: Das eine ist, offen über die Schwächen zu sprechen, die die Europäische Union hat, und darüber, was man besser machen kann. Das ist unsere Verpflichtung; das müssen wir tun. Gleichzeitig müssen wir das, was wir gut können, noch besser machen oder unsere besonderen Stärken betonen. Wir müssen unsere Stärken ausbauen (Ladies and gentlemen, Brexit is a warning to us. It is an event, where we must do two things: the first one is to speak openly about the weaknesses of the European Union and about what can be done better. That is our responsibility; we must do that. Simultaneously we must do that what we are good at even better or emphasize our particular strengths. We must develop our strengths).*

The politician makes use of the personal pronoun *wir* (*we*) and the modal verb *müssen* (*must*) a couple of times, which underscores her message and shows that she identifies herself with the European Union. This serves the optimization of relevance, as she indicates that because she belongs to the European Union she wants to work towards improving the way it functions, along with other politicians. This is, thus, an implicature that can be derived from her words.

On June 28, 2016, Kai Whittaker states the following:

*Es schlagen zwei Herzen in meiner Brust. Als Europäer mag mir, mag uns das Ergebnis vom vergangenen Donnerstag nicht gefallen. Die Einheit des Landes ist in Gefahr. Die wirtschaftlichen Aussichten sind unsicher. Die Zukunft der jungen Briten ist beschnitten. Aber als Demokraten haben wir dieses Ergebnis zu respektieren und umzusetzen. Ein zweites Referendum zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt würde das Land weiter spalten und tiefer ins Chaos führen. (Two hearts beat in my chest. As a European I, we might not like the result from last Thursday. The unity of the country is in danger. The economic prospects are uncertain. The future of the young Britons is curtailed. But as democrats we have to respect this result and implement it. A second referendum at this time would divide the country even more and lead it into deeper chaos.)*

Whittaker states that the result of the Brexit referendum must be honored and that a second referendum would not be a good solution for the UK, believing that it would lead to even greater division and chaos in the British society. He, therefore, implies that the result of the Brexit referendum that was conducted has already led to such division. The assumption can also be formed that the idea of conducting a second referendum is or was taken into consideration.

The cited fragment allows to deduce the implicature that Whittaker regrets the referendum result. By using the metaphorical expression *Es schlagen zwei Herzen in meiner Brust* (*Two hearts beat in my chest*) at the beginning, he can optimize the relevance of this short utterance by leading the listeners to reflect on what he will say next. Thus, he can awaken their interest because the metaphor which he uses can yield different weak implicatures. He makes use of a bridging implicature, as he explains in the next part of the fragment what he means by this, namely that he is a European who regrets the result but concurrently a democrat, and thus, accepts that the result must be implemented.

Another one of the themes appearing in the speeches of the CDU and CSU, namely the fact that the UK will become a third country after Brexit, is expressed in Guido Wolf's speech on Dec. 15, 2017, in which he states:

*Bei allem muss jedoch eines klargestellt werden: Das Vereinigte Königreich wird mit dem Verlassen der EU ein Drittstaat. Wie immer das*

*Abkommen aussehen wird, es muss klar sein, dass Großbritannien als Nicht-Mitglied der EU nicht über die gleichen Rechte und Vorteile verfügt wie ein EU-Mitglied. Es geht nicht darum, das Vereinigte Königreich zu bestrafen. So bitter die Entscheidung für den Brexit ist, wir haben sie als demokratische Willenserklärung zu akzeptieren. (Nevertheless, one thing needs to be made clear: the United Kingdom will become a third country as a result of the exit. Whatever the deal will be, it must be clear that Great Britain as a non-member of the EU cannot have the same rights and benefits as an EU member. It is not about punishing the United Kingdom. As bitter as the decision about Brexit is, we have to accept it as a democratic declaration of intent).*

Similarly to Kai Whittaker, Wolf also signals that the referendum result needs to be accepted but that after Brexit the UK will not be able to have the same rights and advantages that an EU member state has. By stating that it is not about punishing the UK, the assumption should be formed that not allowing the UK to have the same rights and benefits may be perceived as a punishment for the Brexit decision by some. Thus, Wolf, being aware that some think or may think this way, intends to yield the implicature that this is not the case.

It should be noted that Wolf also uses the name of part of the UK, namely *Großbritannien* (*Great Britain*). This is a metonymic use which via disambiguation produces the implicature that he is referring to the UK as a whole and that he is aware that this is a frequent way of referring to the UK, which his listeners should, thus, accept as meaning *the United Kingdom*. This way of referring to the United Kingdom appears in many of the analyzed German speeches and in the British speeches there is a tendency for it to be shortened to *Britain*.

It is worth citing a fragment from Katja Leikert's speech from Jan. 17, 2019, in which she calls the Brexit situation *a drama without end*:

*Sehr geehrter Herr Präsident! Verehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Es ist ein Drama ohne absehbares Ende, ein echtes Trauerspiel mit diesem Brexit, das wir jetzt seit Monaten beobachten. Wir haben gesehen, wie eine stabile, gut funktionierende europäische Demokratie in Chaos und Lähmung abrutscht. Die Folgen für das Vereinigte Königreich, für seine Bürgerinnen und Bürger, sind unabsehbar. Welche Meinung*

*man auch immer zu Europa und zur Europäischen Union hat: Das ist tragisch, das ist erschreckend, und das muss uns alle alarmieren (Dear Mr. President! Dear Colleagues! It is a drama without a foreseeable end, a real tragedy with this Brexit, which we have been observing for months. We have seen how a stable, well-functioning European democracy is slipping into chaos and paralysis. The consequences for the United Kingdom, for its citizens, are unforeseeable. Whatever opinion one has about Europe and about the European Union: this is tragic, this is frightening, and this must alarm us all).*

Leikert's use of the metaphor of a drama whose end cannot be predicted indicates her strong negative stance towards Brexit. She implies that the development of the Brexit situation is uncertain. By her speaking of a well-functioning European democracy which is now experiencing this chaotic situation, the implicature is yielded that she is talking about the United Kingdom. Her utterance about the unpredictable consequences of Brexit for the UK and its citizens allows to derive the implicated conclusion that Leikert is concerned about the British people who are being negatively affected by Brexit. In her last utterance in this fragment she implies that she is aware that not everyone has a positive stance towards the European Union, but makes it explicit that Brexit is a tragic, frightening, and alarming event. She, thus, implies that everyone, independent of their views on the EU should be aware of this, and she aims to emphasize the relevance of her utterance via the repetition of *this is*.

### 3.8.3 Labour Party

The next party whose speeches were analyzed thematically was the Labour Party. Politicians of this political group spoke about the importance of continuing the free movement of goods between the UK and the EU after Brexit and about taking care of the British citizens and the British economy. Thus, they emphasized the significance of dealing with national interests. They generally expressed the view that there is much unclarity concerning Brexit and criticized Theresa May's withdrawal agreement, stating that it threatens the union of the UK. While some of the members stated that they would vote for her deal, they did not remain uncritical of it. The Labour MPs also generally opposed the

option of a no-deal Brexit. They made it clear that the referendum result must be honored, but also indicated that this must be done in an appropriate way, e.g., without damaging the British workers' rights.

Moreover, it was mentioned that the party is being criticized for the lack of an opinion on Brexit. However, it was highlighted that this is not the case, as the party's priorities had been explained. While the politicians praised their own actions, they criticized the Conservative Party government for not leading the Brexit negotiations with the EU properly and referred to the internal problems of the Conservative Party. Labour MPs also spoke of the significance of the connection between the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration (as depicted by Jeremy Corbyn's utterance analyzed in the section on Brexit terms) and expressed their concern about leaving on WTO terms.

The Labour Party was not unanimous on their stance on Brexit, although generally there was a tendency for them to criticize the idea of the negative consequences of Brexit in areas such as economy and fishing because they did not believe that leaving the EU is the appropriate option. Some supported a second referendum. What is more, the Irish backstop was, on the one hand, depicted as a danger but, on the other hand, as an advantage for Northern Ireland to remain in the customs union and single market of the EU. The Irish border problem was also depicted as a consequence of the government's inappropriate actions and the Labour Party's support for the Good Friday agreement, which was connected with this issue, was expressed.

Furthermore, the general scepticism about Brexit brought forth opinions such as that Brexit will not make Britain global and that it is not a means of taking back control. Moreover, the EU was portrayed in the speeches as a trade partner of the UK, and thus, the need for negotiating a good deal with the EU was highlighted. The party also expressed their support for the devolution of power in the UK. They underscored that the country needs to be rebuilt but also praised the UK's good position in the world in areas such as science and the academic level of British universities. Other themes which were mentioned included the protection of the National Health Service (NHS) and issues such as climate change, environmental protection, and migration.

Rupa Huq (Jan. 11, 2021) refers to the idea of global Britain in the following utterance: *Global Britain—a lofty ideal, but with recent months witnessing a dramatic reduction of the UK's international aid and a hard Brexit, I want*

*to strike a note of realism into the Government's one-way triumphalism.* This is an introduction into the rest of her speech, in which she criticizes the negative consequences of Brexit. In this utterance she refers to the government's idea of global Britain, which had been praised, e.g., by Theresa May, who had said that Brexit is a chance for bringing this idea about. In her utterance, thus, Huq implies that she is strongly dissatisfied with the government's actions concerning Brexit. She indicates that the government is satisfied with its actions but that she believes that it has not acted properly.

Julian Hunt (Oct. 20, 2016) also presents his and the Labour Party's general stance on Brexit in the following utterance:

*The debate gives us an opportunity to speak on the future of environment and climate change policy following the EU referendum. The Labour Party has been strong in its support of environmental policies and EU policies, so many of us were of course very disappointed by the Brexit decision.*

The negative stance on Brexit is implied at the end of this fragment. Hunt uses the occasion to underscore this position when speaking in the debate on the environment and climate change policy. The fact that he connects the topic of Brexit with the issue of this policy allows to understand the implicated conclusion that the Brexit decision is a meaningful, albeit by some unwanted, topic. He emphasizes this by stating that his party has strongly supported EU policies. The implicature that is yielded is, thus, that Brexit works against these policies.

Graham Stringer (Jan. 14, 2019), as opposed to other members of his party, does not present himself as an opponent of Brexit. He states:

*As a member of the Labour party for many years who opposed the monetarism of the early 1980s, I am astonished that members of the Labour party are so wedded to the EU, which has at the core of its policies the stability and growth pact. The stability and growth pact is, in fact, monetarism; it is Thatcherism internationalised. It is not just abstract thought. It is one of the reasons why youth across the whole of southern Europe have lost the democratic right to determine what happens in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, and why there is*



*a whole generation of young people on the dole. The situation has been created by the macroeconomic policies at the centre of EU policy. The policy does not just affect those people; by deflating the EU economy, it affects our ability to export there.*

In this utterance Stringer indicates that he is a member of the Labour Party but does not understand why other members of his party *are so wedded to the EU*, implying that he is not a strong supporter of the EU and that he advocates Brexit, which he also indicates in other parts of his speech. He criticizes the impacts of the EU's economic policy, comparing it to the policy which had been introduced by former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher from the Conservative Party. Thus, a further implicature can be yielded that Stringer criticizes not only the EU's economic actions but also those which were put forward by Margaret Thatcher, which can also produce the weak implicature that since Thatcher belonged to the Conservative Party, Stringer does not approve of the Conservative Party's actions.

Stringer also criticizes the negative effect of the EU policy on young people in other European countries and on the UK's ability to export to the EU. Thus, the implicature that can be derived from this is that Stringer presents himself as a politician who cares for both the well-being of the UK as well as for that of other European countries.

In another part of his speech, Stringer criticizes remainers for not honoring the referendum result. He states:

*It was absolutely clear that if people voted one way they were voting to remain in the EU, and if they voted in the other box they were voting to leave. The Prime Minister has not managed to deliver the result. Since then, we have had a vote to trigger article 50, which passed by a huge majority. In many cases, although not in all, remainers have looked for ways to undermine the decision, even though it was unconditional and unambiguous.*

The politician emphasizes that the options to choose from during the referendum were clear. Although he does not state directly that the majority had voted for Brexit, this is implied in his utterance when he states that remainers

have been trying to undermine this decision. He also underscores that PM Theresa May has been unable to implement the referendum result, which yields the implicature that he does not approve of this situation.

Giles Radice (Jan. 13, 2020), on the other hand, indicates his dissatisfaction with the decision to leave the EU when he states:

*I believe that the main reason for our departure lies not so much with the media but with our politicians. If things went well in Europe, it was a victory for Britain. If there were problems, they said that it was the fault of Brussels. With a few notable exceptions, they never spent time explaining the benefits of British membership. In the 2016 referendum result, we reaped what the politicians had sown.*

Thus, his dissatisfaction with the decision is especially implied via the use of the metaphor *we reaped what the politicians had sown*, which accounts for a poetic effect. The whole fragment indicates Radice's critical stance towards the position taken by British politicians who led to the Brexit decision. He optimizes the relevance of this via the repetition of *If* in *If things went well in Europe, it was a victory for Britain. If there were problems, they said that it was the fault of Brussels*. He also makes use of metonymy with the help of the word *Britain*, with which he refers to the UK and the word *Brussels*, which he uses to refer to the EU. As these are typical ways of speaking about the UK and the EU, which is also visible in other analyzed speeches, Radice assumes that the listeners will arrive at the implicature that he is talking about these two places.

### 3.8.4 Social Democratic Party of Germany

The next party whose speeches were investigated from the thematic perspective were those of the SPD. As members of a social democratic party, SPD politicians underscored the importance of Germany's social market economy and the need of implementing it in the European Union. They expressed their regret about Brexit, depicting it, e.g., as a tragedy, but concurrently emphasized the importance of honoring the referendum result and the significance of negotiating a good future economic relationship between the EU and the UK. Similarly as the CDU and CSU, they mentioned issues concerned with the EU

which they believed to be crucial; they spoke about the importance of securing the outer borders of the EU, their concern about youth unemployment in European countries, the significance of cooperation between EU countries, the need to work towards better social security systems in European countries, the issues of poverty and migration, the significance of the special German-French partnership, the need for the reorientation of EU politics and for filling vacant seats in the EU parliament after Brexit, the meaning of strengthening trust in the EU, the importance of the free movement of people, goods, and capital, and the significance of EU elections and of taking care of citizens. They also expressed their support for the EU's Green Deal, and thus, for taking care of the environment.

SPD members also mentioned the issue of a second Brexit referendum, the difficulty of the Irish border matter and the importance of protecting the Good Friday Agreement, the significance of Germany's relationship with Ireland, the need for laws which would help those particularly affected by Brexit (Germans in the UK and Britons in Germany), the risk of a no-deal Brexit and their concern with the uncertainty that Brexit brings. They also expressed their dissatisfaction with the UK government's criticism of the withdrawal agreement and its lack of eagerness to accept this agreement.

Moreover, the party indicated that the UK will become a third country after Brexit. The politicians expressed their regret for the loss of an important financial partner in the EU, namely the UK, after Brexit. They also underscored the solidarity of the remaining twenty-seven member states in the Brexit negotiations and depicted the EU as a peace project and as a place of welfare. They also spoke of the need to supplement the EU's budget with German money after Brexit.

Furthermore, it was also indicated that the SPD is against populism, nationalism, and Euroscepticism and the opinion was expressed that the Brexit referendum campaign had been based on lies. The politicians also signaled that after Brexit the UK will be a close partner but also a competitor.

The politicians also spoke about national issues, including the German budget and their concern about the impact of Brexit on German fishing. They highlighted the importance of digitalization, research development, and fair taxation, and about the need to include the German federal lands in the Brexit discussion. They praised the achievements of their governing coalition with

the CDU and CSU in the Brexit preparations. The SPD also underscored the importance of making Europe more social and the significance of a united EU. The politicians identified Europe with the EU. Moreover, they stated that Germany is the largest remaining EU member state and that a strong Europe is in Germany's national interest. Germany's reliance on the EU was underscored. The UK, on the other hand, was portrayed as a divided nation due to Brexit. The SPD also indicated that the UK cannot simply choose on its own what advantages it wants to have after leaving the EU (this was the idea of no "cherry picking" for the UK).

The idea of the EU being a peace project which also brings welfare and growth is expressed in Michael Müller's speech (July 6, 2018). The politician states:

*Damen und Herren! Europa ist das größte Projekt unserer Zeit und die Europäische Union Garant für Frieden, Wachstum und Wohlstand auf unserem Kontinent. Aber – wir wissen das auch – dieses Europa ist keine Selbstverständlichkeit. Die Krise der Jahre 2008 und 2009 hat Populismus und Europaskepsis befördert und dem Brexit den Weg geebnet. (Ladies and Gentlemen! Europe is the greatest project of our times and the European Union is a guarantor of peace, growth, and welfare on our continent. But – we also know this – this Europe cannot be taken for granted. The crisis in the years 2008 and 2009 had promoted populism and Euroscepticism and paved the way for Brexit).*

Thus, after praising the achievements of the European Union, Müller signals that he is against Brexit, which he implies in the last utterance of the cited fragment. He indicates his negative stance towards populism and Euroscepticism, which, as the listeners are to deduce (to derive as an implicature), were caused by a crisis. The politician further implies that Brexit was a consequence of these two political ideologies via the use of the metaphor *paved the way for Brexit*, which brings about a poetic effect.

Another SPD politician, Metin Hakverdi (Nov. 9, 2018), depicts Brexit as a tragic event and underscores that there are no winners in the situation. He states:

*Kolleginnen und Kollegen, der Brexit ist ein bedauerlicher, ein trauriger, wahrscheinlich sogar ein tragischer Vorgang. Wie auch immer man es betrachtet, es gibt keine Gewinner (Colleagues, Brexit is a regrettable, sad, and possibly also a tragic event. However one treats it, there are no winners).*

The use of negative adjectives adds emotionality to the utterance, and thus, optimizes its relevance, i.e., the adjectives yield the implicature that Hakverdi has a negative stance on Brexit. He uses the metaphorical expression *es gibt keine Gewinner* (*there are no winners*) to imply that no one will benefit from Brexit, neither the UK nor the EU.

A linguistically interesting utterance also appears in Helge Lindh's speech from Feb. 21, 2019, in which he refers to the idea of taking back control connected with Brexit. He says:

*Es gibt ja, uns allen mehr oder weniger bekannt, international den Aufruf: Let's take back control! Wir kennen das aus dem Zusammenhang mit dem Brexit, von Trump und anderen. Mein Appell heute wäre der gegensätzliche Spruch als Anleitung für uns in dieser Debatte: Let's give up control! (There is an international call which is more or less known to all of us: Let's take back control! We know it from the context of Brexit, from Trump, and from others. My appeal today would be the opposite saying as a guidance for us in this debate: Let's give up control!).*

By supporting the idea of giving up control as the opposite of taking back control, Lindh implies that he is against Brexit (as well as against the policy of Donald Trump and others who express the idea of taking back control). This is strengthened via the use of the anglicisms *Let's take back control!* and *Let's give up control!*, which, as utterances in a foreign language (English) contrasting linguistically with the rest of the fragment, which is in German, should focus the listeners' attention more on Lindh's message and this way maximize the relevance of what he is saying. Moreover, the sheer fact that the politician cites the well-known call *Let's take back control* brings forth an echoic utterance, as Helge indicates his negative attitude towards the message conveyed by the call.

In the context of Brexit, the politician, thus, draws on the cognitive environment of the listeners who are aware of the Brexit idea of taking back control and aims to persuade them that this is not a stance that should be taken.

The issue of the withdrawal agreement appears in Heiko Maas's speech (Jan. 17, 2019) in the following fragment:

*Vielen Dank. – Herr Präsident! Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Der 15. Januar war kein guter Tag für die Europäische Union. Die Entscheidung des britischen Unterhauses war ein ernster Rückschlag; denn damit ist die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines ungeordneten Brexits deutlich gestiegen. Dennoch: Der Weg dahin ist keinesfalls vorgezeichnet. Wir werden in den nächsten Tagen und Wochen alles daransetzen, dass ein Austritt Großbritanniens nicht ohne Abkommen, sondern nur mit einem Abkommen erfolgt (Thank you. – Mr. President! Dear Colleagues! January 15 was not a good day for the European Union. The decision of the British lower chamber was a real setback because, as a result of it, the possibility of an unregulated Brexit has considerably risen. However, the path towards that is by no means predetermined. In the next days and weeks, we will do everything possible to ensure that Great Britain will not leave without an agreement but only with an agreement).*

In this fragment Maas refers to the fact that the British House of Commons voted against the withdrawal agreement which Theresa May and her government had negotiated with the EU. Maas, thus, knows that the listeners are aware of this fact, which forms a part of their cognitive environment and allows them to interpret that he is speaking about this situation. He emphasizes that this could lead to a hard Brexit but concurrently reassures his listeners that everything will be done to prevent this so that the UK leaves the EU with an agreement. The use of the personal pronoun *wir* (*we*) implies that Maas is probably talking about the remaining EU member states, including Germany, which are participating in the Brexit negotiations (as he also refers to Germany and the other EU member states with the help of *wir* later in the speech, emphasizing that this is how he is using this pronoun) or about the German governing coalition (made up of the CDU, CSU, and SPD), to which he belongs.

This way he makes the commitment to work towards a regulated Brexit. Maas also uses the metaphor *Der Weg dahin ist keinesfalls vorgezeichnet* (*the path towards that is by no means predetermined*), with the help of which he underscores this commitment, which is to optimize the relevance of what he says.

Another SPD member, Andrea Nahles (Oct. 17, 2018), mentions the idea of “cherry picking”, which appeared in both British and German speeches. She states the following:

*Einen Binnenmarkt à la carte für Großbritannien kann es nicht geben. Es darf keine Rosinenpickerei geben. Es darf kein anderes europäisches Land auch nur die Idee bekommen, dass das geht. (There can be no single market à la carte for Great Britain. There can be no cherry picking. No other European country can even get the idea that that works).*

Nahles implies that the UK cannot simply choose what rights connected with the single market it will have after leaving the EU, drawing on her listeners’ awareness of the idea of “cherry picking” (“Rosinenpickerei”) in the context of Brexit, which arose during the negotiations between the UK and the EU. This awareness is part of the listeners’ cognitive environment used for their interpretation of what Nahles is saying. The politician’s message is strengthened via the French *à la carte*, which, due to its being an expression from a foreign language, can make her language more vivid and focus her listeners’ attention on her words to a greater extent, consequently accounting for greater relevance this way.

In the next part of the fragment, Nahles aims to produce the implicature that no other EU member state should follow the UK’s example and have the idea of leaving the EU by thinking that “cherry picking” could be possible in such a situation. The contextual implication derived from this is that she does not want any other member states to withdraw from the commonwealth and to cause disadvantages to it this way.

### 3.8.5 Democratic Unionist Party

The next party of whose speeches a thematic analysis was conducted was the Democratic Unionist Party. In their speeches DUP members expressed their support for Brexit. They criticized Theresa May's withdrawal agreement and underscored the significance of including Northern Irish issues in the Brexit discussions. They highlighted that they oppose the Northern Ireland Protocol, which, according to them, does not honor the Good Friday agreement and would have a negative effect on Northern Ireland. They also underscored that Brexit itself does not contradict the Good Friday Agreement. The DUP stated that it opposes the Irish backstop regulated by the Northern Ireland Protocol and the fact that Northern Ireland would be treated differently than the rest of the UK as a result of the backstop, which would cause trade barriers between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. They explained that this would, consequently, be a danger for the union of the United Kingdom. The politicians stated that Great Britain is the most important market for Northern Ireland and that, thus, the British internal market must be protected. They also mentioned the danger of the protocol for fishers in Northern Ireland and expressed the idea of taking back control of UK fisheries via Brexit, concurrently underscoring that they are against a hard Brexit, as they want there to be an appropriate agreement between the UK and the EU after the withdrawal.

The party criticized the government for not delivering the referendum result for Northern Ireland, stating that Northern Ireland is being treated differently than the rest of the UK in the Brexit negotiations with the EU. They underscored the importance of honoring the referendum result from 2016 by delivering Brexit for the United Kingdom as a whole, without leaving Northern Ireland in the EU, and they opposed the possibility of conducting a second Brexit referendum. They indicated that Brexit was made possible thanks to DUP's support for the government. The politicians expressed their support for leaving the EU customs union and single market and for free trade agreements with other countries. Brexit was portrayed in their speeches as a means of opportunities. They underscored the significance of sovereignty and freedom from EU rules, highlighting the importance of the right for the UK to make its own laws.



Another theme which appeared was the importance of a frictionless Irish border for trade. However, it was also highlighted that this open border may not be a danger to security. It was also mentioned that a withdrawal of the Republic of Ireland from the EU would bring advantages for this country as well.

Furthermore, the politicians praised the good quality of British food production and the developments of Northern Irish industry and manufacturing but also the innovation of the EU. The DUP was described as a pro-business party, highlighting the importance of business in supporting British economy, which leads to new opportunities for young people. The politicians, thus, underscored the significance of taking care of the British citizens. They spoke of the significance of investing in Northern Irish innovation, skills, and research and strongly emphasized the importance of devolution, and thus, the significance of the Northern Ireland Assembly, i.e., the Northern Irish devolved power. The DUP highlighted the significance of the great achievements in Northern Ireland and the importance of taking responsibility for the citizens in Northern Ireland.

Wallace Browne (Oct. 11, 2018) highlights the importance of Northern Irish issues in the following fragment:

*Yet, even with these recent significant investments in Northern Ireland, if one were to listen to the demands of some, Northern Ireland would be stuck in a bizarre, solo customs arrangement with the European Union. Such a new scenario would prevent Northern Ireland benefiting from future deals put in place by the rest of the United Kingdom. Those who call for this are not only calling for the full integrity of the UK to be put into serious question, they are prioritising the 23% of Northern Ireland's trade with the EU over the 77% of its trade with the rest of the UK and elsewhere. Recent investors and confirmed future investors in Northern Ireland have looked at all the risks involved and carried out their own research. They have invested, or plan to invest, because they know that Northern Ireland is part of a strong, outward-looking and independent United Kingdom, free to make its own deals with the world and an attractive place for them to grow their businesses.*

Browne implies that some politicians want Northern Ireland to be in a customs arrangement with the EU, which would be disadvantageous for this part of the UK. He clarifies the reason for this in the next utterance stating that Northern Ireland would not be able to benefit from deals made by the rest of the country. He, therefore, criticizes the opinion that this part of the UK should be in such a customs arrangement, which would put the integrity of the UK in danger and have a negative impact on trade between Northern Ireland and Great Britain. The implication that can be yielded is, therefore, that Northern Ireland would not benefit fully from Brexit advantages, which produces the implicated conclusion that the DUP supports Brexit. Browne also underscores the importance of the union of the UK by saying that *Northern Ireland is part of a strong, outward-looking and independent United Kingdom*. Thus, he also underscores the importance of sovereignty which the UK gained back from the EU as a result of Brexit, which again accounts for the conclusion that the DUP supports Brexit.

In another one of his speeches, Browne (May 13, 2021) again underscores the importance of the union of the country. He states:

*The case for the union is a compelling one, based on future growth and opportunities. It is important to older and younger people alike. It is a case based on securing our economic future and sustaining our place on the world stage for years to come. Maintaining the union is the responsibility of all of us. Putting forward the case for it is as vital now as it was 50 or 100 years ago. All those who value and respect our United Kingdom, across all parts of it, must seize the opportunities before us to promote and safeguard it for future generations.*

This fragment consists of language which brings about a poetic effect, optimizing the relevance of the speaker's message. Instances of such language include *sustaining our place on the world stage for years to come*, *putting forward the case for it*, and *seize the opportunities before us*. *Our place on the world stage* is a metaphorical expression which can yield the implicature that Browne wants the UK to have a crucial position in the relationship with other countries. A contextual implication which can be derived from the whole fragment is that Browne believes that the unity of the union depends on the unity of the British people.

Another DUP member, Paul Girvan (Dec. 4, 2018), speaks against Theresa May's withdrawal agreement. He states:

*My constituency voted to leave. It did not vote for this withdrawal agreement. It voted to leave the customs union, the single market and the ECJ, but this withdrawal agreement does not address those matters, and it leaves Northern Ireland in a place it does not wish to be. Many people say they have heard business welcome the agreement. In Northern Ireland, many families gave sons to fight to remain part of this United Kingdom. What was not achieved by the IRA and republicanism and its adherents has been achieved by bureaucrats in Europe with a pen, and it will potentially leave Northern Ireland en route to a united Ireland. We will have no control over other Governments, and we will be rule takers, not rule makers.*

Girvan states explicitly that the voters in his constituency voted for the UK's withdrawal from the EU. He implies that the withdrawal agreement negotiated by Theresa May's government does not deliver on this vote, as he believes that the vote to leave was synonymous with voting for the UK to leave the EU customs union and single market and the European Court of Justice. He also states that the agreement *leaves Northern Ireland in a place it does not wish to be*, thus referring to the idea that Northern Ireland, according to negotiations with the EU, is supposed to remain in the EU customs union and single market, which is an idea that he criticizes. The expression is metaphorical, which therefore accounts for a poetic effect. *A place it does not wish to be* is used here to refer to a situation which is disadvantageous for Northern Ireland. *Northern Ireland* is an example of metonymy used to mean 'the people of Northern Ireland'. Thus, another implicature which can be derived is that Girvan believes that the citizens in this part of the UK in general do not agree to the circumstances which Theresa May has negotiated with the EU for Northern Ireland.

Girvan further criticizes the EU for causing the possibility that Northern Ireland may become united with the Republic of Ireland, which had been the goal of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) that had historically brought about a military conflict in the UK to achieve this (Arthur & Cowell-Meyers, 2023). As a member of the DUP, which is against the unification of Ireland, Girvan strongly opposes

this idea. These facts (regarding IRA and the DUP's stance on Irish unification) form part of the cognitive environment of the politician's listeners. The comparison of the actions of the EU with those of the IRA yields the implicature that Girvan is very critical of the EU's actions concerning Northern Ireland, which is underscored by the fact that he calls the negotiators in the EU *bureaucrats*.

Maurice Morrow (Nov. 20, 2018) also expresses his concern about the treatment of Northern Ireland in the Brexit negotiations with the EU. He says:

*My Lords, my party, the DUP, wants to see an orderly withdrawal from the European Union. The United Kingdom, which of course includes Northern Ireland, joined as a single entity and on the same terms and conditions. It is therefore important that we leave in the same manner. However, it is quite clear that this is not the way that it is planned. It is patently clear that Northern Ireland is to be treated differently from the rest of the UK.*

Morrow states explicitly that his party, the DUP, wants an orderly withdrawal of the UK from the EU. This explicitness is underscored via the phrase *my party, the DUP*, in which he strongly identifies himself with his party. He then makes it clear that since the UK had joined the EU together according to the same conditions, this is also the way in which it should leave. Via underscoring that the UK includes Northern Ireland he draws on the assumption from the listeners' cognitive environment, which is concerned with the fact that the Brexit negotiations concerning Northern Ireland differ from the ones concerning the rest of the United Kingdom. His utterance, thus, yields the weak implicature that Northern Ireland is not being treated appropriately in these negotiations. Morrow then underscores this via the phrase *It is patently clear that Northern Ireland is to be treated differently from the rest of the UK*, in which this implicature is strengthened.

### 3.8.6 Alternative for Germany

The last party whose speeches were analyzed in terms of the themes appearing in them was the Alternative for Germany. The party underscored the need to honor the 2016 referendum result despite possible problematic social and

economic consequences of Brexit. The politicians mentioned the unwillingness of the British to keep following EU rules as a reason for Brexit. They stated that the sovereignty of the UK is not being respected and concurrently expressed their concern for the sovereignty of Germany. The party indicated its support for the idea of a Europe of national states and national sovereignty and criticized the idea of the United States of Europe. It also underscored that it is against transferring extra German money to the EU in order to supplement the budget of the EU after Brexit, believing that German taxpayers are not being respected this way. The party spoke against a no-deal Brexit and emphasized the importance of a good partnership between the UK and Germany after Brexit.

The AfD expressed its support for the Brexit decision despite its dissatisfaction that there was a need for this decision. The politicians blamed the EU authorities and the German government for providing reasons for the UK to leave the EU. An important reason which was mentioned was the German government's immigration policy, which was not accepted by the UK and which the AfD itself criticized, highlighting that this policy is a threat to German security. The AfD politicians expressed strong Euroscepticism, seeing the EU as an inhibitor of national sovereignty. They agreed to certain Brexit-related regulations proposed by the German government but frequently criticized the government for its decisions connected with Brexit and other matters. They indicated that they do not support the special partnership between France and Germany and underscored the constant problems of the EU. They signaled their support for British democracy which was demonstrated in the British government's arguments over the appropriate way of leaving the EU. The party criticized the EU for making Brexit difficult and underscored that proper relationships with the UK after Brexit are in the German interest, disapproving of the fact that (from their point of view) the UK is being punished by the EU for the decision to leave. They blamed the EU for trying to show other member states that they should not leave the EU.

The AfD also highlighted the significance of protecting the Good Friday Agreement. Furthermore, the party emphasized the aspect of the restoration of freedom in the UK after Brexit and expressed the idea of making Brexit a success in the German interest. The politicians indicated their support for the idea of taking back control by the UK, perceiving Brexit as a call for freedom and self-determination. They also expressed their approval for populism.

Concurrently, they indicated that a possible hard Brexit would be a catastrophe which could lead to a new conflict between Ireland and Northern Ireland. They stated that a poor relationship between the UK and the rest of Europe would negatively affect European economy, especially German economy.

Furthermore, AfD members emphasized the need for the internal reform of the EU. They spoke against the centralization of power in the EU but also underscored that they are not against Europe but against actions of the EU. They indicated that they oppose unlimited EU control and view the EU as undemocratic, highlighting the idea that the EU is not Europe. They called for more democracy in the EU and expressed their concern about the democratic deficit in the commonwealth. They emphasized the need to return to national values in Europe and the importance of diversity and individualism for the development of the continent. The party indicated that it supports the freedom of movement in the EU but that this right cannot be given together with the right to receive social benefits; the AfD criticized the social benefits for migrants who came to Germany as a result of the migration crisis. The party also spoke of the negative impact of the EU on German agriculture.

The politicians also blamed the German government for wanting to treat the UK after Brexit like any other third country since the UK had been Germany's partner for many years and stated that Germany should have signed a bilateral agreement with the UK. They emphasized that the British are Germany's friends and that the UK is a part of Europe. They also criticized the European Commission for wanting to restrict the UK's access to the EU single market.

Moreover, the party members underscored the right of the UK to make its own laws. They blamed the EU for the destabilization of the importance of subsidiarity and democratic rights of national parliaments and indicated that they oppose uncontrolled EU integration. The party stated that it is against blaming Brexit for problems in Germany and criticized the EU for not being able to deal with its own problems. The importance of German sovereignty and the possibility of the need for Dexit (a German withdrawal from the EU) in the future were underscored. The AfD declared its support for direct democracy, portraying the Brexit referendum as a form of this type of democracy.

Furthermore, the party criticized the German government's environmental policy and its too large (from their perspective) engagement in climate change issues and the idea of the climate-related EU project "Green Deal". The politicians

underscored the importance of tax justice in Germany and emphasized the need to take care of the German citizens and German economy.

A linguistically interesting example in which the support for the British is underscored appears in Stefan Keuter's speech (Dec. 13, 2019). At the end of his speech he states: *Als Letztes: Alles Gute nach Großbritannien. Boris Johnson: Well done! (Lastly, all the best to Great Britain. Boris Johnson: Well done!).* The implicature yielded from *Boris Johnson: Well done!* can be that Keuter is congratulating the then Prime Minister Boris Johnson for his successful Brexit negotiations, which led to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. He may also be congratulating him for his determination in wanting to bring Brexit about. The fact that he uses an anglicism with an exclamation point at the end underscores his support for Johnson and his respect for Johnson by addressing him in Johnson's mother tongue (English), which is to maximize the relevance of the utterance. Relevance can also be achieved via the anglicism because it contrasts linguistically with the rest of Keuter's speech, which is in German (apart from other occasional anglicisms) and thus, may cause the listeners to focus on this contrast more.

In *Als Letztes: Alles Gute nach Großbritannien (Lastly, all the best to Great Britain)*, Keuter implies that despite that his speech was generally concerned with other topics, he remembers about the determination of the UK and its Prime Minister Boris Johnson in leading to Brexit. He explicitly states that he wishes the UK all the best. The UK is called *Großbritannien (Great Britain)* in this utterance, which is a metonymic use that via disambiguation allows to arrive at the contextual implication that Keuter is referring to the UK as a whole.

Similarly to Stefan Keuter, also Harald Weyel (Dec. 13, 2018) expresses his good wishes for the UK after Brexit via the following utterance, which appears at the end of his speech: *Danke und Good Luck nach Großbritannien (Thank you and good luck to Great Britain)*. He first thanks the listeners for listening to his speech and then expresses the wishes for the UK, using the anglicism *Good Luck*. Again, as in the case of Keuter's utterance, *Großbritannien (Great Britain)* functions as a metonymic use. Disambiguation allows to yield the implicature that Weyel is making a reference to the whole UK.

Martin Hebner (Jan. 17, 2019) speaks about the Brexit idea of taking back control: *"Take back control" ist das Ziel vieler Briten in dieser Situation. Die Briten wollen die Steuerung über ihr eigenes Land zurückbekommen ("Take*



*back control“ is the goal of many Britons in this situation. The Britons want do get back control of their own country).* Hebner underscores the significance of the motto “take back control”, frequently repeated by British politicians who support Brexit. He implies that he supports the British in this idea and then explicitly states that the British want to get back control over their country, which makes the implicature of the first utterance stronger.

The following fragment from Hebner’s speech concerns the possibility of other EU member states leaving the EU: *Damit soll eigentlich nur eines erreicht werden, meine Damen und Herren: andere Staaten von einem solchen Schritt abzuschrecken (Only one thing is supposed to be achieved by this, ladies and gentlemen: to deter other states from taking such a step).* Hebner states this utterance after criticizing the EU for making the Brexit negotiations take too much time. In the cited utterance he, thus, gives the reason for this, namely that the goal is to deter other states from leaving the EU as well, which he implies via the metaphor *von einem solchen Schritt (from taking such a step)*, which can produce a further weak implicature that this step would be a very serious and, from the point of view of Brexit opponents, a tragic decision which is underscored by *abzuschrecken (to deter)*. As Hebner refers to what these opponents think and say about Brexit, his utterance can be described as echoic. In this utterance, he indicates that he himself has a negative attitude towards their stance.

Another AfD member, Enrico Komning (Jan. 31, 2019), indicates that Brexit is not the reason for all of Germany’s economic problems. He states:

*Wir erleben gerade das Ende eines Jahrzehnts stetigen Wirtschaftswachstums. Sie, Herr Minister, machen laut Ihrem Vorwort in Ihrem Bericht das außenwirtschaftliche Umfeld für den Konjunktureenbruch verantwortlich. Herr Minister, nicht an allem sind der bevorstehende Brexit und Donald Trump schuld. Das Wachstum in Deutschland ist unter dem europäischen Durchschnitt. (We are now experiencing the end of a decade of steady economic growth. According to your foreword in your report, you, Mr. Minister, are making the foreign trade environment responsible for the economic downturn. Mr. Minister, not everything is the fault of the upcoming Brexit and Donald Trump. The growth in Germany is under the European average).*



Komnings's utterance about Brexit and Donald Trump can be understood as rather ironic, and thus, as echoic, because he refers to or interprets the minister's view that Brexit and the actions of Donald Trump are responsible for Germany's economic problems, which is an opinion that Komning perceives as unreasonable. The utterance may also produce a bridging implicature that this is how Komning understands the minister's view which he first refers to in the previous utterance.

Corinna Miazga (Jan. 30, 2020) speaks about the need to honor the result of the Brexit referendum. She states the following:

*In dieser Woche, genau genommen morgen, verlieren wir mit Großbritannien einen wichtigen Partner und den zweitgrößten Nettozahler in der Europäischen Union. Die Briten treten aus; sie wollten es so. Wer Demokratie ernst nimmt, der respektiert den Willen des Volkes (This week, exactly tomorrow, with the exit of Great Britain we are losing an important partner and the second largest net contributor in the European Union. The Britons are leaving. They wanted it that way. One who treats democracy seriously, respects the will of the people).*

Miazga underscores that the UK is an important partner for the EU and/or for Germany, depending on the implicature of *wir* (*we*), which may be understood as referring specifically to Germany or to the whole EU. She implicitly refers to the result of the Brexit referendum and to the fact that the result of this referendum must be honored because it was a democratic decision of the British people. Another implicature which may be derived is that Miazga may be indirectly criticizing those politicians in the EU who do not want to accept this decision. Furthermore, like in previous examples, the metonymic use of *Großbritannien* (*Great Britain*) meaning *United Kingdom* appears.

### 3.9 Further Remarks on the Thematic Analysis

As the analysis in the previous section indicates, many themes and aspects appeared in the speeches of all the six parties. For instance, an especially crucial aspect was that the parties emphasized the importance of honoring the result of

the 2016 Brexit referendum as the democratic will of the British people. While Brexit supporters highlighted their support for this decision, Brexit opponents expressed their regret for it. This regret was especially visible in speeches by the CDU/CSU and SPD politicians, where the verb *bedauern* (*to regret*) in the appropriate grammatical form was frequently used to refer to the politicians' strong dissatisfaction with Brexit.

Another important topic appearing in the speeches was the withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU. The three German parties were unanimous in that there should be a withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU after Brexit, perceiving this as crucial for the future relationship. On the other hand, the British parties differed in this aspect. The DUP supported leaving the EU with a withdrawal agreement. However, while in the Conservative Party and the Labour Party there were generally politicians who also believed there should be such an agreement, there were also some politicians in those parties who thought that such a deal was not necessary or that the lack of a deal would not bring great disadvantage to the UK, which would, thus, result in a no-deal Brexit. The deal negotiated between Theresa May and the EU was frequently criticized by members of the British parties. For instance, the DUP and the Labour Party opposed the deal as well as part of the Conservative Party politicians. The CDU/CSU and the SPD, on the other hand, regretted that it was not being accepted by the British House of Commons.

All of the parties spoke about the importance of a good future relationship of partnership between the UK and the EU. Although in the case of the DUP terms such as *partners* or *friends* did not appear with reference to the EU, the fact that the party wanted there to be a withdrawal deal between the UK and the EU indicates that partnership with the EU was important to them as well. The idea of friendship between the UK and the EU after Brexit appeared in the speeches of other parties. For instance, Theresa May (Oct. 9, 2017) states:

*A new, deep and special partnership between a sovereign United Kingdom and a strong and successful European Union is our ambition and our offer to our European friends. Achieving that partnership will require leadership and flexibility not just from us, but from our friends—the 27 nations of the EU,*

while Detlef Seif (Jan. 17, 2019) says:

*Meine Damen und Herren, die Gesprächskanäle sind offen. Die Briten sind und bleiben Freunde. Aber eines ist klar: Großbritannien muss jetzt liefern und sagen, wofür es denn überhaupt eine parlamentarische Mehrheit geben kann. (My ladies and gentlemen, the conversation channels are open. The Britons are and will remain our friends. But one thing is clear: Great Britain must now deliver and say, what for there can be a majority in Parliament).*

The second utterance in this fragment implies that the CDU and CSU want a good partnership with the UK and that, therefore, the UK parliament needs to decide what kind of partnership they can accept.

Another topic mentioned by all of the parties was that of the Irish backstop, concerned with the Northern Ireland Protocol and its connection with the Good Friday Agreement. The DUP, which operates in Northern Ireland, and therefore, chiefly raised Brexit-related issues concerned with this part of the UK, opposed the backstop, believing it would do harm to the integrity of the UK internal market. The backstop was also frequently opposed in speeches by the Conservative Party and regarded sceptically by different Labour Party members. The backstop issue appeared in the speech by Florian Hahn (Dec. 13, 2018) from the CDU/CSU faction who depicted it as a good solution for guaranteeing peace on the island of Ireland. In SPD speeches it was also presented as a solution for the Irish border issue. The backstop, as a part of the withdrawal agreement negotiated between Theresa May and the EU was, thus, generally treated as a negative solution for Northern Ireland on the British side of the debate, although as it can be deduced, Theresa May accepted the backstop solution as she had negotiated the deal herself. The idea was also accepted by Andrew Adonis (Oct. 11, 2018) from the Labour Party.

Furthermore, all of the parties highlighted the importance of taking care of national interests, such as the economy and the well-being of the citizens. However, supporters of Brexit from among the parties emphasized the importance of national sovereignty, while opponents of Brexit stood for more European integration. The latter idea was expressed in the speeches of the CDU/CSU as well as in those of the SPD. The significance of sovereignty was underscored

by the DUP, the AfD, and by Brexit supporters in the Conservative Party. This idea was also mentioned by the Labour Party politician Graham Stringer, who expressed his support for Brexit.

The thematic analysis of the speeches reflects certain general perceptions of Brexit among the politicians. These include Brexit seen as a chance, which occurred more frequently in the speeches delivered by the British politicians, especially by those who supported Brexit, but also in German speeches. Brexit was also perceived as a crisis, mainly in the German speeches of CDU/CSU and SPD politicians. Furthermore, it was also depicted as a return to freedom by politicians of the DUP and the AfD and by many politicians of the Conservative Party, but it was also perceived by the CDU/CSU and the SPD as uncertainty, as a tragedy or a drama, and as an event dividing the UK. Many Labour Party politicians also perceived Brexit as a situation causing uncertainty and division in the country.

### 3.10 Further Remarks on the Linguistic Features

The analysis of the speeches, as it has been demonstrated, allowed to deduce certain linguistic characteristics which allow to draw a comparison between the language of the British speeches and the language of the German speeches. For instance, the analysis sheds light on the language used in a parliamentary context in two different countries. In both the British and German parliaments, there are certain customs of referring to other members or addressing them.

One of the differences lies in the way in which the politicians address each other in the two parliaments. As it has already been depicted above, in the analyzed speeches the British politicians addressed each other by their titles and not by their names (e.g. *My right hon. Friend; My Lords*), thus, in the third person, and also referred to them by their titles (e.g., *my right hon. and learned Friend the shadow Secretary of State; the noble Lord, Lord Jay; the noble Baroness, Lady Parminter*). Furthermore, they used the third person pronouns when referring to each other, e.g. *Does she agree that the current EU withdrawal agreement, which she touched on, has the potential to damage local businesses further?*, which is a question which Jeffrey Donaldson (DUP) asked Emma Little Pengelly (DUP, Oct. 29, 2019) when intervening during her speech.

On the other hand, German politicians addressed each other in the second person. When beginning a speech they said, e.g., *Herr Präsident! Liebe Kolleginnen und Kollegen!* (*Mr. President! Dear Colleagues!*). When speaking to specific members they used forms such as *Frau Bundeskanzlerin* (*Ms. Chancellor*) and *Herr Dr. Weyel* (*Dr. Weyel*).

It should also be noted that the German politicians always began their speeches with such forms of address, whereas British politicians started directly with the actual content of their speech or for instance with introductions such as *It is an honour to serve with you in the Chair, Dame Cheryl* (Ian Paisely on Oct. 29, 2019) or *My Lords, it is an honour to follow the right reverend Prelate and to make my maiden speech in this place* (Gavin Barwell on Jan. 13, 2020). Moreover, German politicians typically ended their speeches by thanking the hearers for listening.

Other linguistic characteristics, which are typical of political discourse and which appeared in the speeches, included the use of personal pronouns (e.g., *we* or *wir* in German) and possessive pronouns, via which the speakers indicated that they identify themselves, e.g., with their countries or with their parties (e.g., *wir, die AfD*). They also identified themselves with their parties by using their names or the short forms of these names (e.g. *my party, the DUP; wir, die AfD*).

The politicians also made use of metaphors, rhetorical questions, and irony, the latter being especially visible in speeches of the AfD politicians, as they frequently used it, e.g., to criticize the actions of the governing coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD. As the analysis of the utterances indicates, such devices allowed for optimizing relevance.

Two other aspects of the speeches which may be treated as stylistic devices are praising and criticizing. Both, the British and German politicians in all the six parties praised and criticized, e.g., the actions of different politicians, putting the message across that they are either fond of something or, by contrast, that they disagree with it, which could be derived as an implicature from the given utterance.

Another linguistic aspect in both British and German speeches was the use of metonymy. For instance, the UK was referred to as *Britain* (a short form of *Great Britain*) in the British speeches and as *Großbritannien* in the German speeches, as it has been described earlier. These were instances of metonymy, as a part of the UK was used to refer to the UK as a whole. This shows that the

UK may be primarily associated with Great Britain and not necessarily automatically with Northern Ireland as well, which may result from the fact that Great Britain encompasses England, Scotland, and Wales, and that Northern Ireland does not belong to Great Britain. The metonym of *Britain* in the case of the DUP party occurred only three times. It was considerably more frequent in the speeches of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party. The DUP spoke more often about Great Britain, the region of the UK, instead of about *Britain* in the meaning of *the United Kingdom*.

What is more, in the speeches of all the German parties, the British people were sometimes referred to as *Engländer (the English people)* and the UK as *England (England)*, which indicates how strongly the UK and the British people are frequently associated mainly with England and the English people. This is presumably strongly concerned with the fact that the British parliament has its headquarters in London, which lies in England. The word *London* itself was also used metonymically in the German speeches to refer to the British parliament.

Another instance of metonymy was the use of the lexeme *Europe* (English) or *Europa* (German) to refer to the European Union, in which case a larger territory was used to refer to a smaller territory. Another instance of metonymy was the use of the noun *Brussels* (English) or *Brüssel* (German) to refer to the European Parliament. All these metonymic uses were to direct the listener at a specific meaning in an optimal way via simple associations. Thus, in relevance-theoretic terms, this indicates that the speaker using these metonymic expressions believed that the listeners would automatically interpret the intended meaning of these expressions.

Another linguistic aspect of the German speeches was the use of anglicisms, such as *Good Luck nach Großbritannien* (Harald Weyel, Dec. 13, 2018) described in the analysis of the chosen utterances. Another example of an anglicism also appeared in AfD member Peter Boehringer's speech (May 15, 2018), i.e., *Last, not least*, which could yield the implicature that Boehringer wanted to end by saying something he believed to be particularly important, as using an English phrase in a speech in German should focus the listeners' attention on what the speaker is saying. Another anglicism which was used was *Backstop*, which appeared in the speeches of all the German parties as a reference to the Irish backstop. Thus, the use of this word can imply that the issue of the Irish backstop had become popular and that, therefore, the use of this anglicism

should automatically allow the listeners to retrieve this assumption from their cognitive background.

As it has been demonstrated in this chapter, the thematic and linguistic analysis allows for interesting conclusions regarding the working of relevance theory in the investigated speeches. These conclusions are presented in more detail in the next part of the book.

## Conclusion

To conclude, the analysis indicates that certain issues and mutual views connected with Brexit and other aspects appearing in the speeches were mentioned by all of the parties, regardless of their political orientation. Shared opinions included the need to honor the referendum result of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the importance of a good relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit, and the need for taking care of national issues. In relevance-theoretic terms, expressing these views linguistically could, on an intertextual level, yield the contextual implicature that the parties stand for certain common values such as democracy, respect, and patriotism.

Apart from mutual views, also certain Brexit-related topics were presented in the speeches by politicians from all of the six parties, such as the issue of the withdrawal agreement and the Irish backstop, which was, however, perceived in different ways, depending partially on the political orientation of the parties. Thus, the political orientation of a party only to some extent affected the way how politicians presented their opinions. In certain cases, the fact if a party was from the UK or Germany played a greater role in shaping the views of the politicians. For instance, the two German factions forming the coalition government in the German parliament, namely the CDU/CSU (center-right) and the SPD (center-left), both expressed their regret about Brexit despite their different political orientations and were dissatisfied with the British government's unwillingness to accept the withdrawal agreement negotiated between Theresa May and the EU. Moreover, they focused frequently on social issues and praised German social market economy. Both of the parties indicated that they support more European integration. Their common stance on such aspects may be perceived as the effect of them working in a coalition.

The German AfD (far-right), on the other hand, indicated its support for the Brexit decision and called for more sovereignty in the EU. The importance



of national sovereignty also appeared in the speeches of the DUP (right-wing) and the Conservative Party (center-right). In this case the political orientation affected the views which the politicians of these parties expressed.

Furthermore, the DUP strongly opposed the withdrawal agreement, similarly as many members of the Conservative Party. It should also be noted that while the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the AfD, and the DUP took unanimous stances on Brexit within their parties, this was not the case among the members of the Conservative Party and the Labour Party as in their case, part of the politicians supported Brexit and part of it opposed it. The Labour Party politicians, however, were typically against it.

An interesting stylistic issue which is concerned with the thematic level is that in those speeches, both British and German, in which the topic of Brexit was not the main topic of a given speech, it was intertwined into the speech, which in the context of relevance theory indicates that the utterances concerning this topic, from the politicians' point of view should be treated as highly relevant by the listeners due to the significance of the Brexit issue. Thus, the meaning of Brexit was highlighted not only in speeches focusing mainly on this topic but also in speeches in which the topic was mentioned along with other issues. Since the withdrawal of the UK from the EU was a significant political phenomenon, the mentioning of it along with other matters can be perceived as a natural element of the speeches.

Moreover, the fact that different themes and views frequently appeared in the speeches of a particular party or parties can be interpreted as an optimization of the relevance of the utterances in which these issues were mentioned. It can be deduced that, at least in certain cases, on hearing about a certain topic or view only once, a listener may not immediately attend to all the relevant assumptions which the speaker wants to be produced by their utterances concerning this topic or view, and thus, the hearer may not search for all the intended contextual implications. (It naturally depends on the given listener whether or not they attend to given assumptions and what assumptions will form their cognitive environment.) However, after hearing about the same topics several times, the listener should be able to attend to more assumptions connected with them and consequently be able to deduce more implicatures from what is being said at a given moment, and thus, find certain utterances more relevant. The listeners may, therefore, also perceive the relevance of

previous utterances, which may have appeared vague to them at the time of hearing them, as more relevant after some time.

From the linguistic point of view, both the British and German speeches had many similarities (regardless of the political orientation of a given party) ranging from the common for political discourse use of such stylistic elements as metaphors and the personal pronoun *we* up to parliamentary language, which was, however, specific for the politicians of the given country. Thus, the characteristics of the parliamentary language differed between the speeches of the British and German politicians. Nevertheless, the sheer fact that all the politicians abided by certain rules of parliamentary language was an important similarity. Politeness played a crucial role during the parliamentary debates. Members of both parliaments addressed each other and referred to other members according to the rules. Because all the analyzed speeches were delivered in the British and German parliaments, the general level of formality appearing in the speeches was rather similar among British and German politicians.

Furthermore, both British and German politicians frequently used implicatures in their speeches (for instance with the help of the mentioned metaphors), which is especially crucial in relevance-theoretic terms. Moreover, specific metonymic uses were similar among British and German politicians, while others differed. For example, the short form of *Great Britain*, i.e., *Britain*, was used by British politicians to speak about the whole UK and the German equivalent of *Great Britain*, namely, *Großbritannien*, was used in the same way. Nevertheless, characteristic uses of metonymy in the German speeches were, e.g., *England* referring to the whole UK and *London* referring to the British parliament.

As the examples with differing parliamentary rules concerning the language of the politicians during debates showed and as the specific examples of metonymy indicated, the language was rather affected by the fact if a party was from the UK or from Germany. An exception was the AfD, who used irony more frequently than the other parties, e.g., to criticize the governing German coalition. As has been already stated, however, many linguistic similarities could be found among the British and German speeches.

Moreover, the analysis of the lexemes *Brexit*, *referendum*, *leave*, and *remain*, and the German equivalents *Brexit*, *Referendum*, *austreten*, and *bleiben* also yielded crucial conclusions. The lexeme *Brexit*, as the lexeme denoting the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, naturally appeared frequently in the speeches

of all the parties. *Referendum*, however, generally appeared considerably more frequently (with the exception of the DUP speeches) in British speeches, which can be perceived as a way in which especially the British politicians underscored the significance of the referendum which led to Brexit. Thus, the lexeme *referendum* may have been of greater relevance for the British politicians rather than for the German politicians in the context of the Brexit referendum. *Leave* appeared much more frequently than *remain* in the speeches with regard to the UK's EU membership, which indicates that the issue of the UK leaving the EU became more crucial after the referendum, and thus, the issue of the UK remaining in the EU became less popular. The matter of leaving was, therefore, the more relevant topic to speak about.

In general, apart from producing utterance-specific implicatures concerned with the topic of Brexit, the politicians' utterances also allowed to deduce implicatures regarding to what extent these politicians expressed similar facts and views on a given topic, with the help of given linguistic means, on the basis of the assumptions (the cognitive environment), which analyzing the speeches allowed to attend to. To conclude, the investigation of the British and German speeches indicates that relevance theory allows for a comprehensive analysis of political speeches on the level of particular utterances but that it can also be used to investigate such texts on the intertextual level. A similar study with the application of relevance theory could be conducted on the basis of texts belonging to a different type of discourse.

## Summary

This monograph, which is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, is concerned with the analysis of Brexit speeches delivered by British and German politicians during debates of the parliaments in the UK and Germany. The transcripts of these speeches were taken from the websites of these parliaments, namely from the British *Hansard* and from the German *Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentsmaterialien (DIP)*<sup>1</sup>. The investigated speeches were given in the years 2016-2022, i.e., after the referendum on Brexit up until after the implementation of the Brexit vote. The aim of the research was to depict to what extent the content (i.e., the themes and the facts and views relating to them) and the linguistic elements appearing in the speeches were similar with regard to the political orientation of the parties. For instance, the analysis was to indicate if there were such similarities between the speeches of two center-right parties, from which one was from the United Kingdom and the other one from Germany. Another goal was to determine whether these similarities actually depended more on the fact if a party was British or German, in which case the content and linguistic elements of the speeches would be similar among the politicians from one of the two countries. The research also aimed to indicate what themes and linguistic elements were mutual for the speeches of all of the parties. The analysis was conducted in the context of relevance theory with the help of Laurence Anthony's program AntConc (version 3.5.9 for the Windows operating system).

The British parties whose speeches were investigated were the Conservative Party (center-right), the Labour Party (center-left), and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP, right-wing). The German parties whose speeches were analyzed were the Christian Democratic Union (CDU, center-right) and the Christian

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<sup>1</sup> in English *Documentation and Information System for Parliamentary Materials*, according to the website of the Deutscher Bundestag (German Bundestag)

Social Union (CSU, center-right), which form one faction in the German parliament, and thus, were treated as one party for the purpose of the study; the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD, center-left); and the Alternative for Germany (AfD, far-right). Therefore, on the level of political orientation, the speeches of the Conservative Party were compared with those of the CDU/CSU, the speeches of the Labour Party with the speeches of the SPD, and the speeches of the DUP were juxtaposed with those of the AfD. Fifty speeches were analyzed in the case of each party, thus, three hundred in total (the CDU and CSU being treated as a single party).

The book consists of three chapters. The first two provide a theoretical background on aspects which are connected with the speeches analyzed in the third, practical chapter. Chapter 1 regards political and social aspects. It defines the terms *political party*; *right*, *left*, and *center* in political terms; and *Brexit*. It then provides a further theoretical basis of the aspects designated by these terms and an overview of linguistic connotations and references that occur in politics. It also presents an outline of Brexit and of the British and German political parties whose speeches are analyzed in the practical chapter. Chapter 2 is concerned with linguistic aspects. It defines the terms *pragmatics*, *relevance theory*, *political discourse*, and *rhetoric* and presents an overview of the aspects denoted by these terms. Chapter 3 provides an outline of the methods used for the analysis of the speeches, i.e., the use of AntConc and the implementation of relevance theory in the investigation, and then it presents the analysis itself.

In the first part of the research described in the practical chapter, the fifty transcripts of the speeches of a given party were uploaded into AntConc simultaneously and four Brexit-related lexemes were searched for with the help of the Concordance option. These were *Brexit*, *referendum*, *leave*, and *remain* in the case of the British speeches, while their German equivalents *Brexit*, *Referendum*, *austreten*, and *bleiben* were investigated in the German speeches. The searches were conducted with the help of appropriate search terms which allowed to find the lexemes and their related forms. For instance, the search with the search term *austr\** in the German speeches made it possible to find words such as the verb *austreten* (*leave*) and the noun *Austritt* (*leaving*). AntConc provided the number of occurrences of the mentioned lexemes found in each search and the results depicting these occurrences were then copied into MS Excel spreadsheets. It was then determined, with the help of the File View

option, which displayed (individually) the whole speeches, in which the found lexemes were highlighted, if specific instances were concerned with Brexit (apart from determining this in the case of the occurrences of *Brexit*, which naturally always referred to Brexit), i.e., if the lexeme *referendum* or *Referendum* was used to refer to the 2016 Brexit referendum, if the lexemes *leave* and *austreten* related to the UK leaving the EU, and if *remain* and *bleiben* referred to the UK remaining in the EU. The number of occurrences of each of the four lexemes in the case of each speech in which they appeared were then presented in the form of tables. The presented results concerned specifically the use of these lexemes in the mentioned Brexit context. Chosen utterances with these lexemes were then analyzed in the context of relevance theory.

As the results indicate, the term *Brexit* naturally occurred frequently in all of the speeches as a highly relevant term in the Brexit context. However, the lexeme *referendum* or *Referendum* appeared considerably more frequently in the speeches of the British parties, which can be an indication that, in the context of the 2016 Brexit referendum, this lexeme carried greater relevance for the British politicians than for the German politicians, as the referendum directly affected their country, consequently leading to Brexit. The lexemes *leave* or *austreten* in their appropriate forms appeared considerably more frequently in the context of Brexit than the lexemes *remain* or *bleiben*, which indicates that the issue of the UK leaving the EU became more relevant than the issue of the UK remaining in the EU after the referendum, as the result of this referendum had indicated that the majority of the British citizens had voted for the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

The next part of the analysis was concerned with investigating the themes appearing in the speeches. The fifty speeches of one party at a time were again uploaded into AntConc and the particular speeches were read in the File View option and crucial, typically Brexit-related, themes which occurred were noted in an MS Excel spreadsheet along with the citations in which these themes were found. It was then described (in the third chapter) which themes were mentioned in the speeches of each party and chosen utterances concerning these themes were investigated in terms of relevance theory.

The results indicated that there were certain mutual topics which the parties presented in their speeches, i.e., all of them emphasized the fact that the result of the 2016 Brexit referendum needs to be honored. They also indicated the

importance of a good relationship between the UK and the EU after Brexit and the need for taking care of national issues. In the context of relevance theory, the implicature could, thus, be deduced that the parties stand for common values, such as patriotism, democracy, and respect.

Furthermore, all of the parties also spoke about certain common topics, which they, nevertheless, perceived differently. These topics included issues such as the stance on Brexit, the withdrawal agreement between the UK and the EU, and the Irish backstop. The views on these topics to some extent depended on the political orientation of the parties. However, this was not always the case, as sometimes they depended more on the country which a party represented. For instance, the German CDU/CSU and the SPD, despite having different political orientations, both opposed Brexit. On the other hand, the two right-wing parties DUP and AfD both supported Brexit. Moreover, the CDU/CSU and the SPD strongly underscored the need for European integration, whereas the AfD, the DUP, and the Brexiters from the Conservative Party promoted national sovereignty. What is more, while there was unanimity in the CDU/CSU, the SPD, the AfD, and the DUP concerning these parties' stances on Brexit, in the Conservative Party and the Labour Party part of the politicians supported Brexit and part of them were against it, the latter option being usually the case among the Labour Party members.

In the context of relevance theory, the thematic analysis allowed to deduce that the frequent mentioning of a given theme or view on an aspect depicted by given parties indicated that these particular themes or views were crucial for those parties and that, thus, they wanted to emphasize the relevance of their utterances in which these aspects or views appeared.

In terms of the linguistic analysis, many similarities could be observed, e.g., the use of metaphors and metonymy, which played a role in optimizing the relevance of an utterance. Via using these linguistic elements, the speakers drew on their listeners' cognitive environment, which, according to the speakers' belief, should have allowed the listeners to deduce the messages conveyed by the speakers' utterances. Moreover, because the analyzed speeches were given during parliamentary debates, certain linguistic rules applying in the two parliaments were obeyed, which also caused that there was a similar level of formality in the case of both British and German parties. However, the particular rules were specific for the given parliament, which was, thus, a difference

concerning whether the speeches were given by British or German politicians. In relevance-theoretic terms, the fact that the politicians made use of certain parliament-specific linguistic means should have allowed their listeners to deduce the implicature that they were abiding by the parliamentary rules. Moreover, in certain German speeches anglicisms occurred, which, as contrasting with the rest of the text of the speeches, which were in German, could focus the listeners' attention more on what the speakers were saying, thus optimizing the relevance of the utterances. Certain metonymic uses were also characteristic of the German speeches, namely *London* was used to refer to the British parliament and *England* to the United Kingdom. This indicates that the use of certain linguistic elements rather depended on the country and not necessarily on the political orientation of the parties, as the use of these elements was more relevant in the case of the given parliament. However, a similarity between the British and German speeches was that *Britain* (a short form of *Great Britain*) was used to refer to the whole UK in the British speeches and the German equivalent *Großbritannien* was used to speak about it in the German speeches. As indicated above, there were many linguistic similarities between the British and German speeches. The overall use of different lexemes and other linguistic devices played a key role in bringing about relevance.

A crucial conclusion derived from the analysis is that while relevance theory allowed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the speeches on utterance level, it also allowed to do so on an intertextual level, i.e., the frequent appearance of given topics and views in the speeches of one or more parties indicated that the politicians wanted to maximize the relevance of the utterances in which these topics and views appeared.



## Streszczenie

Niniejsza monografia, będąca zaktualizowaną wersją mojej rozprawy doktorskiej, skupia się na analizie przemówień na temat brexitu wygłoszonych przez brytyjskich i niemieckich polityków podczas debat parlamentów w Zjednoczonym Królestwie i Niemczech. Transkrypcje przemówień pochodzą ze stron internetowych tych parlamentów, tj. ze strony brytyjskiej *Hansard* i ze strony niemieckiej *Dokumentations- und Informationssystem für Parlamentsmaterialien (DIP)*<sup>2</sup>. Analizowane przemówienia zostały wygłoszone w latach 2016-2022, tj. po referendum w sprawie brexitu do czasu po wdrożeniu wyniku głosowania tego referendum. Celem badania było przedstawienie, w jakim stopniu treść (tzn. tematy oraz fakty i poglądy odnoszące się do nich) i elementy językowe pojawiające się w tych przemówieniach były podobne w odniesieniu do orientacji politycznej partii. Na przykład analiza miała wykazać, czy takie podobieństwa występowały pomiędzy przemówieniami dwóch partii centroprawicowych, z których jedna pochodziła ze Zjednoczonego Królestwa, a druga z Niemiec. Drugim celem było określenie, czy te podobieństwa jednak bardziej zależały od faktu, czy dana partia była partią brytyjską czy niemiecką, w którym to przypadku treść i elementy językowe przemówień byłyby podobne u polityków z jednego z dwóch wspomnianych krajów. Badanie miało na celu również wykazanie, jakie tematy i elementy językowe były wspólne dla przemówień wszystkich wspomnianych partii. Analiza została przeprowadzona w kontekście teorii relewancji przy pomocy programu AntConc (wersji 3.5.9 dla systemu operacyjnego Windows).

Partie brytyjskie, których przemówienia zbadano były następujące: Partia Konserwatywna (centroprawicowa), Partia Pracy (centrolewicowa), Demokratyczna Partia Unionistyczna (DUP, prawicowa). Niemieckie partie, których przemówienia były badane to: Unia Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczna (CDU, centroprawicowa) i Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna (CSU, centroprawicowa), które tworzą jedną frakcję w niemieckim parlamencie, a zatem dla potrzeb niniejszej

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<sup>2</sup> Nazwę tę można przetłumaczyć jako *System dokumentacji i informacji dotyczący materiałów parlamentarnych*.

pracy były traktowane jako jedna partia, Socjaldemokratyczna Partia Niemiec (SPD, centrolewicowa) i Alternatywa dla Niemiec (AfD, skrajnie prawicowa). Zatem na poziomie orientacji politycznej przemówienia Partii Konserwatywnej były porównywane z przemówieniami CDU/CSU, wypowiedzi Partii Pracy z tymi ogłoszonymi przez SPD, a przemówienia DUP z przemówieniami AfD. W przypadku każdej partii przeanalizowano pięćdziesiąt przemówień, a zatem łącznie trzysta.

Książka składa się z trzech rozdziałów. Pierwsze dwa przedstawiają podłoże teoretyczne na temat aspektów związanych z przemówieniami analizowanymi w czwartym, praktycznym rozdziale. Rozdział pierwszy dotyczy aspektów politycznych i społecznych. Definiuje terminy *partia polityczna*, *prawica*, *lewica* i *centrum* w ujęciu politycznym oraz *brexite*. Ponadto prezentuje dalszą podstawę teoretyczną dotyczącą aspektów określonych tymi terminami oraz opis konotacji i odniesień językowych występujących w polityce. Przedstawia również zjawisko brexitu oraz brytyjskie i niemieckie partie polityczne, których przemówienia są analizowane w rozdziale praktycznym. Rozdział drugi dotyczy aspektów językowych. Definiuje terminy *pragmatyka*, *teoria relewancji*, *dyskurs polityczny* i *retoryka* oraz prezentuje aspekty, do których odnoszą się te terminy. Rozdział trzeci przedstawia opis metod użytych do analizy przemówień, tj. zastosowanie programu AntConc oraz teorii relewancji, a potem prezentuje samą analizę.

W pierwszej części badania opisanym w rozdziale praktycznym pięćdziesiąt transkrypcji przemówień danej partii zostało załadowanych jednocześnie w programie AntConc i cztery leksemy związane z brexitem były wyszukiwane za pomocą opcji „Concordance” („konkordancja”). Leksemy te były następujące: *Brexit*, *referendum*, *leave* (*opuścić*) i *remain* (*pozostać*) w przypadku przemówień brytyjskich, a ich niemieckie ekwiwalenty *Brexit*, *Referendum*, *austreten* (*opuścić*) i *bleiben* (*pozostać*) były badane w przemówieniach niemieckich. Wyszukiwanie wyrazów odbyło się za pomocą odpowiednich haseł, które pozwoliły na odnalezienie terminów i ich form pokrewnych. Na przykład wyszukiwanie terminów za pomocą hasła *austr\** w przemówieniach niemieckich umożliwiło odnalezienie słów takich jak czasownik *austreten* (*opuścić*) i rzeczownik *Austritt* (*opuszczenie*). AntConc określił ile razy wspomniane leksemy wystąpiły w danym przemówieniu, a wyniki przedstawiające użycia tych leksemów zostały potem skopiowane do arkuszy kalkulacyjnych programu MS Excel. Potem stwierdzono,

za pomocą opcji „File View” („widok pliku”), w której wyświetlono (osobno) całe przemówienia i w których odnalezione leksemy były wyróżnione, czy dane użycia były związane z brexitem (poza stwierdzeniem tego w przypadku użycia słowa *brexit*, które naturalnie zawsze odnosiło się do brexitu), tj. czy leksem *referendum* lub *Referendum* użyto w odniesieniu do referendum w sprawie brexitu przeprowadzonego w 2016 roku, czy leksemy *leave* i *austreten* odnosiły się do wyjścia Zjednoczonego Królestwa z UE i czy *remain* i *bleiben* dotyczyły pozostania Zjednoczonego Królestwa w UE. Liczba użyc każdego z czterech leksemów w przypadku każdego przemówienia, w którym wystąpiły, zaprezentowano potem w formie tabel. Przedstawione wyniki dotyczyły konkretnie użycia tych leksemów w kontekście brexitu. Wybrane wypowiedzenia z tymi leksemami przeanalizowano potem w kontekście teorii relewancji.

Jak wskazują wyniki, termin *brexit* naturalnie często wystąpił we wszystkich przeanalizowanych przemówieniach jako wysoce relewantny w kontekście brexitu. Jednakże leksem *referendum* lub *Referendum* pojawił się znacznie częściej w przemówieniach partii brytyjskich, co może wskazywać na to, że w kontekście referendum w sprawie brexitu z 2016 roku, leksem ten był uznany za bardziej relewantny przez polityków brytyjskich niż dla polityków niemieckich, ponieważ referendum bezpośrednio wpłynęło na ich kraj, w konsekwencji prowadząc do brexitu. Leksemy *leave* czy *austreten* w odpowiednich formach pojawiły się o wiele częściej niż leksemy *remain* czy *bleiben*, co wskazuje, że kwestia opuszczenia UE przez Zjednoczone Królestwo stała się po referendum bardziej znacząca niż kwestia pozostania tego kraju w UE, gdyż wynik tego referendum wskazał, że większość brytyjskich obywateli zagłosowało za opuszczeniem UE przez Zjednoczone Królestwo.

Kolejna część analizy dotyczyła zbadania tematów pojawiających się w przemówieniach. Pięćdziesiąt przemówień danej partii ponownie załadowano w AntConc i dane przemówienia przeczytano za pomocą opcji „File View”, a istotne tematy, typowo powiązane z brexitem, które się pojawiły, zanotowano w arkuszu kalkulacyjnym MS Excel, razem w cytatach, w których tematy te wystąpiły. Potem opisano (w rozdziale czwartym), jakie tematy zostały wspomniane w przemówieniach każdej partii, a wybrane wypowiedzenia dotyczące tych tematów zanalizowano w kontekście teorii relewancji.

Wyniki wskazały, że były pewne wspólne tematy, które partie poruszały w swoich przemówieniach, tj. wszystkie partie podkreślały m.in., że wynik

referendum w sprawie brexitu z 2016 roku musi zostać uhonorowany. Wskazywały również na istotę dobrej relacji między Zjednoczonym Królestwem a Unią Europejską po brexicie oraz na potrzebę zajmowania się interesami narodowymi. W kontekście teorii relewancji implikatura jaką z tego można było wywnioskować to to, że partie opowiadają się za wspólnymi wartościami, takimi jak patriotyzm, demokracja i szacunek.

Ponadto, wszystkie partie mówiły również o pewnych wspólnych tematach, do których jednak miały odmienne podejścia. Tematy te dotyczyły takich kwestii jak postawa wobec brexitu, umowa w sprawie wyjścia Zjednoczonego Królestwa z UE oraz irlandzki backstop. Poglądy dotyczące tych kwestii w jakimś stopniu zależały od orientacji politycznej partii, jednakże nie zawsze, gdyż niekiedy zależne były raczej od tego, który kraj dana partia reprezentowała. Na przykład niemieckie partie Unia Chrześcijańsko-Demokratyczna i Unia Chrześcijańsko-Społeczna oraz Socjaldemokratyczna Partia Niemiec opierały się brexitowi, pomimo różnych orientacji politycznych. Z drugiej strony, dwie partie prawicowe, tj. Demokratyczna Partia Unionistyczna i Alternatywa dla Niemiec obie popierały brexit. Ponadto CDU/CSU i SPD mocno podkreślały potrzebę integracji europejskiej, podczas gdy AfD, DUP i brexitowcy z Partii Konserwatywnej promowali narodową suwerenność. Co więcej, wewnątrz następujących partii: CDU/CSU, SPD, AfD i DUP była jednomysłność pod względem stanowiska w sprawie brexitu. Jednakże w przypadku Partii Konserwatywnej i Partii Pracy, część polityków popierała brexit, a część była mu przeciwna. U członków Partii Pracy przeważała ta druga opcja.

W kontekście teorii relewancji analiza tematyczna pozwoliła wydedukować, że częste wspomnienie danego tematu lub poglądu na określony aspekt przedstawiony przez dane partie wskazało, że te konkretne tematy lub poglądy były istotne dla tych partii i że, w związku z tym, chciały one podkreślić relewancję swoich wypowiedzi, w których te aspekty lub poglądy się pojawiały.

W kontekście analizy językowej, można było zauważyć wiele podobieństw, np. użycie metafor i metonimii, które odgrywały rolę w optymalizacji relewancji wypowiedzi. Stosując te elementy językowe, mówcy (politycy) odnosili się do środowiska kognitywnego swoich słuchaczy, które, zgodnie z przekonaniem mówców, powinno być pozwolone słuchaczom na zrozumienie przekazu wypowiedzi mówców. Ponadto, ponieważ analizowane przemówienia zostały wygłoszone podczas debat parlamentarnych, pewne zasady językowe

obowiązujące w obu parlamentach były przestrzegane, co sprawiło również, że był podobny stopień formalności w przypadku zarówno partii brytyjskich jak i niemieckich. Jednakże konkretne zasady były charakterystyczne dla danego parlamentu, co zatem stanowiło różnicę związaną z tym, czy przemówienia zostały wygłoszone przez polityków brytyjskich czy niemieckich. W kategoriach teorii relewancji fakt, że politycy wykorzystywali pewne specyficzne dla środowiska parlamentarnego środki językowe powinno było pozwolić ich słuchaczom na zrozumienie implikatury, że przestrzegają oni tych zasad parlamentarnych. Ponadto w pewnych niemieckich przemówieniach wystąpiły anglicyzmy, które, jako kontrastujące z resztą tekstu przemówień w języku niemieckim, mogły bardziej zwrócić uwagę słuchaczy na to, co mówili politycy, w ten sposób optymalizując relewancję tych wypowiedzi. Pewne użycia metonimii były również charakterystyczne dla przemówień niemieckich, tj. leksem *London (Londyn)* odnosił się do brytyjskiego parlamentu, a *England (Anglia)* do Zjednoczonego Królestwa. Wskazuje to na to, że zastosowanie pewnych elementów językowych raczej zależało od kraju, a niekoniecznie od orientacji politycznej partii, gdyż użycie tych elementów było bardziej relewantne w przypadku danego parlamentu. Jednakże podobieństwem pomiędzy przemówieniami brytyjskimi a niemieckimi było to, iż leksem *Britain (Brytania, skrócona forma Great Britain, tj. Wielkiej Brytanii)* był używany w odniesieniu do całego Zjednoczonego Królestwa w przemówieniach brytyjskich, a niemiecki odpowiednik *Großbritannien* był używany w odniesieniu do tego kraju w przemówieniach niemieckich. Jak wskazano powyżej, wystąpiło wiele podobieństw językowych pomiędzy brytyjskimi a niemieckimi przemówieniami. Generalnie, użycie różnych leksemów i innych środków językowych odegrało kluczową rolę w przyczynianiu się do relewancji wypowiedzi.

Ważnym wnioskiem wypływającym z analizy jest to, że podczas gdy teoria relewancji pozwoliła na kompleksowe przeprowadzenie analizy na poziomie wypowiedzi, umożliwiła to również na poziomie intertekstualnym, tj. częste pojawianie się danych tematów i poglądów w wypowiedziach jednej lub więcej partii wykazało, że politycy chcieli zmaksymalizować relewancję wypowiedzeń, w których te tematy i poglądy się pojawiły.

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PATRYCJA KUBICHA jest doktorem językoznawstwa i absolwentką filologii angielskiej i germańskiej. Obecnie jest pracownikiem badawczo-dydaktycznym w Instytucie Literaturoznawstwa i Językoznawstwa na Wydziale Humanistycznym Uniwersytetu Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach, na którym ukończyła studia filologiczne oraz napisała i obroniła pracę doktorską. Szczególnie interesuje się prowadzeniem badań z zakresu pragmatyki językoznawczej i jest autorką artykułów dotyczących analiz pragmatycznych wybranych tekstów należących do dyskursu politycznego.

This monograph is a revised version of the author's PhD dissertation. It presents an analysis of chosen Brexit speeches given by politicians from British and German parties. The speeches were delivered during debates at the parliaments of the UK and Germany. The study is concerned with whether the thematic and linguistic similarities between the speeches depend rather on the political orientation of the particular parties or on which of the two countries a given party comes from. In the case of the British parties, speeches by members of the Conservative Party (center-right), the Labour Party (center-left), and the Democratic Unionist Party (right-wing) were analyzed, while in the case of the German parties, speeches by politicians from the Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union (center-right), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (center-left), and the Alternative for Germany (far-right) were studied. The research was conducted in the context of Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson's relevance theory. In order to perform it, Laurence Anthony's program AntConc and the software Microsoft Excel were used.

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